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Abstract 
 This dissertation explores the connection between intersubjectivity, experience and utopia 
in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Walter Benjamin.  The project utilizes a constellative 
approach, reading Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin through and against one another, in a manner in 
which each draws out latent ideas or problems in the other's work.  In these respects, the project 
begins by drawing on a political reading of Merleau-Ponty's late ontology of the flesh in the 
context of his earlier phenomenology of the body and his political engagements.  The ontology 
of the flesh transcends the various dualisms that have marred Western thought, in viewing being 
as in and of the world, and in asserting the very relational character of the body-as-flesh.  Here, 
Merleau-Ponty provides a rich, multifaceted understanding of intersubjectivity.  Yet, the 
ontological contours of Merleau-Ponty's work often operate at a level of abstraction that ignores 
or fails to theorize the contours of embodied experience under the particular historical conditions 
of capitalist modernity.  In theorizing the primacy to the historical, Benjamin's work provides 
such a phenomenology.  In this vein, Benjamin's work suggests that under modern conditions the 
sensuous capacities of the body take on an anaesthetic character, which ultimately elides the very 
relations of alterity that are central to intersubjectivity and political possibilities.  At the same 
time, in deconstructing the "object" of history, Benjamin sees potentially utopian possibilities in 
the ontological and ethical conditions and structures of history.  While this offers only a minor 
gesture in the direction of providing a positive political or ethical optic, these insights provide a 
means for re-reading Merleau-Ponty's account of the body as a site of the utopian/dystopian.  In 
this context, the project turns to theorizing embodied capacities as providing the conditions of 
possibility for both relations of solidarity/emancipation and domination.  Consequently, it 
explores the manner in which the corporeal capacities of embodied subjects can be transformed, 
as well as the problem of the particular forms of institution and intersubjectification that are 
rooted in this transformability.   
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Introduction 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 “What we are calling flesh, this interiorly worked-over mass, has no name in any philosophy…We must 
 not think the flesh starting from substances, from body and spirit – for then it would be the union of 
 contradictories – but we must think it, as we said, as an element, as the concrete emblem of a general 
 manner of being.”1 
  -Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible. 
  
 “[I]mage is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation.  In 
 other words: image is dialectics at a standstill.  For while the relation of the present to the past is purely 
 temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural.  Only 
 dialectical images are genuinely historical – that is, not archaic – images.  The image that is read – which is 
 to say, the image in the now of its recognizability – bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous 
 critical moment on which all reading is founded.”2 
  -Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project 
 
 
 The “flesh” and the “‘concept’ of history”: these terms evade as much as they explain.  
But perhaps there is something in their very nature and intention – in the specific philosophical 
lineage of critical thought – that makes this evasion necessary, that makes it a substantial portion 
of the meaning of both the flesh and the concept of history.  The primary intention of this 
dissertation will be to explore the manner in which Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin attempt – 
through innovative dialectical approaches – to relate the fundamental questions of the body and 
history, intersubjectivity and ethics, experience and ontology, in opening them up to a free 
flowing development, and severing them from the constraints of deterministic and closed 
categorizations.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin both seek to challenge prevailing 
philosophical conceptions, and turn to new terminologies and modes of thinking about traditional 
problems.  Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh aims to overcome the dualistic character of the 
Cartesian cogito (and its mirrors) by theorizing the ontological subject as an embodied cogito 
that relates to the world and others, not as something opposed or external to them, but as 
something composed of, and intertwined with, a common element.  Benjamin’s “concept” of 
history aims to overcome the historical in-itself that has informed positivist and historicist 
                                                 
1
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1968), 147. 
2
 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1999), 462 
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conceptions of history, and instead theorizes historical knowledge and events as dialectical 
categories devoid of the self-same quality of being “always already" there.  In criticizing 
traditionally static, identitarian and dualistic approaches, the flesh and the concept of history seek 
to avoid the rigid imposition of a linear and closed utilization of ontological and historical 
categories.   
 My ultimate goal in exploring the meaning of the flesh and the concept of history lies in 
attempting to develop the political import of Merleau-Ponty's and Benjamin's work, which in 
turn emerges through the fundamental connection between the body, intersubjectivity, 
experience and utopia.  But in this vein, neither Merleau-Ponty nor Benjamin will offer a 
traditional theory of politics.  Rather, what they can offer is a radical theory of subjectivity (as 
intersubjectivity) rooted in the corporeal contours of the body as a mode of being-in-the-world, 
one that is subject to the world and a subject in the world.  In these latter respects, I aim to think 
this mode of subjectivity through a utopian framework, conceptualizing both the dystopian 
modes of corporeal being that prevail under capitalist modernity, as well as the utopian potentials 
that lie at the very core of embodied being and hold out the possibility of shattering reified forms 
of being.  This reading can combat a number of misconceptualizations that have permeated the 
literature on Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin, and offer a unique account of embodied subjectivity. 
I. The Problem of Politics in Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin 
 While there is a voluminous secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty's and Benjamin's 
work generally, politics has had a peculiar or neglected place in this literature.  Despite an 
enduring philosophical legacy and a more recent resurgence of interest in his work, political 
theory has largely been a neglected realm for Merleau-Ponty scholars.3  To the extent that there 
                                                 
3
 Diana Coole, Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics After Humanism, (Lanham: Rowman and Littleman Publishers 
2007), 8-17. 
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is a political literature,4 it tends to be dated, largely inflected by Cold War politics, and framed 
around questions about Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to, and alleged “retreat” from, Marxism.5  
In this account, precipitated by specific developments in the Soviet Union and by the failure of 
the proletariat to produce the "true, homogenous and final society"6 it was alleged to be the 
embodiment of, Merleau-Ponty's increasingly critical stance towards Marxism and Marx's own 
philosophy drove him away from radical/revolutionary political commitments towards a politics 
of reform7 or a sterile liberalism.8  This is often buttressed by Merleau-Ponty's call for a "new 
liberalism" in Adventures of the Dialectic.  In lieu of this Marxist politics, Merleau-Ponty is said 
to have turned to a parliamentary politics, which could found a stable set of traditions and 
institutions capable of enacting moderate reforms,9 or which could allow for free speech and 
different ideas (but not action) in uniting a multiplicity of subjects.  In effect, parliament would 
become the great guarantor of truth, and Merleau-Ponty sets it as the limits to politics.10 
                                                 
4
 I should emphasize here that this largely applies to the English language literature on Merleau-Ponty.  He has 
played a formative role in the thought of a number of French language scholars – centrally, Claude Lefort, Cornelius 
Castoriadis and Miguel Abensour – yet, these theorists are less concerned with Merleau-Ponty's particular 
contribution to political theory, than they are with using some of his philosophical motifs in developing their own 
approaches.  Furthermore, while I will turn to the feminist appraisal of Merleau-Ponty in Chapter 6, I do not include 
this important branch of research because it is still more philosophically oriented, being concerned with Merleau-
Ponty's account of perception/subjectivity, and largely unconcerned with his political writings.  
5
 The key general works on Merleau-Ponty's politics are Barry Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism: From Terror 
to Reform, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979); Sonia Kruks, The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, 
(New Jersey: Humanities Press 1981); Kerry Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and the Foundations of an Existential 
Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988).  While not solely oriented towards Merleau-Ponty, a similar 
concern with his relationship to Marxism animates both Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From 
Sartre to Althusser, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975) and Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The 
Adventures of a Concept From Lukács to Habermas, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1984).  Two more 
recent works follow the same tendency of seeing a reformist, or parliamentary, approach in Merleau-Ponty's work: 
Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty, (New York: Routledge 2008), pg. 152-155; Martin Plot, ‘Our element: Flesh and 
democracy in Merleau-Ponty,’ Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2012. 
6
 Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism, 132. 
7
 As is contended throughout Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism. 
8
 As is contended throughout Kruks, The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. 
9
 Again, this is contended throughout Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism. 
10
 Most of this emerges in Kruks, The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Ch. 7.  In a similar vein, James 
Schmidt agues that, in ultimately rejecting his own conception of the proletariat and the “end of history,” Merleau-
Ponty resigns us to working “within the limits of existing structures” effectively repudiating any conception of 
transcendence or break.  See, James Schmidt, 'Lordship and Bondage in Merleau-Ponty and Sartre,' Political Theory, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1979, 221. 
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 While of much interest to literary or aesthetic critics and cultural historians,11 Benjamin’s 
work has failed to attract much attention in the field of political theory.12  This may be the result 
of the heterodox methodology that animates his work: engaging with both Marxism and 
messianic Judaism, his work is often deemed to be insufficiently in line with the orthodoxies of 
either of these tendencies, if not entirely contradictory because of an attempt at fidelity to both.13  
On those rare occasions when this problem is left aside and Benjamin’s political theory is 
deemed worthy of investigation, two major criticisms have been levelled.  First, he is criticized 
for clinging to a political romanticism, animated by the desire to return to a past prior to the 
corruptions of modernity.  This is the position held by both Jurgen Habermas and Richard Wolin, 
who view Benjamin’s politics as inherently conservative, and thus unable to present an adequate 
theory of political action/praxis.14  Second, Benjamin is criticized for lacking a substantive 
theory of subjectivity.  This line of critique takes a number of forms, and he is variously 
criticized for: ignoring people altogether and shifting his attention towards cultural artefacts15; 
failing to posit a subjective capacity for the messianic force he theorizes, or for failing to name 
                                                 
11
 Vanessa R. Schwartz, ‘Benjamin for Historians,’ American Historical Association, Vol. 106, No. 5, December 
2001; Irving Wohlfarth, ‘Smashing the Kaleidoscope: Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Cultural History,’ Walter 
Benjamin and the Demands of History, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996); Michael Lowy, ‘Against the Grain: 
The Dialectical Conception of Culture in Walter Benjamin’s Theses of 1940,’ Benjamin and the Demands of 
History. 
12
 James Martel, ‘Taking Benjamin Seriously as a Political Thinker,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2011, 
297; Raluca Eddon, ‘Arendt, Scholem, Benjamin: Between Revolution and Messianism,’ European Journal of 
Political Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, 263.  Exceptions to this trend include the work of Eddon and Martel (and the 
issue of Philosophy & Rhetoric on Benjamin that he edited), as well as Susan Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing: 
Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge: MIT Press 1991), Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: 
Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1993), David 
McNally, Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labour and Liberation, (Albany: SUNY Press 2001), Asher 
Horowitz, Ethics at a Standstill: History and Subjectivity in Levinas and the Frankfurt School, (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press 2008) and Michael Lowy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of 
History’, (New York: Verso Books 2005). 
13Lowy, Fire Alarm, 20.  
14
 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism – The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin,’ 
New German Critique, No. 17, Spring 1979; Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1994).  See also, Richard Wolin, The Frankfurt School Revisited, and 
Other Essays on Politics and Society, (New York: Routledge 2006). 
15
 Angela McRobbie, ‘The Passagenwerk and the Place of Walter Benjamin in Cultural Studies: Benjamin, Cultural 
Studies, Marxist Theories of Art,’ Cultural Studies, Vol. 6,  Issue 2, 1990. 
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such a potential force16; or, theorizing the extinction of cognitive or historical subjectivity under 
the forces of modernity.17  The various incarnations of this second critique might also be seen as 
symptomatic of a larger critique of the Frankfurt School: while providing a critique of 
domination, it often fails to develop a “positive ethical optic”18 or a theory of political 
emancipation.19   
 These critiques or neglects suffer from a number of problems and distortions.  In the first 
place, the political accounts of Merleau-Ponty's works are far too encumbered by the very Cold 
War binary of the liberal-capitalist West versus the communist/Marxist East that Merleau-Ponty 
sought to transcend via his call for a non-communist left.20  Moreover, the emphasis on his 
acceptance of parliamentary politics is based on a selective reading of Adventures of the 
Dialectic.  There, Merleau-Ponty suggests that – in opposition to the stifling of opposition in the 
Soviet state – parliamentary and democratic actions should be accepted despite shortcomings, 
because “Parliament is the only known institution that guarantees a minimum of opposition and 
of truth.”21  That it supplies a “minimum” of truth is hardly a ringing endorsement: Merleau-
Ponty accepts parliamentary politics not as a good in itself, but as more open to opposition when 
juxtaposed to communist politics.  But even this proclamation is preceded by qualifications.  The 
non-communist left is intended to continue to raise the social problems that parliamentary 
politics and the dictatorship of the proletariat are unable to confront.  In this vein, Merleau-Ponty 
                                                 
16
 Darko Suvin, ‘The Arrested Moment in Benjamin’s “Theses”: Epistemology vs. Politics, Image vs. Story,’ 
Neohelicon, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2001, 102. 
17
 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
Institute, (New York: Macmillan Free Press 1977), Ch. 10. 
18
 Horowitz, Ethics at a Standstill, xi. 
19
 Miguel Abensour, ‘Philosophie politique critique et émancipation?’ Politique et Sociétés, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2003. 
20
 Commentators have tended to seize on a problematic appropriation of the Merleau-Ponty's "new liberalism" rather 
than on his call for a non-communist left that is neither pro-Soviet nor pro-capitalist.  Moreover, the literal 
appropriation of his use of "new liberalism" shows a lack of understanding of the Weberian genealogy of the term, 
as I suggest in Chapter 1. 
21
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973), 226. 
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notes the falsity of the philosophical and political opposition between “‘free enterprise’ and 
Marxism."22  A non-communist left aims to unmask the ideology of both systems, unravelling 
something beyond the mere pessimism that they present in response to one another (i.e. that the 
failures of the other justify their existence/allegiance).  Yet, rejection of the Soviet regime is not 
a de facto endorsement of the West: “it is, at the same time and without paradox, the condition of 
a modern critique of capitalism because it alone poses Marx’s problems again in modern 
terms.”23  The continued existence of a working class serves as an indictment of the capitalist 
West, exposing the falsity of liberal proclamations, with their reduction of “the history of a 
society to speculative conflicts of opinion, political struggle to exchanges of views on clearly 
posed problems, and the coexistence of men to relationships of fellow citizens in the political 
empyrean.”24   
Five years later, in the ‘Introduction’ to Signs, Merleau-Ponty drew into question even a 
modified parliamentarianism.  In the face of increasing instances of class struggle throughout the 
world, he claimed that “the new economic climates and the development of industrial society in 
Europe, which render the old way of parliamentary and political life decrepit, make the struggle 
for the control and management of the new economic apparatus the order of the day.”25  Of 
course, returning to the Leninist concept of the party or its many variations would simply be a 
return to the rationalism that had failed.  During the course of his lukewarm and qualified 
statements about parliamentary politics, Merleau-Ponty had already suggested that the return to 
the party was “not ‘a solution,’ and we know full well.”26  But this points not to a political 
solution, but a political problem: the attendant forms of politics, given the mutual failures of East 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., 227. 
23
 Ibid., 225. 
24
 Ibid., 225. 
25
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Introduction,’ Signs, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964), 12. 
26
 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, 227. 
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and West.  As Diana Coole astutely observes, Merleau-Ponty “laments a failure of imagination in 
inventing new ways for negotiating collective life.  He no longer believed in revolutionary 
politics as an alternative or panacea to liberal capitalist inertia.  But he did recognize that the 
critical capacities of institutionalized oppositions remain vulnerable, while even the most open 
parliamentary debate is unlikely to assuage broader negativities that emerge within everyday 
experience.”27  Merleau-Ponty's lament has rarely lead political commentators to explore whether 
his philosophy may provide a means to imagining new modes of politics, and more 
philosophically inclined commentators have tended to stay within the realm of ontology and 
phenomenology. 
 The critical accounts of Benjamin's work, or the entire neglect of his potential politics, 
are embedded within the context of his "problematic" relationship to Marxism and/or 
messianism.  Indeed, Marxists generally view Benjamin's appropriation of Marxist concepts as 
too un-orthodox (and messianic) to be properly Marxist and, moreover, as being politically 
ambiguous or a-political at the same time.  In this vein, even a sympathetic critic and friend 
(Theodor Adorno) saw fit to decry his regression into "magic and positivism."  On the other 
hand, those applauding Benjamin's theological focus decry that his Marxism intrudes and inhibits 
the applicability of the former – though this also seems to come at the cost of their assuming a 
theological approach in Benjamin's work that is harmed by the political focus that comes from 
his Marxism.28  A third tendency sees in his approach an entirely contradictory whole because of 
the uneasy relationship between Marxism and messianism,29 and suggests that this undermines 
the analytical/logical and political import of his work.  Of course, the problem with these schools 
                                                 
27
 Coole, Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics, 57. 
28
 On these trends, see Martel, 'Taking Benjamin Seriously as a Political Thinker,' 297-298. 
29
 On the three schools of reading Benjamin (the Marxist, theological and contradiction schools), see Lowy, Fire 
Alarm, 20. 
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lies in their own orthodoxy, and their attempt to impose it upon Benjamin's work, while ignoring 
his own movement and method.  Indeed, Benjamin aims to mediate the Marxist and theological 
poles of his thought – and their strengths and weaknesses – through one another.  While 
Marxism supplied tools for critical social analysis that theological thinking lacked, Marxism's 
regressions into vulgar materialism and the ideology of progress sapped it of its own political 
import.  The elements of Jewish messianism in his work sought to overcome these problems in 
providing a non-linear, non-teleological mode of political action, rooted in the ethics of 
remembrance.  At the same time, Marxism could act to profane the messianic elements of his 
thought, which often veered towards a-politicism. 
 Moreover, if we allow that Benjamin's rather un-orthodox Marxist and messianic 
elements can contribute to thinking politics (or, at the very least, are neither orthodox nor 
contradictory), then we can turn to criticizing the claims that he lacks a theory of subjectivity or 
regresses into a romanticist understanding of political action.  What Benjamin ultimately 
provides is a critical account of the experience of modernity.  While this often emerges through a 
seeming positivism, his intention is to provide something approaching a phenomenological 
description with utopian intentions.  As he described the methodology of one of his essays: 
“[A]ll theory will be kept far from my presentation…I want to present the city of Moscow at the 
present moment in such a way that ‘everything factual is already theory’…thereby refraining 
from all deductive abstraction, all prognosis, and even, within limits, all judgements.”30  In this 
vein, Benjamin's focus on seemingly peculiar, mundane and inane phenomena (shopping, 
gambling, crowds, prostitution, rag picking, etc) actually aims – through the constellative method 
of montage – to provide a political phenomenology that might alienate our traditional 
understandings of such phenomena, in re-opening the desire for freedom and new forms of 
                                                 
30
 Quoted in Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, 28. 
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subjectivity.  Far from a romantic return to the past, his very idea of a "concept" of history aims 
to reject the simplistically linear accounts of temporality – either progressive or regressive – in 
advancing an epicyclodic account that allows for the peculiar starts and stops that characterize 
historical perception and experience.  More to the point, his account of historical perception 
rejects any simplistic notion of an unsullied past, for the past can only be known as an "image" 
that the present grasps in the particular now of its recognizability.   
II. Constellating Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin 
 All of this points to the need to re-think Merleau-Ponty's and Benjamin's potential 
contributions to political theory.  And while there are internal reasons for rejecting the political 
critiques or neglects of Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin respectively, this dissertation also aims to 
read their work as a constellation, in order to develop a political approach that can rescue each 
from the dustbins of political theory.  Constellations are not obvious, inherent or given: they are 
the organization and juxtaposition of a series of phenomena that, in themselves, have no 
necessary connection.  But, brought together through the organizing idea of the constellation, 
they become more than the singularity of their parts, and illuminate a truth that all of the 
moments participate in, contributing a unique aspect of their singularity to this unity.  This 
dissertation utilizes a constellative methodology on two levels.  The first reads the respective 
works of Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin via a constellation and not an intellectual biography.  
While an intellectual biography might seek to understand the development or breaks within their 
thinking, or the intellectual connection that exists between the two theorists, a constellative 
approach charts a new path.  In thinking about each theorist individually, it aims to consider how 
their various works shine a light on one another, in bringing something new to light that may 
escape conceptual analysis if we seek to impose a developmental trajectory upon the texts under 
investigation, focusing on the coherence of each theorist's thought with their attendant breaks 
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and transformations.  Consequently, I seek to read their respective texts backwards and forwards, 
in order to grasp the meaning of these works outside of the tradition/institution created by the 
“name” of the author.   
 In reading Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin in this way, I seek to highlight what is unique 
and politically challenging about their work.  The unique and radical import of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought has been noted31 but rarely elaborated on politically: it lies in a radical anti-essentialism 
and indeterminacy that asserts the fluidity, relationality and creativity of being/existence and the 
body.  In this vein, I seek to develop the political contours of his late ontology by reading it in 
unison with the concerns elaborated in his central political texts.  In doing so, I will excavate 
from his work a theory of embodiment, intersubjectivity and ethical capacities that attempts to 
transcend the traditional subject-object binary that has marred western thought, and which 
retained residues in the types of Marxism that Merleau-Ponty rejected.  Benjamin’s work stands 
out from the theorists of the Frankfurt School in potentially providing a theory of emancipation 
or political subjectivity, via what I will suggest is a critical phenomenology of modernity, rooted 
in a radical historicality (as phenomenological epoché).  In particular, I focus on his later 
“Parisian cycle” of writings (‘The Storyteller,’ ‘Motifs on Baudelaire,’ the Arcades Project and 
‘On the Concept of History) in the light of his earlier habilitation thesis (The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama), in order to understand the critical approach to the experience of history, 
modernity and capitalism that he employs.  In this context, Benjamin seeks to expose – via a 
Freudian, Marxist and messianic methodology – the violence against subjectivity that 
contemporary societies unleash.  Here, his central concern is to develop a critical theory of 
                                                 
31
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
(London: Verso 1985), 146.  
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capitalist experience that is predicated upon an understanding of the corporeal dimensions of 
subjectivity, and their utopian potentials.   
At a second level, the dissertation approaches the relationship between the two theorists 
as a constellation.  Hence, it explores how Merleau-Ponty’s ontological and ethical commitments 
can challenge, dislodge or better bring to light the implicit ethics/subjectivity of Benjamin’s 
critical theory; and, in turn, it explores how Benjamin's critical theory can challenge, dislodge or 
better bring to light the critical political import of Merleau-Ponty's ontological and ethical 
commitments.  In maintaining the particularity/singularity and sanctity of each theorist, this 
approach refuses to reduce one to the other, so as to retain the challenge each presents, in order 
to enrich and develop the other’s political thinking.  In this vein, the project uses Benjamin's 
critical theory to draw out the radical (if latent) import of Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh, 
and uses Merleau-Ponty's ontology and vision of intersubjectivity to draw out the (latent) ethical 
and political subjectivity contained in Benjamin's accounts of capitalist experience and history.  
Hence, while I suggest the critical or neglectful approaches to each theorist's politics can not be 
sustained, a stronger political theory can be extracted by reading them together as a constellation. 
As feminist critics rightly point out, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology/ontology is often 
too little attuned to the power dynamics that exert a critical and limiting effect upon the 
construction of subjectivity and its attendant forms of embodiment.32  In these respects, he fails 
to provide a specifically historical understanding of bodily capacities, instead focusing on an 
abstract ontology.  Yet, his phenomenological commitments require that we return to the 
                                                 
32
 See in particular Judith Butler, 'Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception,' The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy, ed. 
Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1981), Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile 
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994) and Shannon Sullivan, 
Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism and Feminism, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 2001). 
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concrete lifeworld in order to draw out the genesis of particular forms of experience.  
Consequently, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (with its accounts of embodiment and 
intersubjectivity) requires a critical theory of society to bring it to full political fruition – 
something that Merleau-Ponty himself fails to carry through.  Here, we need to account for the 
effects that contemporary power and social relations can have on the functioning of bodily 
capacities.  Benjamin’s work provides an ideal means to explore this not merely because of his 
critical approach to modernity but because he is much concerned with issues relating to 
embodiment, experience and history in the context of capitalism.  Indeed, Benjamin’s work helps 
to expand the Marxist concept of exploitation beyond its abstract, economic configuration (the 
extraction of surplus value) by illustrating the corporeal dimensions of exploitation under the 
conditions of capitalist modernity as a total mode of being.  This is something that affects not 
merely the experience of the labour process, but the human organism as a whole.  Consequently, 
we find in his work a critique – via phenomenological description – of the exploitation of bodily 
functioning, and its mutilating effects on subjectivity.  This can be utilized to provide a more 
politically efficacious account of the body via Merleau-Ponty's work.  Indeed, while secondary 
literature on Merleau-Ponty tends to focus on the "electric" and ecstatic character of experience 
in his work, this generally fails to consider the nature of the body under the specificity of 
capitalism.  If we read Merleau-Ponty in the light of Benjamin's critical theory, we can re-assess 
and re-read the former's work, in providing an account of the body's socialization via the 
capitalist world and its power relations, while also acknowledging the primordial characteristics 
of bodily experience that explain the potential for forms of domination and emancipation. 
At the same time, in developing Benjamin’s thought, I am not merely dismissing 
Merleau-Ponty’s work as constituted entirely by a lack; rather, I aim to read Benjamin through 
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Merleau-Ponty’s work to compensate for the lack of an overt, positive ethical optic in 
Benjamin’s thought – to provide a means to thinking emancipation beyond the realm of pure 
social critique.  This emerges centrally by reading Benjamin through Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of intersubjectivity, exploring the new contours it can bring to the former’s work.  
Benjamin's critique of capitalist experience is not a priori a critique hedged in the context of 
intersubjectivity, yet this concept can bring to light elements of Benjamin's work that remain 
repressed or latent.  In this direction, what he focuses on in his critique of the experience of 
modernity is the suppression of the capacity for embodied collective experiences ("collective 
innervations") at a diachronic and synchronic level.  In seeking to draw these out through 
phenomenological description, he aims to harness the utopian potentials contained in negative 
experiences, such as that of the crowd.  Moreover, intersubjectivity can be used to draw out the 
utopian politics contained in his work on history.  Indeed, far from a romantic return, Benjamin 
posits a mode of intersubjectivity (as ethical demand and the potential for an ethical experience) 
at the level of history, one that is capable of mobilizing new subjectivities against their 
repression by the ideology of progress.  Here, an ontological indeterminacy informs the 
possibility of a utopian politics in such images as the classless society, which emerges 
throughout history in new forms.  At the same time, this image of the classless society posits the 
ethical demand that can open a new realm of intersubjectivity as the return to the origins of a 
movement of emancipation that was trampled by the ideology of progress and the "necessity" of 
historical development. 
By reading Benjamin against and through Merleau-Ponty, we can return to thinking 
Merleau-Ponty's account of the body at a more acute political level, accounting for the layers that 
Benjamin adds to complicate it.  Read through Benjamin's interventions, Merleau-Ponty's 
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account of the body must be grasped in its full indeterminacy, as allowing for multiple relations 
to the outside – including domination and freedom.  In effect, the ontological surplus and the 
critical ethical components of Benjamin's thinking should be attached to the account of the body 
as an indeterminate entity.  This implies re-thinking the flesh in its connection to a body-politics, 
as well as re-thinking Merleau-Ponty's politics both in the context of this new politicized body, 
with the deeper image of intersubjectivity that it facilitates.  In re-thinking his earlier political 
writings in the context both of his later self-critique and his later ontology of the flesh, we can re-
assess and re-interpret his account of proletarian subjectivity as the embodiment of 
intersubjectivity. 
III. Outline of the Work 
 The path of this work follows the constellative reading it provides of Merleau-Ponty and 
Benjamin, alternating between the poles of their thought, while also dealing with issues internal 
to Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin scholarship.  Chapter 1 provides a political reading of Merleau-
Ponty's ontology of the flesh, reading it through his political engagements with Machiavelli and 
Marx.  In attempting to transcend dualistic thinking, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh posits 
the world of being as a realm of non-identical identity, in which self and others intertwine in 
malleable and non-objectifying constellations that inform the indeterminacy of differentiated, but 
not irreconcilable, modes of being-in-the-world.  This develops via the insights and shortfalls of 
Marx and Machiavelli: on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty adopts something tantamount to 
Machiavelli’s politics of division, but against the potentially objectifying and ahistorical social 
relations that permeate Machiavelli’s The Prince; on the other hand, Merleau-Ponty maintains a 
devotion to the emancipatory and egalitarian impetus of Marx, but rejects the theory of the 
proletariat as the absolute/universal subject.  Ultimately, I suggest that the political contours of 
the ontology of the flesh emerge in its conception of intersubjectivity and alterity, both of which 
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are informed by Merleau-Ponty's deployment of the concepts of écart, chiasm/intertwining and 
reversibility. 
 Chapter 2 begins constellating Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin by exploring the latter's 
emphasis on the primacy of the historical.  Indeed, while the body plays an important role for 
Benjamin, this body can only be thought in the context of its particular incarnations within the 
historical – that is, as the historical body.  In this chapter, I focus on unravelling his account of 
the historical, including its debt to the work of Marxist thinkers Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch.  
Through his engagement with Marxism, Benjamin adopts an understanding of the commodity 
structure of capitalism, as well as capitalism's radical historicality – its existence as a historical 
monad.  While the theory of the monad was developed in his early, pre-Marxist work, it comes 
together with his Marxist approach in providing a new means of understanding and perceiving 
history, one that attacks the ideological character of progress and linearity.  In elaborating on 
this, the chapter provides an overview of Benjamin's historical approach, connecting it to what 
we might call a radically historical, phenomenological epoché that seeks to grasp capitalist 
experience as it appears in modernity.  In doing so, I suggest that this historical approach can 
provide a critical political impetus that can extricate Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh (and 
his phenomenology of the body) from its seemingly abstract incarnations. 
 Chapters 1 and 2 provide the groundwork for Chapter 3.  While Chapter 2 posits the 
historical character of being and experience, Chapter 3 provides an exploration of embodied 
experience under capitalism.  Yet, in order to do this, I borrow from the theory of 
intersubjectivity developed in Chapter 1.  On the one hand, if Benjamin does lack a substantive 
theory of subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity can add to Benjamin's critical 
social analysis; on the other, if Merleau-Ponty lacks a critical social analysis in positing the body 
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and intersubjectivity in abstract terms, Benjamin's work provides a concrete account of the 
specificity of capitalist experience and its affects on the human sensorium.  Borrowing from 
psychoanalytic understandings of consciousness and memory, Benjamin argues that the shock 
experience that prevails under capitalism has conditioned the human sensorium in a manner that 
anaesthetizes experiential content and consequently blocks the very experiences that could draw 
us together with others – namely, our conscious recognition of our, and others', modes of being-
in-the-world.  In this context, the chapter elaborates on a biopolitical account of the body and 
capitalism, which emerges substantially in Benjamin's critical engagement with Baudelaire's 
phenomenology of the streets, including the subjectivity of the urban crowd.  While the chapter 
focuses on the anaesthetizing affect that capitalism has on the body, it also explores Benjamin's 
gestures towards theorizing emancipatory subjectivity via this account of negative social 
experiences. 
 If Chapter 3 sounds a pessimistic political tone, Chapter 4 elaborates on the utopian and 
ethical elements of Benjamin's thought at the level of history.  This confronts head on the claims 
that he succumbs to a political romanticism, suggesting a more complicated and complex 
account of historical inquiry and images, in reading Benjamin's concept of history through (or as) 
utopia.  Thus, drawing on Miguel Abensour's accounts of the ontological and ethical sites of 
utopia (and its persistence), the chapter suggests that Benjamin's work oscillates between the 
two, in theorizing an ontological opening that makes possible a new ethical and utopian 
possibility that manifests itself in history.  In this vein, the chapter aims to understand the break 
with the identical "object" of history as opening up (via excavation) its surplus meaning, and 
freeing the repressed energies of the historical.  Here, images and dreams (particularly of the 
classless society) shatter the linear conception of history in opening new possibilities.  But, 
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moreover, this also enacts an ethical obligation (the possibility of an ethical experience): the past 
generations call for the present to redeem them through the re-activation of the surplus energies 
that have been effaced.  The weak messianism he counsels introduces a political interplay 
between Marxism and theology, which acts to reconceptualise the relationship between subjects, 
history and temporality in deploying a political theory of utopia. 
 Chapter 5 returns to Merleau-Ponty's work in trying to draw out more explicitly the 
political and ethical threads that Benjamin begins to unravel.  Indeed, reading Merleau-Ponty's 
account of the body through the biopolitical and ethical/utopian accounts of experience given by 
Benjamin in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter develops an account of the ethical capacities of the 
bodily "I can" in Merleau-Ponty's work on the body as "nature."  Here, I deploy a concept of the 
bio-phenomenological invariant (the body as an experiential and transformative entity 
constituted by a peculiar mixture of invariance and transformation) that seeks to theorize the 
mode of transformation of the body as a sensorial organism.  Here, I suggest – drawing on the 
work of Paolo Virno – that the conditions of possibility of such a transformation lie in the 
moments at which humans experience the conditions of possibility of experience itself.  In order 
to think through this, I explore Merleau-Ponty's account of the body as a corporeal schema that 
retains an immanent relation to an umwelt – the notion that the body is in and of the world, a 
world that both structures and is structured by the body.  Building on this account of the bodily 
sensorium, I argue that the conditions of possibility of experience lie in the encounter with the 
other, and that it is at these moments – including the re-articulation of desire as an ambivalent 
root of relations of domination and affect/solidarity – that we can transform the bodily "I can" in 
accordance with the production of a new umwelt, as a new mode of socio-historical being. 
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 All of this lays the foundation for Chapter 6, which aims to enunciate a political theory of 
intersubjectivity.  This starts by addressing the concept of anonymity in Merleau-Ponty's work.  
While this concept has often drawn the ire of critics, a number of scholars have argued that 
anonymity posits the Janus-faced quality of subjectivity: that we are always-already born into 
subject positions that we become habituated to, and that usurp or inform our "personal" being; 
and, yet, anonymity always retains a surplus and temporality that allows for subject positions to 
be shattered in the deployment of new subjectivities.  In building on this, I draw from Virno's 
understanding of individuation as the production of the "individual" and "society," which are not 
preconstituted but are created out of the common elements of being.  Consequently, I suggest 
that with Merleau-Ponty individuation signifies intersubjectification as the mode of production 
of a particular way of being-together, which builds on ideas developed in the previous chapter.  
Given this, we need to consider the idea that the institution of the social contains particular 
possibilities of being-together that defy the repressive reduction of various beings to an identity.  
Rather, intersubjectivity depends upon an institution as a "hinge" that mediates between different 
beings in the world, supplying simultaneously the capacity for being-together, as well as for new 
modes of individuation.  Finally, the chapter ends by reading Merleau-Ponty's account of 
proletarian institution as a mode of intersubjectivity.  While Merleau-Ponty ultimately laments 
the regression of proletarian institution into proletarian identity, the 1917 Russian Revolution 
still provides a model for understanding the contours and intentions of political intersubjectivity. 
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Chapter 1 
Politics À L’Écart: Merleau-Ponty and the Flesh of the Social 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 “Our state of non-philosophy -- Never has the crisis been so radical --”1 
  -Maurice Merleau-Ponty, working notes to The Visible and the Invisible. 
  
Written in the context of his late ontology, this statement reads like an epigram for 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical method.  Rooted in the traditions of phenomenology and 
existentialism, his work was constantly engaged in a radical interrogation of the inherited truths 
of western philosophy.  This initially took the form of an attempt to elaborate a philosophy of 
perception outside the strictures of its philosophical presupposition and against its entrenchment 
in Descartes’ philosophical dualism and its aftermaths.  His later philosophical forays continued 
in this same vein, deepening the critical import of his earlier work, borrowing from Heidegger’s 
critique of philosophy for its failure to interrogate another category that had seemingly been 
taken for granted by philosophy’s unwillingness to adequately think its own concepts: the 
category of being.  In engaging these complex fields, Merleau-Ponty’s work rose to prominence 
in post-war France, and led one intellectual admirer and critic to label him “a truly great 
philosopher, the last in France before that giant of a philosopher Derrida.”2   
In this context, it is no surprise that there has been an enduring interest in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy and even something of a recent renaissance.  Yet, politics has been a much 
thornier issue for Merleau-Ponty scholarship, and has often been absent from discussions of his 
work.3  There are, perhaps, reasons for this: only a handful of Merleau-Ponty’s texts are 
                                                 
1
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Working Notes,’ The Visible and the Invisible, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
1968), 165. 
2
 Louis Althusser, The Future Lasts Forever, (New York: The New Press 1998), 178. 
3
 Diana Coole and Renaud Barbaras note a revival of interest in Merleau-Ponty’s work in recent decades.  As Coole 
points out, this revival has largely ignored Merleau-Ponty’s politics, or failed to read him politically.  Barbaras notes 
that this revival has been multidisciplinary, though fails to mention politics in this context.  See Diana Coole, 
Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics After Humanism, (Lanham: Rowman and Littleman Publishers 2007), 8-17 and 
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specifically works in political philosophy, and the book length texts are often considered his less 
rigorous, more polemical works.4  Yet, by bracketing these works out, Merleau-Ponty’s thought 
is subjected to an implicit “break” thesis, which treats his political writings as an “interregnum” 
that interrupted his philosophical writings or treats his return to philosophical concerns in his 
later works as a “retreat” from politics.5  This results in two tendencies: on the one hand, the 
many inquiries into his philosophy largely neglect his political writings and concerns;6 on the 
other, the few inquiries into his political thought are often framed around questions about his 
relationship to, and ultimate “retreat” from, Marxism.7  While the philosophical approach 
                                                                                                                                                             
Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press 2004), xx. 
4
 Even those sympathetic to Merleau-Ponty’s work generally are critical of them.  Diana Coole – ‘Philosophy as 
Political Engagement: Revisiting Merleau-Ponty and Reopening the Communist Question,’ Contemporary Political 
Theory, 2, 2003, 332 – states that Humanism and Terror and Adventures of the Dialectic “are not among his best 
[books],” though still engages with them.  M.C.  Dillon – The Ontology of Becoming and the Ethics of 
Particularlity, (Athens: Ohio University Press 2012), 154 – views them as too encumbered by Hegelian and Marxist 
engagements with history, and is less willing to engage with them as evidenced by their complete absence from his 
magnus opus, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (2nd Edition), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1997).  Indicative 
of this problem is the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s English language editor suggested that they were unlikely to ever be 
translated into English.  Dick Howard, The Marxian Legacy, (London: The Macmillan Press 1977), 191.      
5
 This tendency is pointed out by Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century 
French Thought, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1994), 299-300 and Diana Coole, Merleau-Ponty and 
Modern Politics, 1-17.  It appears to be rooted in Jean-Paul Sartre’s recounting of his relationship with Merleau-
Ponty.  In response to a letter from Sartre accusing him of this and other political treasons, Merleau-Ponty 
categorically rejects this characterization of his work.  He notes, amongst other things, that: the ambiguity of the 
truth of events (based on the idea that truth is rooted in the temporality of meaning) made it unwise to weigh in on 
every political event as it happened, hence his desire to refrain from writing on emerging political events; 
philosophy is rooted/anchored within the world and politics; that even the philosophical works he wrote during his 
"retreat" (specifically The Prose of the World) were directed towards/engaged with political questions; Sartre 
ignored his specific political engagements during his alleged retreat.  See both ‘Philosophy and Political 
Engagement: Letters from the Quarrel Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’ and Sartre ‘Merleau-Ponty Vivant,’ both 
in The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, ed.  Jon Stewart, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
1998).   
6
 By way of example, it is notable that the preeminent English language book on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy – 
M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology – contains no references to Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to Marxism, or to 
his political writings.  A more recent monograph – Lawrence Hass' Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press 2008) – aims to connect Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical work to contemporary post-
structuralist thought, but neglects Merleau-Ponty’s own political writings.  Moreover, as Diana Coole points out, 
only two of the thirteen essays in Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. 
Hansen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) deal with Merleau-Ponty’s politics.   
7
 This approach is front and center in Barry Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism: From Terror to Reform, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979); Sonia Kruks, The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, (New 
Jersey: Humanities Press 1981); Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser, 
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appears content to ignore Merleau-Ponty’s politics, the political approach is content to reduce his 
philosophical writings to his political writings, thus contending that he retreated into a political 
liberalism or reformism8 that was mirrored by an ontology of “harmony”9 in his late works.  This 
political reading operates via the simplistic binary of Marxism/liberalism, and seemingly implies 
that any divergence from Marxism is a de facto acquiescence to liberalism and move away from 
radical politics.  That Merleau-Ponty broke with Marxist orthodoxy by no means suggests that he 
simplistically moved into the opposing camp (either politically or philosophically).  Merleau-
Ponty continued to view Marxism as an important source of inspiration10 for both philosophical 
and political concerns – not as the philosophy of history, but as a source with myriad tools for 
critical social analysis.  That said, under the pressure of a number of perceived errors in the roots 
of Marxian thought, Merleau-Ponty sought other sources for politico-philosophical inspiration, 
including the work of Machiavelli.11 
This chapter breaks with these simplistic binaries, and provides a political reading of 
Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology.  That is, it will look at the philosophical problems that he 
addresses through the lenses of his political interventions.12  This is not intended to denigrate 
Merleau-Ponty’s political writings themselves.  Rather, it suggests that his late writings were 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 151; Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept 
From Lukács to Habermas, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1984), ch.12. 
8
 See in particular Barry Cooper, Merleau-Ponty and Marxism, and Sonia Kruks, The Political Philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty.  In a more recent essay – ‘Our element: Flesh and democracy in Merleau-Ponty,’ Continental 
Philosophy Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2012 – Martin Plot follows this trend in reducing Merleau-Ponty’s work to a 
variant of parliamentary democracy.  
9
 As Kruks contends. 
10
 Coole, Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics and 'Philosophy as Political Engagement'; Bernard Flynn, 'The 
Development of the Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty: Humanism and the Rejection of Terror,' Continental 
Philosophy Review, 40, 2007, 135.  Coole sees a more direct and continuing link to Marx than Flynn.  See also 
Michael E. Gardiner, ' "A Very Understandable Horror of Dialectics": Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty,' Weak 
Messianism: Essays in Everyday Utopianism, (Oxford: Peter Lang Publishers 2013), 95. 
11
 Flynn, “The Development of the Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty,” 135. 
12
 Diana Coole, in Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics After Anti-Humanism, provides a thoroughly informative 
political reading of Merleau-Ponty.  My reading of Merleau-Ponty – through the division of the social – is imbued 
with different intentions and lenses. 
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informed by the political interventions that he made but never fully worked out before his death 
while writing his major oeuvre, The Visible and the Invisible.  In this vein, I aim to read his 
ontology of the flesh as an attempt to work through these political problems on a philosophical 
plane; read in this manner, it offers a new ontology of the social.  The chapter begins by looking 
at Merleau-Ponty’s readings of Machiavelli and Marx, and the ways in which they illuminate – 
yet ultimately fail at solving – the complex problem of human co-existence.  After exploring the 
insights and failures of Machaivelli and Marx, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.  In the 
context of his critiques of Machiavelli and Marx, Merleau-Ponty’s work attempts to develop a 
conception of being that transcends the traditional subject-object dualism.  Through his ontology 
of the “flesh,” he puts forth a theory of being in which the self, the world and others are 
composed of the same “stuff” and, hence, not opposed and irreconcilable entities.  But this is not 
to say that he creates an ontology of identity that reduces others to the "same."  Rather, through 
his concepts of écart, chiasm/intertwining and reversibility, he incorporates difference (and 
essentially a non-identical identity) into his ontology.  Ultimately, he presents a 
conceptualization of the being of self and others (i.e. the social) as inherently divided and non-
identical with themselves, though finds this non-identity to be constitutive of the vertiginous 
nature of being.  Thus, Merleau-Ponty de-centers the self and the social in a way that has far 
reaching consequences for any understanding of politics.  After setting out the contours of his 
ontology of the flesh, I return to a more in-depth interrogation of Machiavelli and Marx and the 
political dilemmas their work raises.  In doing so, I hope to show that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
posits the social as a realm of non-identical identity, in which self and others intertwine in 
malleable and non-objectifying constellations that inform the indeterminacy of differentiated, but 
not irreconcilable, modes of being-in-the-world. 
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I.  Existential Motifs in Machiavelli and Marx 
Merleau-Ponty’s political thought is informed by the existential contention that the world 
is governed by “paradox, division, anxiety, and decision.”13  These conditions contradict the idea 
that “universal reason” can exist and that the world is pre-destined for a certain order or 
harmony.  Consequently, Merleau-Ponty proclaims the necessity of breaking with the rationalist 
tradition and its assertions of a closed or complete solution to the problem of human co-
existence.  But the existential contention that the world is governed by division and contingency 
does not reduce it to a meaningless flux.  By the assertion “that unity and reason do not exist”14 
existentialism intends to open the human world to the potential for "human" (or non-
objectifying) relations between self and others.  Indeed, the dislocated world of human existence 
was not something to be simply swept aside for the sake of an ideal/rationalist politics.  Rather, 
they were the very characteristics out of which the political project of human community needed 
to be constructed.  It is because of their attunement to the complicated nature of existence that 
Merleau-Ponty saw something particularly valuable in the political thought of Machiavelli and 
Marx. 
Machiavelli’s work starts from a recognition of the conflictual nature of social life, 
attesting this to the contingency that rules and destabilizes it.  In and of itself, this recognition is 
not unique.  But, unlike previous thinkers, Merleau-Ponty argues that Machiavelli does not 
attempt to overcome conflict/division.  His originality lies in the fact that “having laid down the 
source of struggle, he goes beyond it without ever forgetting it.  He finds something other than 
antagonism in struggle itself.”15  In Machiavelli’s description of the irrationality, violence and 
death of collective life, Merleau-Ponty sees an immersion of self in others: the fear/aggression 
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that I subject the other to is the same fear/aggression which I live in, am subject to and am 
inspired by.  Hence, “The evil that I do I do to myself, and in struggling against others I struggle 
equally against myself.”16  We find here a circuit between self and others, in which our 
immersion in, and engagement with, a world of struggle subjects us all to a “common 
situation.”17  The coercive power of a prince must emerge to stabilize the community and prevent 
conflicts from becoming “insoluble,” but this is not a stunting of them.  The prince aims to 
contain, though not end, struggle/division and his authority has its limits and its goals.  For 
Machiavelli, this division marks the starting point of “a human community emerging from” a 
collective life that is characterized by difference; recognition of this allows “us to estimate the 
task we are faced with if we want to bring some truth to [politics].”18  Indeed, to iron over the 
struggle endemic to social life would be to subject the human community to a truly oppressive 
politics that seeks to annihilate difference.  In a dislocated world, the “prince” attains “mastery of 
his relationships with others…[and] clears away obstacles between man and man and puts a little 
daylight in our relationships – as if men could be close to one another only at a sort of 
distance.”19  Herein lies Machiavelli’s radical humanism: he assesses politics on the basis of the 
relationship it creates between humans, rather than the principles which are used in governing.20  
Merleau-Ponty takes this as the leitmotif of any (immanent) critique: we must not assess the 
values that a regime purports to uphold but the concrete relations existing between people in 
light of these values.21 
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Yet, Merleau-Ponty finds Machiavelli’s solution to the problem of human existence 
somewhat lacking.  In the first place, his operationalization of division appears to fall into the 
sort of dualistic ontology that Merleau-Ponty criticized in Jean-Paul Sartre’s work.  For Sartre, 
the objectifying gaze of the self – the idea that my subjectivity derives from objectifying others – 
negates the potential for ethical relationships.  This view is predicated on a dualistic ontology 
under which I am only able to see the other’s body – which is merely an object to me – and not 
their mind/“subjectivity.”  Consequently, others are either objectified by me, or subjects that 
objectify me; one can, on Sartre’s account, not be both subject and object, and, ultimately, “The 
Other, on principle, is my alienation.”22  Or, to cite Sartre’s other famous phrase, “Hell is – other 
people!”: the ontological objectification translates into the day-to-day objectification of others – 
their use as objects, and objects to struggle over the control of – in a permanent purgatory.23  
Machiavelli’s conception of the exercise of political power in The Prince renders a world in 
which some are subjects and others are only objects or objectified.  Merleau-Ponty argues that 
this is rooted in an immutable conception of human nature that presents two types of people: 
“those who live through history and those who make it.”24  The latter exhibit a “natural art of 
commanding” and are capable of exercising political virtue.  But this presents an absolute 
opposition, for as Machiavelli describes the different “humours” of the body politic: “The people 
do not wish to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles desire to command and 
oppress the people.”25  We thus have a division between those who wish to rule, and are capable 
of doing so, and those who wish merely not to be oppressed.  This conception of the exercise of 
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political power, particularly when politics is reduced to a "place of power," renders a world in 
which some are subjects and others are only objects or objectified.  Indeed, if one group or class 
of people is capable of filling the political void or the place of power, even only temporarily, 
they are capable of acting as subjects but incapable of recognizing those who according to 
Machiavelli want only to not be oppressed.  As we will see, while Merleau-Ponty will 
acknowledge a cleavage in the social, it will not be based on a principle of those who want to 
rule and act as subjects, and those who wish only not to be oppressed/treated like objects.  
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty argues that Machiavelli leaves us no criteria for assessing the 
historic/political men, aside from “evoking a power which would not be unjust.”26  By re-
defining the problem of political virtue and human community, he leaves a void that will be 
filled by arbitrary powers founded in opportunism.27  
Marxism offers a possible transcendence of Machiavelli’s political void and social 
hierarchy in the person of the proletariat.  Experiencing the conditions of capitalism as 
powerlessness and detachment from other individuals, the comprehension of alienation posited 
the very conditions out of which a collective subject could emerge.  The increasing tendency of 
society towards proletarianization situated the proletariat as a universal subject: because the 
processes of objectification and alienation “transcend national, historical and ethnic 
peculiarities,” the proletariat is capable of recognizing “itself in the others who face the same 
problems, the same enemy, and join in the same struggle against the same oppressive 
machinery.”28  Moreover, as a non-class or pure negativity, the proletariat suppresses its own 
existence – and the existence of classes in general – as the final stage of its own becoming.   
Thus, in the very modes of its (non)being-in-the-world, the proletariat possesses the possibility 
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of “community and communication.” In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “it is the sole authentic 
intersubjectivity because it alone lives simultaneously the separation and union of individuals.”29 
For Marxism, this humanization of social relations represents the very meaning of history: the 
proletariat has been shaped by history, and represents a determinate solution to the continual 
struggles that have prevented the problem of human co-existence from being resolved.  In these 
terms, the whole gives meaning to the contingent events that have marred history.30  Far from 
being the closure of the political universe, Georg Lukács argues that the proletariat – as a pure 
negativity – creates itself as a self-critical power capable of “a life which makes attempts, 
corrects itself, and progresses as it goes.”31  In other words, the proletariat – despite, or because 
of, its existence as the identical subject-object of history – produces, in Lefort’s phrasing, a 
“determinate indeterminacy”32 via its continual and critical transformation of itself. 
Yet, ultimately, Merleau-Ponty argues that – like Machiavelli’s – the Marxist solution to 
the problem of human co-existence is a failure.  To begin with, Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
“pure proletariat is a limit-case,”33 and one that is “without historical equivalents.”34 This 
approach – represented by Lukács – treats the proletariat as the identical subject-object of 
history, a being that acts only by acting on, and realizing, itself; in these respects, it is conceived 
of as the first objective possibility of the entrance of an (absolute) subject into history.  But, for 
Merleau-Ponty, this is little more than the desire that the proletariat be capable of carrying out 
such a form of praxis.35 Consequently, the whole closure of history via the proletariat’s 
“becoming” is a pure myth, and the being of the proletariat is simultaneously projected backward 
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and forward in history irrespective of its actual manifestations/existence.  In this form, Marxism 
(and specifically Lukács) capitulates to a rationalism in which, as Dick Howard describes it, “the 
idea of experience dominates over the experience itself.”36  Imbued with a problematic idealism, 
the proletariat is treated as a carrier of a teleological historico-philosophical totality despite its 
inability to live up to this character in historical reality.  Consequently, Lukács’ thought 
minimized the resistance that this idealist subject would meet in historical reality, for it had no 
“means of expressing the inertia of the infra-structures, the resistance of economic and even 
natural conditions, and the swallowing up of ‘personal relationships’ in ‘things.’”  History, in 
Lukács’ approach, “lacked density and allowed its meanings to appear too soon.”37   
While Merleau-Ponty credits Lukács with attempting to preserve “a Marxism which 
incorporates subjectivity into history without making it an epiphenomenon,”38 he criticizes 
Lukács' understanding of this subjectivity as the incarnation of pure negativity in history.  The 
proletariat can become the absolute historical subject who creates the means for a suppression of 
all classes only by producing its own non-being as the being of society; in the process, it 
inaugurates “a transparent society, internally undivided and classless.”39  Against this, Merleau-
Ponty argues that being always contain a partial positivity: for “nothingness” to exist, it must 
itself participate in being.  In particular, historical subjects cannot exist as pure negativity, but 
must exist positively to affect history.  This is true of the proletariat too: “The proletariat is the 
revolution, the Party is the proletariat, the leaders are the party.  This is not an identity in 
difference but, like being, is being.”40  Moreover, he queries of Lukács: “Can one continue to 
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think that negativity remains identical once it has acquired a historical vehicle?”41  Merleau-
Ponty finds the transparency and self-contained character of such a being to be dubious, citing 
Max Weber’s emphasis on “the opaqueness of social reality as a ‘second nature’ [which] seems 
to postpone infinitely the limiting concept of transparent social relationships and therewith the 
categorical definition of history as the genesis of truth.”42  The social as second nature blurs the 
very “essence” of the proletariat as a pure non-being or being, positing it as merely the existence 
of a class in its historically specific intersubjective constellation.  Consequently, if this 
“negative” and “critical” power becomes a positive, historical being then self-criticism becomes 
nominal: the identical subject-object of history negates the possibility of opposition or plurality 
by positing no other outside of it, and asserting its own identity as the conditions of society 
itself.43 
The full import of these problems comes to the fore in Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
“ultrabolshevism,” which emerges at the very point that Lukács' idealist variant of Marxism 
trailed off: that the proletariat is a being without historical equivalents.  While the proletariat “is 
not verifiable, debatable, or living,” Sartre uses it as “a category delegated to represent 
humanity.”44  Hence, he changes it from a historical movement and incarnation of nothingness, 
to the philosophical representation of it – to a consciousness to be created.  Possessing the “gaze 
of the least-favoured,” the idealized proletariat is the only being capable of realizing a true 
humanity by virtue of its own nothingness.  But if the proletariat is a non-existent non-being, 
then it “must be invented.  One must here create from nothing the milieu of a common enterprise 
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or history, and one must even create the subjects of this enterprise: the Party.”45  For Sartre, if the 
proletariat does not exist but its idealization represents humanity’s aims, then its power and 
authority “must pass to the Party which fights in its name.”46  Moreover, if its existence is 
entirely predicated on the pure action of the Party, then the Party’s actions are unquestionable 
and attain the force of objective dictates.  Ultimately, Sartre treats the Party and the proletariat as 
identical.  Without the Party there is no proletariat, while the Party remains the a priori apparatus 
intended to create the proletariat because it does not exist.  The decisions of the Party bring the 
proletariat into existence and, hence, are the decisions of the proletariat itself.  This identity of 
Party and proletariat leads to the absolute exclusion of anything outside of this identity/ideality, 
and denies a pluralistic subject/ivity; indeed, the historically fragmented nature of the proletariat 
must be suppressed as a historical reality and as a part of its identity in the making.  To open the 
possibility of “other decisions” is to break the Party’s identity and, consequently, the proletariat’s 
potential being.  This demands the negation of all internal dissent: the opposition – like the other 
– must be expelled.  Or, like the proletariat itself, it must simply obey, which is to say conform 
and identify.  Hence, in Sartre’s hands, the “permanent revolution” “becomes the permanent 
anxiety of the Party” and its attempts through a falsified or mythical self-criticism to purify itself 
and make real the identity that cannot exist without it.47 
II.  Ontological Turn, Political “Retreat”: The Flesh of the World 
Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology has often been considered a philosophical retreat from 
political considerations.  As I will suggest, we should read his “retreat” as a philosophical 
sublation of the errors he saw in Machiavelli’s and Marx’s own approaches to politics.  Indeed, it 
should be acknowledged that his ontology of the flesh comes on the heels of his intense critical 
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engagement with Marxism, which he saw as the heir to the political dilemmas posed by 
Machiavelli.  Those who advance a "break" or "continuity" theses regarding Merleau-Ponty's 
work tend to do so from one of the binary approaches to reading his work – the philosophical or 
the political.  The philosophical approach is concerned with the trajectory between 
Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible, and what the philosophical 
significance is: whether there is a break between the two works, or whether the latter is merely a 
continuation or deepening of the concerns that animated the earlier work.  But, as I suggested 
earlier, the effect of Merleau-Ponty's political writings on this question are entirely bracketed 
out, because this approach appears to find little significance in the political writings.  The 
political approach starts from the a priori primacy of the political writings and reduces the 
political options to Marxism/liberalism, obfuscating the potentiality that Merleau-Ponty's 
approach might offer something beyond both Marxism and liberalism.48  Against these 
approaches, we need to probe how the dilemma of preserving division/difference can be affected 
without imposing a dualistic ontology that would translate into hierarchical and monadic political 
relations.   
In his early writings, Merleau-Ponty was centrally concerned with developing a theory of 
the embodied mind against Cartesian bifurcation.  His central argument was that, rather than 
being an object divorced from and peripheral to experience and knowledge, the body is “on the 
side of the subject” for “it is our point of view on the world.”49 In these terms, he saw the body as 
the medium of our existence in the world, and the pivot upon which our relationship to objects of 
cognition and experience revolves.  Our ability to know objects is predicated on our embodied 
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approach to them, and our body and soul thus meld in an intentional act that transcends their 
Cartesian separation.  Much of this emerges in what M.C. Dillon terms Merleau-Ponty’s middle 
period (1945-1958), which centered around Phenomenology of Perception and the problems it 
attempted to elaborate and resolve.50  Claude Lefort likens Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body in 
this period to the position of the proletariat in Marxism: the body represented the identical 
subject-object of history, a being whose intentionality and praxis in the world was capable of 
interpreting, transforming and consolidating the meaning of the world and itself.51  But Merleau-
Ponty’s late period (1959-1961) saw something of a “shift” in his work that drew into question 
this focus on the body.  This comes to the fore in the working notes to The Visible and the 
Invisible, where he makes a self-critical remark that appears to call into question some of his 
own earlier insights: “The problems posed in [Phenomenology of Perception] are insoluble 
because I start there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction.”52  Operating at the level of 
phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty’s early work sought to transcend the binaries that informed 
Cartesian and post-Cartesian thinking through an interrogation of subjectivity.  Here, he suggests 
that this focus continued to contain a dualistic residue, not because it failed to transcend a one-
sided notion of subjectivity but because it focused on the subject as such.  This subject, while in-
the-world, was still opposed to “thing-ness.”  In criticizing this, Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
philosophy of consciousness approach had taken him to the endpoint of its logos: for it, the 
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intentionality of consciousness creates a situation in which “there is no exchange, no interaction 
between consciousness and the object.”53  To re-work philosophy, this insight needed to be 
brought to “ontological explication.”54 
With The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty’s focus shifted from the 
epistemological and cognitive dilemma of exploring the embodied character of mind and its 
relationship to the objects of perception to a more general consideration of ontology.  Rejecting 
the binary epistemological alternatives of subject or object, he sought to draw into question the 
very essence of the “being-object” and “being-subject” that had traditionally informed 
philosophy.55  In doing so, he turned to an exploration of “experiences that have not yet been 
‘worked over,’ that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ both existence and 
essence, and hence give philosophy resources to redefine them.”56  In these respects, he aimed to 
get to the core of brute or savage being – that is, being “behind or beneath the cleavages of our 
acquired culture” and “before” the thinking subject of Cartesian inspiration.  This endeavour 
required a rejection of philosophy’s heretofore accepted concepts and the adoption of a new 
terminology.   
The terminology of “subject” and “object” limited philosophy’s ability to express being 
as something that is not simply one or the other.  To overcome this, Merleau-Ponty introduced 
his concept of the “flesh.”  In his words, “The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.”57  
To describe it as any of these terms would be to put it into an opposition with some other 
category of being.  To break up such closed categorizations, Merleau-Ponty proposes that we 
think of the flesh as an “‘element,’ in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, 
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in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a 
sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.”58  
In these respects, the flesh is intended as a non-identical ontological category.  It is unnameable 
as a “substance,” because naming it would subject it to the principle of identity and limit its 
being, potential becoming and relationality.  The flesh is neither a specific substance, nor a 
compound of substances, but is present in all things that have existence.  As flesh, the 
relationship between beings embodies simultaneously identity (they are made of the same 
“stuff”) and non-identity (there is no superposition of one over the other, for these beings retain 
an écart – a distance, separation or dehiscence).  This disorients the traditional epistemological 
leitmotifs of a human subject or seer (e.g. a cogito) coming to have knowledge of an external and 
differentiated object or seen (e.g.  a piece of wax).59  Rather, both of these entities are “flesh,” 
and “the world is made of the same stuff as the body.”60  We will get a better understanding of 
this relationship if we begin interrogating it through the traditional language of “object” and 
“subject”. 
 Beginning with the “object” as flesh, Merleau-Ponty rejects any notion of the object-in-
itself.  Rather, he aims to grasp how an object appears to a subject that is a being-in-the-world, 
negating the very in-itself of the object.  The object is always there for-us.  In his work on 
Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty rejected any atomistic conceptions of objects, emphasizing 
perspective and totality in perception: the object always appears to us as “a figure on a 
background” and “is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field.’”61  
In these terms, the object’s appearance – color, size, perspective, etc – is structured through its 
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relations with other objects contained in that field of vision.  This understanding was epitomized 
in the works of Impressionist painters who – in rejecting the Classical distinction between colour 
and outline – emphasized the extension and melding of colours/objects into each other.  This 
blurred the atomized being of objects and conveyed the relational character of perception.62  In 
the language of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty describes this relationality as a “dimension of 
variation” and an overlapping.  In the context of the colour red, he notes that “this red is what it 
is only by connecting up from its place with other reds about it, with which it forms a 
constellation, or with other colours it dominates or that dominate it, that it attracts or that attract 
it, that it repels or that repel it.”63  This is an overlapping of flesh upon flesh that encompasses 
both identity and difference: while made of the same “stuff,” these colours or these fleshes 
maintain a certain écart in their layering or folding over onto each other.  Indeed, they never 
become homogenous.  Rather, each flesh is determined through its relations within a specific 
constellation.  In these terms, the flesh is a living but malleable relation in which each visible is 
pregnant with the being of other visibles, and the categories of inside and outside (like subject 
and object) are sublated.64 
 If we turn to the “subject” as flesh, Merleau-Ponty views it as not opposed to, outside of, 
or substance-ly different than the object: my flesh – like that of the flesh of the world – is 
perceptible/visible.  It is also visible/sensible to itself, as it is visible/sensible to others.65  In these 
terms, the flesh is distinct from the traditional notion of consciousness, “which only thinks its 
object by assimilating it, by constituting it, by transforming it into thought.”66  By the nature of 
its being composed of the same stuff as the world, the flesh has no necessity to transform, 
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translate or reflect the “external” world: the flesh has an inherence in-the-world, being 
simultaneously in and of the world.  But the body-as-flesh has the distinct quality of being 
capable of drawing the things of the world into communication and sensibility with itself.  The 
body is capable of moving itself, and through the look “it holds things in a circle around itself.”  
Moreover, this look “radiates,” “envelops” and “palpates” the visible world – that is, the body 
extends beyond itself, reaching into the world which it is already a part of.  This extension is a 
result of the corporeal character of the flesh and it “clothes” the world in its flesh.  Essentially, as 
a visible flesh itself, the body “uses its own being as a means to participate in theirs [i.e.  the 
objects], because each of the two beings is an archetype for the other, because the body belongs 
to the order of the things as the world is universal flesh.”67  Again, this is a non-identical identity 
in which identity and difference co-mingle, relating to each other as similar in their being but 
never reducing the other to the self/same.  In these terms, the flesh is an opening in (or up to) the 
world: the flesh extends beyond the confines of its own being, and enters into a communion with 
the seen, in much the same way as the objects in the field of vision did with one another in a 
constellation.  Moreover, while our flesh radiates via the look, it never fully reaches the seen – 
for it never “becomes” it, nor can it totally grasp the seen which always contains parts that evade 
the look.  This distance is what establishes the “other” as truly other – as more than the 
projection or continuation of the self.68  What separates them is not a simple empty space, but 
rather a space itself filled with flesh as the palpation of the flesh.69  As John O’Neill terms it, this 
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is an “aesthetic distance which I am sure of crossing with a glance, but which I can never totally 
embrace.”70 
Yet, in dividing the flesh for explanatory purposes into the traditional categories of 
subject and object we risk obscuring much of Merleau-Ponty’s point: neither is merely “subject” 
or “object.”  As flesh applied to flesh, the subject-object relation gives way to a situation in 
which “the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and 
which is seen.”71  The relationship is not one between opposed beings/substances; rather, it is a 
relationship within being.  In these respects, it is a de-centering of subjectivity.  By describing 
the relationship of “seer” to “seen” as an intertwining or chiasm, Merleau-Ponty conveys that the 
“truth” of their being lies in neither one nor the other, but in their communion.  Neither is a pure 
in- or for-itself; rather, they are beings with-and-through each other, and the object is “a being of 
which my vision is a part, a visibility older than my operations or acts,”72 and vice versa.  This 
defies the traditional “for-Oneself”/“for-the-Other” distinction: “there is Being as containing all 
that,” or a “co-functioning” relationship of reversibility.73  The perceptible/visible world is itself 
formed across the relational intertwining in which seer is seen, and seen also sees.  The look of 
my flesh, and the look or the façade of the flesh facing me, palpate each other and allow for this 
mediated visibility to take place.  In essence, things look at me looking at them, in a relationship 
of mutual – though jarring – recognition.   
At the level of a savage or pre-reflective ontology, there is no a priori opposition between 
these beings.  Indeed, as a relationship of flesh to flesh, neither body nor world dominates or 
fully envelops the other: they do not coincide or fuse.  Rather, they each participate in – and, in 
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effect, extend and subtend – the being of the other.  This participatory aspect is hedged in the 
terms of intertwining, and Merleau-Ponty says that it is “as though [my look] were in a relation 
of pre-established harmony with [the visible things].”74  This de-centring and sublation of the 
subject/object dichotomy occurs because the very notion of the flesh is not oppositional, as 
expressed in being as an opening in the world.  This distinguishes the flesh from the “closed” 
cogito, which perceives the world from a position of interiority, as ideas within the mind.  As an 
opening, the flesh is capable of corporeal relations with the “outside,” relations characterized by 
the openness – the mutual palpation and penetration – of the flesh: in Merleau-Ponty’s words, 
“there is a reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other.”75 In a different language and 
with different results, Merleau-Ponty here reiterates his previous contention that “the relationship 
between human beings and things is no longer one of distance and mastery such as that which 
obtained between the sovereign mind and the piece of wax in Descartes’s famous example.”76  
The de-centered relationship of intertwined flesh dislocates and dissociates the traditional 
categories of subject/object, human/world, inside/outside, with each taking on attributes of its 
binary “other.” 
 What should equally be emphasized is that the flesh is also not identical with itself.  The 
assertion of the non-identity of things – that the object always transcends our attempts to 
know/understand/perceive it – is not entirely new with The Visible and the Invisible, but in the 
context of the reversibility of the flesh and the de-centring of subjectivity it takes on a new 
meaning.  As we saw previously, Merleau-Ponty’s existentialism asserted the incompleteness of 
the world, and its perennial condition of contingency, ambiguity and conflict.  This existential 
condition is mirrored in Merleau-Ponty’s early writings on perception: “Where human beings are 
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concerned…the unfinished quality to knowledge, which is born of the complexity of its objects, 
is redoubled by a principle of incompletion.”77  Because we experience, know and live the world 
from within as “beings who are embodied and limited,” we are capable only of seeing from 
particular vantage points.78  In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty finds that the 
relationship of reversibility dislocates identity to an even greater degree, for it also dislocates the 
identity of the body-subject as flesh.  In the relationship of reversibility, my own being/identity is 
fragmented and partial because it is mediated through my relationship to the object in a 
constellation.  But Merleau-Ponty also contends that the body-as-flesh is non-identical with 
itself.  The full import of this idea emerges through the example of touch.  The body is a sensible 
amongst sensibles.  This characteristic constitutes what Merleau-Ponty calls the body’s “double 
belongingness,” or its concomitant existence at the level of object (a “thing amongst things”) and 
subject (a thing that “detaches itself upon [things], and, accordingly, detaches itself from them”).  
Moreover, touch contains a paradox of immanence and transcendence: my hand “is felt from 
within,” as a synaesthetic aspect of my corporeal being, and as something that is present as a 
sensible part of myself; but, simultaneously, like all my senses and the very nature of flesh-as-
being, my hand is also “accessible from without” as my sentient being that palpates the world 
outside, and touches it while also being touched by it.79  In essence, then, the body-as-flesh is 
always in the process of transcending itself, as an opening palpating the world, but always 
simultaneously felt as an immanent sensible.   
As in perception, we find with touch that the relationship of reversibility blurs the 
identities of sentient and sensible.  But Merleau-Ponty emphasizes “that it is a reversibility 
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always imminent and never realized in fact.”  This emerges in the case of my left hand “touching 
my right hand touching the things.”80  In this situation, my right hand is simultaneously touching 
and touched (the touching-touched).  But the ability to touch my right hand’s touching of the 
things always evades my left hand: either my right hand becomes touched in which case “its hold 
on the world is interrupted”; or, my right hand “retains its hold on the world, but then I do not 
really touch it – my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand only its outer covering.”81  
My hands never usurp one another: my left hand never touches the things touched by the right 
hand, nor does the left hand co-opt the touch of the right hand.  But my left hand does transform 
the touching into the touched, in a relationship that can be reversed when the right hand lets go 
of the world and touches my left hand in turn.  The point is that they “never reach coincidence; 
the coincidence eclipses at the moment of realization.”82 Perceiving or touching necessitates an 
écart which also separates my body – as a sentient-sensible – from itself, cutting it in two.  In the 
case of one hand touching the other hand, rather than coinciding there is an overlapping, and the 
hands alternate between touching and touched.  Hence, while these two hands both belong to the 
same body, their relationship illustrates that – as an opening – my body-as-flesh is not identical 
with itself: the unity of my body with itself is broken.   
We may deem this is an alienation, but it is an alienation that is an affirmative principle 
of the flesh.  The flesh is always de-centred by virtue of its openness and its inherence in the 
world.  In this vein, Merleau-Ponty does not see this imminent-but-unrealized character to be a 
failure, but the perennial condition of being.  Indeed, because the body-as-flesh is not a pure 
interiority but is a being-in-the-world open to other beings-in-the-world, it is continually in the 
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process of its own short-circuited becoming.83  Consequently, the flesh is a hyperdialectics of 
being, envisaging “without restriction the plurality of the relationships and what has been called 
ambiguity.”84  The flesh, then, is a vertiginous conception of the subject, always contained in 
myriad constellations.  As Merleau-Ponty states, “The perceiving subject is not this absolute 
thinker; rather, it functions according to a natal pact between our body and the world, between 
ourselves and our body.  Given a perpetually new natural and historical situation to control, the 
perceiving subject undergoes a continued birth; at each instant it is something new.  Every 
incarnate subject is like an open notebook in which we do not yet know what will be written.”85  
Écart plays into an openness that gives us access to the world and its/our indeterminate and 
vertiginous being.   
But this decentered and vertiginous existence is also contained in the relationship 
between beings/fleshes.  As with things, in the relation of self to others we no longer know who 
sees and who is seen, who is subject and who is object; again, it as though “they were in a 
relation of pre-established harmony.”  Their being composed of the same “stuff” is the means to 
their intertwined communion: I can see and be seen by, touch and be touched by, speak to and 
hear, the other as flesh of my flesh, and vice versa, because we are sensible and open to one 
another.  These are relations and experiences that are not possible in the “mute” and “solipsist” 
world of opposed and closed substances mired in their own particular being.  The flesh as non-
identical “claim[s] no monopoly of being and institutes no death struggle of consciousnesses.”86  
Indeed, there is no a priori opposition which would necessitate my subsumption or conquering of 
others as objects for my own self-realization.  The non-identity of the object-for-me opens it up 
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to other perspectives, and I have no need of a monopoly on the objects of the world.  The world 
is a non-identical depth open to multiple perspectives, and “the field open for other Narcissus, 
for an ‘intercorporeity.’”87  This absence of the death struggle is contained in the idea that the 
flesh’s opening “is more dispossession than possession.”88  This once again emphasizes the 
relationship of non-identical identity that I have been referring to: my flesh positively subtends, 
but never possesses or consumes, the being of others.  As a whole, we belong to the same visible 
world: “as overlapping and fission, identity and difference, it brings to birth a ray of natural light 
that illuminates all flesh and not only my own.”89  But even when Merleau-Ponty states that “we 
function as one unique body” he is not operating in terms of a pure identity, for the body is never 
identical with itself and this reversible relationship of self-to-self equally operates at the 
intercorporeal level.  The other creates “within me an other than myself, a divergence (écart) by 
relation to…what I see, and thus designate it to me myself.”90  Far from being an autonomous 
entity, the flesh-as-being is split within itself, simultaneously impartial and formless in its very 
essence and pregnant with and formed by the others with which it co-exists.     
III. Machiavelli and the Problem of Social Division 
Merleau-Ponty lauds Machiavelli's acknowledgement of the centrality of division to the 
social realm and, on an abstract level, the ontology of the flesh runs parallel to this division of 
the social and the affirmative character that the maintenance of this division brings to politics.  
But, in terms of Machiavelli’s operationalization of this division – specifically as found in 
Claude Lefort’s reading91 – he appears to fall into the Sartrean trap.  In The Prince, Machiavelli 
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posits a “natural” division in the social between the rich/grandee and the people/poor.92  As he 
states, “The people do not wish to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles 
desire to command and oppress the people.”93  Lefort describes this relationship as natural 
because it is essentially pre-political, for it exists prior to – and outside of – politics.94  These 
classes or humours are immediately opposed to one another and, as Lefort summarizes, “in [the 
grandee] the people encounter their natural adversary, the Other who constitutes them as the 
immediate object of its desires.”95  Moreover, Lefort states, “one class only exists by the lack 
that constitutes it opposite the other.”96  In this context, the “humours” of the social body are 
presented as an absolute, and seemingly irreconcilable, opposition.  Derived from the opposed 
natural desires/dispositions of the respective classes, with their separate “lacks” constituting a 
wholeness, each class is the negation of the other.  This opposition cannot be transcended, for it 
is the permanent and perennial division of social life.  Hence, the “solution” to their conflict lies 
in the prince.  The prince – or, more generally, the “empty” place of power that he occupies – 
rises above the social division, giving the “image” of a higher unity that masks but never 
supersedes the division.    
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As I suggested earlier, the nature of subjectivity in Machiavelli presents something akin 
to the Sartrean dualism that Merleau-Ponty criticized.  The ontology of the flesh provides us with 
the means to deepen this critique, and take it in different directions.  In the first place, it 
challenges Machiavelli for the relatively a-temporal or essentialist character of his ontology, and 
its failure to acknowledge the “plurality of relationships” that the hyperdialectic of being posits.  
By asserting that the division of rich/poor or ruler/ruled is a “universal” and natural relationship 
– part of the “immutable” character of humans, and reproduced in the cyclical character of 
history97 – Machiavelli appears to collapse the ontic experience of this division into a permanent 
and primordial feature of social ontology.  In other words, he takes a specific incarnation of 
being as a universal and ultimately transhistorical and/or transcendental fact.  Or, in a more 
complex sense, the Lefortian reading of Machiavelli provides us with something like an eternal 
recurrence of this relationship in which “the same” continually recurs in history.  Throughout his 
work, Merleau-Ponty posits the historically transient nature of being and particularly of 
intersubjective relations.  In this vein, he argues, “History is other people; it is the 
interrelationships we establish with them, outside of which the realm of the ideal appears as an 
alibi.”98  In the context of his existential rejection of an ultimate solution to the division, anxiety 
and decision that characterize human existence, Merleau-Ponty sees the potential for human 
community and mutual recognition through the creation of new forms of being-in-the-world.  
But, in rejecting reference to the ideal, Merleau-Ponty demands that we look at “the real 
relationships between people in our societies.”99  In these respects, he finds that “for the most 
part, these are master-slave relationships.”100  But the existence of these relations is no reason for 
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their acceptance, and he calls for us to think outside of the trap of adopted customs and to 
“prepare the ground for those rare and precious moments at which human beings come to 
recognize, to find, one another.”101   
The reference to recognition here bears the marks of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with 
Hegel.  For Merleau-Ponty, the "existential" Hegel of Phenomenology of Spirit affirms the 
contingency and perennial becoming that is central to the human condition – that is, rather than 
affirming an "end of history," Hegel's existentialism posits the continual unrest at the core of 
human subjectivity: “As long as this last stage of history remains unattained – and should it ever 
be reached, man, deprived of movement, would be like an animal – man, as opposed to the 
pebble which is what it is, is defined as a place of unrest (Unruhe), a constant effort to get back 
to himself, and consequently by his refusal to limit himself to one or another of his 
determinations.”102  This permanent state of self-discovery – the vertiginous, because non-
identical, state of being – ties into the flesh’s dehisence with itself.103  The flesh is characterized 
by its continually deferred realization, “the coincidence [that] eclipses at the moment of 
realization” but which transforms my existence, and the existence of those around me, 
nonetheless.104   
At the same time, Hegel affirms the divisive nature of social existence (the multiplicity of 
being) and my necessity of living “not for myself alone but with other people.”  But rather than 
affirming the relationship of mastery – a specifically deformed determination of human co-
existence – Hegel affirms “the idea of a reason immanent in unreason,” of a drive towards a 
never-to-be-fully-realized-“universality” that would affirm the multiplicity, not the duality, of 
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being.105  In this vein, Hegel’s dialectic of recognition suggests that we are not reduced to a 
binary choice between “the pour soi and the pour autrui, between our version of thought and the 
version of others.”106  The choice of one or the other always involves the denial of both 
positions, for in the dialectic of recognition we each seek the affirmation of others who we 
equally recognize: through the denial of their being, or their “version of thought,” I deny exactly 
what I have chosen to seek from them.  In the dialectic of recognition, “I submit myself to the 
judgement of another who is himself worthy of what I have attempted, that is, in the last analysis, 
to the judgement of a peer whom I myself have chosen.”107  In understanding this, Merleau-
Ponty’s brief reference elsewhere to Montaigne’s friendship with La Boétie is instructive.108  
Despite his desire “to live according to himself,” Montaigne’s “friendship with La Boétie was 
exactly the kind of tie which enslaves us to another.”109  Here, we find an originary belonging 
rooted in our openness to the world.110  Merleau-Ponty suggests that Montaigne was “born of this 
friendship…for him, in sum, existing meant existing beneath his friend’s gaze.”111  In such a 
relation, we are tied or have a responsibility to, and desire for, the other – and the image that they 
have of us – and we must try to decipher and make meaning of it (even if by breaking it) by 
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trying to understand ourselves as they understand us.  If the other has an image of my reality, 
then I must attempt to understand this image while simultaneously trying to understand the other 
who holds it.  This disjoints my own being and the being of the other, de-centering both to the 
point whereby we exist not through our own allegedly authentic and autonomous being, but 
through the process of trying to understand the other and the other’s understanding of us112: “in 
loving them [Montaigne] was himself and regained himself in them as he regained them in 
himself.”113  In “choosing” this other from whom I seek recognition – and to whom I am 
“enslaved” not because they are my “master,” but because I seek their recognition as they seek 
mine –  rather than giving up rights and privileges, I take on a self-affirming obligation “to 
understand situations other than my own and to create a path between my life and the lives of 
others, that is, to express myself.”114   
We should read Merleau-Ponty’s return to ontology in the context of this indeterminate 
and perennial dialectic, keeping in mind that – in recognizing the historicity of the flesh – he 
seeks to avoid reducing being to a specific socio-historical incarnation, and seeks to find in his 
new ontology the possibility for human community while acknowledging its de-centered/divided 
nature.  Hence, with the specific project of The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of the flesh attempts to give an account of savage or wild being; such an ontology 
would be capable of moving “below” or “outside” of contemporary social structures and 
conventions.  This also implies moving “below” the purely phenomenological experience of the 
ontically situated thinking subject – below the thinking subject who has even an immediate 
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consciousness and is hence prone to objectifying social relations in a first collision – to the 
ontological being that informs that ontic experience.  In light of this, his work suggests that 
Machiavelli fails to get to an unsullied analysis of being, still operating at the level of a post-
reflective philosophy tainted by pre-conceived social and cultural categories.  The flesh is rooted 
in a phenomenological ontology that aims to grasp the essence of being, bracketing out what we 
“already know” or think we know about it in order to allow being to appear to us as it is, as 
being-qua-being.  While maintaining the division between self and others (between the I and 
non-I) rather than the post-ontological division between oppressor and oppressed, Merleau-Ponty 
finds the essence of being contained in its openness to the world and others, in the flesh’s 
interactive presence in which others are always the subtending and extension – without 
superposition or consumption – of the self.115  This openness in conjunction with its temporal 
foundations means that the circuit of the flesh is a fluid constellation, and militates against any 
notions of being and intra-being relations as absolute and fixed: the non-identity of the self with 
itself, and with others/things, opens it up to different relations and ways of being/becoming 
across time and space.  In these respects, our being is informed by our interrelations with others 
(and the things of the world): it is constructed, like the being of the color red discussed above, 
out of the complex but contingent interaction of various beings whose identity – in the colloquial 
sense – is determined through their interrelations.    
For Machiavelli this sort of fluid interaction is ontologically absent and consequently a 
political non-starter.  He posits two a-temporal and essentialist beings/humours that constitute a 
self/other difference as opposition, but fails to truly posit it as a de-centering.  His division of the 
social is purely one of opposition, whereby the being of the upper class is contained in its attempt 
to constitute the other as an object, and the being of the lower class is contained in its desire to 
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merely not be objectified.  But in these respects, there is the assertion of subjectivity by the two 
humours against one another (even if the poor/non-virtuous’ subjectivity is predicated on not 
being objects), but seemingly no intersubjectivity between them (each class'/humour's 
subjectivity being predicated on the impossibility of a direct relation with the other – on the 
impossibility of their mutual action).  In the context of political economy, this way of thinking 
drove Marx to assert, in exasperation, that “private property has made us so stupid and one-sided 
that an object is only ours when we have it…when we use it.”116  It is this problem that Merleau-
Ponty’s work aims to resolve at the philosophical level: in positing the non-possessivity of being 
through the depth and non-identity of the world itself, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology aims to 
transcend the opposition found in Sartre, which manifests itself in Machiavelli in the form of the 
conflict of having (the patrician ideal) and being (the plebeian ideal).  In opening the world to 
multiple beings, Merleau-Ponty aims to open up these beings to one another for genuine relations 
of intersubjectivity and alterity – to the actions of a self which comes into being through a 
relationship of mutual encroachment and transgression, immanence and transcendence, 
affirmation and action with others. 
With Machiavelli, “interaction” is only manifested through – and limited to – a play of 
forces, and assertion of self versus other, in the “place of power” or the political.  But this is 
competition, not interaction or intersubjectivity.  The being of each is violently and 
irreconcilably opposed to the being of the other by definition;117 the only “solution” is a masking 
of this struggle, or its mediation through the prince or place of power not through the 
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intercorporeity of these beings.  Here we have a case of mutual exclusion, whereby the Sartrean 
notion of subjectivity is embodied in “the political” as an open realm that facilitates the arbitrary 
alternation of subjects objectifying (and excluding) the other.  The being or subjectivity of each 
is hence not reconcilable with/through the being of the other, and the very depth of being that 
Merleau-Ponty posited is flattened out.  At his most democratic, in The Discourses, Machiavelli 
argues that a mixed constitution – which gives the core social factions a share in the constitution 
– is ideal.  But this is still structured around the opposed social wills of those who want to 
oppress and those who want merely not to be oppressed.  Here, the opposition of irreconcilable 
wills is merely institutionalized as a system of checks or mediations on the power and disposition 
of the other.118  For Merleau-Ponty we are pregnant with others, not as two opposite/opposed 
entities constituting a whole nor as in need of a mediating sphere, but as non-identicals open to 
and decentered by our relationship with these others (which, however, never “complete” our 
being).  But the problem for Lefort (and his appropriation of Machiavelli) may lie in the 
pregnancy of self with others inherent to reversibility. 
IV. Lefort and the Problem of Alterity 
Lefort’s essay ‘Flesh and Otherness’ presents a critical analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of the flesh, which – in the context of what I have been discussing – may appear as a 
defence of Machiavelli’s position or Lefort’s reading of it, and helps us to further understand the 
political implications of the flesh.  Centrally, Lefort argues that there is a tension “between an 
interpretation [of the flesh] principally founded upon the experience of reversibility and an 
interpretation that makes us admit the irreducibility of Otherness.”  On Lefort’s reading, 
reversibility – and the pregnancy of self with other that it entails – is predicated on a relationship 
of sameness: the metaphor of birth is for him a notion of self-begetting, and reversibility is 
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always a relationship of identity between identicals – if not a relationship that is entirely internal 
to the seer (i.e.  the seer sees in the other only his own gaze).  Lefort notes that Merleau-Ponty 
does mention a relationship of intercorporeity, but in the context of the discussion of the 
“synergic body,” and the example of my right hand touching my left hand.  For Lefort, this is a 
relationship of the body to itself.  Ultimately, his contention is that the relationship of 
reversibility is not able to account for (or, rather, does not truly theorize) otherness, emphasizing 
homogeneity and overlapping.  Moreover, Lefort uses the example of “infantile experience” to 
argue that the relationship between child and adult – far from being reversible and lateral – is an 
asymmetrical one in which “the look of the other opens the world to [the child].”  For instance, 
the hand of the adult points the look of the child in the direction of the object.  As he explains, 
“nature is always seen as having already been seen by another.  The reversibility between the 
thing and the seer masks the eye that already had seen before what we are seeing now, and that 
saw us.”  Hence, the claim of reversibility – between the seer and the object – actually negates 
the “third term,” the other which has already seen the object and the seer.  Thus, the child is born 
into a world that has already been named: “the other gives names, and in a certain sense, 
introduces the child into the sphere of law whenever he says ‘this is red, and not yellow,’ or ‘this 
is a house, and not a boat.’”  More to the point, the naming of the child is an “original and 
irreducible transcendence,” and “we cannot escape from being named and bearing the mark of 
some heritage, the mark of debt and law.”  Lefort claims that this naming is not reducible to a 
relationship of reversibility: it is a genuine sign of “otherness in myself,” “imprinted on me and 
at the same time bound to remain outside me, above me.”  Summing up his critique of Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology, Lefort claims that the relationship of reversibility – between sentient and 
sensible, and the body and the outside – is a “dual relation” of sameness.   Thus, Lefort states in 
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no uncertain terms, “What in general is not taken into account is the other, the third one, the 
representative of otherness.”119   
Lefort brings the digression into infantile experience full circle by suggesting a fault with 
Merleau-Ponty's politics.  In reference to Merleau-Ponty’s scant adoption of the language of the 
flesh in his later political writings, Lefort argues that “he did not succeed in leaving the frame of 
sociological analysis.  What he considered essential was the web of purely social relations, so he 
did not get rid of relativism by comparing the different types of social structures.”  Centrally, he 
suggests that Merleau-Ponty failed to acknowledge the “cleavage” between “political forms of 
society,” centrally modern democracy and totalitarianism.  It is on the basis of the “third term” 
that these can be differentiated.  For in totalitarianism – which treats the social as a closed and 
identical being, and the state as the fulfillment of the being of that closed whole through its 
distribution of, and dominance via, the power distributed in the social – “there is no place…for 
reference to the third one, the representative of justice or truth, no sense of otherness.”  
Democracy, on the other hand, is a political form that “accepts that it does not possess the 
meaning of its own genesis and its own ends”: by leaving the place of power empty, democracy 
holds out the possibility of changing its self-generation/representation of the social and never 
conceives of it as a finished and total self-institution.120 
 The response to Lefort’s central claim – that reversibility denies alterity because it is a 
self-relation – should be apparent from what I said about the flesh previously: the flesh as a 
relation is one of non-identical identity.  The relationship of self to others requires identity, for 
these beings must be of the same flesh in order to have a relationship or means of 
communion/communication (particularly one that avoids the subject-object dichotomy and the 
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implicit relations of domination/superposition contained in it).  But the relationship is still 
characterized by the écart/dehiscence that makes them non-identical beings – that makes others 
not merely the continuation of the self but its extension/subtension.  Hence, in ignoring the 
centrality of écart, Lefort errs in seeing a tension between reversibility and otherness: écart and 
reversibility are complimentary concepts, and exactly the ontological characteristics of the flesh 
that allow it to express alterity.121  More to the point, while écart is central in establishing others 
as truly other than myself, reversibility posits the very social relationship between self and 
others, the means to our intercorporeity – namely our double belongingness to the realm of 
subject and object, inside and outside, self and other.  In these respects, reversibility posits our 
intercorporeity as a pre-reflective fact of being and posits the necessity of coming to grips – at 
the ontological and political level – with the very alterity of others.  Admittedly, Lefort manages 
to gloss over this by transforming the relationship of reversibility to one between the subject and 
the world/objects/things or itself.  Of course, this neglects the core of Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontological innovation, namely that “subject”/“consciousness” and “object”/“world” are 
Cartesian categories that he intends to overcome.  In these respects, the de-centered flesh-as-
“subject” contains elements of subject and object, being and world, particularly through its 
complex relations with others, in an attempt to understand others as more than merely objects-
for-us or the objectifying colonization of our self.    
The colonization or objectification of the other’s subjectivity seems to be exactly what is 
at play in Lefort’s use of the child-adult relationship.  As David Michael Levin argues, that the 
child is born into social relations illustrates the “inherently interactional” character of being-as-
flesh that Merleau-Ponty aims to capture: “it enables me to see myself as always already social – 
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as having already been social, social from the very beginning.”122  I am, from the time of my 
birth, already in a relationship of intertwining with others.  And, in this context, we experience 
not an originary division, but an originary belonging: we are born part of an intersubjective space 
that shapes us prior to our own individuality, but this intersubjective space also allows us to 
become an “I” or “we” within the sphere of belonging, facilitating a belonging within division 
(the possibility of the unity of our incompossible perspectives).  Yet, the asymmetrical character 
of the child-adult relationship specifically is not the prototype of being but a particular form of 
social interaction/relations and, when completely asymmetrical, a particularly deformed one 
which stunts and disrupts the potentiality of mutual recognition and communication.  Certainly in 
his reference to the naming of the child, Lefort is aiming to illustrate the disjunction between the 
child and representations of it.  But what should also be noted is that the idea that the child has 
been named, that the other was there before, that the other “introduces the child into the sphere 
of law” and that the child consequently bears “the mark of some heritage, the mark of the debt of 
law,” simply rigidifies the sedimented cultural world that we are born into without legitimating 
(or interrogating) it.  If we were to take the child-adult relationship as a prototype of social 
relations or political being, we would inevitably wind up with a patriarchal regime along the 
lines of Hobbes’ Leviathan, with the absolute sovereign constituting the other that has already 
named and defined justice.  Certainly, this is not Lefort’s intention.  But in treading down this 
path, Lefort’s point ignores that implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is a critique of monadic 
and inherently objectifying, social relations.  His entire ontology is an attempt to break free of 
the Cartesian notions of subjectivity that have informed these social relations.  Merleau-Ponty 
argues that a society should be judged not by its “principles” but “on the basis of the relations it 
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seeks to establish (through the creativity of man).”  What is important for Lefort is not social 
relations but the realm of the political. 
 Indeed, for Lefort, what is key in Machiavelli is not the virtue of the prince, but the 
“place” that he occupies: the political sphere or the place of power.  In these respects, he draws a 
distinction between “politics” as a sphere of competitive social division and “the political” in the 
sense of a political regime.  According to Lefort, the difference between political forms of 
society emerges in the manner in which societies institute, or objectify, themselves in the realm 
of the political: 
Giving [political institutions or regimes] a form implies giving them meaning (mise en sens) and staging 
them (mise en scene).  They are given meaning in that the social space unfolds as a space of intelligibility 
articulated in accordance with a specific mode of distinguishing between the real and the imaginary, the 
true and the false, the just and the unjust, the permissible and the forbidden, the normal and the 
pathological.  They are staged in that this space contains within it a quasi-representation of itself as 
aristocratic, monarchic, despotic, democratic or totalitarian.123 
 
As James Ingram explains, “For Lefort, ‘the political’ constitutes society’s unity by projecting it 
onto a point of ‘power,’ which he understands as a symbolic location.”  Through self-institution 
in this symbolic location, “collective relations and actors’ understandings of them, give 
(objective) form and (subjective) meaning (mise-en-sens) to society.”124  In this context, what is 
important in Machiavelli’s work for Lefort is not the prince but the image of the prince as the 
stabilizing force of society that neither overcomes the division that characterizes politics nor 
posits the political as a closed realm that has an ultimate solution to the problems of politics.  In 
relating this to modern regimes, Lefort argues that the fundamental difference between 
totalitarianism and democracy lies in the manner in which each undertakes the process of self-
institution, specifically in terms of the relations between society/politics and the political.  In 
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Lefort’s words, totalitarianism seeks “to weld power and society back together again, to efface 
all signs of social division, to banish the indetermination that haunts the democratic experience.”  
Through the mechanisms of violence and repression, totalitarianism seeks to ultimately abolish 
the conflictual sphere of politics, and its oppositional elements, and represent society via the 
political as a whole that is identical with itself.  On the other hand, democracy leaves the political 
space “empty” or “open” as a “symbolic void.”  As Ingram explains: “Because the political is a 
realm of representation, it always includes an element of the imaginary: there is always a gap 
between a society’s representation of its unity and its real divisions.”125  Because democracy 
does not permanently fill the void of the political – as totalitarianism does – but only represents 
an image of itself through it, the sphere remains open to the continual contestation of its ability to 
represent society’s wholeness.126  It is in the context of this framework that Lefort’s political 
critique of Merleau-Ponty becomes intelligible: Merleau-Ponty’s focus on social relations 
neglected the analysis of the political sphere and the place of power – which constitutes “the 
third one,” “the representative of justice or truth” and the “sense of otherness” – and is incapable 
of differentiating democracy and totalitarianism.127 
 Lefort shows simultaneously an acute understanding and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the ontology of the flesh.  Merleau-Ponty conceived of the flesh as a being 
that was non-identical with itself, constantly in the process of its own short-circuited/deferred 
realization.  This is what is at play in Lefort’s presentation of society’s relationship to the 
political: society is always in the short-circuited process of attempting to realize/represent itself 
in the political.  But Lefort’s fundamental misunderstanding of the centrality of écart to the flesh 
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as constitutive of otherness blocks him from seeing the ethico-political claim contained in the 
principle of reversibility.  What is more, Lefort’s one-sided appropriation of the flesh – his 
neglect of the otherness contained in it – leads him into offering a non-substantive principle of 
alterity in his own theorization of politics: what he posits is a theory of the non-identity of the 
self with itself, not a relationship between self and others.  In these respects, the alleged fault of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work – that the principle of reversibility is self-referential and ignores alterity – 
appears as the immanent negation of Lefort’s own claim to conceptualizing otherness/alterity.    
In Lefort’s thought the third term, or the representative of otherness, appears to be the 
political, because the social division of the two, or of “self” and “other,” is not constitutive of a 
relationship of alterity.  The being of the contending classes is largely monadic/autonomous, and 
their principle of subjectivity lies in their ability to one-sidedly – even if, “indeterminately” or 
“emptily” – assert their own identity and represent the social through an image of unity (the 
symbolic negation of social otherness) in the realm of the political.  This is an institutionalization 
of class conflict that makes no pretence to taking class alterity and oppression seriously, merely 
presenting the institutionalization as “constitutive of the very unity of society.”128  Even if we 
look at Lefort’s work as a transposition of Machiavelli’s social humours to the realm of a 
symbolic/imaginary contained within society generally rather than in the actual existence of class 
relations, we still wind up with merely a self-relation: the grandee/oppressive humour 
symbolizes the – misguided – attempts to represent the social as identical, while the 
plebeian/anti-authoritarian humour asserts the social’s non-identity with itself.  If the relationship 
of otherness (and of alienated and vertiginous being) is to be found, it is only through the 
relationship between society/politics and the political.  “Society” institutes itself as a non-
identical being, a being always short-circuited in its own becoming (its own becoming in 
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accordance with its image of unity) in the realm of the political.  But this is ultimately the very 
relationship of reversibility that Lefort criticizes for its lack of alterity in his misreading of 
Merleau-Ponty: this relationship of reversibility is one between society and itself (or, rather, its 
imaginary/symbolic self-institution).  Again, as with Machiavelli, we have a subjectivity but no 
intersubjectivity and consequently no alterity/otherness: the self is always its own other (or the 
“other” is the non-identity of the self).129   
This point can be reiterated by looking at Lefort’s critical analysis of Pierre Clastres’ 
work.  There, he argues that despite the “indivision” of the social in Clastres’ work on 
“primitive” societies, the other comes into play in the form of the “invisible” beings contained in 
the laws inscribed on the body of tribal members.  Lefort contends that this represents a 
chiasm/intertwining between self and other, between “the world down here and the other world, 
between the visible and the invisible.”  In this situation, Lefort argues that these peoples are 
essentially subjected to the power of an other that is “absolutely distant from their own living 
space,” one that seeks to banish division and distinction by writing on and inhabiting the body 
itself.  Far from seeing this other as a real being or real world that effaces difference/division, 
democracy transforms this into society’s symbolic imaginary, its self-institution.130  But in either 
situation Lefort sees in this other realm the “other” and the relationship of alterity: society with 
itself, as either the totalitarian incarnation of the One, or as its symbolic and malleable self-
institution.  In either case but particularly the latter, we are not de-centered by a genuine other 
(i.e. an other who actually confronts us as a different being-in-the-world) and our relationship to 
it, but only by the lack of society’s own absolute identity.    
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Merleau-Ponty’s ontological project is intended to convey our dehiscence with ourself 
and our opening to, and de-centering by, others.  For Merleau-Ponty any notion of the “third” 
refers to the fact that intersubjectivity is not limited to the relation between the self and the other, 
but to the relationships between selves and others as constellations.131  Hence, the relationship of 
alterity must be based on a conception of other beings that are, and that I experience as, truly 
other than myself.  Our very existence is predicated on our inherence in a historical situation in 
which we are confronted by others as other beings-in-the-world and as other modes of being-in-
the-world.132  By transferring our focus to the level of our symbolic self-representation, Lefort 
ignores the very layering of flesh upon flesh that reversibility implies both with ourselves and 
with others.  Indeed, our existence is informed by the interactive character of the flesh as a being 
that is open and intertwined with others.  This ontology rejects the superposition, consumption or 
constitution of others, positing in its stead the constellative being of self and others.  This 
constellative intersubjectivity rejects treatment of others as merely the negation of the self, as a 
“disjunction” in which self and others constitute irreconcilable modes of being and, 
consequently, “form a system of reciprocal exclusions.”  It also rejects any form of synthesis 
(imaginary or otherwise) of our modes of being-in-the-world.  Both of these positions are 
entrenched in a philosophy of (constitutive) consciousness that elides Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
step outside of the binary poles of traditional ontology.    
The ontology of the flesh suggests that I “[exist] between others and myself, between me 
and myself, like a hinge, the consequence and the guarantee of our belonging to a common 
world.”133  By acknowledging our embedding in an originary belonging – our common 
belonging to the world of being – we recognize that others “[engage] with the things in my world 
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in a style that is at first mysterious to me but which at least seems to me a coherent style because 
it responds to certain possibilities which fringed the things of the world.”134  This implies an 
openness to – and consequently an interpellation or de-centering by – other modes of being-in-
the-world, and demands the attempt to form a “unity across incompossibles such as that of my 
world and the world of the other.”135  These other modes of being-in-the-world are, hence, not 
the negation or counterpoint of my own.  Rather, they surprise, disorient and disjoint my own 
being.  This is a further layering of the vertiginous being of the flesh for this relationship of 
reversibility “presupposes a transformation of myself and of the other as well.”136  In being 
“enslaved” to others, these other modes of being affect mine and are a part of my own existence, 
ultimately changing me in a way that transcends any monadic or introverted presentation of 
being.  Montaigne’s enslavement to the gaze of La Boétie represents a transformation that 
subtends – but also extends, as a project of understanding himself and others – and transforms 
his being from what it would have been if he were considered an autonomous or monadic 
subject.  As openness, I am always continually – and substantively – changed/transformed by my 
relationship to the “outside,” to the world and others, and we re-make these relations in an 
attempt to attain a recognition that can never be completed, because we can never fully coincide 
with ourselves or others.  Far from extracting from the historical embodiment of modes of human 
oppression a set social “humours” that are then ad hoc de-historicized and hoisted onto the social 
body (which would supply ready-made subjects), this implies a historicity of the constellation of 
being and the continual transformation of existent relations, modes of being and conditions of 
possibility (i.e. it presents indeterminate beings in the continual process of an indeterminate 
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emergence/becoming).  Merleau-Ponty states: “The foundation of truth is not outside time; it is 
in the opening of each moment of knowledge to those who will resume it and change its 
sense.”137  Being and existence are likewise located within the historicity of truth, and changed 
by those who participate in them.  That Merleau-Ponty focuses on social relations and sees the 
dialectic of recognition as a moving principle by no means implies the movement towards the 
eradication of difference via the totalitarian focus on the One of identity.  Écart maintains the 
integrity of others as truly other than myself, but reversibility locates truth in the struggle to 
know, to recognize (to be known by, to be recognized by) others as others and, consequently, to 
recognize and know myself as other as well.138  Ultimately, then, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
suggests that politics cannot merely be founded on the recognition of the “divided” character of 
the social or the non-identity of the divided social with itself, but must be founded on the 
interactive character and the constellation of being in which my world and the world of others 
collides.  For Merleau-Ponty, otherness is expressed in the direct relation – the interworld – 
between the different beings that comprise the social, and what must be assessed is the 
relationship that exists between them.   
V. Marxism and the Problem of Identity 
Through a circuitous route, if we turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ontological critique of 
Marxism it will further address the contention that Merleau-Ponty’s focus on social relations 
contains a relativism that blocks him from differentiating between political forms of society and, 
seemingly, fails to provide an adequate means of criticizing totalitarianism.  In contradistinction 
to Machiavelli’s static and essentialist treatment of social relations or his attempt to 
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institutionalize unequal ones, Marxism grasps the historicity of being, and posits the political 
project of overcoming objectifying social relations.  This was the core insight contained in 
Capital: it showed that the alleged “permanent” features of human/social nature “are really the 
attributes (and the masks) of a certain ‘social structure,’ capitalism, which is evolving towards its 
own destruction.”139  For Marx, being is always historical, and history is constituted by subjects’ 
attempts to realize themselves through the process of externalization via labour; this process of 
externalization also comes to shape their relationship to others and nature.  But two important 
contentions emerge from this: first, different modes of externalization embody forms of being-in-
the-world and forms of giving meaning to the world; second, this self-realizing act often takes 
place at the expense of excluding or coming into conflict with others over the use of the world of 
objects, ultimately turning others into objects as well.140  By taking “the merely momentary for 
the eternal,” political economy and scientism naturalized historically specific modes of 
domination.141  While Merleau-Ponty applauds Machiavelli’s recognition of the affirmative 
character of struggle and the division that it arises from, his ontology refuses to accept 
Machiavelli’s naturalization of the specific struggle/division between the rich and poor, or those 
who wish to dominate and those who wish only not to be dominated.  While 
division/difference/dehiscence will be a permanent feature of social existence, Merleau-Ponty 
draws on Marxism in rejecting the dualistic representation of it, in which “some men exercise 
their absolute right as subjects in which case the others submit to their will and are not 
recognized as subjects.”142  Hence, rather than viewing these divisions as an “end” to be accepted 
and affirmed, Marxism posits the emergence of a subject, the proletariat, that is capable of 
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transcending these boundaries and inaugurating non-reifying intersubjective relations.  Thus, 
Marx’s work attempts to institutionalize human community through the being of a subject whose 
own powerlessness in the structure of human relations can herald a regime “capable of 
suppressing exploitation and oppression.”143 
Yet, we should keep in mind Lefort’s comparison of Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization 
of the body-as-subject in his phenomenological works to the Marxian conception of the 
proletariat: the ontology of the flesh sought to de-center the body/proletariat.  In terms of the 
proletariat/body, we find Marxism (and Merleau-Ponty’s early appropriation of it) still indebted 
to a philosophy of consciousness approach, in which the proletariat – as an embodied being that 
experiences the intense reifying characteristics of capitalist society – is capable of apprehending 
and consecrating history’s objective meaning.  But it does so – in the work of Lukács – by virtue 
of its ability to become the identical subject-object of history that acts only by acting on and 
realizing itself, ultimately consecrating the totality of historical meaning/being.  These problems 
further haunt Sartre’s ultrabolshevism and its theory of the party.  Sartre removes history from 
the equation, and makes recourse to the immediacy of facts (or the fact of immediacy), and the 
pure action that it necessitates.  Thus, he “wants to see all meanings immediately and 
simultaneously,” leaving aside the strictures of the potential ebb and flow, peak and decline, of 
revolutionary consciousness.  Of course, these emerge through the pure and ex nihilo action of 
the party, which creates the proletariat because of its lack of substantial existence. 
With his development of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty finds the transparency and self-
contained character of such a being to be dubious, citing Weber’s emphasis on “the opaqueness 
of social reality as a ‘second nature’ [which] seems to postpone infinitely the limiting concept of 
transparent social relationships and therewith the categorical definition of history as the genesis 
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of truth.”144  Weber’s sentiment, and his place in Adventures, plays an important role in 
unfolding Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Marxism.  As Johann P.  Arnason suggests, Marxism and 
liberalism both confronted the problem of their limitations in the face of experiences they were at 
odds to explain.  Because Weber was conscious of this and sought to transcend it by reinserting 
contingency into historical understanding, his "new liberalism" “could be used as a guideline for 
a prima facie parallel – but ultimately more radical – reflection on the limitations of Marxist 
views of history.”145  Refusing to condemn history to the purity of understanding/knowledge 
(with its multiple options from a position of spectatorship) or action (with its absoluteness and 
immanence in history), Weber opened up history and historical meaning to a dialectic between 
the two.  More importantly, this dialectic knew its own limits and ultimately retained the margin 
of doubt necessary to avoid slipping into an identity thinking that would reduce itself to realist or 
deterministic positions.  By rescuing contingency and choice, Weber’s work taught us that 
“history does not have a direction, but has a meaning.”146  Our embedding in history infects the 
dialectic of meaning with a certain relativism that undermines rationalism’s attempt to reduce 
experience to logic, and ultimately close history by putting the dialectic in things.  Indeed, 
Weber’s “doubt” about the closure of knowledge or realization of society appears to inform 
Merleau-Ponty’s hyperdialectic in its rejection of pure negation and/or pure realization as 
idealizations that ignore that “the only surpassings we know are concrete, partial, encumbered 
with survivals, saddled with deficits.”147  The hyperdialectic must be ruthlessly applied to itself, 
and the error of dialectics lay not in dialectics itself but in “the pretension of terminating it in an 
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end of history.”148  Thus, the hyperdialectic militated against what Merleau-Ponty saw as 
Marxism’s “future positivism.”  In the end, the negation of the negation constitutes a regression 
into the very rationalist politics and exhaustion of being that the proletariat was said to defy 
when it became the positive side of reality. 
Ultimately, the realization of Marxism would efface the very truth that it sought to 
expose149: history as the mediation of subject and object, and itself as the grasp of a particular 
moment of this hyperdialectical unfolding of the open character of history.  Weber’s opposition 
to “revolution” draws this into context: “[Weber] is against revolution because he does not 
consider it to be revolution – that is to say, the creation of a historical whole.”150  This doubt 
introduces a weak relativism that merely asserts the contingency of events and their meaning, 
and the preliminary character of truth – the instability of knowledge and action because of our 
existence within history.  Merleau-Ponty must have had Weber’s problematization of the 
homogenous and transparent character of social relations in mind151 when he suggested the need 
to relativize the Marxist notion of “pre-history” or the “true Society” and claimed that, “History 
is not from this moment on so constructed as to one day point, on all its dials at once, to the high 
noon of identity.”152  In essence, the social itself always leaves a remainder and the pretense of 
anhililating the dialectic in the person of the proletariat as being the true, homogenous society 
was what needed to be re-thought.  The essence here is not that Weber solves the problem, but 
that he brings new contours to the Marxist idea of “a meaning which is imminent in history” and 
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that “this question should now be reopened.”153  With this conclusion, Merleau-Ponty draws into 
question Lukács’ essentialist vision of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history154 
and the very principle of "realizing" the social. 
The ontology of the flesh starts from an entirely different position than the opposition 
(posited by Sartre, yet relevant to Lukács’ work) between positivity and negativity, or being and 
nothingness.  The Sartrean world is one that is “opaque and rigidified,” marred by the “open and 
uncompleted meanings” that characterize the absolute subjectivism of nothingness; he 
overcomes this via the completed meanings that emerge through the pure action and absolute 
freedom of the Party-as-Cartesian-subject.  The flesh, in dispensing with the language of 
being/nothingness and complete/incomplete, presents a world filled with density/depth and 
movement.155  As Merleau-Ponty states: “Our point of departure shall not be being is, 
nothingness is not nor even there is only being – which are formulas of a totalizing thought, a 
high-altitude thought – but: there is being, there is a world, there is something…there is 
cohesion, there is meaning.”156  This implies that – like the other binary divisions – the flesh 
attempts to transcend these oppositions.  With respect to positivity and negativity, we find the 
flesh as something that is partial and incomplete, something that exists positively but is always 
continually remaking itself and its relations to/in the world.  To say that the flesh exists 
positively is to say that it has an inherence in a world and a historical situation that already exists 
and subtends its absolute freedom.  But the flesh is still an openness to a field of meanings and 
directions that are never pre-ordained or complete/identical, and allows for a freedom and 
movement within this field, within the world as depth.  In this sense, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
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existence is in a constant state of self-affirming vertigo, which cannot be closed in some absolute 
subject or in the absolute closure of historical meaning.  Essentially, being is, but being is never 
completed in an "end of history" or a realization of society.  In de-centering the being of the 
“subject” and “object,” there can be no identity between the two: by stripping the subject and the 
object of their “determinacy,” the ontology of the flesh rejects the possibility of their identity.  
Consciousness cannot constitute the “object” as its own: the flesh’s inherence in the world 
sublates the opposition between subject/object and being/world, producing in each characteristics 
of the other and eliminating the absolute freedom of the Cartesian subject.    
Directly related to this is Merleau-Ponty’s contention that we must “relativize the Marxist 
idea of a pre-history which is going to give way to history – of an imminence of the complete, 
true Society in which man is reconciled with man and nature.”157  The proletariat was alleged to 
be that subject which brought about this reconciled history and society, because its own non-
being represented the transcendence of class divisions and the realization of society’s “true” 
being, or because the Party could step outside of historical reality and comprehend/create the 
proletariat’s objective being and guide it in this direction.  The de-centered character of the flesh 
rejects the very idea that “there are beings who are living definitions, whose existence is fully 
included in their essence.”158  Neither a subject nor society are capable of sustaining or 
producing this identity: the relationship of reversibility implies not only that they always retain a 
dehiscence from each other and never become identical, but that this relationship exists between 
each and itself.  Moreover, there cannot be a subject that is pure presence to itself because our 
being is fundamentally subtended and informed through our relationship with the other; a subject 
purported to have a completed essence is ultimately the elision of the other who is outside this 
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essence.  This elision ultimately destroys social relations themselves, positing in their stead the 
relationship of the self with itself – the illusory self-critical being of an identical subject.  Sartre 
ostensibly posits several subjects (proletariat, militant, Party); but, for him, these subjects – like 
the proletariat and bourgeoisie – are ultimately For-Itself’s whose perspectives conflict and are 
incapable of meshing.  By reducing them to an identity – to the identity of the Party – he 
ultimately negates the complex sphere of the interworld, the intersubjectivity and écart that not 
only produces multiple beings, but that separates the self from itself, in denying any "pure" 
identity.   As the absolute assertion of the "I" and the objectification of all that is non-I, there is 
consequently no intersubjectivity; the concomitant destruction of social relations would be the 
summary failure/denial of the drive for recognition.  Hence, Merleau-Ponty argues, “There is no 
longer any ordered passage from one perspective to another, no completion of others in me and 
me in others…the Other can thus be present to the I only as its pure negation.”159  In eliding the 
other, Sartre’s ultrabolshevism ultimately reduces or consumes all that is non-I to the I, which is 
to say it ultimately destroys the dehiscence and difference that characterizes the constellative 
being of the social.    
For Merleau-Ponty, outside of the purely thinking subject, we are always already social 
and intertwined with others.  Through the rejection of the notion of a pure subject or pure object, 
the ontology of the flesh discloses to us the different perspectives and meanings that inhabit a 
world of depth, a world characterized by the openness of being-as-flesh rather than the closed 
and possessive battle of two For-Itself’s.  If the flesh is “more dispossession than possession,” 
then different perspectives, meanings and identities need no longer be conceived of as 
irreconcilable and necessitating coincidence; rather, the flesh facilitates “the meshing of two 
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experiences which, without even coinciding, belong to a single world.”160  Hence, the political 
dilemma of others is not about the negation of the self, but about constructing a human 
community capable of recognizing and affirming multiple subjects, multiple perspectives and 
multiple modes of being-in-the-world.  Yet it should be emphasized that Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of others as always more than a latent potential of my own being: being already 
instituted – already instituted in social relations, which is to say being always already social – the 
other comes to form a central aspect of my own essential being.  Adventures asserts, in embryo, 
the hyperdialectic of being: “There is dialectic only in that type of being in which a junction of 
subjects occurs, being which is not only a spectacle that each subject presents to itself for its own 
benefit but which is rather their common residence, the place of their exchange and of their 
reciprocal interpretation.”161  In other words, my very identity is formed not in the interiority of 
my own being, but in that junction or meeting place (the interworld, the place of recognition) of 
other subjects that my being-as-flesh opens onto, palpates, in which I am a hinge to my own and 
their being, and vice versa; consequently, I am enslaved to others not despite “myself,” but 
because it is through them that I am shaped, recognized and affirmed.  Hence, meaning – which 
is continually open, as a constellation always in the process of formation, yet never realized – is 
created through our participation in the world, with and through others.162  In these respects, 
while his political and ontological thought has undergone changes, Merleau-Ponty continues to 
demand that we judge societies on the basis of the relations they attempt to create between 
subjects, between the self and others all of whom are capable of being-in-the-world in their own 
way.  Social relations – and particularly the integrity of others and genuine alterity – continue to 
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provide the means for judging political regimes, even if he refuses to idealize a singular political 
form.  
*   *   * 
 “The essence of revolution is to be found in that instant in which the fallen class no longer rules and the 
rising class does not yet rule.”163 
 -Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic. 
 
 We have here the seeming confirmation of Lefort’s adoption of Merleau-Ponty in his 
description of the political.  Merleau-Ponty asserts that the revolutionary essence is contained in 
that delayed gap – the point of deferred realization – before one ruling class replaces another.  
This affirms both the indeterminacy of the social, and the repressiveness contained in the attempt 
to fill the gap of the political with a singular identity.  And, certainly, this assertion of the non-
identity of being, and its concomitant opening of meaning, is something to be affirmed in his 
work.  Yet, it is also, at the same time, not enough.  Recognition that the social is divided, and 
that no part of society can fill the void and reduce the rest of society to its own being, is 
insufficient.  The ontology of the flesh posits simultaneously a rich alterity in which social 
relations are characterized by the recognition of the reversibility of self and others, of our 
intertwined communion that sees our modes of being-in-the-world not merely as the opposition 
of wills or character traits but as co-possible responses to the world.  While Merleau-Ponty’s 
work posits a critique of Marxism, and particularly the proletarian politics that it conveys, this is 
not intended to give up on the focus on class struggle because it contains potentially totalitarian 
implications that are solved by a reconsideration of the political.  As he states, “There is a class 
struggle and there must be one, since there are, and as long as there will be, classes.”164  
Contained in this is simultaneously the affirmation of a politics rooted in non-domination, and 
the confirmation of the mutability of being or the transition beyond class-subjects, even if class 
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subjectivity retains a saliency.  That the proletariat is without historical equivalents merely calls 
for the renovation of our understanding of class and subjectivity.  Moreover, this criticism, and 
the demand for a non-communist left that is critical of both Soviet-style Marxism and liberal 
capitalism, is “the condition of a modern critique of capitalism because it alone poses Marx’s 
problems again in modern terms.”165 
Hence, while Merleau-Ponty’s premature death prevented him from potentially 
elaborating on the political import of the ontology of the flesh, I hope to have shown that his 
ontology is loaded with implications that come to the fore if we read it in unison with his 
political engagements.  Indeed, while Machiavelli and Marx may have paved the road for 
Merleau-Ponty’s “retreat” into philosophy, they also provide a means for drawing his ontology 
back into the political web.  While affirming the division and difference that characterize their 
work, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology diverges in key respects.  While he rightly acknowledges the 
centrality of division to the social, Machiavelli appears to present an immutable conception of 
social relations, rooted in a hierachical structure that owes something to the sorts of dualisms 
from which Merleau-Ponty sought to extricate philosophy.  Marxism aims to eliminate these 
sorts of hierarchical human relations, but falls into its own dualism, and ultimately slides into a 
theory of the absolute subject that elides relationships of alterity and intersubjectivity.  These 
illustrate something of a divergent impulse in Merleau-Ponty’s work: on the one hand, towards 
the affirmation of struggle, division, and openness in politics; on the other, towards a 
commitment to an emancipatory and egalitarian politics of alterity.  In these respects, Merleau-
Ponty’s ontological renovation provides us with a new means to criticizing the objectifying 
characteristics of capitalism, with a radically new form of politics intended.  Yet, Merleau-
Ponty’s own work fails to provide us with this critique.   He has laid the groundwork, and it is 
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through turning to a constellative reading of his work with that of Walter Benjamin, who is 
ideally suited to providing us with a radicalized critique of capitalism, that I aim to flesh – all 
puns intended – out a new politics.  Indeed, utilizing the theory of intersubjectivity that is so 
central to Merleau-Ponty’s work, I aim to re-read Benjamin’s through its lenses – while 
simultaneously utilizing Benjamin’s insights to bring some historical depth to the theory of 
intersubjectivity. 
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Chapter 2  
The Primacy of the Historical: Benjamin's Monadology 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Leaving aside Benjamin’s peculiarly uncritical consent to technology, I want to question the conception of 
the body taken for granted here…According to this conception, the body is a chaos of drives: turbulent, 
frenzied, and without any internal principle of organization.  It is conceived in the image of Dionysus, a 
god of excess, knowing no measure: a body of self-abandonment, intoxication, and wildness.”1 
 -David Michael Levin, ‘Justice in the Flesh.’ 
 
“What sort of perceptibility should the presentation of history possess?  Neither the cheap and easy 
visibility of bourgeois history books, nor the insufficient visibility of Marxist histories.”2 
 -Walter Benjamin, ‘Materials for the Expose of 1935.’  
 
 
A point of entry into a discussion of any possible relationship between Merleau-Ponty 
and Benjamin is perhaps not readily apparent.  While dealing with a number of common themes, 
the phenomenological and ontological focus of Merleau-Ponty’s work would, on first 
appearances, appear to be at adds with the critical theory of Benjamin in particular, and his 
Institute for Social Research colleagues in general3: while Merleau-Ponty sought to expose and 
elaborate the concepts and categories that informed being, Benjamin’s work often sought to 
bring being down to earth against the abstract and naturalizing tendencies of figures such as 
Heidegger.4  If an entry point is not readily apparent, then we might proceed through an 
interrogation of Levin’s attempted connection – the body.  According to this account, the 
ostensible error is not merely that Benjamin takes this theory of the body for granted but that this 
conception of the body is mistaken and, in these respects, it is incapable of providing an adequate 
                                                 
1
 David Michael Levin, ‘Justice in the Flesh,' Ontology and Alterity In Merleau-Ponty, ed. Galen Johnson and 
Michael B. Smith, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1990), 36. 
2
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Materials for the Expose of 1935,’ The Arcades Project, (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1999), 
911. 
3
 For direct critiques by the Institute members of phenomenology (and its connections to ontology), see in particular, 
Herbert Marcuse, ‘Sartre’s Existentialism,’ The Essential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social 
Critic Herbert Marcuse, (Boston: Beacon Press 2007) and Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (New York: 
Continuum 2000).  For secondary elaborations of the relationship – often conflictual – between critical theory and 
phenomenology, see Pier Aldo Rovatti, ‘Critical Theory and Phenomenology,’ Telos, 15, 1973 and Fred Dallmayr, 
‘Phenomenology and Critical Theory: Adorno,’ Cultural Hermeneutics, 3, 1976.  
4
 As Benjamin states: “What distinguishes images from the ‘essences’ of phenomenology is their historical index. 
(Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology abstractly through ‘historicity.’)”  See Arcades 
Project, (Cambridge: Belknap Press 1999), 462. 
 74 
 
theory of action (“ethical” or more purely “revolutionary”) because it is devoid of reason, devoid 
of order.  Moreover, Levin contends, because this conception of the body is monadological and 
self-contained, “it is a body incapable…of ethical relationships.”5  These very characteristics 
allegedly put Benjamin’s theory of the body into conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s, which is the 
very measure of reason, order and an ethics that can follow from them.6   
Against Levin's account, I argue that a more productive relationship can be drawn 
between the two.  But to gather some fruit from the relationship, the existing connection must be 
broken so that we can write anew the possibility of a constellative relation between Merleau-
Ponty and Benjamin: a constellative relation, not a monocausal or monocular relation that 
reduces – in contradistinction to a Merleau-Pontian ethics – the other to the outside, without even 
trying to understand this other in its fullness, let alone how it may chiasmatically interpenetrate 
with, or disrupt the closure of, the self.  A constellative relation in which self and other, inside 
and outside, moment and moment, dislodge each other and bring out a truth content that can only 
exist through the mutual dislocation of their priorly existing positions.   
In beginning on this path, this chapter explores Benjamin's account of the historical.  
While this appears to be a divergence from the focus on the body, for Benjamin it is impossible 
to extricate the body from its historical anchoring.  Indeed, the abstract account of the body 
simply is not sufficient: it needs to be wedded to a temporal dimension which concretizes and 
disrupts any simple a priori notion of a structure of being, as well as positivist conceptions of the 
character of history.  In these respects, Benjamin veers towards an ontological primacy of 
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historicality7 that demands that the body be contextualized and considered in its concrete 
relations – relations between self-others-things that ultimately limit and/or expand the 
possibilities of the body’s experiential capabilities and possibilities (or relations that are limited 
and expanded by the body’s capabilities and possibilities).  While the next chapter will turn to 
understanding the specificity of the body and perception/experience under capitalism, this 
chapter sets the ground work for this exploration through unravelling Benjamin's account of the 
historical.  In this vein, it focuses on reading his early, constellative methodology through his 
later Marxist inflected critique of reification and progress, in establishing the present as a 
particular field of experience that retains a non-linear relation to the past.  In this context, 
Benjamin develops his account of now-time, and the now of recognizability, that becomes 
central to a phenomenological impulse that can provide a critical account of the flesh under 
capitalist modernity.  
I. From the Metaphysical to the Historical Body 
In one of his earliest – and one of only a few sustained – excursions into the question of 
the body, ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem,’ Benjamin explicitly addresses the Cartesian 
mind-body dualism that has inhabited a central place in Western philosophy.8  The ‘Outline’ 
begins with a simple enough claim: “[mind and body] are identical, and distinct simply as ways 
of seeing, not as objects.”9  While Benjamin admits a separate existence between body and mind, 
this only emerges in terms of a formal and abstract separation: they are separate only as different 
modes of vision.  But he is quick to eliminate even this formal dualistic separation, arguing that 
“the form of the historical is that of mind and body combined,” for this embodied mind 
                                                 
7
 Given Benjamin’s opposition to “historicity” – as embodied in the positivist and teleological permeations he 
rejects –  I will use the word “historicality” to avoid confusion.  
8
 David McNally, Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labor and Liberation, (Albany: State University of 
New York 2001), 170.  
9
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem,’ Selected Writings. Volume. 1, 393. 
 76 
 
constitutes the “now” of the form of the historical.  Thus, the embodied mind is not an abstract 
construction, but the ontological being that is “proper to reality in all its forms.”10   
In these first, and very fragmentary, thoughts on the psychophysical problem, Benjamin 
attempts to establish the embodied mind as the central nexus in our temporally-situated (the 
“now”) worldly existence and experience; that is, he seeks to establish the embodied mind as our 
mode of presence in the historical and material world.  Benjamin sees both “limbs and organs” as 
part of the form of this mode of being,11 and puts forth a holistic and synaesthetic conception of 
the body.  Moreover, this body is for Benjamin not merely an individualistic body.  As he states, 
“The body, the function of the historical present in man, expands into the body of mankind.”12  
Again, this collective body is the functional entity of historical existence.  But co-existent with 
this development of the embodied mind is Benjamin’s regression into a dualistic conception 
separating the historical/material and the spiritual/theological.13  For, while claiming that the 
embodied mind is the modicum of worldly existence, Benjamin also claims that, unlike our 
corporeal substance, this embodied mind is not the “substratum of [the body’s] particular being.”  
Benjamin here suggests the difference between the incarnated and historical being of the body, 
which is an ephemeral entity that dwells in the immediacy of the “now,” and the eternal, 
transcendent and metaphysical character of corporeal substance.  Highlighting the consequences 
of the two definitions, Benjamin states: “Man’s body and his corporeal substance place him in 
universal contexts.  But a different context for each: with his body, man belongs to mankind; 
with his corporeal substance, to God.”14   
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  The ‘Outline’ aims to address the issue of the ontological status of the body within the 
context of the traditional Cartesian dualism; however, Benjamin’s subsequent works fail to 
conform to the questions that Merleau-Ponty and Western philosophy have sought to answer, and 
we must stretch his works – possibly beyond the point of breaking – if we wish for them to do 
so.  And yet, the fault here is not with Benjamin’s work, but with this particular manner of 
approaching the body.  The increasing influence of Marxism on Benjamin shifts his focus from a 
metaphysical or ontological account of the body to an historical account of bodily experience.  
Indeed, he begins to focus on the historically constituted nature of being, rather than on being as 
such.  It should be remarked that it is not so much the injection of Marxism into Benjamin’s 
thought that is of importance here, for Benjamin’s Marxism – like his Messianism – is 
idiosyncratic.  Rather, it is the historical methodology that is introduced into Benjamin’s thinking 
through his entanglement with Marxism.  These new elements play a central role in Benjamin’s 
works, introducing ideas not apparent in the ‘Outline’ but constituting an important feature of his 
subsequent works.  Indeed, the ‘Outline’ retains a certain abstract quality, dealing generally with 
the notions of mind and body, spirit and corporeal substance, in somewhat a- or un-historical 
terms.  Certainly, Benjamin asserts that the embodied mind exists in, or constitutes, a historical 
now.  But even with this introduction of the “historical,” Benjamin is not distinguishing between 
historical moments or historically situated modes of being, but between the being of a historical 
now (ephemeral and earthly) and that of a metaphysical and trans-historical being (eternal and 
transcendent).  Hence, we are ultimately dealing with the juxtaposition of two opposed forms of 
“materiality,” not between the historically constituted and variable being of the body/materiality 
at the level of “history” itself.   
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With ‘Naples,’ we find the beginning of a shift towards the historical that is central to 
understanding Benjamin’s work.  As Susan Buck-Morss argues, Benjamin shows that, despite 
the implanting of modern social relations in the midst of a crumbling precapitalist order, in 
Naples “the structuring boundaries of modern capitalism – between public and private, labour 
and leisure, personal and communal – have not yet been established.”15  While Benjamin will not 
use the explicit language of the commodity or commodification, it does comprise an underlying 
theme in this work.  Written as a travel piece, Benjamin notes that the fetish that draws the 
foreigner to Naples is “Pompeii”: “‘Pompeii’ makes the plaster imitation of the temple ruins, the 
lava necklace, and the louse-ridden person of the guide irresistible.”16  With the emergence of 
capitalist social relations, the ability to sell these sorts of fetishes/commodities penetrates Naples, 
and commodifies Neapolitan life itself.  Indeed, commodification begins to penetrate the whole 
of life without respect for the boundaries of private and public, or modern and pre-modern, and 
everything is transformed into an object for exchange.  Hence, in addition to the regular markets 
and auctions, Benjamin discerns the emergence of a bizarre economy on the streets of Naples in 
which everything is a commodity: Christ and the Madonna both play the role of a remunerated 
prostitute, as a street artist pimps their chalked images on the sidewalk for coins; “the art of 
eating macaroni with hands” is displayed for money; even chivalry has its price, as a “fat lady 
drops her fan” and, unable to pick it up herself, receives assistance from a “gentleman” at the 
price of ten lire.17  What Benjamin finds in Naples is a society on the cusp of two different 
historical/social orders (capitalist/modern and precapitalist/premodern), which consequently co-
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mingles into a transient state of being that melds aspects of both – and upsets, or transforms, the 
functioning of being.   
 If this represents the development of a methodological shift – the introduction of a 
temporal dimension in which historicality informs the structure of being – the more particular 
contours of this development’s effect on Benjamin’s conception of the body emerges in ‘On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire.’  While I will deal with ‘Motifs’ in more depth in the next chapter, 
what is relevant at this point is Benjamin’s engagement with Henri Bergson.  Benjamin discusses 
the reception of lyric poetry, suggesting that it has become less popular because it is less in tune 
with the experience of readers.  He argues that philosophy has attempted to understand the 
change in experience through a “series of attempts to grasp ‘true’ experience,” and for this it has 
“invoked poetry, or preferably nature – most recently, the age of myths.”  For Benjamin, 
Bergson’s Matter and Memory stands out amongst this literature.  Regarding “the structure of 
memory as decisive for the philosophical structure of experience,” Bergson’s work is firmly 
linked to empirical and biological research.  But it is here that Benjamin discerns a problem, for  
Bergson is not only unconcerned with the historical determination of memory – he rejects it.  As 
a result, Bergson misses the historical anchoring of his own ideas in the “alienating, blinding 
experience of the age of large-scale industrialism.”18  Through this, and his concomitant 
suppression of death in his notion of durée and the “bad infinity” this suppression produces, 
Bergson’s notion of experience has been “estranged from history.”19  As Benjamin states, in 
shutting out the historical nature of experience, “the eye perceives a complementary experience – 
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in the form of its spontaneous afterimages, as it were.  Bergson’s philosophy represents an 
attempt to specify this afterimage and fix it as a permanent record.”20   
This critique of Bergson emerges out of Benjamin’s engagement with Marxism and its 
forms of historicality.  Marx had repeatedly criticized various opponents for their inability to 
understand the historically determined nature of various categories of human existence.  In 
particular, he argued that the classical economists sought to generalize/de-historicize the specific 
features of capitalism – private property, wage labour, exchange value, etc – turning them into 
the eternal categories of human existence.21  Against Bergson, Benjamin expresses the same 
sentiment with respect to biological or neurological factors such as memory.22  For Benjamin, 
experience and the being through which experience comes to be – the body, including its 
neurological functions/capacities – are historically determined/situated: “the body” is not a 
transcendent/al entity, but a being that is subject to a first and second nature.  Indeed, while first 
nature may represent a pre-temporal notion of embodied being, Benjamin notes that it is 
ultimately subsumed by the social and historical character of a second nature whose problems 
“must be very close to resolution before those of the first – love and death – can be distinguished 
even in outline.”23  Ultimately, under Bergson’s estrangement from history, the ontic being of 
capitalist society is reified to the point that it comes to appear as pre-ontological: it produces the 
now as an ever present absolute, devoid of breaks or changes, death or suffering.24 
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II. History as Monad and Constellation   
 If the historical plays a central role in Benjamin's account of the body and experience, 
then we need to probe the contours of the "historical" as he understands it. The centrality of 
history/the historical actually animates Benjamin's early work, and is by no means simply the 
result of his engagement with Marxism.  While I will turn to his key Marxist referents and their 
contribution to his historical methodology in the next section, it bears first turning to the 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to his first major work, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (or 
Trauerspiel).  In the 'Prologue,' Benjamin develops his concepts of constellation, monadology 
and origin, all of which are central to understanding his work on history.  In developing the 
concept of constellation, Benjamin provides a new epistemology that informs his understanding 
of historical truth and recognizability.  With this new epistemology, he presents not merely a 
means of conceptualizing or understanding history, but a way of seeing it – and the manner in 
which history presents its own visibility.   
 The ‘Prologue’ begins by raising what Benjamin sees as perhaps the most important issue 
for philosophical reflection: the representation of truth.  This issue is at the forefront of a theory 
of non-identity, which must necessarily know its limits: the idea that “the object of knowledge is 
not identical with the truth”25 demands an answer to how truth can be represented.  This requires 
a consequent break with the traditional ways of thinking about truth, concept and object.  The 
very phrasing Benjamin uses here points to a two-fold problem.  The first, explicitly stated, is the 
very idea that the object and conceptions or representations of it are not identical.  At its very 
core, this demands that we go beyond the confines of the objectivist/positivist assertion of truth’s 
self-apparent, and already-existing, non-representational form: beyond the reified existence of 
things.  But the second problem lies in Benjamin’s distinction between truth and knowledge.  He 
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criticizes both the propensity of mathematical/scientific thinking to disregard representation, and 
systematic thinking’s abstract imposition of principles of truth and organization upon the 
phenomena.26  In both cases the being (or becoming) of the object is restricted, and the 
organization of these objects is constructed a priori.  As Richard Wolin has pointed out, 
Benjamin seeks to redeem phenomena27 – to free them from the restricted meanings and truth 
that they take on when reduced to an identity or confined to a closed organization and 
juxtaposition.  In freeing or redeeming phenomena, Benjamin affects a radical reorganization of 
the traditional methods of philosophical thinking, displacing moment and totality, form and 
content, in an attempt at developing an open method of thinking and seeing.  No longer can we 
understand these moments only from the perspective of totality (or system), and no longer can 
we understand the content only through its form.   
Rather than starting from the high-altitude view of an all-being or all-seeing 
philosophical observer, Benjamin aims to dispense with the possessivity of what he deems 
knowledge: “Knowledge is possession.  Its very object is determined by the fact that it must be 
taken possession of – even if in a transcendental sense – in the consciousness.  The quality of 
possessing remains.  For the thing possessed, representation is secondary; it does not have prior 
existence as something representing itself.”28  The last sentence speaks to the general problems 
of dualistic epistemologies in both their idealist and positivist variants.  In the idealist 
perspective, the object of knowledge is totally constituted by consciousness (transcendental or 
otherwise) and hence devoid of self-representation; in the positivist perspective, the object 
transcends representation by being self-apparent and automatically corresponding (in the 
collapsed sense) to its concept.  Thus, in knowledge, Benjamin sees all of the perils of identity 
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thinking, and the very question of representation is negated by the acquisitive possession that 
knowledge asserts: the object is not represented, interpreted or recognized, for in being possessed 
it is known beyond the confines of representation.  Moreover, possession implies a closedness of 
being, and an elimination or collapsing of the gap between existence and essence, thought and 
thing, seeing and seen.  Freeing phenomena from these impositions implies allowing their self-
representations to emerge in all their immanence; that is, it implies allowing the objects to speak 
for themselves and shatter those ideas that we seek to impose upon them.  In freeing 
phenomena/objects from their reified form, truth appears “as the burning up of the husk as it 
enters the realm of ideas, that is to say a destruction of the work in which its external form 
achieves its most brilliant degree of illumination.”29  In essence, phenomena themselves take on 
a centrality to the process of thinking and truth. 
In criticizing knowledge, Benjamin is not rejecting any relationship or organizing 
principles between the objects of representation, or between objects and “subjects.”  In fact, one 
of the failures of “knowledge” lies in their separation: “Knowledge is concerned with individual 
phenomenon, but not directly with their unity.”30  Of course, we cannot simply turn to filtering 
these objects through a system – let alone an encyclopaedic system that organizes them 
according to closed definitions – which would be the antithesis of Benjamin’s renovation.  
Rather, truth emerges through the idea, which is itself the mediated relationship between 
phenomena (represented in concepts): “As the salvation of phenomena by means of ideas takes 
place, so too does the representation of ideas through the medium of empirical reality.  For ideas 
are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete 
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elements in the concept: as the configuration of these elements.”31  We find here a dialectical 
relation between form (ideas) and content (the empirical data that ideas represent and illuminate), 
which both shape one another.  But, simultaneously, we find a series of mediations and 
representations.32   
Phenomena as empirical reality are mediated by consciousness and its perceptions which 
illuminate the “reality” of the objects of the world.  In acknowledging this as mere 
representation, and a representation that is itself historically/temporally mediated, Benjamin 
leaves open the possibility of the transformation of the concepts, which is to say he opens up 
phenomena to the transiency of their meaning/being.  In recognizing this transiency, the reified 
unity and self-sameness of phenomena cannot be represented as an intrinsic part of their nature.  
In turn, these concepts (these representations of phenomena) mediate the idea as an organizing 
principle: “Through their mediating role concepts enable phenomena to participate in the 
existence of ideas.  It is this same mediating role which fits them for the other equally basic task 
of philosophy, the representation of ideas.”33  Benjamin is ultimately arguing that the idea gives 
the concepts their unity and actuality: it draws them together into a unity that can be accorded 
with truth (truth as a relation of the unity of concepts).  It does this through breaking the apparent 
self-same unity of phenomena, dividing them so as to be capable of participating in a higher 
order of truth – one that transcends, but does not eliminate, their individuality.  Hence, it is a 
unity that does not reduce the concepts or phenomena to an overarching “identity”: the unity 
attains its meaning only through the co-mediation of the parts as separate entities that come 
together in their singularity to produce a truth in which the moments are mediated through one 
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another and through the idea, as a pseudo-totality containing a “synthesis between extremes.”34  
This is a unity whose truth lies in the non-identity upon which it is founded, which is to say that 
the truth of the moments lies in their configuration and mediation through one another – each 
moment/concept being what it is only through the others, and vice versa.  In giving an analogy 
for this rather obtuse formulation, Benjamin states: “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to 
stars.”35  Constellations are not obvious, inherent or given: they are the organization and 
juxtaposition of a series of phenomenon that in themselves have no necessary connection.  But, 
brought together through the organizing idea of the constellation, they become more than the 
singularity of their parts, and illuminate a truth (and form) that all of the moments participate in, 
contributing a unique aspect of their singularity to this unity. 
 In locating truth within the concept of constellation, Benjamin is not re-asserting truth as 
a closed system or as a fixed constellation.  The moments within a constellation are distinct and 
fragmentary; their unity is essentially a unity of the discontinuous, and a unity of extremes which 
reflect and refract each other in coming together.  As Benjamin puts it, “in a conceptual 
treatment they acquire the status of complementary forces, and history is seen as no more than 
the colored border to their crystalline simultaneity.”36  The point here is that the idea draws 
together the parts into a coherent whole, but this whole only coheres in the moment of their 
coming together.  And, in this vein, constellations are eminently historical formations, and 
“every idea is an original one.”37  Far from reducing the world to a relativity, this merely 
maintains the transiency of truth as it is contained in the relation of monadic moments.  Hence, 
truth-as-constellation transcends itself via the shifting character of their concepts.  In connecting 
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this to the notion that truth lies in a nucleus of time, constellations are thus never static: they are 
floating/changing.  But this is not to say that the phenomena themselves change.  Rather, the 
concepts (the representations of phenomena) change via the continual and critical assertion of the 
non-identity of the phenomena.  In this sense, truth lies in the moment and in the configuration of 
the parts of the constellation.  Each change in the parts fundamentally changes the overall 
meaning and truth content derived from the disparate and distinct phenomena, their concepts and 
their interconnection.  Thus, in tune with the assertion of non-identity, the changing character of 
the concepts can rupture the truth content of the overall organization of phenomena.  And, in 
reflecting the relationality of the monads, the shifting nature of one monad changes the singular 
character of the others, for “every single monad contains, in an indistinct way, all the others.”38  
In these respects, Benjamin suggests that the totality is nothing more than an expression of its 
parts in a constellative sense – the totality only exists through the monadological relation of 
parts, which reflect and refract each other, without losing their uniqueness/particularity.  In these 
terms, the idea may be an organizing principle that draws together moments, but it is not 
something that is imposed on the parts: it emanates from them.   
The monadological element is not limited to the constellation as a merely temporal and 
unique moment of truth, but operates simultaneously at the level of history: the same relation 
exists at the singular moment and across moments, and while the monad is historical, history 
likewise contains a monadological structure.  Benjamin refers to his mode of interpretation as 
“philosophical history” or a “science of origin,” an endeavour concerned with the concept of 
origin (ursprung).  As he states, “Origin, although an entirely historical category, has, 
nonetheless, nothing to do with genesis.”39  In this sense, origin is not a tracing out of the direct 
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development of the existent being of things, and is not tied to the pure facticity of the world.  
Rather, origin aims “to describe that which emerges in the stream of becoming and 
disappearance.  Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the 
material involved in the process of genesis.”40  Truth emerges in bursts, as a revelation and 
fulfillment of the idea through the phenomena.  Thus, origin refers to neither a linear 
development nor a tracing of the ever present.  Rather, origin focuses on understanding and 
conceptualizing the existence of things (rather than presupposing them) and in doing so focuses 
on recognizing them in the process of emergence – including the manner in which these 
historical monads come to refract and reflect each other in new constellations.  This allows for 
the trajectory of constellations to be not merely linear/developmental, but lateral and 
backwards41 – or, more generally, dialogical in so far as the dialogical can account for the 
historical (as a relationship between moments) in a manner that the purely logical cannot.  This 
dialogical element refers simultaneously to the relationship between the parts (as disparate and 
extremes) and to the changing character of those relationships.  In this sense, the critical 
interrogation of origin represents “the form which, in the remotest extremes and the apparent 
excesses of the process of development, reveals the configuration of the idea – the sum total of 
all possible meaning juxtapositions of such opposites.”42   
Origin/history, then, is a principle of interrogation of the very relationship of the 
development (as emergence and disappearance) of parts within a constellation.  Origin must of 
necessity show its own authenticity through its emergence in the process of being’s becoming, 
and this must be a genuine representation or image of the world.  This implies both the 
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understanding of the transformation of the constellation and its parts in the process of appearance 
and decay, and plays out the role of de-naturing and redeeming phenomena.  As a critical 
investigation, the pursuit of origin is tied to the idea and its relationship to the historical, a 
relationship which is oriented towards redemption and fulfillment.  There is a sense, then, in 
which the study of origins remains a truth in potential; but the point is not that this truth is thus 
false, but that its latent being must be extracted through the dialectical process intrinsic to 
constellative thinking.  In essence, origin can appear only in the process of discovery and is thus 
a matter of recognition that aims to illuminate the very historicality of the phenomena.  And, in 
these respects, the life of the phenomena emerges in its own monadological relationship, 
fundamentally rupturing the static being of their various incarnations.  Indeed, the historical 
totality emerges, but it emerges as a pseudo-totality that is itself ruptured by the transformation 
of the parts in their continual process of transience.  History, in these respects, is characterized 
by the principle of incompleteness, but in a sense which still aims for an objectivity of truth tied 
to time.43 
While this presents a rather prolix formulation, in a fragment entitled ‘Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy’ Benjamin puts these ideas into a more historiographical form.  He states: “Historical 
time is infinite in every direction and unfulfilled at every moment.  This means we cannot 
conceive of a single empirical event that bears a necessary relation to the time of its 
occurrence.”44  In these respects, he likens time to a form that encapsulates the content of 
empirical events.  But, as he suggests in the ‘Prologue,’ form is a husk that is burned up through 
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the redemption of empirical events.  Benjamin links the anchoring of events in time to a notion 
of a mechanical, empty time – a form of time centrally linked to mechanical notions of change.  
Genuine historical time militates against this, opening itself up to the infinity of the non-
identical, with its plurality of directions and its ability to transform itself by transcending the 
mere contours of the temporally momentary.45  This posits historical time as an ambiguous (or 
open) realm.  As Benjamin states, “a process that is perfect in historical terms is quite 
indeterminate empirically; it is in fact an idea.”46  As we saw previously, the idea is something 
that emerges out of the complex interconnection between phenomena, their conceptualization 
and their interconnection – which is intentionally indeterminate and caught up with the principle 
of redemption. 
III. Lukács and Korsch: Referents for a Theory of Historicality 
While the 'Prologue' is centrally concerned with issues relating to history and historical 
knowledge, Benjamin's encounter with Marxism comes to direct his monadological and 
constellative approach towards a more directly political reading of history.  Indeed, Benjamin's 
account of modernity as monad takes on the form of a critique of capitalism and its modes of 
being and historicity with his encounter with the work of Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch.47  
Published in the same year (1923), Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness and Korsch’s 
Marxism and Philosophy both sought to return to Marxism its revolutionary core, in the face of 
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the theoretical and practical stagnation of the Marxism of the 2nd International.  For both, this 
required resuscitating the philosophical element contained in Marxism, against the adoption of 
the positivistic scientism of 2nd International Marxists.  Indeed, the conflation of essence and 
appearance, and the vulgar reduction of consciousness to little more than a reflection of existing 
reality, had sapped Marxism of its revolutionary, activist blood, a matter that Lukács and Korsch 
saw as the heart of Marx’s approach.  Far from adopting in total either of their accounts, 
Benjamin finds in Lukács and Korsch the means to attempt to understand and unravel the 
enigmas of capitalism as historical formation, for the purposes of transcending it.  And, in these 
respects, Benjamin took from each a key methodological element: from Lukács, the notion of 
reification and the commodity structure of capitalism; from Korsch, a radical historicality 
embodied in the idea of historical specificity. 
 Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness represents one of the most important and 
celebrated elaborations of Marxism and, as has been often noted, Benjamin was quite taken by 
Lukács’ work when introduced to it by Asja Lacis.  In terms of the development of Benjamin’s 
thought, the main reference point is the essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat’ and its understanding of reification and the commodity structure of capitalism.  In 
attempting to re-read Marx in order to understand the nature of capitalist society, Lukács states: 
“there is no solution that could not be found in the solution to the riddle of commodity-
structure…That is to say, the problem of commodities must not be considered in isolation or 
even regarded as the central problem of economics, but as the central, structural problem of 
capitalist society in all its aspects.”48  Lukács is quick to differentiate the commodity-structure of 
capitalism from previous modes of commodity exchange, noting that the specifically capitalist 
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form (and all of its effects) only emerge when all of society’s needs are met by commodity 
exchange: that is, “only when [the commodity] becomes the universal category of society as a 
whole.”49  Under these conditions – the complete commodification of the potential necessities for 
the reproduction of life, including labour – reification comes to rear its ugly, socially disfiguring 
head.  As Lukács explains, under the process of reification “a relation between people takes on 
the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so 
strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation 
between people.”50  The central crux here is that the specific social relations that constitute 
capitalist exchange come to take on an independent character, despite being merely the 
embodiment of human productive powers and the product of human collective agencies.  
Reification indicates that in the process of exchange, this reality is veiled by the appearance of a 
mere relation between commodities.  Moreover, this process comes to permeate all aspects of 
capitalist society, particularly bourgeois modes of thinking which came to separate the subjective 
realm from the objective and “natural” realm of the economy.  This process of reification has a 
two-fold effect: objectively, the market puts into force the actual exchange of these commodities, 
and this power cannot be escaped under the total organization of society according to a 
commodity-structure; subjectively, the labour of individuals is incorporated into the commodity 
nexus and estranged from its possessors.  Consequently, the commodity-structure produces an 
alienating effect, abstracting labour from people and utilizing it against them, turning the 
production process itself into a rationalized activity that denies any notion of fulfillment for 
workers.  Moreover, under the guise of “a relation between things,” this whole process takes on 
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the appearance of an uncontrollable and natural force, ultimately obfuscating the particular 
socio-historical forces that produce it.  
 As we saw, the notion of commodification was present in ‘Naples.’  But there, Benjamin 
described a society on the cusp of taking on the total character of the commodity structure of 
capitalism: it was a society in transition, and the reifying aspects that emerge with totalization 
appeared to be absent, or at least unclear/in development.  Yet, this Lukácsian motif begins to 
makes its full appearance in ‘One-Way Street’ where, rather than illustrating the historical 
transition between these phases, Benjamin begins to discern the fully reified form in which the 
subject of capitalism encounters and expresses reality.51  Central in these respects is the passage 
‘Imperial Panorama.’  In surveying life in Weimar Germany, Benjamin notes the dissipation of 
“close relationships” under the rule of money, which becomes “the center of vital interest” and 
the “very barrier before which almost all relationships halt.”52  In the Manifesto, Marx had noted 
the ways in which the commodity-structure of capitalism reduced all relations to issues of 
calculation mediated through the cash nexus.53  Benjamin sees this cash nexus as having 
permeated society to such a degree that conversations with others exhibit little more than the 
concern with prices.  Such concern for narrow private interests emerged through the paradoxical 
adoption of mass values; in the face of society’s alienation from itself, the use of intellect and 
agency gave way to the forces of “imbecility” and the decline of vital defence instincts of which 
even animals are capable.  Indeed, the effects of reification constitute a vicious circle in which 
we watch ourselves as actors on a stage, but without the chance of escape.  This is a matter 
simultaneously of the actions of people and their perceptions of their actions.  Poverty, 
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homelessness and the generally wretched conditions of human existence (under stable and 
unstable conditions) permeate this society, yet its own perception is that they are the result of 
natural forces, “invisible hands.”  Benjamin sees the possibility of such conditions leading to the 
revolutionary uprising of the afflicted, but finds it continually repressed by the perception – and 
ideological representation – that these effects arise from “dark powers that hold [their] life in 
thrall.”  Yet, his overarching claim is that this perception does not negate the reality that people 
are subjected to the horrific powers of “collective forces” rather than fate or the natural 
economy.54 
In a sense, ‘One-Way Street’ represents the partial culmination of a shift that had begun 
with ‘Naples’: the understanding of the commodity structure of capitalism as central to 
experience.  This methodological element is central to ‘Motifs,’ and points to the very essence of 
Benjamin’s critique of Bergson: the failure to consider the ways in which memory and 
experience are mediated through the concrete historical process, particularly the specific forms 
reification takes under modern capitalism.  But Lukács’ approach also presented a number of 
methodological problems, particularly in respects to his approach to history (and situating 
capitalism within it).  In seeking to explain the intellectual roots of Adorno's and Benjamin’s 
common intellectual project (a negative dialectics), Buck-Morss argues that Adorno adopted the 
negative/critical side of Lukács’ philosophical resuscitation of Marx (the theory of reification), 
while rejecting the positive/revolutionary side.  In these latter respects, where Lukács went 
wrong was in seeing the proletariat as the subject-object of this process of reification, and hence 
the repository of truth: Adorno rejected the idea that truth could be singularly embodied in this 
class, and that “total” knowledge could be attained of capitalism as an objective social formation 
by the proletarian subjects it produced.  Part of the problem with Lukács’ account will be 
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familiar from my discussion of the debate between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in the previous 
chapter: the metaphysical standpoint Lukács adopted was at odds with the empirical reality of 
proletarian consciousness, and so he fell back on a conception of “imputed consciousness” which 
required the party-as-mediator to bring the “truth” to the class – or required the party to 
manipulate truth to fit its purposes.55  David McNally notes that Benjamin also never fully 
adopted Lukács’ conception of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history.56  In the 
wake of these criticisms, we are left to ponder the specific nature and departing of Benjamin’s 
own approach from Lukács’ adoption of a Hegelian conception of history.  It is at this point that 
we might turn to Korsch’s influence for a better understanding of the radical historicality that 
Benjamin appropriates in order to avoid the problems of history marring Lukács’ work, for it is 
Korsch’s work that informs aspects of Benjamin’s historicality, particularly in ‘Convolute N: 
Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress’ of the Arcades Project. 
While Lukács and Korsch have numerous points of convergence – and Korsch had 
proclaimed his philosophical solidarity with Lukács in Marxism and Philosophy – an obscure 
criticism of Leninism in Korsch’s 1930 postface, ‘Problems of  Marxism and Philosophy,’ offers 
us a point of divergence that takes on a central importance.  Marxism and Philosophy had treated 
Marxism itself as a historical mode of consciousness, subject to changes – retrograde and 
progressive – in accordance with its complex interconnection with history.  But, in the postface, 
it was the refusal of this principle and the assertion of the absolute objectivity not only of 
Marxism but of truth itself, that the “Leninists” were affecting.  In this vein, Korsch maintained, 
Leninists merely inverted the dialectic that Marx inherited from Hegel, and unilaterally applied it 
to all categories of society (“Object, Nature and History”).  By virtue of this, Korsch argued, 
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“they have abandoned the question of the relationship between the totality of historical being 
and all historically prevalent forms of consciousness.”57  Indeed, the vulgarization of the 
materialist perspective regressed into a metaphysics that took being as “absolute and given” and 
knowledge as little more than the coming to consciousness of the imputed objective being.  
Hence, this approach severed “the dialectical relation of being and consciousness and, as a 
necessary consequence, the dialectical relation of theory and practice.”58  This metaphysics 
represented consciousness as a potentially pure consciousness – even if it was imputed and the 
party was necessary to bring it to light – capable of abstractly and completely comprehending 
being/reality outside of the specificity of historical forms of consciousness.  In these respects, the 
ontological status of being was neglected in favour of “the narrower epistemological or 
‘gnoseological’ question of the relationship between the subject of knowledge and the object of 
knowledge.  Nor is this all.  They present knowledge as a fundamentally harmonious 
evolutionary progress and an infinite progression towards absolute truth.”59  Far from 
conforming to Adorno’s critique of succumbing to identity thinking,60 Korsch drew into question 
the absolutes that identity thinking required.  Moreover, he drew into question any blind faith in 
the progression towards an absolutely reconciled form of knowledge that would consecrate the 
total historical process: the internal/immanent relationship between being and consciousness – 
that is, their mutual relation within history – negated the possibility of their absolute identity. 
While Korsch never names Lukács directly in this criticism, aspects of this tendency can 
be seen in History and Class Consciousness.  Indeed, for all his complexity, Lukács ultimately 
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falls into a conception of Marxism as the finally discovered, supra-historical truth that can 
consecrate all of history (as embodied in the proletariat’s adoption of Marxism as imputed class 
consciousness via the party); or, in other words, a relatively fixed materialist position beholden 
to an identity thinking that fails to take seriously the historically prevalent forms of 
consciousness.  In these respects, Lukács reproduces the teleological character of the Hegelian 
philosophy of history: history and the past could only “truly” be known from the perspective of a 
completed historical totality.  Consequently, in pre-capitalist societies “class consciousness is 
unable to achieve complete clarity and to influence the course of history consciously.”61  For the 
most part, this is “because class interests in pre-capitalist society never achieve full (economic) 
articulation.”62  Through mystification (via political and religious obscuring) the realization that 
the roots of social conflict are determined through these class positions are denied the objective 
possibility of being brought to consciousness.  With the emergence of capitalism, the situation 
takes on a new character: "With capitalism...class consciousness arrived at the point where it 
could become conscious.  From then on social conflict was reflected in an ideological struggle 
for consciousness and for the veiling or the exposure of the class character of society."63  
Through the knowledge of its position as a commodity in the capitalist process of production, the 
proletariat is able to attain knowledge of the historical genesis underlying capitalism and the 
production of the objective world through human actions/agency.  And the consequences of this 
are clear for Lukács: “When the worker knows himself as a commodity his knowledge is 
practical.  That is to say, this knowledge brings about an objective structural change in the object 
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of knowledge.”64  Through knowledge of this process of objectification, the proletariat realizes 
itself as a historical subject, thus bringing to an end the “pre-history” of humanity.  
If we read this in the context of Korsch’s critique of Leninism, we find that Lukács fails 
to properly and dialectically mediate the relationship between moment and totality in the 
historical process by artificially treating his own perspective as the closure of the historical 
totality.  Lukács is rightly concerned with the problem of relativism in the philosophy of history, 
and seeks to avoid conceiving of every historical moment as value neutral.  But reducing history 
to the progressive realization of the contradictory tendencies contained in the present epoch (i.e. 
judging all history from the position of capitalism and its transcendence) does not provide an 
adequate way out.  The categories drawn out through the dialectical deconstruction of capitalism 
are valid for capitalism.  Moreover, we can discuss the historical descent and becoming of its 
categories, culminating in their present configuration (i.e. the genealogy of capitalism as a 
totality).  But this cannot reduce the past to a teleological and linear progression to the present, 
replete with a post ex facto assertion of every past moment’s inevitable impotence.  The 
objective possibilities of each totality must be considered from the vantage point of their own 
immanent tendencies, predicated on their own epistemological categories and the practical 
possibilities emanating from them – even if the totality of these possibilities were not fully 
realized.  In these respects, truth itself must be historicized, and the teleological truth imputed to 
the proletariat as identical subject-object must be drawn into question. 
We can begin excavating the influence of Korsch’s ideas on Benjamin through their 
common interlocutor, Bertolt Brecht.  In this vein, Benjamin records a salient comment by 
Brecht: "Yesterday, after playing chess, Brecht said: 'You know, when Korsch comes, we really 
ought to work out a new game with him.  A game in which the moves do not always stay the 
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same; where the function of a piece changes after it has stood on the same square for a while: it 
should either become stronger or weaker.  As it is the game doesn’t develop, it stays the same for 
too long.'"65  While this is said with a certain good-natured mockery, the core of what Brecht gets 
at is Korsch’s notion of historical specificity: there is no transcendent truth, for historical change 
dialectically transforms truth’s very form and content.  Indeed, Brecht’s comment suggests that 
Korsch conceives of a shift in the nature of the subject (“the function of a piece changes”) and its 
forms of subjectivity (“the moves do not always stay the same”) – all in accordance with the 
passing of time.  In this context, we get a notion of historical presentism,66 and this is the core 
idea contained in the passages from Korsch’s Karl Marx that Benjamin transcribed into 
‘Convolute N.'  In noting the restricted character of Marx’s materialism, Benjamin cites Korsch 
to the effect that, “the general propositions of materialist social theory concerning the relations 
between economy and politics or economy and ideology, or concerning such general concepts as 
class and class struggle…have a different meaning for each specific epoch and strictly speaking, 
are valid, in the particular form Marx gave them within the present bourgeois society, only for 
this society.”67  The divergence from Lukács’ historical understanding should be apparent.  For 
him, Marxism did not represent a complete fissure in the epistemological universe, but the truth 
that had escaped previous epochs about being.  In essence, Marxism itself did not change: only 
its function did, as it went from being critique to Truth.  Contrary to this, Korsch suggested that 
“time” was not the measure of superior knowledge, and could not reduce the past to a series of 
follies.  Furthermore, Benjamin cites Korsch to the effect that, “Marx replaces the overweening 
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postulate of Hegel that the truth must be concrete with the rational principle of 
specification…The real interest lies…in the specific traits through which each particular 
historical society is distinguished from the common features of society in general and in which, 
therefore, its development is comprised.”68  We find here the assertion that the present 
configuration – its ways of being, acting and thinking – is wholly unique and peculiar to a given 
society, not that a new mode of “thinking” brings the truth to the world of being and action.  Of 
course, as the claim about development asserts, these must be situated in the context of the 
general processes of historical change.  But this does not undermine the essential particularity of 
the present moment itself, but only the need to understand the present's "origins" – the 
modifications, changes and breaks, that have contributed to its own formation and the ways in 
which it distinguishes itself from the past.  This also establishes the present as a moment capable 
of qualitative transcendence – transcendence as rupture.   
While Marx’s thought was subsequently taken over by his “epigones” as a “general” set 
of rules, capable of being transposed and applied to “society in general,”69 this ultimately 
undercut the revolutionary intention of such historical specification by positing little more than 
an evolutionary schema tied to inevitability and the dismissal of “primitive” attempts at social 
upheaval – the old story about waiting for the conditions for revolution to be ripe.  However, as 
we will see in Chapter 4, Benjamin’s weak messianism sought to break with such conceptions, 
and veered in the direction of Korsch’s non-dogmatic approach to Marxism – not all of which 
would have been familiar to Benjamin, but the contours of which are still present in Karl Marx.  
Korsch’s whole intention was to open “a wholly undogmatic guide to research and action”70 that 
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situated Marxism within the working class movement, as one of its moments along with other 
theoretical tendencies.  Benjamin’s interest in the work of Fourier, Blanqui and other “utopian” 
socialists would appear to be part of this same project.  The resurrection of these moments, and 
of the past as a living entity, represented an intersubjective or constellative realm.  In essence, 
then, the theoretical monopoly of valid thought itself was being severed by this principle of 
specification, as was the alleged monopoly Marxism had on socialist thought. 
All of this suggests a very different historical procedure than the one undertaken by 
Lukács.  Transcending Lukács’ error requires the acknowledgement that past and present are 
dialectically or constellatively – and not causally or linearly – interconnected: neither moment 
has an absolute identity, and each moment casts the other in a new light that is only true at the 
moment of their interconnection.  In Lukács’ hands, historical materialism necessitates a re-
writing of history not as a dialectically new reality, but as the secret, finally discovered, of all 
history.  Ultimately, this fails to consider that the notion of historical totality undialectically 
presupposes a fixed end (or “beginning”) of history, and reduces all historical moments to a mere 
link in the causal chain to the present (and its transcendence).  For Benjamin, the past cannot be 
seen as the teleological culmination of the present, in which truth finally emerges to illuminate 
all previous epochs.  Rather, the present (as monad) contains its own epistemological and 
ontological foundations that shape the very perceptibility of the past: rather than illuminating a 
homogenous time, the past is filled by the “now” of historical perceptibility.  In this vein, 
Benjamin cites Karl Kraus to the effect that, “Origin is the goal.”71  Historical inquiry was not 
the exposing of an absolute truth – known a priori through an evolutionary schema, or through 
the “truth”  of the present – but the means to extracting the ur-history of the present.  In reversing 
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the claims of evolutionary biology, Korsch cited Marx to the effect that “the anatomy of man is a 
key to the anatomy of the ape.”72  In Benjamin’s hands, then, we find a radical historicality that 
rejects Lukács’ notion of the suprahistorical truth contained in Marxism and dismissive of all 
previous revolutionary projects as inevitable failures.  Benjamin wanted to retain these "failed" 
moments, so their very essence could be explained by the current fragmentation of social life.  
What Benjamin adopts from Korsch, vis–à–vis  these tendencies in Lukács, is a radical notion of 
historicality divorced from teleological and linearly progressivist conceptions.  This culminates 
in a presentism which views the current historical moment as a monad, refusing both the 
Bergsonian approach that would present being as contained in a homogenous-empty time devoid 
of birth, suffering and death or the Lukácsian approach that would see the present as the 
inevitable culmination or result of an epistemologically limited past.  In essence, we must 
understand the current historical moment – with its commodity structure – in its own specificity. 
IV. The Crises of Progress and Historical Perception 
 The combination of Benjamin's constellative methodology and his appropriation of 
Marxism from Lukács and Korsch informs his critique of progress as a historical concept in his 
later works.  As in the 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue,' Benjamin's approach begins from a rejection 
of a positivist understanding of history, but this critique comes to be imbued by the reifiying 
character of capitalism's commodity structure and the assertion of historical specificity (via a 
radical presentism).  Centrally, Benjamin rejects linear temporal structures and the focus on the 
past as an object-in-itself, both of which aligned with Leopold von Ranke’s maxim that the goal 
of history is to “tell how it really happened.”73  All of this presupposes the positivist conflation of 
existence and essence (if not a complete dismissal of the question of essence), which in turn 
effects an illusory dissociation of history from concepts of meaning.  The roots of this fact-based 
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history lie in the traditional, Cartesian epistemological separation of subject and object, which 
acts to separate the “neutral” historian from his/her object of inquiry and facilitates their knowing 
it as an object-in-itself.74  It is only through such a separation that the past could be recognized 
“the way it really was” – that is, as an independent entity unencumbered by the problematic 
intrusions of the organizing perceptions of the historian or his/her epoch.75  Consequently, the 
object is treated as a self-identical thing, completely and totally transparent to any and all 
perceiving subjects.  In the process, the past is represented as an “eternal image” divorced from 
time itself76 and, by virtue of this, the urgency to know or come to terms with it is annihilated by 
its ever-present character.77  It is in this stance that history is presented as a mere matter of 
recounting the facticity of the world.  Yet, Benjamin discerns in this a duplicitous smuggling in 
of a progressivist historical trajectory focused largely on causality and continuity.  As Benjamin 
summarizes its method: “Its procedure is additive: it musters a mass of data to fill the 
homogenous, empty time.”78  Hence, far from being devoid of a principle of historical meaning, 
this historicism is centrally concerned with developing a causal nexus amongst these moments.  
The very procedure of picking out events suggests that these moments represent something 
meaningful about the historical process itself.  This has the effect of representing “the sequence 
of events like the beads of a rosary.”79  In essence, history is represented as a succession of 
moments, all linearly connected via a progressive and continuous line in which each historical 
epoch is the resolution, development and continuation of the previous one.  History is then 
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understood through the attempt to pick moments out of the continuous flow of events, and to 
understand these past moments as looking forward towards the future.80   
 Benjamin is concerned to assess the meaning or function that this conception of history 
has, particularly in its relation to the present moment.  Here, Korsch's inversion of the 
evolutionary schema – the assertion that “the anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the 
ape”81 – becomes key.  An evolutionary schema is central to the historicism Benjamin critiques.  
He discusses this in terms of the question of empathy: “Empathy with the past serves not least to 
make the past seem present.  It is no coincidence that this tendency accords very well with a 
positivist conception of history.”82  In this context, empathy is a passive sentiment that aims to 
draw the past into the present, seeing in it the teleological fore-history of the present – even if 
across a homogenous, empty time that sees only quantitative development (i.e. “progress”).  The 
present is thus represented as the proper culmination of the failures of the past, their culmination 
in the evolutionary progress of a realized present.  Far from truly being “alive” in the present, the 
past is merely that era whose existence necessitated the being of the present, and the past is 
relegated to a nodal point in the development of the present.  Yet, if this appears to be the 
transposition of the “scientific” character of positivism into an historical understanding of 
causality, Benjamin is quick to draw out the ideological function that it plays.  As he states: 
“With whom does historicism actually sympathize?  The answer is inevitable: with the victor.  
And all rulers are the heirs of prior conquerors.”83  Ultimately, history’s continuity is held 
together by the succession of victors/rulers who have trampled over the oppressed throughout the 
course of historical “progress.”  This serves the purpose of not only justifying them, but of 
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covering up the failed revolutionary moments that lie repressed and suppressed in the historical 
past: existing outside of the continuity of victory and the succession of victors, these moments 
come to represent little more than irrational blips on the historical radar.  As Adorno suggests, by 
virtue of their impotence/vanquishment, they are rendered “irrelevant, eccentric, derisory” 
moments (or beings) that “did not fit properly into the laws of historical movement.”84   
 Within this, Benjamin finds the ultimate betrayal of the concept of progress.  He defines 
progress as “the first revolutionary measure taken.”85  This definition remains somewhat obtuse.  
Yet, the obtuseness is by design, for Benjamin wishes to treat progress as a concept no longer 
glued to identity thinking: it is in identity thinking – and the ideological purposes that it serves – 
that progress comes to negate itself.  In its critical capacity, progress denoted a revolutionary 
break or rupture with existing concepts, and an attempt to actualize social goals.  Or, in Adorno’s 
translation of Benjamin’s intent: “progress would be the very establishment of humanity in the 
first place, whose prospect opens up in the face of its extinction.”86  In this context, Benjamin 
sees true progress as an active transformative moment, but one of rupture and actualization not 
linearity and inevitability.  Under this conceptualization, it is necessary to critically interrogate 
given historical moments to determine their meaning and significance, and whether they 
represent a development of humanity’s claims/demands.  Progress loses its critical edge when it 
comes to measure not the potential development or actualization of social goals, but “the span 
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between a legendary inception and a legendary end of history.”87  Progress in this sense indicates 
simply what the historical process “as a whole” always is: linear conceptions of development and 
growth as a progressive trajectory that is guaranteed by the march of time.88  It is thus an 
inevitable and automatic occurrence.  Here, there is no critical element to the concept, and 
progress becomes “an uncritical hypostatization rather than a critical interrogation.”89   
In the particular context of modernity, the problem with “progress” lay in its complicity 
with emerging bourgeois conceptions of history and its end: the complete separation between the 
past and the present.  In this vein, Benjamin argues that discontinuity “is the regulative idea of 
the tradition of the ruling classes (and, therefore, primarily of the bourgeoisie).”90  What he 
means here is that the bourgeoisie presents itself as the realization and harmonization of a pre-
existing humanity, which has finally thrown off the shackles of the previous oppressors or 
developed fully the conditions of possibility for the utilization of the capacities of that pre-
existing humanity.  Benjamin’s sentiment draws on Marx’s contention that, as a revolutionary 
class, the bourgeoisie presents itself as the representative of a universal humanity, but that with 
its victory it imposes its own exploitative mode of being upon the other classes within capitalist 
society.91  The class dynamics of Enlightenment notions of progress only come to the fore with 
the consecration of bourgeois power, and manifest themselves in the increasing alienation and 
immiseration of the proletariat in the midst of the “progress” of the means to the 
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domination/exploitation of nature via the growth of technological capacities.92  Here, we find 
that progress is reduced to the quantitative growth of commodity production, and the 
concomitant development of the productive forces.  Thus, progress becomes a “shallow 
rationalism,” for it is only utilized to measure an “infinite” quantitative growth within a 
qualitatively static mode of existence – or within a qualitatively static and closed conception of 
humanity itself (characterized by the “universality” of bourgeois conditions of existence).93   
Ultimately, progress comes to refer to a reified history which measures the birth and 
development of bourgeois society and its economic apparatus.94  And, in terms of the bourgeois 
philosophy of history, it comes to describe little more than the post-humous chain of causal 
connections that the present epoch has created in order to glorify itself; this self-aggrandizing 
history’s “enshrinement as heritage” covered up the very possibility of unfulfilled revolutionary 
moments in the past (their reduction to irrationalism).  Indeed, for Benjamin the claim to 
“history” and “progress” serves as the “spoils” of the victors, and it is beholden on them to 
present their own epoch as the culmination of history, and their own coming to power as the 
fulfillment of a historical necessity.  The past is thus relegated to being an irrational occurrence 
incapable of keeping up with the march of history – the past is something dispensed with because 
of historical necessity.  Despite the discontinuity bourgeois history purports to represent, the 
apologia/enshrinement of history creates a continuity of succession – it establishes the rosary 
beads that denote the development of the present’s perfection, or its perfectibility within itself.95  
In narrating history as an epic undertaking, this configuration attempts to turn the past into an 
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eternal/timeless truth, by showing things “as they really were.”96  But, in doing so, it merely 
grabs hold of the present’s own historical imposition.  For, as Benjamin contends, the “purity” of 
the gaze – the gaze that excludes “anything that has taken place in the meantime,” particularly 
those events that fall outside of the enshrined narrative – is impossible, and the present 
constantly informs the understanding of the past.   
And yet, this "perception" of the past represents a reified form of perception that occludes 
the non-identity of the past as "object" and phenomena.  Indeed, what Benjamin discerns in this 
positivist conception of history is a crisis of historical perception.97  The principle of empathy 
with the past sought “to make the past seem present.”98  In drawing out the implications, 
Benjamin states: “In the field of history, the projection of the past into the present is analogous to 
the substitution of homogenous configurations for changes in the physical world…The former is 
the quintessence of the ‘scientific’ character of history, as defined by positivism.”99  We find 
here the collapsing of existence and essence, and the representation of changes in quantity via 
homogenous entities.  Hence, when this is transformed into a mode of historical 
perception/knowledge, the past is identical with the present as regards its ultimately static, 
qualitative essence: growth and progress only refers to the quantitative growth of a pre-existing 
entity,100 and anything that falls outside of this – those moments or beings which defy the linear 
historical narrative – are rendered peripheral/irrational and ultimately moot.  Hence, the process 
of making the past present refers to a process of the present recognizing only itself or its own 
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image in the past, excluding all that might transcend it: the present sees in the past only its own 
fore-history.  In evolutionary terms, this fore-history would only be the present’s 
infancy/childhood, conceived of as a necessary stage which we have since left behind.  
Consequently, the development to the present takes on a pre-ordained and teleological character, 
imbued with a monological mode of subjectivity: the present develops only in dialogue with 
itself, and in accordance with a linear dynamic.   
And yet, at the same time, the present completely forgets the past and turns its focus 
towards development for the future.101  The present is conceived of as having broken with the 
past: there is a separation between past and present, which represents the present as the perfect 
fulfillment of humanity and the past as an obsolete entity that merely played out the role of 
evolving to the present.  This was why Benjamin argued that discontinuity was the regulative 
idea of the victors: they must represent their own coming into being as the fulfillment or end of 
history.  Of course, at the same time, this requires the representation of history as a continuity 
and a continuity that could not be broken: again, it measures “the span between a legendary 
inception and a legendary end of history.”  This end point is the culmination of historical 
development, whereby humanity has come to realize itself.  Yet, this is entirely self-referential 
and requires the exclusion of unfulfilled moments of the past.  To assert the perfection of the 
present is to deny the very potential being of these past moments: they were nothing more than 
irrational moments incapable of realization, because they lacked the purity of the present’s 
existence.  Indeed, “humanity” is victorious only as the emergence of its representatives and as 
the betrayal of those parts of humanity who fail to conform to its representation.  This betrayal 
plays out against two entities: those who fail to conform to humanity’s current representation, or 
those that failed to conform to – or keep in step with – the historical narrative that feeds and 
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legitimates this current representation.  Hence, the present’s progress threatens not merely those 
who exist within the current epoch, but those who have died or been killed to fulfill humanity’s 
perfection in the present – it threatens them via a historical amnesia which serves to buttress the 
ideological purposes of history.102  Indeed, with the gaze turned squarely towards the future as a 
realm of quantitative growth, the past – particularly those parts that are already excluded – is 
ignored and forgotten.  
 Benjamin is arguing that universal history is only universal to the extent that one part of 
humanity is represented in the historical narrative, and everything that transcends or negates this 
is excluded and forgotten.  It is in this context that the famous “angel of history” thesis comes to 
have a meaning.  History as the history of progress is the continual catastrophe of the denial of 
humanity’s realization.  The ideology of progress drives us forward, and no matter how 
destructive or dehumanizing the events that transpire along the way are, these are thought to be 
the “cost” of progress itself.  Hence, in the context of the rise of fascism, Benjamin notes the 
peculiarity that people can be amazed that these events are “‘still’ possible.”103  The narrative of 
progress represents such circumstances as external and contingent to history’s overall march.  
Yet, Benjamin sees in fascism the continuation of the singular catastrophe that has to the present 
marred human existence.  Moreover, the continual unwillingness to comprehend or come to 
terms with such experiences – the repetition of them throughout history – perpetuates the 
continual commission of such atrocities.  The angel, as that being potentially capable of 
consecrating and amending history through the recognition and awakening of the dead, appears 
in the metaphor as no match for the gale force winds of progress and is continually pressed 
forward along with the flow of bodies that accrue at its feet for the “sake” of progress.  As we 
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will see with the experience of the crowd, alterity is elided and subjectivity is summarily denied.  
But the figure of the angel contains several clues to unravelling the possibility of the emergence 
of subjectivity.  Indeed, against the flow of progress towards the future, Benjamin sees the angel 
as facing backwards, towards the past.  Moreover, the redemptive capacities of history lie in the 
angel’s own existence in the now through the recognisability that this opens the past up to.  
Within this and within his more general claims about history, Benjamin is demanding a new 
mode of historical perception that can open the past to the present as a realm of alterity and 
dislodgement, outside of a philosophy of possession or imposition. 
V. The Historical Presentism of Now-Time as Monad 
The critique of progress pushes Benjamin towards a historical presentism that sees the 
present as a wholly unique experiential moment – divorced from linear or homogenous 
connections to the past and present – structured by specific ways of thinking and being.  In the 
context of the terminology of constellations, we can now conceptualize the present as a monad, 
representing a specific/particular essence.  But, as monad, this includes a relationality with other 
historical moments.  Empty, homogenous time represents the world as either a linear progression 
of static and self-identical moments via the teleological realization of humanity across time or as 
self-same and devoid of qualitative change or qualitatively different moments.  Benjamin’s 
concept of history signifies the idea that history is itself comprised of monads and, more 
importantly, that the present – its needs and modes of thinking – shapes the beginning of 
understanding the coming into being of the other monads (i.e. the past) and vice versa: the 
present’s interrogation of the past brings it to life.  Within Benjamin’s later lexicon, the present 
as relational monad is referred to as “now-time.”  Now-time represents a wholly unique moment 
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that lacks a continuity with the past,104 for it is only as a separate unit that a relationship can be 
established between the past and present, which is to say that for a relationship of alterity to exist 
the past as other must be conceptualized as truly other than the present.  The presentist element 
of now-time rejects any notion of the purity of the gaze: the past can only be seen from the 
perspective of the present as a unique now, and in its unique engagement with the past.  In this 
sense, Benjamin likens the historian to “a prophet facing backward.”  The essence of this 
metaphor lies in the idea that the prophet’s gaze is structured by the present while rummaging 
through the past – though the transiency of the present often renders this intentionality 
impotent.105  But, intentionality aside, the point is that by virtue of this, Benjamin distances the 
present from the idea that there is an eternal or permanent image of the past.  And, more to the 
point, the intention of the historian is not to dispense with the past, but to make the past present 
as its image flits by during his/her rummaging.   
Benjamin’s conceptual moves thus far are intended to re-think and reconfigure the 
relationship of past and present as a dialectical and constellative one, and this requires that he 
also reconceptualise the very nature of the historical “object.”  In tune with the non-identical 
epistemology at the center of his thought, Benjamin reconfigures the terminology of the object to 
divorce it from possession and identity.  Thinking history through its monadological structure 
allows us to conceive of the relationship of past and present as containing multiple threads 
(which are not linear) and as defying the self-apparentness of the object which lies in wait to be 
known.  Indeed, containing a non-identical essence, the monad represents an entity whose being 
is constantly in flux and structured by its relations to other beings.  This facilitates the 
“Copernican turn in historical perception” whereby history no longer concentrates its forces on a 
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given object to know it as it really was (and already is).  Rather, Benjamin now conceives of 
history as a “not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been”106: a knowledge that is itself in the 
process of being, becoming and disappearance through the very transformation of the 
relationship between the monads within temporality.  This process of transformation is 
fundamentally structured by the character of the monad as “object.”  Indeed, Benjamin likens his 
historical method “to the process of splitting the atom,” which aims to liberate “the enormous 
energies of history that are bound up in the ‘once upon a time’ of classical historiography.”107  It 
is the very monadological structure of the historical object that allows it to break with this “once 
upon a time.”  As a monad, the historical object can be “blasted out of the continuum of 
historical succession,” and its emancipatory value recuperated and redeemed at a higher level of 
actuality through a new historical constellation.108  Benjamin argues that this must occur through 
the object itself, and not merely its conceptual form; in fact, the redemption of the object often 
emerges through its throwing off of the conceptual form (linearity) that limits and inhibits it.  
Benjamin repeatedly refers to this redemption as a political rather than historiographical 
endeavour.  To understand this through the epistemology of the Trauerspiel, we might liken this 
difference to the one between truth and knowledge.  Knowledge, as possessive, aims to 
encapsulate the object/phenomenon.  But it does so without much of a practical purpose, and 
does so through a closed and singular approach.  Truth would seem to know its own limits, and 
aim to represent the phenomena – and to represent them in their monadological relation, and in 
their process of birth and decay.  It is exactly this function that the political reading of history 
entails – and it does so as the redemption of the objects and subjects of history.   
                                                 
106
 Benjamin, Arcades Project, 388-389. 
107
 Ibid., 463. 
108
 Ibid., 474-475. 
 113 
 
Given the transient and non-identical character of the historical object, historical 
perception requires the arrest of progress/time, in order to allow for the present to establish a 
specific and unique relationship to the past.  Hence, rather than being subject to the flow of 
events, time would stand still and structure the very historical perspective that is absent in the 
ideology of progress.  After all, if the image of the past flits by, then time must stand still in 
order to grasp this tempestuous image.  Only through the arrest of time can the continuum of 
history be blasted open.  Indeed, given the pace of progress, and its ideological functioning, the 
past is subject to the desecration of an historical amnesia.  But through the arrest of time, the past 
can be brought into a perceptive relation with the present109 in a manner that transcends this 
amnesia.  Here, Benjamin sees the past attaining a higher plane of being, or acquiring “a higher 
grade of actuality than it had in the moment of its existing.”110  As a failed moment by the 
struggling/oppressed class, this moment did not achieve its actuality.  Within the context of a 
political reading of history, the past emerges as “a moment of humanity”111 – and,  it emerges as 
“a history that is originary for every present.”112  The past emerges only in the now of its 
recognizability, as a non-linear connection in which moments much distanced from the present 
may come into connection with it outside of the medium of the direct, structured, developmental 
connections that exist across empty, homogenous time.  But, in and of itself, this emergence does 
not entail the full redemption of the past: it only achieves a higher actuality by virtue of opening 
up the potential of redemption as recognition.  Indeed, the very notion that history as an object of 
knowledge is determined by the interest the present takes in it opens it up to the possibility of an 
actualizing connection/relationship, by breaking with the flow of events and time that would 
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ultimately pass it by.  By drawing a concrete connection between the moments, even without an 
actualizing redemption, the past-as-object has already attained a higher existence.   
What Benjamin has conceptualized here is a notion of the recognizability of history.  But 
this is not a pre-existent or omnipresent recognition and it seeks to dispense with what Benjamin 
conceives of as the abstract historicity of Heidegger’s approach.  Now-time encloses the present 
within a particular ontological and epistemological field, and it does so to theorize its 
relationship to the past.  In conceiving the past as something that flits by, Benjamin is 
conceptualising “the moment of its recognizability.”113  Again, this rejects any notion of the past 
as an eternal image, and instead aims to convey the uniqueness of the experience, a uniqueness 
tied to temporality as that in which the specific relationship of knower and known comes to be 
(or decays).  And it is the nature of this temporality which necessitates time taking a stand – or 
the idea that the present is not merely a transition, and holds out the possibility of the arrest of 
time as a moment of recognition.114  Within this process, the intentionality of the present as 
subject is denied.  While the historian rummages through the past, it is the past itself that flits by 
and presents itself as recognizable to the now.  And it does so in the moment of its 
recognizability, a moment that is itself not eternal but must be seized at the point of its arising: 
“each ‘now’ is the now of a particular recognizability.”115  This alludes to the importance of 
vision/perception in history: the recognizability of history can be elided by the powers of 
progress that represent the present as a continual transition and efface its relationship with the 
past.  In such cases, the image of the past disappears and is irretrievably lost.  The very 
presentism that Benjamin conceptualizes sees those moments as only perceptible in that specific 
form at the moment of their emergence.  The failure to grasp the image at these moments allows 
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them to recede into the past, and their meaning to decay.  Thus, we find a failure of recognition 
and redemption, one that threatens the knowledge and emancipation of the present and past.   
In aiming to recuperate the past, Benjamin argues that one of the key characteristics of 
historical materialism lies in its “constructive” or “creative” element.  In order to affect a change 
not merely of historical vision but of the course of history, historical materialism aims to rupture 
the triumphant narrative the present has created, to draw it into crisis and to rescue the dead from 
the catastrophe of being forgotten.  Indeed, Benjamin suggests that it is the work of the historical 
materialist to engage and hold fast to the past as it emerges.  In rejecting the identitarian basis of 
historicist thought, he argues that this moment lacks a static or causal epistemological 
foundation.  Rather, historical moments come together in a constellative relationship.  In 
conceiving of this relation within the flow of time itself, Benjamin sees it as a moment of truth in 
which simultaneously knowledge of a past historical moment is brought into a new light and the 
nodal points come together to illuminate one another, but only at that moment of their 
connection.  It is to express this very idea that Benjamin utilizes the terminology of “image”: he 
suggests that the “image” of the past is characterized by its historical index – that is, by the 
particular character and moment of its recognizability/legibility.  Moreover, he argues that the 
now “is determined by the images that are synchronic with it.”116  This suggests the very 
dialogical and monadological character of the relation between historical moments.  Indeed, this 
is not a monological imposition of the present on the past: “it is not that what is past casts light 
on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what 
has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation.  In other words: image is 
dialectics at a standstill.”117  Indeed, the synchronic coming together of moments implies their 
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intersubjective transformation.  Benjamin is thus quick to note that the connection between 
moments, rather than being temporal/continuous, is dialectical and figurative.  Benjamin refers to 
this moment of the dialectical image/constellation as a caesura:118 that is a pause, gap or break in 
time in which the historical object comes into its direct contact with the present.  And this 
moment blasts the present out of its reified continuity and self-proclaimed actualization of 
humanity, recuperating the past by inciting a crisis of history (and historical knowledge).119   
What is established in this caesura is a not-yet-conscious knowledge of the past, which 
brings to light a not-yet-conscious knowledge of the present  – a truth is brought to light that is 
only recognizable as the intersubjective relation between these moments.  In essence, each 
moment becomes pregnant with the others.  Benjamin likens the dialectical image to literary 
texts.  As he quotes Monglond: “the past has left images in literary texts, images comparable to 
those registered by a light-sensitive plate.  The future alone possesses developers active enough 
to scan such surfaces perfectly.”120  This succinctly summarizes the gist of Benjamin’s treatment 
of the non-identity of history itself.  The present generation (or future generations, from the 
perspective of those whom the past has left such light-sensitive images) must “read what was 
never written”121 in drawing out the meaning and truth contained in these images.  This suggests 
the very monadic character of the historical object itself, and the historical materialist only 
confronts the object “where it confronts him as a monad.”122  The monadic character is what 
allows the object to be jarred loose from the historical continuum and read in a different light.  
And, in jarring it loose, the historical materialist “blasts a specific life out of the era, a specific 
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work out of the lifework.”123  Doing so allows the historical to make whole what has been 
fragmented and repressed; moreover, in showing the fragmented character of history, its 
exclusionary quality, history and the object can be made "whole" again.  Indeed, wrenching the 
object from the continuum of historical succession is a process of sublating the object: “the 
lifework is both preserved and sublated in the work, the era in the lifework, and the entire course 
of history in the era.”124  In wrenching these moments from the historicism that would see them 
as a series of transcendences, the moments become parts of a single catastrophe that implicates 
the present in their continued oppression/repression.  Moreover, through this the crisis of the 
present is exposed.  It is only in the context of the caesura that the intersubjectivity of past and 
present may emerge, for in pausing or breaking with the flow of events (like pulling the brake on 
the locomotive of history) the moment of recognizability comes into being rather than fading 
away.  More to the point, the caesura brings the past to light as a moment of shock: “where 
thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that 
constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad.”125  In essence, the image of 
the past that flits up exposes the tensions contained in the present’s image of itself and its 
relationship to the past, and exposes the multiplicity of the monad’s historical capabilities – 
which is to say the multiple histories that emerge with the passing of time.    
In redeeming the past, Benjamin’s constellative epistemology reconfigures the 
juxtaposition of historical moments by completely freeing them from the strictures of 
temporality-as-succession.  But this does not mean that each constellation – as an originary 
formation, informed by the revolutionary conception of progress as caesura or break – is 
disconnected from history.  Rather, each constellation brings into being a non-linear relation of 
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historical monads, a relation that is related to meaning and essence rather than causality: that is, a 
relation that illuminates the meaning or truth of objects, but in their connection to temporality.  
In blasting the object of history out of its enshrinement within the continuity of victors, historical 
materialism sees “the work of the past as still uncompleted.  It perceives no epoch in which that 
work could, even in part, drop conveniently, thing-like, into mankind’s lap.”126  The non-identity 
of the past is contained in the idea that historical objects contain secret meanings not apparent to 
those who first discovered them.  Redeeming the past entails utilizing it for new purposes outside 
of its enshrinement as self-aggrandizement of the present.  This alludes to the break with 
contemplativeness: the object is a practical and open being, rather than a whole object that can 
fall into the lap of the historian for the possessive purposes of asserting its identity and absolute 
truth.  The originary character of every constellation includes the originary historical relation that 
it inaugurates.  Indeed, in wrenching it from its context, Benjamin argues that the very bowels of 
the object – its inner connections – enter into a new relation, due to its monadological 
structure.127  Thus, in breaking the object from the continuity of succession, the present affects a 
break in the connective tissues of historical phenomenon.  In essence, the now of recognizability 
opens up the object, breaking its self-sameness and its fixity, showing that either the object itself 
or fragments of its very being are excluded from the triumphal narrative.  Here, we find the 
science of origin coming into play: the object, which now emerges in its non-identity, becomes a 
dialectical object.  Indeed, the becoming and disappearance of the object shows its subjection to 
continual change; but it is still beholden upon the history of origins to trace out this process of 
becoming and the manner in which it transforms the object.  This involves two procedures.  First, 
it must unravel the very disappearance and coming into being of the object itself.  Essentially, the 
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emergence brings to light the recognizability of the origins themselves, for as Benjamin notes: 
“threads can become lost, only to be picked up again by the present course of history in a 
disjointed and inconspicuous way.”128  Thus, the present – by virtue of drawing into being a new 
meaning or essence of the object – effects a change in the very origins of the historical moment 
itself.  But, second, this also changes the connection of the moments to the present, affecting 
changes in the very origin of the present.  This is what Benjamin intends to convey when he 
argues that historical objects “integrate their fore-history as well as their after-history; and it is 
by virtue of their after-history that their fore-history is recognizable as involved in a continuous 
process of change.”129   
 In drawing out his presentist perspective, and locating the origins of the process of 
change, Benjamin states: “It is the present that polarizes the event into fore and after-history.”130  
It is the present that affects, or draws out, the monadological structure of the past and its relation 
to the present.  But it is the historical materialist’s goal to draw the past into the present, 
interpenetrating the two moments.  In these respects, in accordance with their monadic character, 
each moment comes to refract and express the other.  The present imbibes and absorbs its fore-
history, a fore-history that only emerges as a function of the now-of-recognizability of the 
moment of connection, which is to say the dialectical image.  In recognizing the past, the 
dialectical image emerges as something charged with the polarizing character of its fore-history 
and after-history.  The fore-history emerges – always anew – in accordance with the character of 
the present, as it interpenetrates via its emergence in the now of recognizability.131  But this 
fundamentally ruptures the existent character of its after-history, for the transiency and 
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uniqueness of the present must force a new relation.  This becomes particularly pertinent in 
rupturing the direction of “progress” that had characterized the historical role of the present prior 
to this rupture.  The now of recognizability creates a unique connection between the present and 
the past, and affects a break in the historical continuum with the direction of “progress” in the 
present: it entails a transformation of the after-history of the present monad as well, for the 
dialectical image affects a transformation in the interconnections and the meanings contained in 
them.  By interspersing the past with the present, the present is portrayed as that which has failed 
to actualize the past for it only reigns via its own repression and repulsion of the past.  Here, the 
dialectical image – the image of the past perceived from the position of the crisis of the present – 
is an image filled with tensions which ruptures the fundamentally compartmentalized or 
empty/homogenous character of historical moments in bringing forth an entirely new 
constellation.132  The after-history of the present comes to be – and comes to be read – through 
this confrontation.  But, in these terms, the dialectical image exhibits a synthetic character133: the 
collision of monads affects a transformation of the nodal points contained in the constellations, 
as well as their relational connections (that is, their fore-history and after-history).  In redeeming 
the past, the present ruptures its self-same and embedded character, opening it up to its non-
identity and alterity (its other being).  But, by virtue of opening up the meaning of the past, the 
past imposes on the present the alterity of history and the ethical demand (the redemption of the 
past) that opens up the very tripartite alterity of the present: its relation to the past (as an ethical 
demand that needs to be answered), its relation to itself (its non-identity, and its own redemption 
from the fixity of the ideology of progress) and, predicated upon these first two, its alterity to a 
synthetic and fundamentally new mode of being in general (to the utopia of a future). 
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VI. Constellating Merleau-Ponty: Re-Phenomenologizing the Flesh 
We have taken a fairly long digression here, and much of it will need to be unravelled in 
the next two chapters.  What I hope to have established is a rather simple, but central, claim by 
Benjamin, through the mediation of Lukács and Korsch: under modern conditions the totality of 
life comes to be permeated by the commodity structure of capitalism, with its reifying effects; 
but these very categories are only real, discernable and applicable from the specific approach or 
vantage point of capitalism itself – from its specific forms of being and knowledge.  This is the 
central point through which we need to understand Benjamin’s approach to the body: it 
establishes the present as a monad, containing a particular configuration of a particular field of 
experience.  The question we must answer is: what becomes of the living functioning of the flesh 
within its existent field of experience, within the conditions of the specific historical functioning 
of capitalism and its commodity structure?  And, following that, how does Benjamin attempt to 
reconceive “history” itself via his monadological approach as containing the possibilities of a 
future utopia?  Benjamin’s writings on Baudelaire present a concentrated attempt to link bodily 
experience to the specific experience of capitalism, and it is to them that I will turn in the next 
chapter to answer the first question.  And I will turn to the Arcades Project and ‘Theses on the 
Concept of History’ in the fourth chapter to answer the second question.  However, we must first 
briefly return to Merleau-Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work is not devoid of an acknowledgement of the historical character of 
being and intersubjective relations.  In Phenomenology of Perception, he asserted the historical 
nature of being, and sought to enclose this being in a phenomenal field devoid of the abstractions 
of a-historical and purely intuitive/introspective thinking: “The first philosophical act would 
appear to be to return to the world of actual experience which is prior to the objective 
world…restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways of 
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dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history.”134  As I noted in the previous 
chapter, Merleau-Ponty was concerned with “the real relationships between people in our 
societies.”135  Reading this sentiment in concert with the passage from Phenomenology suggests 
the need to understand the concrete relations between self-others-things as they exist in our 
historically charged field of experience, and as modes of habit or being-in-the-world.136  To this 
same end, Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Marx shows an attunement to the historically constituted 
character of being.  As he states: “Marx’s entire effort in Das Kapital is directed precisely to 
showing that [the laws of classical economics], often presented as the permanent features of a 
‘social nature,’ are really the attributes (and the masks) of a certain ‘social structure,’ 
capitalism[.]”137  As with Benjamin’s critique of Bergson,138 we find a concern over the 
treatment of an ontic reality as a permanent feature of existence.  Far from being merely a 
concern aimed at classical economics, Merleau-Ponty extends this to “physical nature.”  As he 
argues, even “modern physics only conceives its laws within the framework of a certain 
historical state of the universe,” a state which is not permanent.139  Nature, as a dialectical and 
not an idealist or dualist entity, is inseparable from human perception and action – though also 
co-existent and co-constitutive of/with it. 
Yet, if these passages present us with a framework for discerning the historically specific 
character of the present moment through the simultaneous assertion of subjectivity’s inherence in 
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history and the discovery of a fundamental phenomenological trinity (self-others-things), 
Merleau-Ponty offers virtually no elaboration on what effect this historicality may have on the 
specific functioning of the flesh under particular historical moments.  With all of his emphasis on 
the phenomenological principle of the lived body, we rarely find in Merleau-Ponty’s work an 
elaboration or exploration of the way the body/flesh lives under capitalism.  In attempting to 
delineate an ontology of pre-objective or savage/brute being, his work often takes on an abstract 
and a- or un-historical character.  Certainly, this is not to say that Merleau-Ponty ignores the 
existence of capitalism, history or historicity.  In what we may deem his overtly political texts – 
namely Sense and Nonsense, Humanism and Terror and Adventures of the Dialectic – Merleau-
Ponty is much attuned to capitalism and history.  Yet, he dodges the question of the specifically 
historical character of the flesh/body/experience itself.   
The omission of a political/critical reading of the historicality of the flesh is reproduced 
to the point of exaggerated hyperbole in the secondary literature.140  Lawrence Hass’s Merleau-
Ponty’s Philosophy is representative of the political neglect that often permeates the 
philosophical and ethical readings of Merleau-Ponty.141  Hass – perhaps admittedly – accentuates 
the disjunction between ontology and politics/history.  His treatment of Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the dynamic between self-others-things draws out its richness, noting the 
interweaving of these nodes of existence and asserting their character as a contingent though 
“living” reality; but the avowed historicity is presented as an abstract and symbiotic relationship 
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devoid of historical/political/social determination or situation.  That said, Hass readily argues 
against the sort of social constitution of the body he sees in Foucault’s work.  As he states, 
“Foucault’s explicit insistence that society is ‘totally constitutive’ of one’s body, imposing all 
form and definition, renders the body essentially passive and formless, a contentless material 
substrate, a ‘blank slate.’”142  Against this, Hass asserts – via Merleau-Ponty – the active nature 
of the body: “It surges up toward the world through ‘its stable organs and pre-established 
circuits.’  It is an organic being, with a basic structure that makes certain actions possible and 
other actions utterly impossible...Incorporation transpires not by external imposition of form, but 
by repetition and application in relation to social practices and forms.”143  Obviously, Hass is not 
merely implying that the body exists in a non-situated void, and he calls for an “inter-dynamic” 
account of the body and its constitution.  In these respects, he admits to a lesser (and less 
hyperbolic) version of Foucault’s critique: that while he may have a political theory, Merleau-
Ponty lacks a politics of the body.   As Hass states, “there is little or no recognition by Merleau-
Ponty that culture coerces our bodies in a political way.  This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty 
doesn’t have a political theory, for he does.  What he doesn’t have is a political theory of the 
body.  That is, he is missing a ‘body politics’ – and this is a serious omission.”144 
  Leaving aside Hass' total neglect of Merleau-Ponty's political theory and political 
writings, if we focus on his defence of Merleau-Ponty against Foucault’s “constructionist” 
critique, we find that he seems little interested in these political questions, as he slides into the 
sort of dualist reading of Merleau-Ponty that would separate his philosophy/ontology from 
politics.  His defence centres on the assertion of a set of “organs and pre-established circuits” (“a 
brain and central nervous system that develop, function and dysfunction in identifiable patterns”) 
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that respond to and resist external phenomenon.  Certainly, he argues, this system is adaptable 
and able to “incorporate new behaviours and cultural forms, such as dancing and bike riding.”  
These incorporations occur through “repetition and application in relation to social practices and 
norms.”145  But this line of argument shows the politically neutered nature of the philosophical 
reading of Merleau-Ponty.  While Hass admits to the adaptability of organs and circuits – albeit 
in a-political and mundane acts like bike riding and dancing – he fails to acknowledge that these 
organs and circuits may be deformed and short-circuited through repetition and application in 
response to historically specific social environments and experiences.  This deformation and 
short-circuiting goes beyond the mere “dysfunction” that may result from the body’s inability to 
adapt to certain tasks, or to achieve certain goals that are impossible by virtue of the way in 
which the body functions.  But this very question of the im/possibility of the body’s functioning 
as an organ, is no more a standard set of capabilities than it is a blank slate: it is a question of 
historically situated and constituted being, even to the extent that the body resists, adapts to or 
alters its present organization and functioning.  Hass fails to acknowledge this, and fails to probe 
the ontological and phenomenological import of Merleau-Ponty’s political work. 
As Diana Coole points out, feminist scholars have often critiqued Merleau-Ponty for this 
precise point, for he appears to fail to account for historically specific power relations (such as 
gender), instead providing an abstract (and de-subjectified) account of the body and its 
capacities.  With respects to gender, Judith Butler argues that “Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
the ‘subject’ is…problematic in virtue of its abstract and anonymous status, as if the subject 
described were a universal subject or structured existing subjects universally.  Devoid of a 
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gender, this subject is presumed to characterize all genders.”146  In rebutting this and reading 
Merleau-Ponty through Husserl’s claims about phenomenology, Coole notes that “the 
phenomenologist must operate on different levels, sometimes focusing on the general structures 
of the lifeworld and sometimes describing the genesis of particular forms therein.”147  The 
implicit ontology of Phenomenology of Perception and the explicit ontology of The Visible and 
the Invisible148 subject being to an epoché/bracketing which aims to grasp existence independent 
of its contingent manifestations – hence, to avoid treating gender and capitalism (or the 
philosophies that express/signify them) as natural, they are taken out of the equation at the basic 
level of pre-reflective ontology (a level that breaks with the reigning dualism of subject/object 
that would treat these characteristics as static binaries of a naturalist or linguistic/discursive 
variety).149  But in aiming to capture the “particular experiences” at the concrete-
phenomenological level, this approach demands that we re-introduce them to deepen the 
ontological analysis.  If the general contours of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology aim to describe the 
possibilities of agentic capacities,150 the phenomenological description of concrete/lived being-
in-the-world is merely a further layer of concretion for the ontological being described in 
abstraction.  In describing the chiasmatic intertwining of the body and the sensible, the flesh and 
the field of force it inhabits, Coole notes the mimetic intermingling that occurs – though notes 
that it contains both freedom and inertia, resistance and reification.151  Yet, she does not offer a 
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phenomenological reading of the flesh under capitalism,152 and it is in hopes of developing one 
that I turn to Benjamin’s work: I aim to use Benjamin as a complement or another 
layer/dimension of the flesh of Merleau-Ponty’s work.    
 When embedded within the historicality elaborated above, Benjamin’s work may be 
ideally suited for developing the phenomenological implications of the flesh because of the very 
way in which he aims to write philosophy.  As we have already seen in our brief encounter with 
‘Motifs,’ Benjamin is centrally concerned with understanding the ways in which history affects 
the psychophysical experience of situated being.  Moreover, with the adoption of the idea of 
reification from Lukács and historical specification from Korsch, his approach is concerned to 
understand the specific configuration of the historical nature of the relationship between self-
others-things in this nexus of experience.  And, in these respects, Benjamin’s “philosophy” 
provides us with an opposing entry point to Merleau-Ponty’s: rather than starting with the 
questions of philosophy or being-qua-being, Benjamin writes philosophy/being through concrete 
history.  This method had already permeated some of his earlier, experiential writings.  As 
Benjamin said of his Moscow essay: “[A]ll theory will be kept far from my presentation…I want 
to present the city of Moscow at the present moment in such a way that ‘everything factual is 
already theory’…thereby refraining from all deductive abstraction, all prognosis, and even, 
within limits, all judgements.”153  If we take this intention to still be present in his writings on 
Baudelaire and the Paris of the 19th century, we find that he intends to allude to theoretical 
contentions without spoon-feeding them to his readers.  The intention here seems to be to 
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preserve the non-identical character – the depth of experiential content – so central to what 
Benjamin deems “storytelling,” which I will explore in the next chapter.   
Ultimately, then, the error in attempting to find an abstract or “first philosophy” of the 
body in Benjamin’s work lies in its failure to grasp that his seminal works in fact aim to jettison 
this very way of writing philosophy.  As Buck-Morss argues, Benjamin attempted to write 
philosophy through history154 – that is, he sought to provide a “phenomenological hermeneutics 
of the profane world,” a phenomenology of everyday experience.155  Indeed, Benjamin’s work 
sought to expose the very experiences of bourgeois life outside of their reified and naturalized 
forms and historical narratives.  And he sought to do this via a peculiarly phenomenological 
methodology: “Method of this literary project: literary montage.  I needn’t say anything.  Merely 
show.  I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations.  But the rags, the 
refuse – these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by 
making use of them.”156  This begins with the radically historical, phenomenological epoché that 
his historical method constitutes, divorcing the various historical moments from one another in 
order to avoid the teleological and naturalizing implications of progress and development.  This 
facilitates the interrogation of these historical moments outside of any presupposed temporal 
direction.  In exposing these phenomena through something akin to phenomenological 
description, he focused on fragments and the seemingly ordinary as experiential moments that 
betrayed the peculiarity and reality of bourgeois existence; and, in showing them in relation to 
one another, he sought to preserve their independent significance/meaning outside of any 
totalizing logic, while still connecting them to one another.  This very “methodology,” 
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particularly as it permeates Benjamin’s later, more “materialist” works, can perhaps be blamed 
for the contention that he is not properly a philosopher, or cannot be deemed to be engaging in 
“philosophy.”157  But, as Richard Wolin argues regarding Benjamin’s early elaboration of the 
concept of constellations, Benjamin seeks to achieve new truths at the noumenal level through 
the juxtaposition of phenomenal material.158  As we will see in the next chapter, the intention in 
focusing on seemingly disparate phenomena (storytelling, factory labour, gambling and the 
encounter with the crowd) is to draw out a philosophical truth from their investigation and 
interconnection (the decline of bodily experience).  In these respects, the temporal and 
phenomenal dimension come to have an “ontological” primacy for Benjamin and it is impossible 
to talk about the structure of being or the a priori functioning of the body: the body is always 
historically situated – or there is always a historically specific functioning of the body.  This is 
not to say that Benjamin was oblivious to theoretical insights, or that his own work was not 
informed by philosophical – and, more specifically, psychoanalytical – motifs.  Indeed, the last 
draft of Benjamin’s Baudelaire essay, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ aimed to draw these into 
the open to correct what Theodor Adorno viewed as the positivistic character of the earliest draft 
(‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire’).  This theoretical insertion into the final version 
will help guide us through Benjamin’s thought process in adding some concretion to the theory 
of the flesh.  
*   *   * 
 
 To understand Benjamin’s approach to the body it is necessary to approach the body’s 
functioning as a specifically historical entity: to consider it as a living flesh, whose shifting 
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character constitutes and is constituted by the field of experience within which we find it.  In 
drawing from Benjamin’s adoption of aspects of Lukács’ and Korsch’s approaches to Marxism, 
we find him trying to locate the body in the very specific field of a capitalist system rooted in a 
commodity structure and the reifying effects it produces.  It is with this in mind that I turn my 
attention to Benjamin’s work on Baudelaire, to see what his historico-phenomenological 
approach can contribute to a critical understanding of the flesh – and to supply it with a political 
import.  But the question that we need to ponder before turning to Benjamin’s phenomenology of 
capitalist experience and its complementary relationship to Merleau-Ponty’s ontological and 
phenomenological concerns, is whether Benjamin’s work allows such a rapprochement.  In 
particular, does Benjamin’s concrete philosophical approach resist the abstract character of 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology?  Or, is Merleau-Ponty’s ontology another variant of the Heideggarian 
ahistorical historicity159 that Benjamin intended to confront?   
 Critical theory has posed a number of criticisms of phenomenology (and its ontological 
counterparts) that would suggest an uneasy, if not entirely irreconcilable, divide between the two 
approaches.  There are at least three general critiques rendered against phenomenology,160 
though they are not mutually exclusive.  First, phenomenology takes ontic structures and treats 
them as ontological a prioris, in essence “naturalizing” the particular characteristics of existing 
lifeworlds.  Second, in doing so, it succumbs to bourgeois individualism, presenting subjects as 
individual consciousnesses (focusing on the intentionality of individual experience).  Third, and 
again related, it oscillates between idealism/subjectivism and realism/objectivism in a 
contradictory manner.  Rolling out of its individualist fix, phenomenology asserts the 
transcendental and/or constitutive character of consciousness (the ontically ever same character 
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of the individual) at the same time as it aims to get back to “the things themselves,” which would 
defy the transcendental and constituting character of consciousness.  And, in this sense, it seeks 
to assert that reality can be exhausted, or grasped as a whole – as an “in-itself.”  In sum, it 
presents an identity of subject and object that excludes mediation.   
When not directed at phenomenology generally, these criticisms by Adorno, Benjamin 
and Herbert Marcuse are directed variously at Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre.161  Benjamin’s 
incorporation of a “phenomenological” method sought to avoid succumbing to these criticisms.  
But are they applicable to Merleau-Ponty?  It would appear that Merleau-Ponty’s approach 
manages to avoid them, even if his work requires the phenomenological and critical deepening 
that Benjamin can supply.  To begin with, Merleau-Ponty’s work was always attuned to the same 
principles of Marxian social critique that drove much of the thought of Benjamin and the 
members of the Institute for Social Research, while Marx failed to make a positive impression on 
the phenomenologists162 they criticized.  In these respects, Merleau-Ponty remained attuned to 
the problems of capitalist society, and sought to avoid ontologizing its ontic features.  In this 
vein, as we saw with Coole, the phenomenological reduction was intended to avoid the very 
naturalizing features that other approaches saw as the core of experience and, in these respects, 
Merleau-Ponty sought to unmask the reality that the various forms of bourgeois thought sought 
to eternalize.  Moreover, in describing being as open, Merleau-Ponty placed primacy on the 
becoming of being, its constant transformation in and through time via different types of “being,” 
human relations and human community.  Thus, he asserted the hyperdialectic as a means to 
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accounting for the variability of being in and through time.163  And, in these respects, Merleau-
Ponty’s early phenomenology and later ontology of the flesh assert the perennial 
intertwining/mediation of “subject” and “object” – the idea that the subject is in and of the world, 
and that the object is an inextricable part of its existence but not entirely determining.  Rejecting 
the transparency of the self/consciousness, its detachment from the world, or its “creation” of it, 
this defies the constitutive and transcendental character of “consciousness.”  By understanding 
consciousness as embodied and in and of the world, as well as constantly in the process of 
transcending itself, Merleau-Ponty rejects any closure of knowledge, locating knowledge itself 
within the specificity of situations (which are the very condition of possibility of knowledge).164  
Here, truth lies in the process of uncovering and making it. 
From the Benjaminian perspective we may in fact see Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as 
presenting something approaching a non-identical first nature rooted in the primordial 
ontological space of originary belonging that can dislodge and disjoint the capitalist second 
nature that Benjamin aims to expose.  To undermine the second nature of capitalism implies that 
there is something “other” than it, even if we cannot name exactly what it is.  The indeterminate 
character of the flesh represents this other, both in undermining the supremacy of capitalist 
being’s claims to a first nature and in defying “nature's” own claims to permanency or to the 
status of a mythical entrenchment.165  Moreover, rooted in a phenomenological perspective, the 
flesh does not purport to be the unsullied being of some primordial community.  Rather, it seeks 
to explain the very structure of being and experience in the first place, and does so by 
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characterizing it as open to myriad possibilities including the negation of the original sociality 
that Merleau-Ponty posits.  In these respects, as we will see, Benjamin aims to expose the 
mortification of being and experience under the reign of capitalist reification, in the service of 
bringing into being something else.  But, that “something else” remains underexplored in 
Benjamin’s work.  Indeed, while presenting a critical, phenomenological approach that seeks to 
understand the historically specific experiences of capitalist oppression, Benjamin lacks an 
ethical optic/potential contained in a body politics166 (or politics of the flesh), and more 
specifically in an explicit theory of intersubjectivity.  In this vein, reading Benjamin’s work 
through the lenses of intersubjectivity will bring new contours to it and help to break with the 
problematic conceptions of the Lukácsian identical subject-object, opening up being to its non-
identical groundings.  In essence, Merleau-Ponty’s fails to provide a historical optic capable of 
critically undermining capitalist being (though hints at it), while Benjamin lacks an 
ethical/political optic capable of transcending capitalist being (though hints at it).  In reading 
Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin together, I seek to unite their ethico-political and critical optics.  
Hence, rather than seeing these two approaches as irreconcilable, we may see them as the 
embodiment of a dialectics at a standstill. 
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Chapter 3 
Mortifying the Flesh: 
Benjamin’s Phenomenology of Capitalist Experience 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“As I study this age which is so close to us and so remote, I compare myself to a surgeon operating with 
local anaesthetic: I work in areas that are numb, dead – yet the patient is alive and can still talk.”1  
-Paul Morand, cited by Benjamin in the Arcades Project. 
 
 In the Communist Manifesto, Marx presents his classic argument for the proletariat’s 
emergence as a subject.  As an oppressed class, and the objectified and immanent product of 
capitalism, the social system itself provides the means/conditions – namely, the organization of 
large masses via factory labour and urbanization amidst their continual immiseration and 
exploitation – under which it may become revolutionary (i.e. produce it as a subject-in-itself).  
But it is only through the development of class consciousness that these possibilities can become 
a practical force, and the proletariat can become an active and conscious collective subject (i.e. a 
class-for-itself).  This only comes about through the conscious recognition that the same 
conditions of life permeate the existence of “others” like them: the workers come to see others 
who are exploited and subject to the dictates of capitalism, just as they are.  Yet, the key 
assumption contained in this is that the proletariat is capable of recognizing the common 
demands (intersubjective and ethical) of others in the first place: the idea that through the process 
of capitalism’s concentration of the proletariat in a given locale under specific conditions, the 
proletariat is capable of the sensuous recognition of others at all.  This assumption seems to be at 
the core of Merleau-Ponty’s work as well, for in locating the sensuous circuit of 
phenomenological life in the nexus of self-others-things, we presume that these others – this 
outside – is readily apparent, and not subject to misrecognition or failed recognition through the 
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short-circuiting of the flesh via its historical embodiments.  In both cases, there is the seeming 
assumption that the corporeal and perceptive capacities of subjects are in no way corrupted.   
 In providing us with a phenomenological approach to the historically specific features of 
capitalist experience, Benjamin finds that this process of recognition is upset through the 
reifiying effects of capitalism, which do not merely “veil” the reality of class oppression but 
mortify the flesh of living beings.  Consequently, there emerges a stunting of the possibilities of 
collective subjectivity within the immanent conditions of capitalism.  Like Morand, Benjamin 
plays out the role of a surgeon, working through and diagnosing those experiential areas that 
have been numbed or deformed under modern conditions.  But as with all anaesthecization, this 
is not the assertion of the death of the patient: it is conducted with the intention of resuscitating 
them and curing their maladies.  In order to cut open the patient – the modern subject – Benjamin 
enlists the help of Proust, Freud and Baudelaire, figures who maintain an uneven presence in his 
work.  Proust, while not an ever-present figure, is something of a recurring character – even 
being the central figure in at least one of Benjamin’s writings.  Freud occupies a subterranean 
place, often underpinning Benjamin’s analysis, but only occasionally emerging outwardly in a 
handful of essays.  Baudelaire occupies a central place in Benjamin’s later writings: ‘Convolute 
J: Baudelaire’ is the largest section of the Arcades Project, and Baudelaire is the central figure in 
a number of completed texts Benjamin wrote surrounding it.   
 As Benjamin states: “What I propose is to show how Baudelaire lies embedded in the 
nineteenth century.”2  He uses the image of Baudelaire to shock us from taking for granted our 
own experiences, and to alienate those experiences from our usual associations.  But 
understanding Baudelaire requires the help of Proust and Freud, a trinity that emerges in its full 
breadth in ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.’  In producing an image of Baudelaire’s life, 
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Benjamin’s work aims to situate it within the emergent capitalist context of 19th century Paris, 
illustrating the changing forms of literature, modes of socio-economic being and experience that 
were existent while Baudelaire was producing his key literary texts, Les Fleurs du mal and Paris 
Spleen.  In these respects, Benjamin draws attention to Baudelaire’s resistance, and capitulation, 
to these emerging tendencies.  This is not an antiquarian focus on a figure for purely literary or 
poetic purposes.  Rather, the image of Baudelaire – as read through some motifs in Proust and 
Freud – stands out as a representative of the decline of experience/sensibility, a representative of 
its anesthetization. This decline is evident in both new literary forms and their aesthetic 
reception, as well as in the modes of memory and experience that permeate capitalism.  To 
elaborate on this, Benjamin develops a psychoanalytic approach to the body, its specific 
responses to the phenomenon of capitalism and the ways this contracts the experiential and 
perceptive capacities of the body.  Rather than expressing the grandiose, electric character of 
worldly experience, Benjamin finds a world of deadened senses and mortified beings.  In 
developing these themes, Benjamin’s work adds a historical dimension that has far reaching 
political implications that affect our reading of the flesh.  Centrally, we will find that the 
sensuous circuit of self-others-things is replaced by the reified relation of mortified beings to one 
another.  Under these circumstances the experience of one’s own body, and of others, is elided 
and the intersubjective relation is summarily denied. 
I. Signs of Decline: Experience and Storytelling 
Central to understanding Benjamin’s work on the decline of experience is the story of the 
decline of storytelling itself.  For Benjamin, storytelling is an inherently multifaceted, 
experiential and relational act.  In the first place, the story itself aims to convey an experience.  
This experience – “passed on from mouth to mouth” – may speak of the traveller’s experiences 
of a distant land, or it may tell “local tales and traditions.”  Regardless of which one, the 
 137 
 
“orientation toward practical matters” is key.  Indeed, Benjamin contends that the story 
“contains, openly or covertly, something useful.”3  Thus, it is a form of “counsel” that “embeds 
the event in the life of the storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening.”4  In 
these respects, the story itself bears the marks of the storyteller: it contains the non-identical 
depth that defies the “in itself” of absolute events.  To relate the story as an “in itself” would 
simply be to recount an event with no practical orientation and no counsel, as merely the 
presentation of a set of facts surrounding some isolated occurrence.  The story is, rather, 
characterized by the perennial to-be-continued of non-identity.  Indeed, each storyteller crafts 
her/his product like an artisan, producing the story in a specific way.  S/he may present the story 
as something that happened to themself, something that they witnessed or merely as a parable.  
But the point is that the story is presented so that it can be assimilated by the audience as a useful 
experience for their own practical living.  How the story carries on owes something to the way 
the story is continually transmitted by new storytellers to new audiences, and how this form of 
counsel is used by its audience.  Hence, the experience of storytelling is re-doubled: it not only 
tells a story of experience, but is an experiential act itself.  Both storyteller and listener engage in 
the act face to face as embodied beings, and the story is continually altered by their interaction.5  
Thus, there is an inherently collective and intersubjective character to the experience of 
storytelling, and the experience assimilated from the story itself: there is a relation between 
storyteller and audience, and storyteller and story, both of which are mediated by and through 
each other, and there is – at the same time – the relationship of audience to storyteller and 
audience to story.  We may say, in relating this to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
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intersubjectivity, that in this collision of experience all of the subjects involved (storyteller, 
audience and story) are ultimately altered and disjointed from their own being in the process.6 
Benjamin’s concern is ultimately with the decline of storytelling’s particular mode of 
literary/aesthetic expression, reception and experience.  Indeed, he begins ‘The Storyteller’ with 
a lamentation: “Familiar though his name may be to us, the storyteller in his living efficacy is by 
no means a force today.  He has already become something remote from us and is moving ever 
further away.”7  Benjamin argues that storytelling is in a precipitous decline, if it is not already 
dead.  The emergence of print production created the conditions of possibility for the novel, and 
ultimately changed the conditions of possibility for literary experience itself.  As Benjamin 
states: “What distinguishes the novel from all other forms of prose literature – the fairy tale, the 
legend, even the novella – is that it neither comes from oral tradition nor enters into it.”  Indeed, 
the entire structure of storytelling was predicated upon the direct transmission of experience, in 
which the experience of the storyteller became the experience of the audience.  Here, we 
assimilate the story in the company of others.  Moreover, in this environment we forget ourselves 
– enraptured in the experience of others, or in the rhythm of the artisan work that often 
accompanied storytelling – so “the more deeply what [we listen] to is impressed upon [our] 
memory.”8  In listening, we imbibed so as to transmit that experience.  In the novel, neither 
author nor audience encounter one another.  One does not read a novel in the company of others: 
they read alone.  Likewise, the author of the novel “has secluded himself.  The birthplace of the 
novel is the individual in his isolation, the individual who can no longer speak of his concerns in 
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exemplary fashion, who himself lacks counsel and can give none.”9  Consequently, “we have no 
counsel either for ourselves or for others.”10  Benjamin here presents a unique understanding of 
counsel and wisdom, for he contends that these are both things that novel characters such as Don 
Quixote lack.  The novel is inherently tied to the principle of time; in these respects, it has a 
definitive end point.  But this end generally suggests an answer, and in the novel this end 
proposes some sort of answer to the questions posed by the meaning of life.  But it is also the 
meaning of a life isolated from us – its focus is “one hero, one odyssey or one battle.”  Hence, 
the warmth that we derive from the novel – no matter how didactic – is largely a cathartic 
denouement.  By contrast, the counsel of the story refers to diffuse heroes and occurrences; it is 
“less an answer to a question than a proposal concerning the continuation of a story which is in 
the process of unfolding.”11  Rather than providing us with knowledge of the events that 
transpired, the story provides us with the wisdom to carry on the unfolding of the story: “counsel 
woven into the fabric of real life is wisdom.”12  Thus, the decay of counsel for ourselves comes 
from the non-counsel based knowledge that is expressed in the novel; but the lack of counsel for 
others comes from the very manner in which we take in and process the novel.  According to 
Benjamin, “in this solitude of his, the reader of a novel seizes upon his material more jealously 
than anyone else.  He is ready to make it completely his own – to devour it, as it were.”13  This 
devouring for one’s own cathartic purposes represents a distinct departure from the assimilation 
of the story which depended upon relaxation and boredom.  The story goes beyond the 
herme(neu)tically sealed form and content of the novel.  
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 Yet, the novel is itself brought into crisis by the emergence of a different form of 
communication: information.  Information represents a more stark departure from storytelling, 
and something of its opposite or counterpoint.  As Benjamin states, “the prime requirement is 
that [information] appear ‘understandable in itself.’”14  In essence, the move from the story to 
information is tantamount to the move from the non-identity of meanings and their intertwining 
with the “subject” that comes to know the meaning of these objects to the pure identity of the 
object in-itself.  Information must appear as “understandable in itself,” and to do this it is “shot 
through with explanations.”15  But, by consequence of this, it is distanced from the realm of 
experience in general – from that of the receiver and that of the presenter.  Storytelling evaded 
these explanations and left itself open to the assimilation and processing of occurrences for the 
purposes of wisdom in living.  Information merely presents us with the facts of an event, and 
aims to present the material as completely exhausted: there are to appear no mysteries 
surrounding information.  In these respects, it is also momentary and fleeting: its value “does not 
survive the moment in which it was new.”16  In explaining the essence of an event, information 
cannot outlive its own espousal.  The non-identity of the story, its continued ambiguity, was 
centrally directed at presenting the audience with something that – no matter how “distant” 
geographically or temporally – may provide them with a counsel that could be woven into the 
fabric of real life; with the disappearance of this, all we imbibe is a fleeting knowledge that 
quickly gives way to the next event. 
Modern newspapers represent the climactic victory of information over storytelling and 
the novel.  The general intention of newspapers is to provide brief news items, re-counting 
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events in an objective style that focuses on “newness, brevity, clarity.”17  Again, the intention 
here is to convey the pure in-itself of events, explaining all that can be known about the event.  
The manner of writing is not conducive to any sort of imagination or openness.  These features 
assure that the event/information is not assimilated into the experience of the reader: it is an 
account of an event – and a series of scattered and disconnected events – that occurs in the 
world, and not in the experiential nexus of the reader.  Moreover, that “newness” is necessary to 
avoid the obsolescence of the previous day’s newspaper assures that these events are, generally 
speaking, not intended to enter into tradition – there is a transiency to newspapers, a never 
ending necessity to provide something new.  But the different character of newspapers-as-
information also rings through in the way in which they are received.  As Benjamin notes, 
initially single newspapers were not available for purchase and people were forced to subscribe 
or “go to a café, where often several people stood around reading one copy.”18  This changed 
with the introduction of lower subscription costs: newspapers became more accessible and could 
be read in isolation from other individuals.  Ultimately, this destroys the intersubjective 
experience contained in the story, replacing it with the objective and isolated non-experience of 
newspapers.  But we likewise find the decline of the conditions of possibility for the sharing of 
experience – the decline of the capacity to imbibe or express experience.  As Benjamin argues, 
the intersubjective relation between listener and storyteller “is controlled by [the listener’s] 
interest in retaining what he is told.”19  This interest is also linked to the listener’s intention to 
potentially tell the story himself.  Newspapers destroy this experiential nexus by mass producing 
their product so that there is no story that anyone needs to share with another: the transmission of 
information on a “mouth to mouth” basis is usurped.  But simultaneously – and this connects to 
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the nature of information itself – the ability to listen and remember declines.  Information itself is 
of course never assimilated as the listener’s or teller’s own experience in the first place.  The 
rapid fire nature of information’s continual pursuit of the new, and the over-exhaustion of its 
content (that is, its tearing of the event away from the realm in which it could be assimilated), 
resists memory’s full assimilation.  Moreover, the mode of reception alters the manner in which 
memory aims to imbibe it in the first place.  Benjamin contends that “the process of assimilation, 
which takes place in the depths, requires a state of relaxation which is becoming rarer and 
rarer.”20  This state of relaxation is linked to boredom, which is something that drives our need 
for experience.  In artisan work, the story was told to pass time.  With information, rather than 
passing time in an experience that we engage with, we are bombarded with an information 
overload – with the overload of information dissociated from the realm of experience, but 
intricately tied to the realm of facts to be devoured.  The interactive character of experience is 
thus summarily denied, and our ability to engage with genuine experiences ultimately erodes. 
Thus, in the decline of storytelling, Benjamin ultimately explains the decline of 
intersubjective relations and the decline of experience in its literary form.  But Benjamin’s 
concern is not merely with the change in terms of literary forms.  Rather, he sees a fundamental 
rupture with the structure of experience in general.  In describing the changes emerging in the 
late 19th and early 20th century, he states: "For never has experience been more thoroughly belied 
than strategic experience was belied by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, 
bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power.  A generation that 
had gone to school on horse-drawn streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape where 
nothing remained unchanged but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in a force field of 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 149 
 143 
 
destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body."21  We find here a description 
of a series of ruptures that have ultimately transformed the very character of human existence.  In 
this context, Benjamin echoes Marx’s description of capitalism as a system continually in the 
process of re-defining and re-inventing itself, tearing down all of the previously sedimented and 
ossified characteristics of life.22  That he includes “the tiny, fragile human body” amongst the 
exceptions to the changing nature of modernity seems peculiar in the context of what I said about 
Benjamin’s potential contribution to a theory of the historicality of the body in the previous 
chapter.  At the same time, this echoes his contention that the body – as an embodied mind – is 
the now of the historical, the functional entity of human experiential existence.  Moreover, it is 
important to note that he locates the body within “a force field of destructive torrents and 
explosions.”  As I argued in chapter 2, this notion of a force field was fundamentally informed 
by Benjamin’s appropriation of Lukács and Korsch, in developing a theory of the historical 
specificity of capitalism’s commodity structure.  This force field represents the historicality 
within and from which all experience must be understood.  But, that he saddles the body with the 
modifiers “tiny, fragile” suggests that it maintains a vulnerability to phenomenon – a 
vulnerability embedded in its historicality.  Indeed, the destructive field of capitalist modernity 
that the body inhabits subjects it to repeated assaults on the senses.  This is not merely a matter 
of constraining the body’s movements and freedom,23 but an actual assault on its very 
functioning.  Indeed, while the body may not appear “changed” this does not imply that the 
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manner in which it functions is constant: Benjamin sees the body as containing defence 
mechanisms that attempt to counter-act its vulnerability, and that become conditions conditioned 
through continual subjection to this field. 
Benjamin already suggested that the presence of the body as an expressive mode of 
praxis was in decline.  This emerges in the final aphorism of ‘The Storyteller,’ where he cites 
Paul Valery’s reference to “a certain accord of the soul, eye and hand” in artistic observation.  
Benjamin notes the centrality of this synaesthetic nexus to storytelling.  While speech and 
hearing are paramount, the eye and hand are no less important: the gestures/gesticulations of the 
storyteller, and vision of the listeners, are also central to the entire exchange.  As he states, 
“Interacting with one another, [soul, eye and hand] determine a practice.  We are no longer 
familiar with this practice.”24  In understanding this claim, the connection between the storyteller 
and the artisan points to a much larger phenomenon.  Like an artisan, the storyteller is able to 
fashion something out of his abilities – namely, experience.  He is able “to fashion the raw 
material of experience, his own and that of others, in a solidly, useful and unique way.”25  With 
the changing nature of communication, this ability becomes more distant and less capable of 
expression and reception.  Under capitalism, Benjamin argues that this is the same change that 
the artisan undergoes in the nature of their practice and experience: “the role of the hand in 
production has become more modest.”26  Indeed, like information constantly flowing before a 
reader’s eyes without leaving an imprint, providing counsel or involving an experience that may 
revolve around the practice/use-value that comes from storytelling, the artisan-cum-factory 
worker is subjected to a fleeting interaction with the articles of labour on the assembly line.  The 
article of labour itself passes before the worker without leaving an imprint: it only passes by to 
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make way for the next article to come down the line.  This denies any potentiality of 
“completion,” and each moment is a repetition of the same futile operation; consequently, any 
connection between the articles or stages of production is effectively severed.  Under these 
circumstances, a genuine interaction with the object – the experience or practice that may be 
derived from the act of labour – is constantly denied, and we have the summary severing of the 
conscious element from the activity of the body and its complex, experiential nexus.  Ultimately, 
practice, as something that allows for the creative and indeterminate interaction of self, others 
and things is absent.  Indeed, practice – like wisdom – implies an agency or an action which can 
be perfected, changed and continued.27    
II. On Some Motifs in Proust and Freud 
The idea that the conditions of capitalist modernity lead to the general decline of 
experience as expressed in the case of storytelling and factory work is intended as a dialectical 
contention.  For Benjamin, it is not that “nothingness” prevails under capitalism; rather, there is a 
sensory bombardment.  The entire experience of capitalism is a series of shocks, contained in 
everyday occurrences – factory work, the encounter with the (urban) crowd, mechanization, 
gambling, shopping, etc.  Indeed, while Benjamin suggests that warfare was perhaps the first 
shock that illustrated the decline of experience, shock became an entirely commonplace 
phenomenon.  In explaining the dialectical co-mingling of an overload of shock with a corollary 
decline of experience, his essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ develops a psychoanalytic 
theory of the senses and their defensive response to the shocks of modern experience.  In doing 
so, he begins with a discussion of Proust’s À la Recherche du temps perdu.  Benjamin regards 
Proust’s book “as an attempt to produce experience…in a synthetic way under today’s social 
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conditions, for there is less and less hope that it will come into being in a natural way.”28  The 
specificity of the shock factors are not central to Benjamin’s arguments with respect to Proust.  
But it is important to highlight that Proust and Baudelaire aim to express the specific experiences 
of capitalist modernity.  This breaks with the abstraction – and suppression of death – that 
characterized Bergson’s musings on memory.  
In beginning with Proust, Benjamin dissects the issue of memory as embodied in the 
famous story of the madeleine.  Upon eating the cake, Proust remembered his childhood 
experiences in the town of Combray, which until that time had been largely vague.  In explaining 
this experience, Proust refers to the vague and “indistinct” memories of “conscious attention” as 
a mémoire volontaire (voluntary memory).  As Benjamin states, “Its signal characteristic is that 
the information it gives about the past retains no trace of that past.”29  Proust notes that until 
eating the madeleine his memories could register Combray, but since voluntary memory 
“preserves nothing of the past, I should never have had any wish to ponder over this residue of 
Combray.”30  In these respects, voluntary memory resembles information and the experience of 
the factory: it does not effect or recall an experience that is assimilated, but is rather an emptiness 
that comes with the inability to fulfill the potential for, or recall in its fullness, genuine 
experience.  Voluntary memory keeps these experiences at a distance.  Moreover, because of the 
distant and monadic way in which they are registered, these memories fail to enter into 
“tradition” – they do not leave an imprint or connect the events that make up a life, in much the 
same way as the division of labour suppresses the experience of – or relation to – the completed 
product.  Thus, Proust states: “In vain we try to conjure [our own past] up again; the efforts of 
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the intellect are futile.”31  According to Benjamin, the past for Proust is thus contained 
somewhere other than in the conscious/voluntary memory, in a “material object” like the 
madeleine.  Yet, this material object is unbeknownst to us, and we may never come upon it or 
may simply miss it – it is “free-floating.”  This suggests that our ability to recollect the past, far 
from being a matter of “choice,” is a matter of “chance.”  When or if we do encounter it, this 
object jolts us from our voluntary memory – with its fleeting attentiveness to the now – and 
triggers a mémoire involontaire (involuntary memory) in which our past can become actualized.   
In distilling the insights from Proust’s conceptions of memory and connecting them to the 
nature of experience, Benjamin states: “Experience is indeed a matter of tradition, in collective 
existence as well as private life.  It is the product less of facts firmly anchored in memory 
[Erinnerung] than of accumulated and frequently unconscious data that flow together in memory 
[Gedachtnis].”32  Memory as erinnerung corresponds roughly to the conceptions of voluntary 
memory and the isolated experience (erlebnis) it leads to, while memory as gedachtnis 
corresponds to something like involuntary memory and the long experience (erfahrung) it draws 
together.  Voluntary memory and its isolated experience produce subjects as fundamentally 
isolated/monadic, and something of forgetful creatures always caught up in the quasi-forgetting 
of the now – the mere registering of a disconnected past or in the repetition of the same.  “True” 
experience requires a break with this: it requires the emergence of involuntary memory and the 
long experience it supplies.  This long experience “is inseparable from the representation of 
continuity, a sequence.”33  Hence, it allows us to re(-)collect memories – the traces of the past – 
that had been “screened” from the “inventory” of the individual.  Or, rather, it allows the isolated 
memories to be assimilated in their fullness.  This would entail simultaneously our assimilation 
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of them as experiences and our retention of them as the inventory of our lives.  Moreover, it 
would supply the individual subject with the means to connecting his life to the overall tradition 
of collective being.34  Indeed, rather than being isolated from experience and others, genuine 
experience for Benjamin occurs in the conjunction of the personal and collective experience that 
can emerge when involuntary memory becomes actual.35   
To grasp the full import of these Proustian thoughts on memory, and to understand the 
meaning/nature of the distinction between these forms of memory, Benjamin suggests that we 
read them through Freud, specifically Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  Freud’s essay is a self-
confessed work in speculative psychoanalysis36 that seeks to unravel the relationship between 
consciousness and the unconscious which, for Benjamin’s purposes, has a direct relationship to 
questions of memory and experience.  Despite the speculative character of Freud’s inquiry, 
Benjamin has no interest in verifying the scientific veracity of Freud’s claims; rather, he wishes 
merely to explore their fruitfulness in understanding experiences that were often divorced from 
Freud’s own intentions.37  In these latter respects, the case of individual psychological impacts 
are of less interest to Benjamin, though certainly connected to his more general musings on the 
character of experience.  But the general context for Benjamin’s appropriation of Freud is a 
creative one: he is interested in seeing what insights Freud’s theory might provide towards a 
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theory of subjectivity, and in adopting them as an ethical and aesthetic optic, not as a concrete 
and verifiable science.38   
In drawing out the implications of Freud’s work, Benjamin sees a correlation between the 
ideas he developed through Proust, and Freud’s conception of memory (which is akin to 
involuntary memory) and consciousness.  As Benjamin states, “In Freud’s view, consciousness 
as such receives no memory traces whatever, but has another important function: protection 
against stimuli.”39  In Freud’s words, “protection against stimuli is almost more important than 
the reception of stimuli.”40  Essentially, the human organism itself possesses an internal energy 
or power which it must protect against the assault of the external world, which threatens this 
internal energy/existence with death.41  In order to protect the being of the living organism, 
consciousness attempts to “screen” – to cancel out – the potentially destructive shocks that come 
from the outside.  But in screening these experiences, they are not internalized as part of memory 
or long experience: they are subjected to the realm of the quasi-forgetting of isolated experience 
and voluntary memory.  As a protective layer insulating the self from trauma, Benjamin argues 
that “the greater the shock factor in particular impressions, the more vigilant consciousness has 
to be in screening stimuli.”42  Hence, he suggests that within the context of the shock-infested 
world of capitalist modernity, consciousness is on the defensive to the utmost degree: “the tiny, 
fragile human body” expresses its vulnerability and malleability in its defensive response to 
these shocks.  Whether it be in the factory, at the gambling table, on the war field or in the 
crowd, consciousness is constantly attempting to screen stimuli.  This produces experience as 
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mere isolated experience, and it does so “at the cost of the integrity of the incident.”43  
Consequently, in the experience of gambling and factory work, we find “futility, emptiness, an 
inability to complete something.”  Benjamin’s suggestion here relates to the never-ending 
character of such futile acts.  For him, long experience would be in the service of fulfilling the 
wish or goal that isolated experience continually denies.  We seek experience for the possibility 
of achieving or completing something, rather than “continually starting all over again” as one 
does in pushing a button in a factory or pulling the lever of a slot machine.  In Freudian terms, 
we might say that the repetitive nature of isolated experience (the inability to fully assimilate the 
traumatic experience) is ultimately a failure to acknowledge the traumatic experience which 
continually recurs in new forms: the failure to place it in the inventory of a life.  The initial 
trauma may be acknowledged/registered by consciousness but, in screening it, consciousness 
does not allow the victim to connect the occurrence of symptoms (hysteria, neuroses, etc) to the 
original experience.  Consequently, the victim repeatedly falls prey to the same traumatic 
recurrence in its current forms because consciousness has prevented them from coming to terms 
with it: while registering the initial event, consciousness prevents the victim from dealing with 
the event and merely registers its occurrence.44  The victim remains, at best, unconsciously aware 
of the trauma that affected them, and their desire to come to terms with their malaise is denied.  
The consequence, Benjamin states, is that they “relive the catastrophe in which they were 
involved.”45 
 What should be noted is that in these situations the process of blocking/screening is not 
entirely successful.  As Benjamin argues, psychoanalysis aims to understand shocks “in terms of 
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how they break through the shield that protects against stimuli.”46  To explain this, he draws on 
the work of Freud’s student, Theodore Reik, who views this process in terms of repression.  
When consciousness is not up to the task of screening shocks, it “only lays them aside”47 or 
parries them.  This allows them to penetrate consciousness as involuntary memory.  As Reik 
notes, true memory aims to “protect our impressions” and is “conservative”; on the other hand, 
voluntary memory “aims at their dissolution” and is “destructive.”48  Hence, voluntary memory 
ultimately leaves the past behind, allowing the significance of the event to dissolve, and 
destroying its integrity.  But, as involuntary memory, the events can still dwell in the recesses of 
the psyche, preserved by the possibility of coming to terms with them.  As Freud suggests, this 
occurs when a part of the cortex has become “so frayed by stimulus” that it can no longer screen 
shocks.  With the breakdown of the protective core, the event is able to enter into the 
unconscious as an isolated experience; but this isolated experience holds out the possibility of 
being transformed into a long-experience.  Ultimately, the unconscious holds out the possibility 
of involuntary memory bursting/bleeding into conscious recollection.  In particular, Benjamin 
takes notice of Freud’s mention of “the sort of dreams that may afflict accident survivors – those 
who develop deep neuroses which cause them to relive the catastrophe in which they were 
involved.”49  As Freud notes, consciousness must “endeavour to master the stimulus 
retroactively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic 
experience.”50  By reliving the event,51 the victim is capable of “training in coping with stimuli” 
and re-organizing the reception and receptivity of stimulus in general.  In several respects, then, 
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the dream contains a repressed wish52 – the wish to cope with the traumatic event, and integrate 
it into the collective register – that aims to be converted into the conscious integration of 
long/genuine experience.53 
The utilization of these Proustian and Freudian themes should not be taken as limiting 
this discussion to the question of “consciousness” and “memory” – that is, to the realm of the 
mind.  As with ‘The Storyteller,’ ‘Motifs’ deals with the whole bodily sensorium, and tells the 
story of the bodily sensorium’s decline under the conditions of capitalism.  Susan Buck-Morss 
provides us with an insightful optic for understanding this, suggesting that Benjamin’s work 
describes how the synaesthetic experiential organism becomes an anaesthetic one.  As she states: 
“The senses are effects of the nervous system, composed of hundreds of neurons extending from 
the body surfaces through the spinal chord to the brain.”54  Here, she aims to connect the various 
organs/surfaces of the body in a synaesthetic system, against attempts to isolate the 
brain/consciousness as the locus of sensory experience.  As she further contends, the very 
sensory/nervous system itself is not purely insular, but is embedded in the historical and cultural 
world.  Hence, the co-mingling of the bodily organism and the world – which transcends the 
subject-object division – presents what we may properly call “experience.”  In language and 
intent close to Merleau-Ponty’s, Buck-Morss describes this synaesthetic experiential/perceptual 
system as “open” in the dual sense of open to the world and open/non-identical within itself.55  In 
transitioning into the question of the Freudian impulse of ‘Motifs,’ Buck-Morss notes the 
compatibility of this synaesthetic conception of the embodied mind with Freud’s conception of 
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the ego.  As she states, Freud understands “the ego as ‘ultimately derived from bodily sensations, 
chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body,’ the place from which ‘both external 
and internal perceptions may spring’; the ego ‘may be thus regarded as a mental projection of the 
surface of the body.’”56  In this context, the implications should be clear: it is not merely 
consciousness’ parrying of psychological trauma that takes place but the synaesthetic 
sensorium’s parrying of all threatening psycho-physical phenomenon.  At the level of the body, 
we find a response tantamount to the one directed against threatening psychic phenomenon: we 
react physically by means of a reflex-action devoid of conscious action and without psychically 
imbibing/retaining the experience or response.  Moreover, the repetitive occurrence of this 
process in the midst of the excessive stimulation of shocks under capitalism ultimately mortifies 
the synaesthetic character of the embodied organism, turning it into an anaesthetic one “in order 
to protect both the body from the trauma of accident and the psyche from the trauma of 
perceptual shock.”57  Thus, the anaesthetic system reverses the role of the synaesthetic system 
and, rather than the bodily sensorium opening onto and imbibing the world via its sensory 
capacities, it ultimately dulls or numbs the senses and closes itself off from the world and the 
possibility of genuine experience.  In tune with the theory of commodification/reification, we 
find that the self becomes a mortified object that experiences the world not as a sensuous, 
intersubjective circuit of self-others-things, but as a mortified object parrying the blows of other 
objects.58  Essentially, the body’s capacity for innervation59 is short-circuited. 
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In going beyond the theoretical critique of political economy that Marxists often render,60 
Paolo Virno and Joseph Fracchia consider the affects of the capitalist labour process on 
embodied beings in a manner that will lead us back to the embodied and anaesthetic elements in 
Benjamin’s thought.  To begin with, Virno’s Marxist inflection on Foucault’s concept of bio-
politics illustrates the consequences of anaesthetization in the specific context of the very 
concept of “labour.”  For Virno, the key to understanding bio-politics – the political 
administration of biological life-processes and forces – lies in understanding the concept of 
labour power.  In defining labour power, he cites Marx to the effect that labour power “is the 
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living 
personality, of a human being.”61  More appropriate for our purposes, the utilization of labour 
power in the labour process means mobilizing “the most universal requisites of the species: 
perception, language, memory, and feelings.”62  Ultimately, then, we find that labour-power is 
defined as those human, sensuous capacities that are inherent in the psychophysical organism (or 
the flesh) of living subjects – all of which are commodified, or objectified, in the being of 
“labour power” under capitalism.  Virno’s point is that the commodity labour power is 
inseparable from the living person who possesses/sells it: “The living body of the workers is the 
substratum of that labour-power which, in itself, has no independent existence.”63  The bio-
political element is contained in the fact that the human corporeal sensorium – life, the “bios” – 
is a potential subject that is ultimately objectified, administrated and controlled for use in 
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production as a process of the consumption of labour power.  Indeed, what is ultimately bought 
is, in Marx’s words, “labour as subjectivity.” 
In his analysis of the corporeal contours of Marx’s concept of immiseration, Fracchia 
draws out the effects of the bio-political administration of labour as subjectivity.  The key focus 
for Marx lies in the nature of “human corporeal organization” under the capitalist production 
process.  To avoid naturalizing the system of production, Fracchia points out that it is “a made 
object” (the result of human agencies) but that it acts as a substitution for the body, in so far as it 
is an extension or prolongation of the human body’s capacities for producing.  But this system, in 
its capitalist form, is not a symbiotic extension of human corporeal being.  Rather, corporeal 
being as merely labour-power (i.e. the expenditure of energy: a measure of time) becomes an 
object utilized by the system of production in its self-perpetuating drive to extract surplus value.  
As Fracchia explains, in his theory of immiseration Marx attempts to read “the corporeal 
hieroglyphics, barely visible to the observing intellect, inscribed on the wage-labouring body in 
pain.”64  This inscription of pain is rooted in the drive for the extraction of surplus value via 
pushing the limits of the “fluid” work day.  Indeed, the work day is limited by physical factors 
(the corporeal needs of the body, such as food, drink and shelter) and moral factors (intellectual 
and social needs for cultural satisfactions).  The point for Fracchia is that the production process 
continually seeks to extend the work day, pushing it beyond these limitations and thus beyond 
the limits of the body’s capacities.  As he cites Marx:  
In its blind and measureless drive, its insatiable werewolf’s appetite for surplus labour, capital oversteps not 
only the moral but even the merely physical limits of the working day.  It usurps the time for growth, 
development and healthy maintenance of the body.  It steals the time required for the consumption of fresh 
air and sunlight.  It haggles over the meal-times, where possible incorporating them into the production 
process itself, so that food is added to the worker as to a mere means of production…It reduces the sound 
sleep needed for the restoration, renewal and refreshment of the vital forces to the exact amount of torpor 
essential to the revival of an absolutely exhausted organism.  It is not the normal maintenance of labour-
power which determines the limits of the working day here, but rather the greatest possible daily 
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expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory and painful it may be, which determines 
the limits of the workers’ period of rest.65 
 
As a form of labour-power, as a mere commodity to be consumed in the process of production, 
the agentic capacity of the worker (her/his creativity, will and corporeal being) is negated, and 
they are subject to the disciplinary consumption of capital as the “head”/”brains” of the process 
of production.  But, in addition to this de-subjectivization, capital subjects the worker to a 
constant infliction of pain within the disfiguring process of production.  The vampire-like 
extraction of power does not merely take away time, but the life and health of the worker.  Marx 
lists the myriad afflictions that confront the body, and Fracchia summarizes these succinctly: it is 
“a manifold and painful process which cripples the bodies and minds, stunts the personal growth, 
and foreshortens the futures of working people.”66   
Thus, capitalist bio-politics subjects the body (as the totality of human faculties) to a field 
that is beyond its control and which constitutes a specific set of forces that act upon it – it 
subjects the body to a form of “socialization.”  And, as Virno points out, this is not merely a 
question of psychological phenomenon, but the administration or shaping of an entire mode of 
being-in-the-world.67  The sentiments behind Virno’s and Fracchia’s arguments are front and 
center in Benjamin’s work, via the mediation of Marx.  Rather than focusing on the outer 
physical effects (the scarring of the body) of the labour process, Benjamin focuses on the 
corporeal and ontological responses of the body as a sensorial organism, and the manner in 
which it blocks and dulls the drudgery of factory labour68: the manner in which it resists the 
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process of objectification and infliction of pain, in the service of protecting the organism.69  In 
recalling that the experience and capacities of the flesh can be contracted or expanded, and that 
the flesh is a being of openness that radiates beyond the inward character of consciousness while 
also having a greater depth than its outer shell, we must also acknowledge that the body is 
subject to particular comportments and artificial appendages that play a role in that contraction or 
expansion and which simultaneously affect its inner and outer functioning.   
In ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,’ Benjamin suggests that technology in general “has 
subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of training.”70  While he suggests this in the 
context of the effect traffic signals have, he follows this with a discussion of Marx’s analysis of 
the factory labour process.  As we saw previously, the segmentation of the labour-process ran 
parallel to the voluntary memory and isolated experience that would ultimately suppress a 
genuine interaction with, and experience of, the products of labour.  But the anaesthecized 
response is also contained in the workers’ bodily actions, which become increasingly 
mechanized.  The factory itself makes use of the worker rather than being a potential field for 
his/her experiential practice; consequently, it produces the worker as a machine, and expels 
practice from their actions and its purview.  As Benjamin quotes Marx: “In working with 
machines, workers learn to coordinate ‘their own movements with the uniformly constant 
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movements of an automaton.’”71  The repetitive hand movements that characterize factory work 
coalesce with the principle of incompletion that characterizes the worker’s interaction with the 
object.  In effect, the worker is produced as an object, and in general the factory embodies the 
relationship between objectified beings.  Thus, the worker’s response to his/her work 
environment is not that of a conscious actor, but of a machine operating in a manner which 
blocks off the entire experience from consciousness in something like an act of dissociation from 
the self – the better to fend off the catastrophic effects of the extension of the work day.  Under 
these conditions, the senses are themselves robbed of their ultimate function and perceptibility, 
in being harnessed for bio-political purposes, is corrupted.  Moreover, vis–à–vis the expansion of 
the drive to expand the work day and the body’s physical and moral limits, the body is capable of 
“adapting” via these defense mechanisms to its increasing immiseration.  Thus, exploitation is 
not only an economic category, but also a cognitive72 and corporeal one.  And, more generally, 
the experience of capitalism is not merely the deprivation of social empowerment, but the 
deprivation of the (social) body’s power for sensory capacity.   
In an earlier fragment recounting a conversation about Mickey Mouse, Benjamin already 
discerned something of this sentiment.  As he starts off the piece: “Property relations in Mickey 
Mouse cartoons: here we see for the first time that it is possible to have one’s own arm, even 
one’s own body, stolen.”73  While we might attest this stealing of body parts to comedic hijinx, 
‘Motifs’ draws out a larger meaning: under the conditions of capitalist production, labourers are 
robbed of their body parts as a function of their own corporeal being, which is consumed by the 
system of production.  The agentic capacities of these labourers is mirrored by Mickey, who 
proves that “a creature can still survive even when it has thrown off all resemblance to a human 
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being.”74  Rather than using the system of production for self-affirming purposes, the anaesthetic 
response combats the immiseration of the body by the disavowal or abdication of synaesthetic 
experience.  In a sense, this response is tantamount to Mickey’s existence, for it is the means 
through which “mankind makes preparations to survive civilization.”75  And it is in this context 
that we must assess Benjamin’s “peculiarly uncritical consent to technology.”76  The defensive 
agency at the core of the corporeal response is a means to survival, but the revolutionary path 
Benjamin charts in ‘Surrealism’ seeks to transcend this need for mere survival through a 
collective innervation.  Far from being an uncritical consent to technology, it is necessary – 
given the fact of technological exploitation and its anaesthetic effects – to confront the reality of 
technology and its relationship to the body.  As Benjamin states, “Only when in technology body 
and image space so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective 
innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective become revolutionary discharge, has 
reality transcended itself to the extent demanded by the Communist Manifesto.”77  The “only 
when” indicates that this is not something already existing, but something that can only emerge 
when body and image space are recuperated as functions of the corporeal being of human 
subjects, who can then utilize technology in a self-affirming way.78 
III. Baudelaire’s Phenomenology of the Streets 
While the motifs from Proust and Freud provide Benjamin with an optic for 
understanding the effects of capitalism within the context of factory labour,  Virno adds in 
connection with Benjamin’s conception of shock that these sorts of experiences are also 
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produced outside of the workplace in a manner that shapes “the relationship with the world, with 
others, and with oneself.”79  And it is into this fold that the figure of Baudelaire steps, drawing 
out important aspects of the decline of experience, sensibility and relationality.  In Benjamin’s 
reading, Baudelaire tells the story of how the contemporary mortification of the body and 
experience play out in the new urban field of experience: Baudelaire’s work supplies a 
phenomenology of the streets.  In much the same manner as Merleau-Ponty would celebrate 
Cezanne’s impressionist painting for attempting to paint the world as we see it,80 Baudelaire’s 
great phenomenological contribution was to write the world how we perceive and experience it 
in our living flesh.  In these respects, he represents a storyteller who is subject to, expresses and 
attempts to transcend, the deformed conditions of capitalist experience.  In literary terms, 
Benjamin argues that poetry retains the form of storytelling even against its print production: it is 
still a sensory mode of writing that drives the reader “to utter words aloud for the benefit of a 
listener.”81  In contextualizing the specifics of Baudelaire’s poetry, Benjamin draws a parallel 
with theories of “art for art’s sake,” suggesting that these approaches “issued directly” in the 
poetic structure of Baudelaire’s work in the form of a specific concern: “that sensibility is the 
true subject of poetry.”82  Baudelaire’s focus included both the “natural” changes that sensibility 
was undergoing in the guise of our Proustian and Freudian motifs, as well as the artificial, 
narcotic effects that modern subjects were exposed to.83  Adding a wrinkle to this, Benjamin 
argues that sensibility is itself always caught up with suffering – and, we might add, the attempt 
to alleviate suffering and traumatic experience.  Hence, he situates Baudelaire’s writings at the 
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crossing point of sensibility and suffering; in the context of a constellative reading with Freud 
and Proust, Benjamin thus sees Baudelaire as a keen storyteller of the deformity of sensibility, 
and its effects on experience.   
Benjamin situates the figure of Baudelaire within the social order establishing itself in the 
mid-nineteenth century – within the specificity of emergent capitalism.  While this gives 
Baudelaire a special access to the new experiential matrix being established, it also situates him 
within the specifically new conditions of aesthetic/artistic production being established at this 
time.  In this context, Benjamin argues that his lyric poetry stepped into an historical epoch that 
was little prepared or capable of understanding it.  In the first place, capitalism had transformed 
social relations, severing the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the poet, and subjecting 
the poet to the “objective” power of the market, thus transforming him/her into a commodity.  
Ultimately, lyric poetry was itself in decline, making way for the physiological and panoramic 
literature (examples of information supplanting storytelling) that flourished in the markets of the 
2nd Empire in Paris.  At the same time, the conditions facilitating lyric poetry’s positive reception 
were in decline.  Baudelaire was cognizant of this change, as is made manifest in the opening 
verse of Les Fleurs du mal, ‘To the Reader.’84  The entire verse is littered with references to the 
mortification of our corporeal, and spiritual, being: “Possess our spirits and fatigue our flesh,” 
“our captive souls,” “when we breath, death flows into our lungs,” “our spirit lacks the nerve.”85  
These already hint at something being amiss with the capacities and nature of human existence, 
as we find an uneasy unity between death/mortification and life.  But this comes out more 
explicitly in the closing lines where, in naming the “most foul and false” creature, Baudelaire 
states: “He is Ennui! – with tear-filled eye he dreams, Of scaffolds, as he puffs his water-pipe.  
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Reader, you know this dainty monster too; -Hypocrite reader, – fellowman, – my twin!”86  Here, 
Baudelaire implicates himself and his reader in succumbing to the conditions of apathy and 
longing for death (or existence as a walking death).  If we read this through the backdrop drawn 
by Benjamin, we find him lamenting the condition of non-being – the utter passivity of the flesh 
that emerges with its anaesthecization – that prevailed under modern conditions.  Baudelaire and 
his readers are both subject to this same pathological condition of inactivity.  But, at the same 
time, the allusion to puffing a water-pipe suggests the sort of narcotic consumption that implies 
an agency or complicity in this anaestheticized being.  Indeed, Baudelaire seems to suggest that 
rather than being a permanent condition, ennui – and the deadening of sensory capacities – can 
be overcome.  In these respects, Baudelaire’s “heroic bearing” springs not only from his choice 
of artistic medium,87 but also from the fact that his lyric poetry addressed head on the alienating 
existence that these changes were affecting.   
Indeed, as Benjamin states: “In Baudelaire’s melancholy, all that is left of the infinite 
regress of reflection…is the ‘somber and lucid tete-a-tete’ of the subject with itself.”88  
Baudelaire’s poetic method was exactly the sort that sought to affect this reflection of the subject 
on its own self-estrangement, its departure from its living being as flesh.  In these terms, 
Baudelaire possessed the same rebellious pathos as the flâneur, the professional conspirator, the 
boheme, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat – though he was himself none of these.  Their 
rebellious character was rooted in their alienation from the emerging conditions of modern 
society: each of these figures had lost their place (economic, social, experiential) in society.  It is 
this condition that Baudelaire, in appropriating “the gaze of the alienated man,” puts front and 
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center in making Paris the subject of his poetry.89  In doing so, he sought to fortify the self-
estranged human being “with armor against the reified world.”90  In the context of what has been 
said thus far, there would appear to be something contradictory in Benjamin’s claim: the 
anaesthecized human being has fortified themself from experience because of the reifying 
character of capitalism.  But Benjamin seems to be speaking in an allegorical mode here, and 
means something more along the lines of drawing experience back into the being of the self-
estranged human: “armor against the reified world” would appear to be the sensual and sensible 
nature of the non-alienated being.  Thus, when Benjamin states that “Baudelaire placed shock 
experience at the very center of his art,”91 he suggests that he sought to bring shock experience 
into the open, rather than letting it fall into the abyss of isolated experience.  Baudelaire’s 
specific method of doing this involved taking to the streets, and attacking shock experiences 
head on:92 rather than screening shock experiences through consciousness, “Baudelaire made it 
his business to parry the shocks no matter what their source, with his spiritual and physical 
self.”93  It is not inconsequential that Benjamin argues that Baudelaire parries the shocks with his 
spiritual and physical self, and not his consciousness.  This may seem a minor turn of phrase, but 
that Benjamin puts the consciousness/memory and screening/parrying differences front and 
center in ‘Motifs’ should draw our attention to a larger intent: Baudelaire wanted to evoke the 
sort of fright that would draw out the significance of experience.  Thus, he thrust his spiritual and 
physical self into the line of shock experiences, to explicitly evoke the jarring/frightening nature 
of them for his readers – and to avoid allowing them to recede into the quasi-forgetting of 
isolated experience/memory. 
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In describing Baudelaire’s aesthetic method, Benjamin states: “To interrupt the course of 
the world – that was Baudelaire’s deepest intention.”94  This sentiment mirrors Benjamin’s own 
suggestion that revolution, rather than being the locomotive of history, was “an attempt by 
passengers on this train…to activate the emergency brake.”95  For Baudelaire, interrupting the 
anaesthecized being that modern humans lived involved stopping and drawing out the movement 
that the world was already undertaking.  In Central Park, Benjamin makes a connected 
methodological point: “The wrenching of things from their familiar contexts…is a procedure 
highly characteristic of Baudelaire.  It is linked to the destruction of organic contexts in the 
allegorical intention.”96  Ultimately, in breaking experiences from the apparent normalcy that 
would come from isolated experience (the locomotive of experience, in which we can register – 
but not recollect – our stops), Baudelaire seeks to draw attention to them so they can be 
recognized (he attempts to pull the handbrake, so that we might assimilate the experience in its 
fullness).  Thus, Baudelaire’s “raison d’etat” was “the emancipation from isolated 
experiences.”97  This emancipation lay in extracting events from the flow of ordinary 
experiences, in which they would be the subject of voluntary memory and its reflex responses.  
In this context, Proust states: “Time is peculiarly dissociated in Baudelaire; only very few days 
can appear, and they are significant ones…They are days of recollection [Eingedenken], not 
marked by any immediate experience [Erlebnis].  They are not connected with other days but 
stand out from time.”98  In extracting and drawing out what would normally be registered as 
isolated experience, Baudelaire seeks to transform the banal into the poetic.  For him, it is the 
work of imagination – which is not defined as a realm of fantasy, but an act of the intellect that 
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breaks through reified forms – to perceive “the intimate and secret relation of things, the 
correspondences and the analogies.”99  Here, to perceive things is not simply to see them as they 
“really” are, but to “see through them”100 and recognize the underlying peculiarity of the 
seemingly normal, or the poetic character of the seemingly banal.  Through the act of 
imagination, Baudelaire aims to draw into the open the conflict between prehistory and 
modernity – each representing a different mode of being – to lament the breakdown of 
experience under modernity.101  In drawing these connections, correspondances recall the “data 
of prehistory,” as festivals recall “the encounter with an earlier life.”102  These modern events 
thus stand out, rather than being taken as the natural/organic order.  Whether we take this as a 
literal nostalgia for a past epoch, or as an allegorical conjuring that unifies imagination and 
memory, Baudelaire’s intent is to show that – like modern subjects in general – he is a truly 
unhappy man, constantly staring back at the past103 while lamenting the “breakdown which he, as 
a modern man, was witnessing.”104 
IV. Scenes From Within (and Outside of) the Crowd: 
The Crisis of Perception and the Tragedy of Failed Recognition 
The central shock experience that Baudelaire’s work sought to isolate in this way was his 
contact with the urban crowd105 – a distinctly modern phenomenon that will bring us back to the 
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realm of Benjamin’s psychoanalytic reading of the body/experience.  The crowd drew the 
attention of a great many writers during the 19th century.  Victor Hugo saw the crowd as his 
clients/the public, and they entered his writings as “an object of contemplation.”106  Friedrich 
Engels saw the crowd as something of an unnatural intrusion – both aesthetically and morally – 
upon his provincial values.  Benjamin suggests that Baudelaire expressed an altogether different 
relation, one indicative of a Parisian: rather than seeing himself as merely an observer standing 
outside of this rising mass, for Baudelaire “the masses were anything but external to him.”107  
Baudelaire was a part of the crowd, and it represented a moment of fascination for him.  Yet, this 
was a bittersweet moment, containing simultaneously fascination and heartache, allure and loss.  
This informs the melancholic character of ‘A une passante.’  As Benjamin argues, it is the crowd 
itself that brings love in the form of a passing woman.  This passing woman can only be captured 
by the gaze – or in the experience – of the city dweller, who finds himself in a crowd of 
constantly passing figures.  But this also contains the “the figure of shock, indeed of 
catastrophe.”108  According to Benjamin, the verse is an ode not to love at first sight but to love 
at last sight, an experience “which one might not infrequently characterize as being spared, rather 
than denied, fulfillment.”109  Indeed, this is a chiasm that is never fulfilled – the rush of the 
crowd pushes the woman continually by, and her gaze never catches Baudelaire’s.  While the 
woman becomes the object of his vision and his affections, he also submits to the potential that 
he will never see her again.  Thus, we have a dialectical experience in which the crowd brings 
simultaneously the feeling of being close to an other (the encounter) and the subsequent shock of 
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the lonely man whose encounter is ultimately missed (the averted gaze and the crowd that moves 
the woman past).110   
 Yet part of Baudelaire’s flâneur-esque attraction to the crowd was simultaneously 
because of the horror of the social reality that these sorts of experiences betrayed.111  Indeed, if 
his initial relation to the crowd was that of being a part of it, and sprung from fascination and a 
melancholy appeal, Benjamin argues that this soon faded away.  As he states: “Of all the 
experiences which made his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out being jostled by the crowd 
as the decisive, unmistakeable experience.  The semblance of a crowd with a soul and movement 
all its own, the luster that had dazzled the flâneur, had faded for him.”112  Here, Benjamin finds 
something more sinister than the melancholic prose that issued from a fascination with the 
passing of strangers.  Baudelaire came to exhibit a defensive reaction to the crowd.  In these 
respects, his idea that the crowd itself was a collection of flâneurs gives way to a conception shot 
through with the Proustian and Freudian motifs that characterize the decline of experience: the 
crowd exhibits its “inhuman character” in its increasingly isolated experiences, devoid of 
functional action or practice.  Indeed, the conception of the man of the crowd as a flâneur was 
never tenable, for the very manner of actions exhibited by the flâneur and the crowd clearly 
separated them.  This became more and more obvious to Baudelaire.  The crowd, rather than 
“looking around” or “demanding elbow room” as a flâneur does, exhibited a “manic behaviour” 
that was oblivious to attempts to stand out.  Citing Valery, Benjamin notes that the crowd 
“reverts to a state of savagery – that is, of isolation.  The feeling of being dependent on others, 
which used to be kept alive by need, is gradually blunted in the smooth functioning of the social 
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mechanism.”113  The savagery of the crowd is rooted simultaneously in its wildness (i.e. its 
reflexive, non-cognitive mode of action/being) and in its isolation (i.e. in the fundamentally 
inward character of the consciousness of its members, and their failure to experience/register one 
another).  Ultimately, the crowd comes to mirror the mechanization that takes place in the 
factory and at the gambling table.  Increasingly, its members take on – in mimetic fashion – the 
appearance of machines, with their actions being nothing more than reflexive.  This culminates 
in Poe’s claim: “If jostled, [the pedestrian] bowed profusely to the jostlers.”114  Here, the member 
of the crowd undertakes no conscious action and fails to exhibit any conscious recognition of the 
other who jostles, betraying only the reflex action of the isolated automaton: deprived of their 
agency, they act in a manner that strips the exchange of any register or anything approaching 
long experience or a relation to the other.  Indeed, the very encounter of the other is robbed of its 
chiasmatic character, and the individuals who collide in an accidental bump remain contained in 
their isolated being, abstracted from the world of alterity and interdependence.   
In the context of Benjamin’s description of the defensive function that consciousness 
plays under the conditions of shock, this phenomenon points to a general crisis of perception.  
While, for my purposes, this plays out most importantly at the level of the streets, this contention 
is rooted in an aesthetic claim.  While Benjamin had touted the democratizing elements 
contained in mechanical reproduction in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility,’115 ‘Motifs’ focuses on the crisis of perception that the destruction of aura 
affected.116  He argues that traditional aesthetic objects possessed an aura that was tantamount to 
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involuntary memory: the object contained associations that placed it within the inventory of 
tradition/life.  This aura allows us to inscribe the object for the uses of long 
experience/practice.117  If this auratic character endows traditional art with the longevity 
necessary to produce genuine experience, Benjamin suggests that cameras and similar 
technological means of reproduction can “extend the range of the memoire volontaire” allowing 
us to retain events that would otherwise be lost – an important achievement for “a society in 
which long practice is in decline.”118  Yet, in freezing events, apparatuses like the camera 
destroyed a fundamental characteristic of aura: its infinite, non-identical and inexhaustible 
depth/distance.  As Benjamin quotes Valery: “We recognize a work of art by the fact that no idea 
it inspires in us, no mode of behaviour it suggests we adopt, could ever exhaust it or dispose of 
it.”119  In this vein, Benjamin suggests, “the painting we look at reflects back at us that of which 
our eyes will never have their fill.”120  He finds this aspect of aura symptomatic (and a 
transposition) of human relationships: genuine human relationships are characterized by an 
intertwining or chiasm, a relationship of reversibility, in which the person or object looked at 
simultaneously looks at the looker.  This is informed both by the distance that exists between the 
two beings and the fragmentation that results from it, which in combination produce a non-
identity or dehiscence between the two beings that informs their very essence.  Like the gaze of 
the other symbolized in the relationship between Montaigne and La Boétie, the painting defies 
my attempts to overcome this distance but also informs my attempts to know myself and the 
object as "other."  In essence, I attempt to find myself in others and them in me, as I also attempt 
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to find the beautiful in a painting – two actions that can never be fulfilled, but also two 
experiences which (if genuine) we always retain.  But, as an infinite/non-identical project, this 
always presupposes the gaze of the other – that is the expectation that our own gaze will be 
returned.  With the introduction of the camera in particular, this relationship breaks down.  In the 
first place, the camera captures what evades the eye:121 whether in positive or negative fashion, it 
aims to capture the in-itself of an object, rather than conveying the object as we see it.  But, more 
to the point, technological means of re/production record “our likeness without returning our 
gaze.”122  As the anaesthetic/protective eye takes over the human sensorium, it mirrors the failure 
of the gaze to be returned, and we ultimately have the break down of the intersubjective and 
interdependent relationship, which constituted the struggle to come to terms with the being of 
others. 
The failure of the gaze to be returned is exactly what plays out at the level of the streets 
under capitalism.  Indeed, while Baudelaire the flâneur looks the passing woman directly in the 
eye, she fails to return his gaze and is swept up by the crowd.  This is a more general 
phenomenon than what is conveyed in ‘A une passante.’  In referring to the “protective eye,” 
Benjamin argues that it is obvious that “the city dweller is overburdened with protective 
functions.”123  Ultimately, shock experience is contained in the new forms of relationships found 
in the urban, capitalist environment.  To elaborate on this, Benjamin draws on George Simmel, 
who states: “Before the development of buses, railroads and trams in the nineteenth century, 
people had never been in situations where they had to look at one another for long minutes or 
even hours without speaking to one another.”124  For Simmel, this signalled both a new form of 
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human interaction and, along with it, the primacy of visual activity in the urban environment.  In 
the latter respects, he suggested that visual phenomenon presented a greater shock – or produced 
a greater unease – in urban subjects than aural phenomenon: in the form of vehicles and roads, 
and the ominous and consumptive character of the crowd itself, this new environment was 
fraught with shocks that caused their greatest unease through sight.  Hence, with the production 
of these new situations of social interaction, we find that the protective function described by 
Freud sought to alleviate the unpleasant shock that came in the urban crowd – be it on public 
transportation, in the marketplace or elsewhere.  In effect, it was not merely the jostling of the 
crowd that affected an anaesthetic, reflexive response but the very encounter with a mass of 
others.  This defensive stance ultimately annihilated the very relations of alterity – the very 
dependence upon others, the very forming of the self in its relation to others – that both Valery 
and Merleau-Ponty speak to.  On public transit, people file by one another without a glance or 
acknowledgment.  And, under the reifying characteristics that prevail under capitalism, people 
relate to each other in the market place not as beings but as objects.  In Benjamin’s words: “More 
and more relentlessly, the objective environment of human beings is coming to wear the 
expression of the commodity.”125  Ultimately, people themselves become commodities – judged 
and subject to a status valuation that is predicated upon the value of their labour/services in the 
market.  Under these conditions, they also see in others only commodities, and we have a 
situation in which the commodity sees only its own reflection.  The flâneur’s voyeuristic 
character is likewise subject to these commodifying effects.  Purportedly, the flâneur went to the 
marketplace to marvel at the crowd and the melange of commodities, but the narcotic effect that 
the marketplace has on the crowd (including the flâneur) only heightens the allure of 
commodities: indeed, the allure draws bigger crowds and heightens the exchange value of the 
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entire experience.  In the process of the flowering of capitalist social relations, the flâneur 
becomes subject to the conditions of commodification:126 the flâneur goes to the marketplace 
“ostensibly to look around, but in truth to find a buyer.”127  Under these circumstances, each 
member of the crowd – even the flâneur who aims to go against the stream of the crowd – 
submits to their own alienation and to that of others as well. 
Baudelaire was abundantly aware of this crisis of perception.  But Benjamin contends 
that his defensive reaction leads to revulsion and complicity: in essence, he takes on the approach 
of Hugo and Engels, viewing the crowd as external to him – even while he aims to live the life of 
a flâneur from within its auspices.  Benjamin argues that this changing relation culminates in a 
glance of contempt indicative of an “impotent rage” – a rage incited by the failure of the gaze to 
be returned.  Consequently, the melancholy of ‘A une passante’ gives way to the resignation of 
‘Fusees’: “Lost in this base world, jostled by the crowd, I am like a weary man whose eye, 
looking backward into the depths of the years, sees only disillusion and bitterness, and looking 
ahead sees only a tempest which contains nothing new, neither instruction nor pain.”128  
Baudelaire is pained by the loss of “the ability to look”129 but resigns himself to this loss.  This 
does not, however, denigrate Baudelaire’s contribution to a critical reading of human existence: 
his work is important exactly because it expresses the conditions of experience in bourgeois 
society – even if it often succumbs/acquiesces to its illusions as well.  But it is for this reason that 
Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire is a critical reading: Benjamin seeks to push Baudelaire’s 
work beyond its own confines. 
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In extracting some underlying political motifs from Baudelaire, Benjamin suggests that 
the experience of the crowd and the anaesthetizing of experience symbolized the eradication of 
the trace of the individual in the field of urban shocks.  This was expressed in literary form in the 
detective novel: the victim and the suspect were invariably lost in the crowd, and nobody noticed 
either no matter how many blocks they may have been in the open city.130  At the psychophysical 
level, this literary representation finds a match in the mechanization of the crowd’s 
actions/existence.  In a sense, the marketplace brought the crowd together for the fulfillment of 
each individual’s private concern, but ultimately obliterated their individuality in the process.  
Benjamin saw in this phenomenon the premonitions of, or preconditions for, fascism.131  In the 
face of the levelling effects of the market, the crowd represented an amorphous entity, 
undifferentiated into classes or collectives:132 “A street, a conflagration, or a traffic accident 
assembles people who are not defined along class lines.”133  Seizing on this, fascism sought to 
organize these masses through its aestheticization of politics/war.134  Under these conditions, the 
increasing proletarianization that was occurring in the cities with the growth of industrial 
production was twisted away from any radical potentials: the fundamental structure of society 
was left intact, while the market appeared as a happy accident that allowed for the reunification 
of “the race.”  Fascism thus sought to efface both individuality and the multiplicity of social 
being, subjecting them to the One of racial identity.135  To do so, it made “the concentration of 
[its] citizens permanent and obligatory for all [its] purposes” and gave “free rein to both the herd 
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instinct and to reflexive action.”136  But it is not merely the mechanization of the crowd or the 
disappearance of the trace of the individual that appears in fascism or in the general decline of 
perception: it is the general failure to recognize others (the tragedy of mis- or failed recognition 
and the consequent elision of alterity) as a fundamental condition of being and ethical existence, 
the effacement of the originary belonging that posits intersubjective being as the foundation of 
being itself.137  Indeed, fascism’s attempts to turn the obliteration (and a self-obliteration at that) 
of humanity into an aesthetically pleasing “sublimation of desire”138 would seem to require 
and/or be predicated upon the complete lack of recognition and alterity that anaesthecization 
symbolizes.   
Virno’s work again supplies us with an optic for developing this idea, and one that 
connects up with Buck-Morss’ concept of anaesthetization139 in the specific context of the 
problem of recognition.  Building on the work of Vittorio Gallese, Virno argues that there is a 
biological foundation for sociability (and a pre-conscious realm of socialibility) that has been 
located in the mirror neurons of the inferior frontal lobe.  These mirror neurons are connected to 
our bodily capacities/agencies, and are “discharged” when we complete actions related to goal 
oriented uses of our bodies.  But, more importantly, they are also discharged while observing 
others carrying out a similar action.  As Virno states, “This is the neuro-physiological basis that 
allows us to recognize immediately the emotive tonalities of members of the same species and to 
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infer the aim of their actions.”140  The major point here is that there is a pre-conscious sphere of 
interaction – and an original sociality – that predisposes us towards the recognition of others, and 
particularly to the recognition of their grief and suffering.141  Indeed, we ultimately feel what 
they feel by imitation at the neural level, in a mutual innervation and an act of co-feeling.  As 
Virno states, “The interactions of a bodily organism with the world are radically public, always 
shared by the other members of the species.”142  This finding posits the intersubjective sphere as 
ontologically and biologically primary, and rejects the “metarepresenational” theories of 
cognitive psychology, in a manner that is congruent with Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, 
and the way in which Buck-Morss reads Benjamin’s Freudian impulse: all posit a conception of 
an embodied mind, predisposed to the openness of experiential content – both the world and 
others.  But the wrinkle added by Virno lies in the contention that despite this predisposition, we 
must acknowledge that “the human animal is capable of not recognizing another human animal 
as being one of his own kind.”143  Virno locates this possibility in the interconnection of mirror 
neurons and linguistic negation.  Indeed, in drawing on a sentiment from a poem by Primo Levi, 
he argues that the act of linguistic negation – the presentation of the other as “not human” – can 
play the role of “bracketing off” neural co-feelings.  He presents this specifically through the 
optic of the holocaust (the insight from Levi): a Nazi officer is able to block off the mirror 
neurons through which he would recognize the cries of a suffering prisoner, through the 
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sentiment that “the tears of this old Jewish man are not human.”144  While this acknowledges the 
essential emotive sensation, it denies the other possession of it as a human – and it denies the 
subjectivity and the ethical demand that recognition aims to draw out in a chiasm.   
The core of this argument is not necessarily the explanation of misrecognition as a 
linguistic phenomenon, but that misrecognition is a possible outcome in the struggle for 
recognition.  Virno argues that this is the core of Hegel’s famous chapter on the master-slave 
dialectic in Phenomenology of Mind, and he draws inspiration from it – on the condition that we 
re-interpret it.  Indeed, rather than showing the “happy” outcome that results from the drive for 
recognition, Virno argues that the chapter aims to illustrate the various ways in which 
recognition can go wrong: the initial moment of self-destructive conflict; the subsequent 
monological recognition accorded the master by the slave; the ensuing emancipation of the slave 
in a manner that reverses this relationship and denies the master the recognition s/he previously 
refused the slave; and finally, the “unhappy conscience” in which this failure is heightened to a 
permanently internalized way of being.145  Thus, if Virno’s linguistic explanation of this 
phenomenon takes us in an ostensibly different direction than Benjamin’s psychoanalytic 
reading, the conclusion that they both draw about misrecognition (or the failure of recognition) is 
mutually supportive, as is the notion of a transition from an original (ontological or 
phenomenological) sociality to an elision of the relationship of alterity.  Benjamin locates the 
failure of recognition in the crisis of perception that permeates modern (urban) capitalism, and in 
the defensive reaction that the embodied mind undertakes in the service of protecting its own 
psychophysical powers against repeated onslaughts.146  In this vein, the missed gaze of the 
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woman in the crowd is the result simultaneously of the power of the crowd as a force pushing her 
by, and of the defensive reaction of the human sensorium in response to the encounter with the 
crowd in the first place.  Benjamin’s thought may even allow us to look at this through the 
framework of linguistic negation if we conceive of language as part of the commodity-structure 
that permeates the totality of capitalist society.  Lukács’ influence on Benjamin could push us in 
this direction, for as Lukács states: “the problem of commodities must not be considered in 
isolation or even regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the central, structural 
problem of capitalist society in all its aspects.”147  In connecting the various parts of the capitalist 
totality to its commodity structure, he notes that the commodity structure comes to permeate “all 
the objective forms of bourgeois society together with all the subjective forms corresponding to 
them.”148  Under this conceptualization, the bodily form of anaesthetization finds a linguistic 
counterpart: the “not human” of the concentration camp becomes the “only an 
object/commodity/competitor” of the experience of others in the market place.149  While this may 
sound like the very subjective representation of reification/commodification that Adorno thought 
he sensed in Benjamin’s work,150 Adorno himself noted the extent to which language could 
become “the reified and banal, the sign of commodities, falsifying thought from the start.”151  
Regardless of this linguistic approach to anaesthetization, the larger point is that the 
negation/elision of the humanity/existence of others is front and centre in the various phenomena 
– the decline of storytelling, the toils of factory labour, the encounter with the crowd, etc – that 
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Benjamin focuses on, and it is one of the key motifs that he discerns in the work of Baudelaire.  
This basic point can be seen most stirringly in ‘The Eyes of the Poor,’ where Baudelaire 
describes the meeting of gazes between himself and a poor family, as he sat in a café with his 
lover.  While Baudelaire was moved by the intermingling of his look with theirs, his lover 
exhibited in conscious form the unconscious misrecognition that permeates the experience with 
the crowd: “As I turned my gaze to yours, my love, to read my own thoughts; as I immersed 
myself in your eyes…you said to me: ‘I cannot bear those people with their eyes out on stalks!  
Tell the waiter to get rid of them.”152  As Baudelaire turned to affirm his own recognition of the 
passing family in the gaze of his lover, he expected to find the same embodied simulation; what 
he received was a failed recognition – a rejected recognition or a failed innervative discharge.153  
As Benjamin states of such a phenomenon: “What happens here is that the expectation aroused 
by the gaze of the human eye is not fulfilled.  Baudelaire describes eyes that could be said to 
have lost the ability to look.”154  It is these sorts of experiences that Benjamin saw as the core of 
Baudelaire’s encounter with the crowd, and the centre of his attempt to recuperate shock for the 
purposes of long experience: in this case, he not only aims to draw attention to the encounter 
with the other, but also to the crisis of the gaze exhibited in the response of Baudelaire’s lover.  
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But in turning his back on the crowd, Baudelaire ultimately acquiesces to the immediacy of 
immediate experience, giving it “the weight of long experience.”155 
The recuperative core of the critical reading of Baudelaire that Benjamin undertakes aims 
to resurrect these experiences in the service of a deeper, political understanding of the 
phenomenon.156  In aiming to understand Baudelaire’s work through Freudian motifs, Benjamin 
seeks to extract and understand the phenomenon as a part of the very being of experience and the 
experience of being under modern conditions: the anaesthetization of the body-as-subject 
represents the cutting off of the possibility of collective innervation in what should be the 
mutually disjointing and affirming encounter with the crowd of others.  If Mikhail Bakhtin is 
correct to assert that with Baudelaire, and the Romantics and Symbolists, death “ceases to be an 
aspect of life itself and becomes again a phenomenon on the border between my life here-and-
now and a potential other kind of life,”157 then Benjamin’s critical reading of Baudelaire attests 
this to his acquiescence to modern conditions and aims to excavate the immanent truth contained 
in the experience of the crowd.  Far from death being the link to the “other” kind of life/world, it 
is the very death or misrecognition of the other that blocks the possibility of an other world, the 
possibility of utopia: the utopian desire for alterity is simultaneously the desire to break with the 
solitude of bourgeois reality.  In these respects, it is the alterity that the other represents for me, 
and creates in myself, that opens up the possibility of a world other than this one through the 
recognition of the other as other than myself.  This is simultaneously a matter of a perspective 
other than mine, a person who is non-identical with me, and of a constellative human innervation 
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that emerges through a radical break/brake158 with the existing conditions of experience and 
existence: of the collective action of the crowd as a being informed by multiplicity.  The 
anaestheticization of experience subjects being to the solitude – without end and laden with an 
eternity of repetition – of the crowd: to collective existence as impotence and isolation, as a 
being-alone-together.  Thus, the recuperation of experience and subjectivity can only be effected 
by pulling the emergency brake, by shocking the crowd out of waking death, consequently 
producing the possibility of an institution of experience – of the long experience that capitalist 
modernity has destroyed. 
But, we return here to where we began and ended the previous chapter: the potential 
relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin.  Benjamin’s work does not present the body 
as merely ordered by chaos, and as a monadological entity devoid of the possibility of ethical 
relations as Levin contends.159  Nor does it present an extinction of the cognitive or historical 
subject.160  Rather, Benjamin finds the mortification/mutilation of subjectivity – and more 
particularly collective and constellative intersubjectivity – not necessarily the subject: under the 
sway of capitalist existence, the body161 undertakes a defensive response – simultaneously 
resistant and acquiescent – to the new environment, to the alienating and corruptive field, that it 
enters into.  The phenomenology of the urban, capitalist environment and the presentation of the 
anaesthetization of human experience does not reject, or contradict, the ontology of the flesh as 
elaborated by Merleau-Ponty.  On the contrary, it adds a necessary political wrinkle, an 
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experiential content or a phenomenological layering that will help to radicalize the potentials of 
this ontology.  If we wish to translate Benjamin’s arguments into the language of the flesh, we 
find that the flesh’s living character includes its defensive preservation of itself, and the parrying 
of portions of the experiential nexus of self-others-things to defend the functioning of the 
organism against the destructive potential of shocks.  Indeed, the anaesthecization that Buck-
Morss describes entails a sensory and neurological deadening or closing off of the human 
sensorium and its capacity for innervation.  By closing itself off from the world, and encouraging 
the reflex actions typical of voluntary memory and isolated experience, the intertwining of the 
living flesh and its environment – the very essence of “experience” – becomes abridged.  To 
describe exploitation as both economic and embodied/biopolitical means that the 
commodification or reification that takes place in the production process – where beings are 
incorporated by the commodities that they possess – also takes place in the process of 
experience.  In the production process, I come to relate to others not as a living human being 
caught up in a social, intersubjective process (collective innervation) but as the bearer of a thing-
ified commodity (my labour).  Likewise, in the process of experience, my body becomes thing-
ified, deprived of its sensuous character and relating to others as objects relate to other objects: 
their mutual existence is inconsequential and is not characterized by a conscious and existence-
forming intertwining, but by a defensive deflection of intersubjective experiences.  The outward 
appearance of reified existence is ultimately reproduced in the internal functioning/organs of the 
body as flesh.  This comes via “repetition and application in relation to social practices and 
norms,” and forces the body to “incorporate new behaviours and cultural forms.”162  Yet, with 
capitalism, rather than expanding the experiential possibilities, we have a contraction: the flesh is 
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mortified, hollowed out as a soulless entity capable of only peripheral – unconscious – relations 
with the outside world.   
Yet, this does not entail the death of the subject, but merely the shrinking and the 
mortification of subjectivity in its specific historical incarnation.  Because it is only the sphere of 
potential action, the manner in which the subject functions at present, this sentiment still holds 
out the possibility of a resurrection of sensuous being and intersubjective relations.  It is in these 
respects that the work of Merleau-Ponty acts as the dialectical counter-point to Benjamin’s.  
Capitalism alters the manner in which the flesh functions, conditioning it to function other than 
in its “natural” form.  I use the term “natural” here in the natural-historical or dialectical sense.  
This is intended not to assert the centrality of a first nature – absolute and fixed – but simply to 
undermine any contention that the second nature of capitalism is itself “natural,” and to 
historicize the potentiality of a first nature gone wrong.  The first nature of the flesh was 
informed by its openness to experience and the “external” world – even if this contained its 
malleability.  The second nature of capitalism is a suppression of this openness, and a turn 
towards the “interior” of isolated being and experience.  Indeed, if Merleau-Ponty provides us 
with an account of the sensuous character of the body as a “natural” phenomenon, Benjamin 
provides us with an account of the violence the second nature of historical being subjects it to – 
as well as the manner in which the body adapts to this violence.163  This dialectic plays out the 
two fold action of subjecting nature to history, and history to nature, in a chiasmatic intertwining 
intended to dislodge both.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh cannot be looked at as 
merely some unsullied and perfect/identical form of being; in fact, its non-identical character 
defies this possibility.  What it posits is an open realm of intersubjective action, facilitated by the 
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open character of being itself.  Of course, the wrinkle added by Benjamin is the very idea that 
this intersubjective and sensuous being can be closed off.  But the manner in which Benjamin 
does this also highlights the manner in which individuals become differentiated from each other: 
it points to the separation or multiplicity that can be contained in being (even if the interior of 
bourgeois existence represents an ultimately repressive manifestation of this).  This militates 
against the erasure of the individual within a potentially oppressive originary belonging.  The  
larger point is that this collision demands two things: the sublation and return of the sensuous 
subject and the re-opening of its relationship to self-others-things through a break/brake in the 
current order of experience (the recuperation of subjectivity); and the conceptualization of an 
intersubjective sphere that converges with the multiplicity of existing subjects (the political 
problem of accommodating a de-centered conception of subjectivity). 
*   *   * 
 
If the flesh is an opening onto others and the world, one whose future or existence is 
never written in advance (an opening that is open), then we cannot merely presume being to be 
“electric” or affirming: we must acknowledge that being can be closed off.  In this context, and 
in the context of his work on storytelling and Baudelaire, Benjamin laments the decline or 
deformation of human experience and sensibility, and the essentially inhuman social relations 
that come about in the face of these developments.  Storytelling presented something akin to the 
social relations embodied in Merleau-Ponty’s work, ultimately representing a transformative 
intersubjective experience.  These interactive relations are muted with the rise of the novel, and 
all but destroyed in the form of information.  But these changes are symptomatic of a general 
decline of experience.  Through his psychoanalytic approach to memory, experience and the 
bodily sensorium, Benjamin suggests that the changes taking place in literary expression and 
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reception were not limited to these spheres.  Rather, the tendency towards monadic and 
anaesthetized being was mirrored in the experiences of the urban crowd, factory labour and 
gambling, and the shock experience of capitalism more generally.  In essence, the processes of 
objectification and reification took hold of human capacities in mortifying the flesh and turning it 
into a mechanistic form of being.  Consequently, we find a crisis of perception, in which the 
look/gaze is not returned, and our means to meaningful human interaction become suppressed.  
In these respects, Benjamin does not present a dualistic, monadic or “wild”/unstructured 
conception of the body – let alone a conception that is incapable of ethical relations.  Rather, he 
presents an account under which the body responds to the external conditioning that treats it as 
an “object,” ultimately conditioning the flesh to operate in an inward and closed manner.  The 
dualistic (disembodied) and monadic (misrecognition) character that experience takes on under 
the pressures of urban capitalism are ultimately the result of the very defensive and agentic 
structure of the subject as a psychoanalytically-functioning, embodied entity (i.e. an entity with a 
principle of organization, capable of expansion and retraction).  And, in these respects, 
Benjamin’s work is not a confirmation of this situation, but a lament and a call for the 
recuperation of experience and subjectivity/agency: a call for the resurrection of our corporeal 
being, a re-sensualizing of our bodily capacities and our potential for intersubjective relations 
and recognition. 
Benjamin offers us only a minor gesture as to the direction this might take: the 
recuperation of subjectivity and the re-opening of the sphere of sensuous being lies in the 
collective innervation that manifests itself in revolution.  As he argues, it is in revolutions that 
the alienated conditions contained in second nature are subjected to an attempted reversal – to 
the recuperation of them within the realm of our own subjective action.  It is with these attempts 
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that the possibility of dealing with the problems of the human organism has the possibility of 
being solved.  Hence, it is through the emergence of a revolutionary collective innervation that 
draws us closer to others, and manages to transcend the anaesthetic misrecognition, that the 
sensuous being of a first nature might be brought into the realm of a possible resuscitation and 
sublation: to pave the way for this recuperation of human capacities, we “first have to displace 
the problems of the second nature in the process of humanity’s development.”164  In these 
respects, his alleged “uncritical consent to technology”165 is actually the result of the reality of 
the body’s alienated intermingling with technological developments in the context of capitalist 
experience.  Indeed, his positive presentation of technological possibilities of revolutionary 
transcendence – particularly in art – stem from the need to confront technology in the face of the 
increasing encapsulation of the aesthetic/perceptual realm by the technological means of artistic 
and capitalist reproduction.   
The question we are left with is how (or from where) Benjamin sees this potential 
collective innervation coming about.  This would seem to require the re-emergence of a genuine 
form of “subjectivity” that could facilitate the possibilities of intersubjectivity.  As Benjamin 
states in ‘Central Park’: “From the perspective of spleen, the buried man is the ‘transcendental 
subject’ of historical consciousness.”166  That he puts “transcendental subject” in quotations 
should tip us off to an ulterior intention.  As he explains elsewhere, “spleen is nothing other than 
the quintessence of historical experience.”167  Thus, Benjamin does not intend to posit a truly 
transcendental subject; for him, the buried human is an inherently experiential being-in-the-
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world, but one whose experiential content/capacity must be uncovered.  In this vein, the division 
of society into classes hides behind the capitalist presentation – so useful for fascist purposes – of 
society as composed of equal individuals within the amorphous crowd.  The poetry of Baudelaire 
aimed to see through such an image, and focused on the figure of the ragpicker.  The ragpicker, 
like the proletariat, owned no commodity other than his/her own labour.  But the ragpicker’s 
misery went a step further and represented the apotheosis of human misery: not only was s/he 
subjected to selling their labour, but the ragpicker lived off the refuse of the city – utilizing the 
trash that the capitalist process shed.  Benjamin’s work is composed of the same sorts of 
recuperations as the ragpicker undertook, picking the seemingly mundane or discarded from the 
scrap heaps in order to find the missing truths contained in it.168   
While there are a number of paths – or rags – within Benjamin’s work that we might pick 
through to address the political problem that confronts us, I want to return to his move to the 
analysis of subjectivity and alterity at the level of history as the potential breaking point for a 
mode of emancipatory practice/subjectivity.  Indeed, collective innervation as a transformation 
of first and second nature remains a latent possibility, and one that requires me to fill in some 
gaps that were left in the conceptualization of history or historicality in the previous chapter, 
which includes the further conceptualization of alterity as an historical phenomenon – as, 
perhaps, the phenomenon that can enact a historical awakening in the service of a collective 
innervation.  In these terms, I turn to a utopian political reading of Benjamin's understanding of 
history, founded in both the process of excavating and redeeming the past, both as historical 
object and subject.  As we will see, for Benjamin the past contains not only the buried subject(s) 
that must be excavated for the explosion of an emancipatory, intersubjective relation but the 
dream-image that this intersubjective relation aims to achieve: the classless society, a realm of 
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originary belonging, that can spark the desire for a new form of political relation.  This would be 
predicated on the return of the repressed – the repressed embodiment of human subjects, and the 
repressed others that escape their experiential relations in the world. 
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Chapter 4 
Between Ontology and Ethics: 
Benjamin's Concept of History as Utopian Politics 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
"It is in the nature of the defeated to appear, in their impotence, irrelevant, eccentric, derisory.  What 
transcends the ruling society is not only the potentiality it develops but also all that which did not fit 
properly into the laws of historical movement.  Theory must needs deal with cross-gained, opaque, 
unassimilated material, which as such admittedly has from the start an anachronistic quality, but is not 
wholly obscure since it has outwitted the historical dynamic."1 
 -Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia. 
 
“There are two historicities.  One is chronic or even derisory, full of misunderstandings, in which each age 
struggles against the others as against aliens by composing its concerns and perspectives upon them.  This 
historicity is forgetfulness rather than memory.  It is dismemberment, ignorance, externality.  But the other 
historicity, without which the first would be impossible, is the interest which attaches us to what is not 
ourselves.  It is the life which the past in a continuous exchange finds in us and brings to us.”2 
 -Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World. 
 
Taking up the challenge of Nietzsche’s rebuke of the historian as a “spoiled idler in the 
garden of knowledge” prone to “the smug avoiding of life and action,”3 Hayden White’s ‘The 
Burden of History’ sought to set a new agenda for historiography, proclaiming the need to break 
with the “thoughtless obstructionism” contained in the “study of the past ‘as an end in itself.’”4  
Addressing the question in the context of the declining status of history as an academic field, 
White placed the blame on “outmoded conceptions of objectivity” derived from nineteenth 
century artistic and scientific methodologies.  For the discipline to regain its potency, he 
suggested it is necessary to adapt new modes of representing history that go beyond conceiving 
of the past as a mere object of contemplation, and transform it into a way of understanding and 
resolving the problems plaguing the present.5  It is in this context that I will address Benjamin’s 
concept of history.  But it is in the context of the demand for new historiographic methods that 
Benjamin’s work has been taken up by historians, even holding a certain pride of place in the 
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1990s and experiencing a renaissance at the end of the decade with the English language 
translation of the Arcades Project.  Perhaps understandably, much of this interest has been 
garnered by cultural history, where Benjamin’s approach is in line (even if conceived of ahead of 
time) with the reigning orthodoxies of the discipline.6  Yet within cultural history and within the 
contours of a more general historiographical approach, it is claimed that Benjamin teaches things 
that “all historians already know,” namely that they wrench objects from the past in accordance 
with the needs of the present.  In this context, Benjamin’s disavowal of the in-itself of the 
historical “object” merely suggested that “history was a constellation of past and present through 
which the present would find an image of itself and thus see more clearly.”7   
If this is what historians take out of Benjamin, they fail to adequately understand his 
unique contribution to White’s attempt to rescue history from its own perils, imposing upon his 
concept of history an ultimately monological obscuring of the dialectical relationship of past and 
present, and reducing his contribution to an academic exercise.  This ignores the very 
transformative intention of Benjamin’s work, which aims not to see the present (or past) more 
clearly but to disrupt the very understanding and existence of both: the present does not find an 
image of itself in the past, or a clearer image of itself through the past, but finds in the past an 
other that simultaneously produces otherness (and the potential explosion of an other way of 
being) within itself.  Hence, the cultural-historical approach misses8 that Benjamin’s historical 
approach is not merely a historiographical or epistemological endeavour, but a politico-ethical 
one.  Reading Benjamin’s work in the context of White’s plea for a new living historiography, 
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this chapter aims to draw out the radical and disruptive character of Benjamin’s treatment of the 
concept of history.  In this vein, I suggest that Benjamin’s understanding of history is predicated 
on, or contains, a utopian politics –  that genuine history, which militates against the reified 
history of “homogenous, empty time," contains a utopian structure.  In this vein, while Susan 
Buck-Morss suggests that Benjamin sought to write philosophy as history, I suggest that he 
attempts to write history as ethics – and, more specifically, as intersubjectivity predicated upon a 
politico-ethical demand with utopian aspirations.9  Or, put another way, the structure of history is 
presented as the structure of an ethical experience – particularly in the form of an active and 
creative intersubjectivity.  Thus, the messianic emergence of a political experience represents the 
re-opening of the ontological conditions of life and, concurrently, the resurrection of an 
intersubjective capacity that is rooted in an ethical experience.  In asserting this, and in drawing 
this chapter into the ideas developed in the previous one, we must remain cognizant that this is 
an intersubjective and ethical experience that can also be elided.  Indeed, contained within the 
different conceptions of history and historical perception there are two different and opposed 
tendencies.  As Merleau-Ponty elucidates, one is structured by forgetfulness, externality and the 
renunciation of alterity (the attempt to impose our own being upon the being of another), while 
the other is a relationship of openness and transformation.  The latter one for Benjamin in fact 
represents the conditions for the breaking of the anaesthetization of experience, for it is through 
intersubjectivity at the historical level (through the process of the return of the historical 
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repressed and its redemption) that the intersubjectivity of the present historical moment can be 
opened up to the possibility of utopia. 
I. The Ontological and Ethical Sites of Utopia  
Amongst critics, an influential tendency has been to view Benjamin’s concept of history 
as calling for a romantic return to the past, which carries with it a problematic (or negligible) 
politics.  This position has been put forth by both Jurgen Habermas and Richard Wolin.  
Habermas sees Benjamin’s concept of history as eminently conservative.  For him, Benjamin’s 
concept of now-time necessitates the conservation of a seemingly unsullied past, and its original 
meaning.  The gaze of the present aims to redeem the past as it truly is because this being or 
tradition threatens to disappear, and the relationship between generations is deemed a “causal” 
one.  Here, redemption is conceived of as only a matter of holding onto that which threatens to 
dissipate.  Thus, what Habermas reads in Benjamin’s thought is a nostalgic longing for a 
primordial state of fulfillment in the relations of human beings and their environment/nature.  On 
this reading, Benjamin wants to redeem/rescue some form of semantic potential deposited in 
myth, a feature which ultimately divorces his work from questions of political practice.  Within 
this critique, Habermas appears to be defending Marxism against Benjamin: Adorno is declared 
the “better” Marxist, and Habermas contends that Benjamin engages in “redemptive critique” 
(which aims to recuperate what was lost) rather than ideology-critique (which aims to de-reify 
the existent).  In defending Marxism, Habermas is content to criticize Benjamin’s work because 
it aims to marry the “anarchistic” concept of now-time to historical materialism, which is 
allegedly evolutionary/progressive by nature.  In these latter respects, Habermas is concerned 
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with Benjamin’s pessimistic appraisal of the possibility of tradition’s unity against its forgetting, 
a matter that threatens emancipation.10   
If Habermas’s account of Benjamin’s work represents the first misrecognition as tragedy, 
Wolin’s represents the second as farce.  Like Habermas, Wolin reads Benjamin through the 
lenses of a conflict between redemptive critique and ideology critique, with the former aiming to 
return to things their “proper” and primordial names and the latter aiming for the sublation of the 
fragmentation of modern life.  Again, Benjamin misses the mark and Adorno is declared the 
“better” Marxist and more consistent critic of ideology.  The core of Wolin’s argument lies in the 
suggestion that Benjamin, while often correcting himself, ultimately falls into a romantic 
valorization of a golden age of experience and community that existed in the past – a reconciled 
society that emerges through the medium of idealistic, collective dreams.  Wolin suggests that 
these dreams are problematic enough in and of themselves.11  But his larger issue appears to be 
with the historical method/opposition that they present.  While conceding that in some works 
Benjamin is more consistent with Adorno’s interpretation of Benjamin’s methodology,12 Wolin 
argues that there is an overriding tendency in Benjamin’s work to undialectically and uncritically 
oppose a redeemable and reconciled past and an oppressive and catastrophic present.  These are 
represented as the black and white choice of forms of existence, and Benjamin problematically 
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chooses a primordial golden age as the direction of the future.13  As Wolin states: “according to 
Benjamin’s complex schema, old and new are ultimately interchangeable; for the ‘old,’ classless 
society of prehistory will ultimately become the ‘new’ or utopia; and the ‘new,’ the ruins of 
modernity, will at this point turn into the ‘old’ – i.e., ‘prehistory’ in the Marxian sense.”14   
While Habermas and Wolin do not phrase it as such, they are criticizing Benjamin 
simultaneously for an alleged romanticism and a utopian politics.  The elements of romanticism 
are clear.  The criticism of Benjamin's utopianism, while latent, are familiar critiques of utopia 
and utopian politics generally.  Yet, they fail to grasp the full possibilities of a utopian politics 
generally, and Benjamin's mobilization of such a politics explicitly.  In this context, I want to 
turn to Miguel Abensour's understanding of utopia as persistent, as well as to the sites of this 
persistence, in order to understand the critical utopianism contained in Benjamin's work.  As 
Abensour notes, utopia is often decried as holding – in its emphasis on harmony, unity and 
permanence – totalitarian implications: the utopian project, if successful, “would invariably 
produce a closed, static, authoritarian society that negates temporality and does violence to 
plurality and individual singularity.”15  In Benjamin's work, Habermas and Wolin discern this as 
a return to an unsullied pre-history before the problematic emergence of modernity.  Yet, this 
fails to fully grasp the potentiality of a utopian politics, following traditional critics in limiting 
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the political import of utopia by ironing over differences within the tradition.16  In refusing such 
a simplistic dismissal, Abensour has emphasized the heterodox and historical character of 
utopian thinking.  Centrally, he argues that utopian theorists themselves have become cognizant 
and receptive to the criticisms that have been lobbed at utopia, and this has forced them to re-
write its meaning.  In distilling the insights from a “new utopian spirit,” Abensour reconceives 
utopia as “persistent utopia.”  The fundamental core of utopian thought lies in “the orientation 
toward what is different, the wish for the advent of a radical alterity here and now.”17  Persistent 
utopia emerges from the recognition of the need to preserve this alterity even in the process of 
striving for utopia.  Thus, utopia’s persistence is tied to the duality of the very definition of the 
word: the permanent oscillation between the good place and the non-place – the non-identical 
depth that emerges from refusing to divorce the good place from the non-place.  Rather than 
being a permanent one off that would allegedly realize humanity for eternity, persistent utopia 
represents a permanent attempt to realize the unrealizable/indeterminate, and by virtue of this 
impossibility the permanent alternation between fulfillment and defeat, between the opening and 
re-opening of the utopian desire.  In this sense, the end of utopia is always also its beginning: 
“the ever-reborn movement toward something indeterminate.”18  Here, utopia is related to a 
perennial impulse or desire for something “other” than the given, and is “a stubborn impulse 
toward freedom and justice – the end of domination, of relations of servitude, and of relations of 
exploitation.”19   
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To further explain this persistence, Abensour turns to exploring two “sites” of utopia: an 
ontological and an ethical one.  The former emerges in the work of Ernst Bloch, for whom 
utopia’s persistence “has to do with Being.  To the extent that Being is thought at once as process 
and as incompletion, utopia and its persistence are inscribed in the very economy of Being.”20  
This economy of being is fundamentally informed by lack: the “Not” or “Not-Yet” which 
informs simultaneously lack and transcendence (though never exhaustion of lack).  Lack as 
contained in being drives the human towards the place in which we have gone beyond lack.  The 
essence of this non-identical ontology is that the lack constitutes a driving force: it is the point of 
emergence, and continuation, of movement itself.   But, given the perennial character of being as 
movement, Abensour concludes that “the Not-Yet is the experience – a sort of repetition of the 
origin – of the non-accomplishment of Being.”21  Lack is thus what informs the moment of 
invention, which in turn represents the exit from lack and the drive towards accomplishment.  In 
this sense, Bloch contrasts the human with being, and sees in this difference the continual 
striving towards utopia as the realization of being.  Yet, because being always exceeds its 
realization (because it retains a surplus), the principle of hope is never exhausted.  In essence, 
utopia is driven by the tension created by the unbridgeable chasm between being and the human, 
or essence and existence.  The Not-Yet is an experience of this chasm and tension, which puts 
into motion the moment of exit or innovation – a striving towards that which escapes us.  Yet, 
because this non-accomplishment is a permanent characteristic of being, utopia never subsides 
for it can never be realized: it persists.  Consequently, the “non-accomplishment of being” is 
utopia’s “indistinguishable source, the secret of its persistence, its surest principle.”22 
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On the other hand, Levinas re-orients our thinking about utopia by thinking it “under the 
sign of the Encounter”23 or ethics, rather than ontology.  For him, the persistence of utopia 
emanates from the site of sociality, which is to say the human or ethical:24 utopia is opened by 
the irreducibility of the other in an encounter that breaks the spell of the nexus of 
power/knowledge that is emblematic of ontological and autarchic positions and their fixation on 
essence, and refuses to reduce the other to an object of knowledge which can then be reduced to 
the same.  More to the point, the encounter – which brings into existence the possibility of the 
human bond – precedes thought, consequently denying the dualistic colonization of the other, 
and forces us to recognize sociality as originary.25  Moroever, by virtue of the infinity of alterior 
encounters, there can be no “mastery of the social,” no imposition of the same on the other.  
Here, Abensour reads in Levinas' work a utopian politics predicated on “a pluralism that is not 
fused into unity.”26  Such a fusion would efface the alterity of the other, which is exactly what 
constitutes the ethical: the alterity of the face to face relationship, and a proximity that exists as a 
concern for, or obligation to, the other.  This alterity drives the notion of transcending relations 
of domination via the fidelity to the other in their very difference and suffering: “The alterity of 
the other is inseparable from his destitution.  The misery, the poverty, and the nudity of the other 
are his manner of summoning me: his suffering the mode of his proximity.”27  The encounter is 
the moment in which the alterity of the other attaches to the self, opening up a world beyond the 
autarchy of the self, by rupturing its self-identity and imposing an ethical obligation manifested 
as “‘being caught up in fraternity,’ self-sacrifice, the institution of ‘one for the other.’”28   
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While these might appear as opposed positions, Abensour argues that Levinas discerns an 
ambiguity in Bloch’s work “to the extent that beneath the ontological text another text circulates 
that is more on the side of the human than on that of being.”29  I contend that the same ambiguity 
exists in Benjamin’s work.30  In particular, there seems to be a slippage or oscillation from the 
Arcades Project and ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’ (the ontological) to ‘On the 
Concept of History’ (the ethical).  I want to draw on this understanding of utopia to explore the 
nature of Benjamin’s work, essentially suggesting that using the language of a politics of utopia 
can tease out the politics latent in it.  While Benjamin makes recourse to the terminology of 
classless society, his image of it is not a static or identical rendering; moreover, the image of the 
classless society becomes driven by the desire to redeem the trampled generations of history as 
an ethical encounter.  Perhaps more to the point, and perhaps in more than the "latent" 
connection contained in Bloch's work, in Benjamin's work the ontological and ethical sites of 
utopia are connected.  The ontological (and non-identical) characteristics of the historical object 
meld and open up the ethical demand that is placed on the present by the past.  In effect, 
redemption entails shattering the historical object to release the oppressed from their containment 
within the self-same, homogeneous empty time that would sacrifice them in accordance with the 
demands of progress.  Hence, the ambiguity of – or oscillation in – Benjamin’s work is mirrored 
in the ambiguity of persistent utopia, which, in Abensour's words, “consists not of choosing 
such-and-such a ‘solution,’ but in being able relentlessly to imagine new figures of a free and 
just political community[.]”31 
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II. Benjamin, Brecht and History as Ideology Critique 
Before directly addressing the critiques rendered by Habermas and Wolin, I want to 
return to Benjamin's historical methodology.  The theory of constellations contained in the 
‘Prologue’ to the Trauerspiel represents a substantial moment in the development of Benjamin’s 
later historical thinking.  Indeed, the development of Benjamin’s thought involves the 
transposition of his constellative epistemology to the realm of concrete history – though this 
transposition takes on new dimensions.  In particular, Benjamin’s growing engagement with 
Marxism – and his attempts to wrest historical materialism away from the progressivist 
positivism of the Second International – gives it a new inflection, one reflected in his general 
critique of the historicist approach.  In providing a historical approach with an empancipatory 
impulse, Benjamin suggests the necessity of breaking with “the concepts of the ruling class” 
which “have always been the mirrors that enable an image of ‘order’ to prevail.”32  Of course, 
this order is tied to a conception of progress through homogenous, empty time and Benjamin’s 
work aims to break with it in order to open up the contained and repressed possibilities.  Hence, 
in providing a new conceptual matrix, he states: “Definitions of basic historical concepts: 
Catastrophe – to have missed the opportunity. Critical moment – the status quo threatens to be 
preserved.  Progress – the first revolutionary measure taken.”33   
One of the basic premises of a constellation was that phenomena needed to be redeemed.  
With Benjamin’s later historical perspective, this continues to animate his attempt at a new 
analytical tableau.  Indeed, in the context of history, phenomena must be rescued from their 
“enshrinement as heritage” in the historical narratives of the ruling classes: they must be 
redeemed and freed from this fixity, blasted out of their reified presentation within a continuity.  
To allow them to continue in their existent position is part of the catastrophe that allows the 
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present to be shown as the realization of freedom and progress.  Against this, Benjamin 
paraphrases Strindberg to the effect that “hell is not something that awaits us but this life here 
and now.”34  And hell appears as the Sisyphean – as eternal sameness in which nothing is created 
and the catastrophes of the present and past not only cannot be transcended but are continually 
repeated.  True progress becomes possible through the revolutionary rupture with the existent via 
a redemption of the past.  Benjamin views this break with semblance/eternal sameness as the 
only authentic form of political experience.  While the concept of constellation suggested the 
malleability or transitory character of truth, we now find it taking on a political component: truth 
and the unique experience represent the break in the historical continuum and the transformation 
of the catastrophe of the present.  Hence, break becomes the very meaning of progress – or 
progress becomes the break with the status quo.  All of this represents a new mode of historical 
perception, which itself inaugurates a genuinely new relationship of subjects to history, and a 
new relationship of subjects within history.  This dispenses with the concern to present the 
historical object the way it really was, which severed the object from the subject who perceives it 
and thus concentrated knowledge on possession of a moment in the past (to be known and 
possessed, but not recuperated or redeemed).  Redemption entails not merely a redemption of the 
phenomena in terms of a recuperation of a “not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been,”35 
but simultaneously drawing the past into the nexus informing knowledge of the present.  Hence, 
historical knowledge becomes self-knowledge through the alterity of the past. 
For Benjamin, the redemption of the past takes part in a redemption of Marxism itself.  
But, in the same vein as his constellative epistemology, this is not merely a recuperation but a 
transformation.  The very concept of redemption entails freeing historical materialism from the 
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restrictions of closed systems and sedimented meanings.  Hence, it requires pushing Marxism to 
its extreme in order to draw it away from its cooptation into bourgeois/positivist modes of 
thinking about history (progress, continuity, etc) and emancipation (freedom within the context 
of the existing productive relations and their progress).36  It is in this vein that Benjamin lays out 
his starting point: “It may be considered one of the methodological objectives of this work to 
demonstrate a historical materialism which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress.  Just 
here, historical materialism has every reason to distinguish itself sharply from bourgeois habits 
of thought.  Its founding concept is not progress but actualization.”37  The meaning of 
actualization lies in what Benjamin sees as the original, revolutionary meaning of progress: the 
actualization of social goals, in the sense of the realization of the very term humanity.  Progress 
in its bourgeois incarnation presupposes a conception of humanity that grows through the empty, 
homogenous time of self-defeat (humanity’s increasing subjection under the reign of 
technological development).  In Benjamin’s reconfiguration, progress takes on a discontinuous, 
ruptural meaning in accordance with his assertion of the uniqueness of political experience, an 
experience of interference “where the truly new makes itself felt for the first time, with the 
sobriety of dawn.”38  Thus, historical materialism presents a new configuration of time/history, 
one no longer beholden to the eternal sameness of homogenous, empty time nor to the 
predictability/inevitability of continuous history.  But, here, we also confront the idea that 
revolution, rather than being the locomotive of history, is the attempt by humanity to pull the 
emergency brake.  In these respects, history would be the arrest of development, in the form of 
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the attempt to stop and recognize the past as something that is incomplete – and in which the 
present course of history will not actualize the humanity of that past, given that it is largely 
repressed and its oppression justified through the ideology of progress.  Of course, this involves 
redeeming the past, at least at this point in terms of resuscitating it and bringing it into dialogue 
with the present.  Doing so would involve a genuine experience of the past as embodied in long 
experience via the explosion of involuntary memory. 
In summing up this redemption of Marxism, Benjamin writes: "On the elementary 
doctrine of historical materialism.  (1) An object of history is that through which knowledge is 
constituted as the object’s rescue.  (2) History decays into images, not into stories.  (3) Wherever 
a dialectical process is realized, we are dealing with a monad.  (4) The materialist presentation of 
history carries along with it an immanent critique of the concept of progress.  (5) Historical 
materialism bases its procedures on long experience, common sense, presence of mind, and 
dialectics."39  As Benjamin points out in (1), knowledge emerges via the rescue of objects – the 
rescue from their embedded and fixed position within the dominant historical narrative, which 
seeks to repress (or entirely forget) their revolutionary and critical content.  The political 
character of history lies in recuperating or recognizing these objects at moments of danger – 
moments of oppression and resistance in the present that threaten to be suppressed and forgotten, 
and moments in which the past itself may be lost – to draw the present into crisis by attaining a 
higher knowledge of the present, through actualizing the past (i.e. making the past present via 
redemption).  In concert with (4), these past moments can often be ones that show the very 
betrayal of progress: they are moments that exhibited a critical, emancipatory content that was 
repressed in the process of historical “progress.”  The idea of history decaying into images is key 
to unravelling the monadological structure of history.  The terminology of image aims to de-
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center the historical object: by decaying into images, history takes on a non-identical character 
tied to the temporality of perception and recognition, as well as the variability and multiplicity of 
meaning.  Benjamin connects the notion of image to language and philology, and suggests 
reading history and reality like texts.  The conclusion he draws from this is that the past contains 
meanings that transcend its own era, meanings that can be utilized for the constructive purposes 
of the present, but only by wrenching objects from their reified context so they can be “filled by 
now-time.”40  This politically charges the past, giving it an entirely new meaning – one that only 
has the potential to be actual in the moment it presents itself.  But, perhaps more to the point, this 
image emerges via a process of excavation, which is part of the class struggle that seeks to trace 
the origins of the historical object as something subject to the process of becoming and 
disappearance.  Given that the dominant narrative seeks to repress the past, Benjamin views 
these moments as buried underneath ideological rubble or hidden in a chamber that “has been 
closed and locked.”41  He equates digging through the rubble, or entering the room, with political 
action.  The very act of aiming to recuperate these lost pieces of the past (both objects and 
subjects) entails incorporating them into genuine memory and long experience.  This requires 
meticulously digging through the rubble and severing – or alienating – the objects from their 
typical associations in order to split the historical atom and its destructive energies.  The 
destructive energies are contained not in the inventory list of the objects that are found and ready 
to be placed in the sphere of empty, homogenous time;42 rather, they are found in constructing an 
image of the object which would ultimately shatter this empty, homogenous time and facilitate 
the recuperation of these buried memories for the political purposes of the present, consequently 
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calling “into question every victory, past and present, of the rulers.”43  Class struggle is contained 
in the struggle over the meaning (and significance) of the past, as well as over its recuperation or 
repulsion.  And this signifies the depth of meaning contained in objects.  As Terry Eagleton 
points out, there is a sense in which this very procedure of “excavation is out to deconstruct the 
homogeneity of history.”44  Here, excavation signifies both the interrogation of the meaning of 
historical objects (particularly as they are presented by the victors) and the search for useful 
objects that have been hidden or forgotten in the rubble. 
In this context, the criticisms offered by Habermas and Wolin suffer from a number of 
fatal, conceptual misrepresentations.  In the first place, the very contours of Benjamin’s concept 
of history are intended to be an ideology critique.  This is part of what makes excavation a 
political action – its attempt to unearth the rubble that contradicts the ideology of progress that 
animates bourgeois conceptions of history.  Indeed, Benjamin’s historiographical method aims to 
draw the present into a historical crisis by showing the transiency of being (hence exposing the 
second nature of capitalist modernity) and the potentials of transcending the present.  It also acts 
to show that the present has become victorious only by virtue of its own historical repressions 
and violence.  This is central to the demand for a break with homogenous, empty time as the 
reification of history as an object of knowledge: a rejection of history’s presentation as a fixed 
and permanent set of events, characterized by continuity and progress, and contained in a static 
relationship.  In these respects, Benjamin aims to give history its living flesh, in a two fold sense.  
In the first place, he aims to dispense with the “contemplativeness” that characterizes the epic 
element in history, opening up the sphere of subjectivity and viewing history itself as a complex 
interplay of subjects with emancipatory intentions.  Second, in order to enact such a historical 
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subjectivity, Benjamin aims to open up the historical object, conceiving it as a mutable being no 
longer fixed and static.  The demand for a new mode of perception that would be capable of 
reorganizing our understanding of history in turn demands that we move away from the 
monological conception found in positivist/historicist thinking, as well as its attachment to 
identity thinking.  This begins with the assertion of the non-identity of knowledge and the claim 
that truth is in flux.  For Benjamin, this emerges out of a renovation of Marxism and its 
understanding of history: history must liberate “itself from the schema of progress within an 
empty and homogenous time,” for such a liberation “would finally unleash the destructive 
energies of historical materialism which have been held back for so long.”45  As he further 
argues: “To grasp the eternity of historical events is really to appreciate the eternity of their 
transience.”46  Hence, the event as object – its meaning or interpretation – is also transitory.  Yet, 
Benjamin’s claim is not intended to suggest the complete relativity of the world or truth: rather, 
it suggests that “truth” is structured by the unique character of the experience that comes through 
the interaction of “subject” and “object,” which shape and transform one another.  Hence, he 
suggests that truth is “bound to a nucleus of time lying hidden within the knower and the known 
alike.”47  This suggests a depth of meaning which ties itself to the concrete moment, and the 
unique experience, in which subject and object come to find/confront one another. 
In distancing Benjamin from Marxism (or at least an “adequate” version of it), much of 
the blame is placed on the influence of his close friend, Bertolt Brecht.  And yet, Brecht’s work 
on the structure of theatre and its relationship to representations of history can help to get at the 
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ideology critique contained in Benjamin’s work.48  In attempting to break free of the historicist 
consciousness that turns events and social structures into something self-evident, permanent and 
natural, Brecht introduced the Alienation-Effect into his theatre.  The A-Effect attempts to 
dislodge, or alienate, events and social structures from naturalizing conceptions/associations by 
turning them into something extraordinary and “un-natural.”  As Brecht states: “A representation 
that alienates is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem 
unfamiliar.”49  There is something here of Marx’s dialectical deconstruction of the commodity.  
While the commodity is often seen as “an extremely obvious, trivial thing,” Marx attempted to 
show that it is only under specific conditions of possibility that the commodity emerges as a 
central force in society.50  In essence, the objects are jarred from their self-apparent context and, 
like Baudelaire’s correspondances, this procedure has the character of a shock experience.  
Brecht seeks to shock the self-evident representation of the historical object by detaching its 
associations and showing the conditions and possibilities of everyday existence and, hence, 
simultaneously the possibilities of its manipulation as a product of a specific mode of historical 
being.51  This would turn daily existence into an historical event – in the dual sense of a 
historically situated event and a historically transitory event.  Against the historicist presentations 
of historical being and events as permanent and/or final, the A-Effect draws out the differences 
between the social structures of various epochs, showing them as singular and separable monadic 
structures (hence not subject to mere “quantitative” transformation/relations).  By 
comprehending and representing all epochs as historically specific, the A-Effect ultimately 
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alienates the present and shows it to be one of many possible modes of being.52  Benjamin’s 
entire notion of tearing moments from their context – i.e. from the rosary bead-like organization 
that modernity imposes upon them – plays out the simultaneous role of illustrating their non-
identity and opening up the realm of history.  In tune with Benjamin’s notion of the transiency of 
the present (its very historicality), Brecht suggests that the entire effect of a static representation 
of historical being is upset: “The audience is no longer taking refuge from the present day in 
history; the present day becomes history.”53 
III. Benjamin's Ontological Site of Utopia:  
Memory and Excavation, Dreams and Images 
The illustration of the transitory character of historical being is an indictment of the 
present as itself merely a temporary configuration.  But this does not entail a nostalgic longing 
for an earlier era.  Rather, historical moments – including the present – act as monadic entities 
that interact, not through the retroactive or monocausal determinacy of the present, but through a 
mutual collision and interpenetration.  Brecht incorporates this premise into the scene structure 
of his historical representations in the theatre.  He suggests that “the scenes should…be played 
quite simply one after another…without taking account of what follows or even of the play’s 
overall sense.”54  In this manner the scenes are presented as independent monads – or, as a series 
of self-contained historical moments – “so that the action progresses by jumps.”55  By 
representing history as a montage of events and images unglued from our ordinary associations 
both in terms of temporality and causality, the moments do not seamlessly flow into one another, 
but are characterized by jumps and ruptures that break the flow of a simple teleological 
progression.  This allows the events to be displaced from their imposed sequence: each 
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individual scene is torn from its context.  Without a necessarily (and necessary) linear thread 
tying together an entirely resolved plot, the contradictions, transformations and potentialities that 
are fulfilled or unfulfilled in given scenes can be related to other scenes and it can be seen that 
trajectories and relations were reversed or reinforced, and that things could have transpired other 
than the way that they did.  Consequently, the scenes alienate one another: they become other 
than what they are in and of themselves, and as they would be in the context of a linear 
development.56  In this context, historical moments retain a monadic independence, but they 
collide and disrupt each other in instances of dialectical interpenetration that drastically upset the 
meaning of both moments.   
Rather than opening a past that we must return to, Benjamin argues that moments of 
historical awakening produce an entirely new relationship between the past and present that 
illuminates the possibility of a dialectical future: the historical prophet “perceives the contours of 
the future in the fading light of the past as it sinks before him into the night of times.”57  The past 
is never lost, or dead, but hangs in time waiting to be resurrected in a dialectical collision that 
will ultimately unhinge the present (and the past).  But Benjamin denies that there is a mythical 
past that can be recaptured.  Indeed, the past itself can never be known outside of its dialectical 
relationship to the present.  Moreover, this relationship is not permanently fixed, and Benjamin is 
quick to point out its fleeting nature: it “emerges suddenly, in a flash” but “in the next moment is 
already irretrievably lost.”  Indeed, the goal is not to recognize history “the way it really was” 
but to seize hold of this image “at a moment of danger” and awaken “a not-yet-conscious 
knowledge of what has been.”58  And the recognition of what has been must play an integral role 
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in our understanding of what our present is.  By refusing to herald “the dead to the table,”59 
history repels and forgets its own failures, even where it aims to herald change.   
None of this entails a simple return to the past.  Habermas and Wolin neglect this, 
because they seek to impose the necessity (or historical materialist orthodoxy) of comprehending 
history as a linear, progressive development.  Within this, they assume that a presupposed long 
experience will be able to inform some present notion of political action (or that the ideology 
critique of Negative Dialectics will magically fall from the sky and inspire political action), and 
treat memory as a merely conservative faculty.  All of this is at odds with Benjamin’s project.  In 
drawing into question the direction of history, Benjamin is also drawing into question the simple, 
linear narrative about the development of radical subjectivity, and the nature of “subjectivity” 
itself.  Indeed, the very premise of his concept of "origin" is that objects/subjects come into being 
and disappear; the philosophical history/science of origin that he puts forth aims to excavate 
threads that have “become lost, only to be picked up again by the present course of history in a 
disjointed and inconspicuous way.”60  In mirroring the problematization of subjectivity, history 
cannot be represented as a line, even if we problematize this line with the concept of false 
consciousness and the ignorance of history’s objective direction.  This would mirror the ideology 
of progress, and continue to subject the past to instrumentalist considerations of its irrationality, 
or its necessary transcendence.  Such a conception would place the emergence of fascism in the 
20th century outside of the historical continuum, and repress the very being (or non-being) of the 
victims of fascism to a contingent occurrence irrelevant to the development of a “humanity” that 
contradicts itself by this act of exclusion-as-anhilation.  Hence, as Benjamin cites Lotze, “In 
opposition to the readily accepted doctrine that the progress of humanity is ever onward and 
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upward, more cautious reflection has been forced to make the discovery that the course of history 
takes the form of spirals – some prefer to epicycloids.”61  The point here is that humanity 
emerges in bursts and flits, and history is the melancholic longing for the re-emergence of these 
moments and their political potentials as they dissipate behind the flow of progress.  Benjamin’s 
progress is aimed at recuperating these moments, as moments of subjectivity and humanity – to 
recuperate the various incarnations of the project of humanization, to recuperate the potentials of 
its actualization, to bring it back into being against its forgetting or mortification.  The ideology 
of progress ultimately presupposes what it should be explaining, and inevitably delays it: it 
assumes the emergence of subjects (and their realization via teleological and mechanical forces) 
and their liberation.  In the concept of epicycloids, we find a reiteration of the notion of 
recognition as a break with the heretofore reign of misrecognition.  With Benjamin, recognition 
and intersubjectivity come into being as the creative emergence of human interrelations and 
actions which traverses linear threads (of quantitative growth) and connects that which is 
different (the others who are not merely our own projection).  When history comes to a standstill, 
knowledge and the remembrance of the past become a possibility.  And this knowledge is not 
merely one that seeks to achieve knowledge of the object-in-itself: “knowledge within the 
historical moment is always knowledge of a moment.”62  As a specific relation, dialectics at a 
standstill indicates not a static knowledge of what was always already there, but knowledge of 
what comes together with the now to transform both historical moments: it is knowledge of the 
transiency and intersubjective character of the moments of history. 
Furthermore, Habermas and Wolin fundamentally misunderstand Benjamin's account of 
memory and redemption.  While Benjamin refers to memory as “conservative” this only has 
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meaning in the context of its opposition to reminiscence (or voluntary memory) in which the 
past/experience is destroyed and forgotten.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Benjamin cites 
Reik to the effect that this process of destruction (or repression) of the past was tied to the 
inability of the organism/ego to meet the demands that this repressed memory placed on it: 
consciousness parried painful/dangerous memories or experiences in trying to remove them from 
the conscious register.  Consequently, Benjamin invokes Carl Jung in suggesting that the sin of 
modern man is his “unhistorical” consciousness; and, more to the point, that “higher 
consciousness is thus guilt.”63  This higher consciousness requires the conscious recognition of 
the past, a consciousness in which one knows “that even the dead will not be safe from the 
enemy if he is victorious.”64  Our guilt lies in failing to preserve their memory, and in repeating 
the catastrophic barbarism that trampled them in the first place.  Indeed, in failing to 
conserve/register the past – or in treating past victims as those instrumental beings over whom 
progress had, and continues, to trample – we are subject to the melancholy and acedia of those 
who unconconsciously contribute to the incomplete emancipation of the past, and to our own 
failed emancipation.  Given the flow of progress, and the fleeting character of experience, 
memory aims to conserve and resuscitate these repressed beings via an ethical experience: it 
allows these beings to return in a unique experience capable of facilitating a political experience.  
As Benjamin says in rebuttal to Horkheimer’s contention that past suffering is complete, memory 
has the ability to modify this suffering/oppression in bringing it back to life.65  In these respects, 
Benjamin’s concept of memory contains a creative component66: “memory brings about the 
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convergence of imagination and thought.”67  In essence, imagination acts to arrange memories 
when they flit by – it puts them to use, drawing correspondences between historical moments and 
interpreting the objects of history in accordance with the openness/non-identity of their 
meaning/being against their fixity and conformism.  In the idea of now-time, this is centrally 
predicated upon the subjectivity of the present, and upon the present political situation conceived 
of as crisis.  It is the now that seeks to recuperate the past through the co-ordinated efforts of 
memory and imagination.  And, of course, this allows the present to potentially recuperate the 
past – but only in that particular time/moment of the past’s emergence, which is to say in the 
now of its recognizability under conditions of emergence/y.  Under such conditions, the present 
opens up via the surplus contained in the historical object.  The political action contained in this 
act of memory seeks to create an institution of experience, one capable of incarnating itself as 
long experience and long memory. 
 In tune with the conception of anaesthetics, Benjamin refers to historicism and its 
attempts to represent things “as they really were” as having a narcotic effect: it dulls the 
historical senses, and allows for the repression of the past (our passing it by) to appear as natural.  
The processes of deconstructing and excavating history were intended to redeem and liberate the 
surplus energies that were hidden within this mode of historical understanding.68  To draw out 
this surplus, Benjamin turns to the concepts of dreams and awakening.  In surveying the cultural 
history of the nineteenth century, Benjamin sought to retain the “dreams” – in the form of 
utopian experiments – that emerged out of the collective consciousness of the epoch.  Rather 
than being simple ideological manifestations, such images expressed an inner truth contained in 
the collective consciousness and material relations of the epoch.  In the first place, they 
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represented the starting point for the critique of the historicism that represented the eternal 
return/same that cannot be broken.  If historicism represented the failure of historical experience, 
collective dreams represented the potential of the emergence of genuine experience and the 
transformation of social existence.  Dreams represent a potential, because they still retain the 
quality of a repressed reality/experience – a repressed wish, which is not entirely clear to the 
collective which dreams it.  But Surrealists such as Louis Aragon were content to remain within 
the realm of dream (conceived as mythology and the irrational), rather than finding the 
“constellation of awakening” that would bring these insights not only to light or conscious 
attention but to political fruition – to political praxis.69  Psychoanalysis broke with this 
separation, representing dreaming and waking as parts of the total consciousness of subjects, 
even if dreams retained a repressed quality.  Experiences that were parried in order to protect the 
psyche from the onslaught of shock experiences often seeped into dreams, which in turn allowed 
the subject the chance to relive the experience for the purposes of coming to terms with it and 
incorporating it into long experience.  Understanding these dreams requires reading them 
psychoanalytically, as wish symbols in need of decoding to extract memory’s surplus energies.  
Moreover, psychoanalysis broke with the individual character of Surrealist dreams, transposing 
the phenomenon to the level of the collective. 
 In the context of excavation, the now of recognizability is “the synthesis of dream 
consciousness (as thesis) and waking consciousness (as antithesis)”70: it is a moment of 
awakening, in which the dream is retained in, and engages with, waking life rather than 
maintaining itself at a repressed distance from it.  Indeed, awakening is the moment of rupture 
                                                 
69
 Ibid.,  458. 
70
 Ibid.,  463-464. 
 213 
 
and the realization of that which has been repressed.  As Benjamin states in his preparatory notes 
for ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’:  
-Not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been.  Structure of what-has-been at this stage.  Knowledge of 
what has been as a becoming aware, one that has the structure of awakening.   
-Not-yet-conscious knowledge on the part of the collective.   
-All insights to be grasped according to the schema of awakening.  And shouldn’t the “not-yet-conscious 
knowledge” have the structure of dream?71 
 
Here, Benjamin fuses the notion of the collective consciousness/phenomena with the language of 
dreams/awakening.  Both the collective un/consciousness and the phenomena that comes to 
conscious knowledge are eminently historical.  The realization of a specific moment in a specific 
light is unique to a particular epoch, which “rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular 
dream image as such.”72  Against Adorno's objections,73 Benjamin saw in collective 
consciousness the very means for conceptualizing collective agencies: it was in the concept of 
society’s awakening and unearthing of its unconscious dream images that genuine history and 
experience could emerge.74  As a historical category, specific to the now and based on the 
mediation of the non-identical image by the oppressed, this conception of agency resists the 
alleged mythification of a collective subject devoid of division75: the oppressed seek to 
resuscitate those who are excluded by the fragmentation of “humanity.”  Indeed, the very act of 
wresting history from the conformism of positivist conceptions indicates a class struggle over the 
meaning and significance of the past, though this only comes to the fore with the emergence of 
the moment of political contestation over the image of the past.76  The now of recognisability 
was what facilitated the historian’s ability to undertake a dream interpretation of the present 
which sought to shatter its illusions about itself and free the oppressed from this narrative.  In 
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essence, sleeping consciousness carries with it the automatic movement in which we need not 
consciously act and can forget the events that transpire before our eyes (but are retained in 
dreams).  Sleeping represents “the moment of waiting” – a moment tied to the teleological 
conception of history that holds that awakening will come of its own accord.  Awakening 
requires acts of cunning that can break us from sleep, while retaining the dream contained in the 
sleep state.77  In this conceptualization, the repressed past is retained in dreams: dreams represent 
that which has been, but which we only have a “not-yet-conscious” knowledge of.  As the past 
comes to a standstill in the now of recognizability, this moment represents a “dialectical 
reversal” of the heretofore accepted or acknowledged consciousness of the past.  It represents a 
moment of awakening (a break) in which memory ruptures the sleeping consciousness and 
excavates the dreams contained in it.  It is in dreams that we find not only what has been severed 
from knowledge/knowing (the past), but also the wish to recognize/redeem it.  As Benjamin 
summarizes the new historical method: “The new, dialectical method of doing history presents 
itself as the art of experiencing the present as waking world, a world to which that dream we 
name the past refers in truth.  To pass through and carry out what has been in remembering the 
dream!”78  In these terms, the moment of awakening represents an act of memory: the retaining 
via memory of the image contained in the dream, to affect the moment of awakening. 
 In analyzing the dreams of the nineteenth century, Benjamin finds the recurrence – 
particularly in the form of failed revolutions and political movements – of dreams of a classless 
society.  This emerges centrally in ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’: 
Corresponding to the form of the new means of production, which in the beginning is still ruled by the form 
of the old (Marx), are images in the collective consciousness in which the new is permeated with the old.  
These images are wish images; in them the collective seeks both to overcome and to transfigure the 
immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social organization of production.  At the same 
time, what emerges in these wish images is the resolute effort to distance oneself from all that is antiquated 
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– which includes, however, the recent past.  These tendencies deflect the imagination (which is given 
impetus by the new) back upon the primal past.  In the dream in which each epoch entertains images of its 
successor, the latter appears wedded to elements of primal history (Urgestichte) – that is, to elements of a 
classless society.  And the experiences of such a society – as stored in the unconscious of the collective – 
engender, through interpretation with what is new, the utopia that has left its trace in a thousand 
configurations of life, from enduring edifices to passing fashions.79   
 
This passage informs much of Wolin’s critique of Benjamin.  For Wolin, Benjamin relies on a 
notion of the memory of a pre-historic classless society, a previous civilization which had “yet to 
be tainted by the capitalist division of labour and the fatal separation between the ‘use value’ and 
‘exchange value’ of goods.”80  As I suggested, this ignores the creative and imaginative element 
contained in Benjamin’s conception of memory.  What memory seeks to preserve is an 
experience that would otherwise be forgotten.  And, in the context of the above quote, we need to 
be cognizant of the fact that Benjamin continually refers to the image (and wish image, at that) of 
a classless society, not its realization in the past.  If his concept of history has taught us anything, 
it is that history-as-object cannot be known as it really was: it is caught up in the intertwining of 
the two moments situated within the flow of time.  Thus, it is permeated by the consciousness of 
the present (just as the present becomes permeated with it), and only becomes recognizable at a 
specific moment in a specific light.  The image of the classless society – classless society as 
dream – seeks to dislodge the very solidified foundations of the present, drawing it into crisis in 
transforming past and present.  In the constellative sense, as the image of the classless society 
rises up it has a monadological effect: it draws into itself the being of other historical moments, 
and fundamentally shifts the character of the present.  This draws out the “not-yet-conscious” 
memory of the past – the origins of the present in the trampling of the image of classless society 
– and draws out the possibility of the utopian future.   
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In this vein, we can read the concept of the “not-yet-conscious” image of the classless 
society – an image that would seem to persist throughout history in different incarnations, and 
through the consciousness of various moments – through Abensour’s reading of the ontological 
site of utopia.  That Benjamin refers to the image of the classless society represents not so much 
the reality of it, as the ontological condition of striving for it: the impulse or desire to overcome 
the permanent lack inscribed in being.  If history is characterized by a permanent transience, 
despite the alleged “Golden Age,” then the recurrent image of the classless society is not so 
much the return to the place itself, as the return to the ontological origin of its emergence as 
indicative of a lack.  If we link this up with Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology, we find the very 
means to theorizing the transformation of being and the attempt to institutionalize the perennial 
lack that characterizes being within the context of hyperdialectics.  In this direction, the image 
contains the invisible as a meaning that ruptures and transforms the very character of the visible, 
bringing it into a new light, interpenetrated by the savage character of the ontological place of 
utopia.  In the concept of ontology as primordial, Merleau-Ponty aims to highlight the lack 
contained in the acculturated and hierarchical character of Cartesian ontologies (and the 
rationalist politics they perpetuate).  In reading Benjamin this way, we can also remain cognizant 
that the images of classless society (e.g. the Paris Commune, the Spartacus League, the Fourierist 
phalanstery) that persist throughout his work were all failures or, more accurately, trampled by 
the “progress” of history and the actions of the victors to suppress that which challenged the 
narratives of progress (the non-identical).  When they emerge as dream images, these moments 
do not emerge as the confirmation of a living reality that we have passed by, but emerge as the 
failed attempts at instituting utopia.  The “ought to be” is something that thus characterizes any 
failed moment in the past.81  Consequently, the return to the monadological origins of the 
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moment of classless society is in fact the persistent return of history’s attempted transformation.  
In line with Abensour’s reading of Bloch, we find the persistence of a dual lack: the lack 
contained in the present, and the lack of actuality that permeated the past as well.  Thus, the 
image of utopia persists because the lines of utopia are cut via the dialectic of emancipation (that 
is, emancipation conceived as catastrophe).  In this sense, Benjamin’s historiographical method 
aims to resurrect and redeem (or “invest” and “orient”) these moments of utopia “otherwise” – 
that is, against the grain.     
IV. From Ontology to Ethics: Redemption and the Tradition of the Oppressed 
Benjamin's characterization of the image of the classless society that is unearthed through 
memory and excavation points to a more substantive role than ideology-critique in his concept of 
history, for memory and excavation likewise aim to unearth a subjectivity within history.  In 
these respects, subjectivity is directed explicitly towards redeeming political practice against its 
mortification within the contours of capitalist modernity.  Hence, more centrally in the context of 
the conception of intersubjectivity developed thus far, excavation is also political action by 
opening up the relation of intersubjectivity by attempting to redeem the dead – to bring to life the 
presence of past generations in the face of the threat of the disappearance of the past under the 
weight of progress.  Here, Benjamin seeks to dispense with instrumentalist approaches to 
history,82 and thus the suffering and oppression of the past (or present) cannot be justified by the 
progress of the present (or future) in the name of some abstract humanity.  In this connection, 
Benjamin cites Herman Lotze: “The reason of the world would be turning to unreason if we did 
not reject the thought that the work of vanishing generations should go on forever benefiting 
those who came later, and being irreparably wasted for the workers themselves.”83  For 
Benjamin, the strongest means for re-opening subjectivity lies not in the thought of future 
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generations: the call for the working class to wait for the conditions of revolution to present 
themselves opens itself up to the eternal sameness of working for an emancipation that is always 
beyond us, putting off indefinitely all subjectivity in accordance with the development of the 
productive forces.  Rather, the oppressed class as the subject of history is tied to the ethical 
demand that emerges via “the image of enslaved ancestors.”84   
Thus, against Horkheimer’s contention that “past injustice has occurred and is 
completed,” Benjamin contends that “history is not simply a science but also and not least a form 
of remembrance.”85  In refusing to view the past as complete, Benjamin asserts remembrance’s 
ability to modify “what science has ‘determined’”: the present can carry on the failed projects of 
the past.  We find here that remembrance is recognition, and that remembrance as recognition re-
opens the realm of alterity and intersubjectivity that is closed off via the powers of missed or 
failed recognition.  The subjectivity of the present is opened up by the opening of another being, 
and the possibility of another form of being that the past can produce in the present.  Indeed, 
wresting “tradition away from the conformism that is working to overpower it” is simultaneously 
a process of wresting inter/subjectivity away from the forces that work to efface and deny both, 
by affectively burying them under the weight of the reigning historical construction (progress 
through homogenous, empty time) which seeks to aggrandize the present.  For Benjamin, 
entering the historically repressed chamber is tantamount to opening up the whole process of 
intersubjectivity in order to liberate the present not from the weight of the past but the weight of 
its own failure to actualize its self-proclaimed project of freedom from toil and dependence – 
which is to say the failure to actualize humanity and its happiness.  The act of the historian is not 
simply a defence of a certain historiographic method, but the attempt to draw out the potentials 
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through which subjects can redeem the past in saving themselves at a moment of danger – which 
is to say that only in the now of recognizability do contemporary subjects come to see the crisis 
that they themselves have fallen into.  Overpowering the conformism of the present entails 
rescuing the dead from the continued amnaesthetic relationship that the historical victors force 
them into in order to protect the present.86 
In this vein, in ‘On the Concept of History’ Benjamin states that “the subject of historical 
knowledge is the struggling, oppressed class itself.”87  Excluded from the historical narrative, the 
oppressed class represents the philosophical contradiction/negation of the historicist or universal 
history approach – it is the embodied truth that the object of history transcends its “concept.”  
More to the point, its existence represents the sublated dis/continuinty of history: on the one 
hand, the continued existence of the oppressed represents the negation of the present’s claims to 
representing humanity as a discontinuous break with the past, illustrating the continuity of its 
solidarity with the oppressed (of the) past; on the other hand, the oppressed class, as the 
embodiment of historical (lack of) knowledge and as itself constituted out of the continuity of 
oppression and the long experience it implies, holds out the possibility of avenging and liberating 
“the generations of the downtrodden”88 that have been stepped over on the long march of history, 
consequently representing the potential to break with the catastrophe of history as the history of 
oppression.  In unravelling the false and oppressive narrative that dominates the historical 
discipline and the popular consciousness, this would supply the means to re-configuring history 
itself and to inaugurating a new conception of historical subjectivity that breaks with the 
teleological aspects of universal history.  But a different version of this statement in the 
‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’ points to the intersubjectivity contained in this 
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subjectivity: “the history-writing subject is, properly, that part of humanity whose solidarity 
embraces all the oppressed.”89  This claim coalesces with and expands the other claim.  As the 
subject of historical knowledge, the struggling, oppressed class holds the potential for the 
historicist mode of perception to be broken: it supplies a new angle or position of vision via the 
non-identity of the oppressed, which acts to rupture the existing view point and allows for a new 
meaning to be brought to the very relationship between past and present.  Indeed, in aiming to 
draw the past into the present, the history-writing subject acknowledges the being of the past 
(both as an object of knowledge and as a set of subjects capable of being resuscitated and placing 
an ethical demand on the present) as a living entity.  We can see the influence of Benjamin’s 
constellative methodology here, for what occurs is not the death of objectivity or reality in favour 
of an empty relativity, but the transformation of the meaning of the historical object which must 
still live up to the criteria of its own pretensions – the actuality of the immanent proclamation of 
humanity’s realization remains the measure, but the historical object (the object of recognition) 
has taken on a new perspective.   
Thus, in reading Benjamin through the notion of utopia, we must note two key traits of 
the image of the classless society.  In the first place, these images are of the interstitial 
experiences of classless society, which have generally failed.  They fundamentally lack an 
integral actuality: they are not incorporated as the genuine experience of a classless society, but 
represent experiential moments within and against the contours of fundamentally hierarchical 
and oppressive historical moments.  In this vein, we might think of the social histories of E.P. 
Thompson and Jacques Rancière.  In tracing the formation of the English working class, 
Thompson sought to save various figures from the "condescension" of history, illustrating their 
role within the revolutionary tradition despite even the left’s treatment of their contribution as 
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minimal or obsolete.  At the same time, he sought to understand the spaces and places that 
contributed to the possibility of the formation of class identity, conceived of as an institution of 
experience or places of the formation of class consciousness/subjectivity.90  For his part, 
Rancière is attuned to the sort of Fourierist schemes that inform Benjamin’s conception of the 
transformation of the nature of work rather than theorizing liberation within the context of the 
drudgery of manual labour.  In searching for emancipation from class society, Rancière focused 
on the interstitial character of working class artistic expression outside of the place of work.91  In 
probing these interstitial realms, neither Thompson nor Rancière aim to return to some obscure 
18th century society for letters or 19th century workers’ journal.  Rather, they seek to represent 
the types of spaces which illustrated an experience that not only contributed to the formation of 
collective subjectivities, but which represent non-hierarchical forms of social experience.  This is 
likewise the case in Benjamin's account of the decline of storytelling.  By no means does 
Benjamin valorize storytelling as the experience par excellence, as a lost kingdom that we must 
return to; nor does he find modernity entirely devoid of redeeming characteristics.92  Rather, 
what interests Benjamin is the form of experience that storytelling exhibits: a non-identical 
exchange that illustrates the embodied character of intersubjective exchange.  More to the point, 
as with the images evoked by Thompson and Rancière, the forms of storytelling that Benjamin 
often focuses on existed in the interstices of the pre-modern world – in the spaces of craft 
production, and embodied as a form of working class expression/experience – in ways that are 
not inherent to the overarching social body.  Indeed, these were moments of intersubjective 
                                                 
90
 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (New York: Penguin Books 1980). 
91
 See both Jacques Rancière, ‘The Myth of the Artisan: Critical Reflections on a Category of Social History,’ Work 
in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Practice, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986) and 
Jacques Rancière, Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France, (New York: Verso 
2012). 
92
 Wolin, Walter Benjamin, 225-226. 
 222 
 
experience within the artifice of larger relations of domination (not through them).  As an 
interstitial moment, such experiences carry out a two-fold role: first, impugning the unnatural 
character of the current historical epoch, showing it to be contingent and capable of 
transformation; second, representing a failed moment of liberation that requires redemption 
through a dialectical confrontation between such lost moments and the claims to wholeness of 
the repressive present.  Benjamin aims to recuperate such moments from the mutilation of 
history, releasing their surplus energies.  The recurrent emergence of such images of experience 
represents the wish to transcend the relations of domination and hierarchy that stultify the senses, 
expressions and very existence of the oppressed.  In the recurrent image of the interstitial, we 
find the call for the caesura that will extend this time of non-domination against the forces of 
progress that trample it.   
Thus, on the one hand, in the dream image of the classless society, Benjamin aims to 
conserve experiences of moments (or attempted moments) of emancipation.  Their failures to 
attain integral actuality necessitate their redemption.  But in invoking a utopian politics or a site 
of utopian possibilities, Benjamin’s work oscillates between the image of classless society 
(‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’) and the memory of the oppressed whose experiences 
of classless existence failed (‘On the Concept of History’).  Here, we find in Benjamin’s work 
the traces of what Abensour finds as a second site of utopia’s persistence: the ethical site (“under 
the sign of the Encounter”93).  In this context, Benjamin invokes utopia as redeeming “that” 
which existed (a place, though an interstitial one) and “those” (as a multiplicity of subjects) that 
existed within these interstitial spaces across a varied temporal landscape.  Simply put, it is 
subjects that make (and are made by) these spaces, and history requires the redemption of both.  
The image of utopia as lack calls for the present to alleviate the suffering of the past, through the 
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transformation of the present.  This is not a return: it is the opening of a historically rooted 
intersubjectivity.  While Benjamin proclaims the “struggling, oppressed class” to be the subject 
of history, this is a non-identical, dialogical subject.  Indeed, in the figures of Spartacus and the 
members of the Spartacus league, the participants in the French Revolution and the 
Communards, we find fundamentally different embodiments of oppression and emancipatory 
experience throughout history.  The recuperation of them in a new historical constellation 
illustrates the very lack contained in the singular moments.  Redeeming and alleviating the 
suffering of these subjects does not imply returning to the epochs which saw them subjected to 
the Hegelian slaughter-bench of history, but it does require recognizing alterity and answering 
the ethical demands it imposes.94  Hence, the emancipatory project that can be read in his critique 
of the decline of experience demands a resuscitation of the experience of the other.  Simon 
Critchley argues that ethical experience is not the passive experience of a being-as-object or 
something that is imposed upon it, but a function of subjectivity.  As he states, “ethical 
experience is an activity whereby new objects emerge for a subject involved in the process of 
their creation…Ethical experience is activity, the activity of the subject, even when that activity 
is the receptivity to the other’s claim upon me – it is an active receptivity.”95  Essentially, the 
actions of the subject (which is to say subjectivity itself) open up new objects in the historical 
fold of being; and it is through the opening up or discovery of this realm of alterity that these 
new “objects” (i.e. historical subjects) place an ethical demand upon the present, which 
facilitates the active reception by, and interrogation of, the self.   
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Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intersubjectivity runs parallel to this, conceiving of 
subjectivity as existing between subjects who jar one another from their priorly existing position 
to establish not only a new relation between them, but a new identity for each.  Yet, as I 
suggested, the assumption that Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjective relation merely takes place in a 
deterministic or automatic/smooth fashion remains problematic, and Benjamin points out the 
extent to which such experience is as likely to be stunted as affirmed.  But in his concept of 
history the point is to show that at the level of history itself, such an ethical experience opens up 
subjects not only to transhistorical or diachronic intersubjectivity but to the temporal or 
synchronic alterity that is abridged in the anaesthetic character of the experience of capitalist 
modernity.  The elision of others at both levels is the very refusal of emancipation not only for 
those others who are excluded, but for the historical self who is denied the very possibility of 
their engagement.  Subjectivity, conceived as answering an ethical demand, is predicated upon 
the self resuscitating the excluded (taking up the ethical demands of the repressed generations of 
the past) for the very purposes of forming a transhistorical collective subject that can rupture the 
reality that excludes them.96  Indeed, these others are never truly destroyed and their existence 
lurks within the recesses of memory and the world we live in, the past being likened by 
Benjamin to the very air we breathe.  Moreover, past generations remain expectant of the coming 
of present generations as their potential redeemers: “there is a secret agreement between past 
generations and the present one.  Then our coming was expected on earth.  Then, like every 
generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on 
which the past has a claim.”97  This weak messianic power is something that the present retains, 
but it is indicative of the ethical demand placed on the present by the past.  Answering this 
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demand requires opening up the past to the possibilities of an ethical encounter via the 
deconstruction of the historical object.  Again, Benjamin assigns this project to historical 
materialism: “Historical materialism must renounce the epic element in history.  It blasts the 
epoch out of the reified ‘continuity of history.’  But it also explodes the homogeneity of the 
epoch, interspersing it with ruins – that is, with the present.”98  While this alludes to an aspect of 
ideology-critique reminiscent of the other members of the Frankfurt School, this form of history 
finds its incarnation in the practice of concrete subjects, for the very relationship of past and 
present is conceptualized by Benjamin in terms of the beings/subjects representing these nodal 
points.   
V. Messianism, Time and Politics 
 All of this re-raises the very question of the nature of utopia for Benjamin, which in turn 
re-raises the meaning of “redemption.”  Benjamin uses “redemption” in the context of its 
meaning within the Jewish messianic tradition.  To unravel – or render a reading of – what he is 
trying to do with the concept, we may gain some insights from Benjamin’s close friend, 
Gersholm Scholem, and his 1932 article on ‘Kabbalah.’  Benjamin held the article in high 
regard,99 and the section on “tikkun” is particularly pertinent.  As Scholem recounts, the light of 
the infinite emanated from Adam Kadmon (“primordial man”), bringing to the world the 
“original design in the mind of the creator.”100  Out of Adam Kadmon, vessels formed that were 
intended to contain the light and, originally, they were “joined together in a common vessel in 
accord with the ‘collectivity’ that was their structural nature.” 101  But neither Adam Kadmon nor 
the vessels could contain the light, and they shattered into individual pieces.  Tikkun denotes 
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“the laws by which the process of cosmic restoration and reintegration works itself out”102; or, 
put another way, it represents the reconstruction and redemption of the broken vessels.  As 
Scholem is quick to point out, the redeemed figure of Adam Kadmon and the vessels is different 
than the original.  After the breaking of the vessels, the shattered pieces take on the character of 
“parazufim” or faces, and become the “principal manifestations of Adam Kadmon.”103  In 
essence, the breaking gives the pieces a new shape, and out of it they emerge as faces of “long 
suffering” engaged in a cathartic reconstruction.  Within this reconstruction, the faces become “a 
medium for reindividuation and redifferentiation of all the emanated beings into transmitters and 
receivers of influx,” and the relationship between them takes on the character of “looking face-
to-face,” the central characteristic of “intellectual and erotic unions.”104  Within this union, a new 
face is born, in the form of the Ze’eir Anpin (short-faced or impatient).  As Scholem explains, 
“The structural unity of Ze’eir Anpin is assured by the workings of a principle called zelem 
[image]…which involves the activity of certain lights that help serve as a constituent element in 
all the parazufim but are especially centered in Ze’eir Anpin.”105  In the initial stages of tikkun, a 
spiritual light emanates, filtering out what obscures or blocks the pieces, allowing them to 
transition to another phase in their redemption.  While illuminated, the pieces continue to exist in 
incorrect places.  The completion of tikkun requires that the pieces be returned to their spiritual 
place by the inward actions of “man.”  Such inward acts would enable the spiritual light to 
complete the outward restoration.106 
 In reading Benjamin, Habermas and Wolin misread or misrepresent the conception of 
redemption, presenting it as merely the return to a primordial state (of language, for Habermas; 
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of prehistorical harmony, for Wolin).  As Scholem’s account illustrates, tikkun represents 
something more complex than a simple return.  In this vein, Lowy takes a cue from Scholem, 
arguing that Benjamin’s use of redemption implies a return to a sublated conception of a 
primordial classless society.  As he summarizes his version of Benjamin’s redemption: “the 
classless society of the future – the new Paradise – is not the return pure and simple to the 
society of prehistory: it contains in itself, as dialectical synthesis, the whole of humanity’s 
past.”107  While Lowy is closer to the intent of Benjamin’s work, his description retains a certain 
vagueness, failing to adequately explain what is being sublated, and what constitutes utopia 
outside of a return at a higher level.  Moreover, the idea of primitive classless society is 
underexplored, isolated to a scant reference to Benjamin’s review of Johann Jakob Bachofen.108  
In treating utopia ontologically and ethically, I would point to Benjamin’s use of the language of 
images and the interstitial character of the moments that he often cites.  I would further add that 
Lowy’s conception lacks a sufficiently dialectical conception: it counterposes merely the present 
moment and the primordial, where the future has somehow incorporated whatever has occurred 
in between.  Certainly, my focus on examples such as the Paris Commune and the Spartacus 
League may be deemed insufficient, for they are moments that are inspired by the image of 
classless society.  But we must acknowledge, in accord with the constellative/monadological 
principle at the center of Benjamin’s work, that these moments in turn become dialectical 
images, something which Benjamin’s own use of them intends to convey.  For this reason, I am 
inclined to read the image of the classless society not as a primordial era, but as the ontological 
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and ethical site of utopia.  Consequently, I will read Scholem’s account of tikkun in a different 
light, one that will return me to the question of Benjamin’s relationship to Marxism, only this 
time in its connection to theology.   
In suggesting earlier that Benjamin sought to redeem Marxism, by no means was I 
suggesting that he turned his back on theology/messianism as some accounts would have it.  
Rather, Benjamin’s work aims to redeem theology through Marxism, and to redeem Marxism 
through theology.  Consequently, rather than the logical coherence of Benjamin’s work being 
found in either the Marxist or theological strain (with the other side being an unwelcome or 
metaphorical intrusion) or there being an irreconcilable contradiction between the two,109 the 
relationship between them is an intersubjective one: a dialectics at a standstill in which each 
mediates/constellates the other, giving it a new truth content contained in the specificity of their 
interconnection (but never collapsing their difference).  In passing, I have hinted at some of the 
content of Marxism’s redemption of theology in the previous chapters: Marxism profanes 
theology,110 bringing the theological-messianic realm into the world of concrete and practical 
history.  This profaning is a politicization that demands the outward praxis and engagement of 
human subjects, rather than their inward action.111  Indeed, the transcendent and metaphysical 
character of the theological elements in Benjamin’s work is – with his encounter with Marxism – 
profaned and given an immanent and worldly political form.  Here, too, the historicality of being 
is taken into account to dispense with any metaphysical abstraction that would obfuscate the 
temporal location of worldly being.  But, while pushing in this direction, Marxism succumbs to 
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its own metaphysics of the worldly in the form of its dependence on the development of the 
productive forces and history’s “natural course” – political praxis again comes to lie outside of 
the realm of human agency.  In answer to this problem, Benjamin turns to re-theologizing 
Marxism to recuperate its revolutionary core. 
 While there are a number of avenues we might probe in understanding this, two aspects 
of the theologizing of Marxism are particularly relevant in connection with redemption: 
remembrance and messianism.  In the final thesis of ‘On the Concept of History,’ Benjamin 
notes that “the Jews were prohibited from inquiring into the future: the Torah and the prayers 
instructed them in remembrance.”112  The idea of the future in the Marxist lexicon contemporary 
with Benjamin’s writings served as a fetish: the drive for quantitative growth directed the gaze of 
Social Democrats squarely towards the future, and away from the past.  Concomitantly, as the 
“idea” of the classless society was defined as an “infinite task,” the practical revolutionary 
aspects of Marxian theory were delayed indefinitely (via an eternal return), until the conditions 
for revolution could develop of their own accord at some indefinite point in the future.113  By 
turning towards the past via remembrance, Jewish theology played the role of disenchanting the 
future, stripping it of its teleological character and drawing out the crisis in which the past 
threatens to be forgotten and oppressed (again).114  The Jewish concept of remembrance, and ban 
on the future, allowed the present to answer the ethical demand of the past by carrying on and 
completing (i.e. redeeming) the past; that is, it enabled the past to “make the incomplete 
(happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something 
incomplete.”115   
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For Benjamin, this fundamentally theological concept becomes central to historical 
materialism, which can now address the incompletion of the past (its non-identical character).116  
The incompletion and unhappiness of the past is caught up with the incompletion and 
unhappiness of the present.  In these respects, Benjamin appears to be linking his theological 
concepts of remembrance and redemption with Lotze’s conception of progress.  For Lotze, 
progress cannot be achieved through “the unrewarded efforts and often by the misery of those 
who went before.”117  Redemption as progress implies alleviating (retroactively) the suffering of 
the downtrodden of the past via answering the claims that the past has placed on us to realize the 
utopian dreams of emancipation from toil.  This requires memory of the past as a moment of 
experience.  Indeed, the very capacity for subjectivity is informed by long experience, and the 
struggles out of which it comes.  Remembrance of struggles in the past implies the restoration of 
the movement that sought to alleviate suffering in the first place; and, from the perspective of 
Benjamin’s conception of origins, history takes on an epicycloidic nature because these threads 
can disappear from memory by processes of regression/repression, only to be picked up again.118  
It is only in these terms that Benjamin can see the past as weighing on the present like a 
nightmare: “the idea of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the idea of redemption.”119  The 
failures of the attempts at breaking with oppression and actualizing happiness instils in the 
present a “secret agreement” in which the present can redeem the past.  Thus, the past does not 
exist as something divorced from the present, but as a part of the very essence of the present: it 
shares the breathing air, living space and very lineage of the past.  And it is for this reason that 
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Benjamin sees the present as being “endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which 
the past has a claim.”120 
 Benjamin’s notion of a messianic power and messianic time breaks with the 
characterization of history as homogenous, empty time, inaugurating historical time as endowed 
with qualitative distinctions and ever present potentialities – i.e. as a break with the ever same or 
the return of the same.  While Marx presented revolution as a locomotive of world history, he 
likely did not have in mind the concept of an infinite progression through a self-same eternity.  
But this was how his revolutionary ideas were translated in the work of his later followers.  And 
this in turn paved the road to the indefinite delay of revolution based on the immaturity of either 
the productive forces or the working class itself.  By introducing messianism into Marxism, 
Benjamin shatters this: “every second was the small gateway in time through which the Messiah 
might enter.”121  The very idea that the messiah may come at any second breaks with the myth of 
progress and acknowledges that it is in remembrance of the past – and not waiting for the future 
– that liberation and redemption lie.  And this remembrance is not a force external to human 
capacities, but an ever present potentiality.  It remains potential because it requires a qualitative 
break with the present: “Redemption depends on the tiny fissure in the continuous 
catastrophe.”122  As I stated previously, a genuine conception of progress – which is to say, the 
true meaning of redemption – implies a break with the existing direction of history.  Pulling the 
handbrake of the locomotive institutes an authentic political experience of that which, otherwise, 
would be passed by.  In interfering with the heretofore repression of the past, the new as 
intersubjective recognition and relation can make its appearance.123  In breaking with the 
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historical continuum, the messianic power of the present has the capacity for the redemption of 
the entire course of history (including the present).   
In translating this into political terms, Benjamin appears to read messianism through the 
figure of August Blanqui, connecting his image with that of Baudelaire.  What Baudelaire sought 
to express (the decline of experience as intersubjectivity), Blanqui sought to transcend.  Indeed, 
Blanqui resisted the faith in progress that had marred Social Democratic thinking: “he always 
refused to develop plans for what comes ‘later.’”124  What was important for Blanqui was the 
drive “to do away with present injustice,” or the “firm resolve to snatch humanity at the last 
moment from the catastrophe looming at every turn.”125  This presents revolution as a messianic 
act, one that could come at any moment as a cataclysmic break with the present.  It is as the ever 
present possibility of humanity’s emergence that theology can enable Marxism (the automaton) 
to win every time.  But far from being a volunteerist or indeterminate form of negation, 
Blanqui’s messianic conception – when read through Baudelaire – represents an attempt at 
illustrating the coming into being of the ethical experience necessary for revolutionary 
subjectivity: it represents the actuality of the past, and locates the roots of subjectivity in the 
actualization of the past.  Here, the break with the present represents a sublation of continuity 
and discontinuity.  Revolutionary messianism aims to break with the oppression and exclusion of 
the present, in order to establish the continuity of the present with that which has been excluded: 
it breaks with what is purported to be “complete” (happiness, emancipation) in order to re-
inaugurate the movement that seeks their completion.  Redemption in these terms entails the 
resurrection of the since disappeared traces of the past (subjects and objects), and the 
recuperation of their revolutionary project.  Hence, in looking towards the past with indignation 
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at the class character of society, the Blanquist project wishes to save the past and the present 
from the inevitable and indefinite sacrifices that would purportedly serve the purposes of the 
future.  This can only be established through the determinate character of the non-identical 
elements that have existed throughout the historical continuum – that is through their excavation 
and retention in an institution of experience.126  Revolution and redemption are only possible in 
the context of the determinate character of the past.127 
In this context, we can turn to re-reading Scholem’s conception of tikkun through 
Benjaminian lenses.  The breaking of the vessels represents not the primitive experience of 
classless society, but the primordial character of the ontological place of utopia as lack.  
Certainly, this account involves the idea of society as fallen, but it sees – as Benjamin's angel of 
history does – all of history as catastrophe.  In borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, this posits 
originary belonging as an ontological, not an historical, reality and demands the bringing into 
being of intersubjective relations.  Dreams of emancipation emerge from the latent, interstitial 
moments that seek to create emancipation.  The idea of the breaking of the vessels allows for the 
monadological “reindividuation and redifferentiation” (which is to say fragmentation and de-
centering) of the various moments (both subjects and objects) of history.  This breaks with the 
concept of totality contained in Lukács’ philosophy of history, and rejects the idea of a total 
subject or object of history.128  The subject of history exists within history, and it exists within it 
as a differentiated and fragmented being, formed in the hinge of the being of multiple beings.  In 
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essence, the single catastrophe of history creates the oppressed as a fragmented/dialogical being, 
experiencing oppression and lack in various incarnations.  The looking face to face of the long-
suffering is the moment of dialogical intersubjectivity which can shatter the monological 
character of universal history: the creation of the individuated faces creates the very possibility 
of erotic and intellectual (or solidaristic) unions.  The present comes to represent the face of the 
impatient one, who awaits the emergence of the images of the past to hold open the possibility of 
tikkun.  The messianic element is contained in the idea that the flash of light that will illuminate 
the parts can emerge at any moment.  But Benjamin gives this theological rendering of 
redemption a Marxist coloring by conceiving of redemption as only possible through the outward 
praxis of human subjects.  Revolutionary praxis seeks to establish the redemption of the 
fragmented being whose coming together has existed only in the utopian dreams that resist 
incorporation into the narrative of progress.  Revolution entails the heralding of the emaciated 
subjects of the past to the table of history, allowing them to have a say in their own 
emancipation/redemption of the structure of history via the transformation of the present.  To the 
extent that “origin is the goal,” things do not return to an original place but to the origin of a 
process/movement that was defeated: it is a process of messianically redeeming (as continuing 
on) what was cut short and disappeared behind the epicyloidic character of historical movement.   
While this is not a return, it is a looking backwards which aims to avoid the very dialectic 
of emancipation which sees each new generation trampled under the foot of progress and time.  
Because knowledge of history is only possible within historical moments, and because the 
oppressed class is the subject of historical knowledge as the confirmation of its non-identity, we 
should read the realization of knowledge in the messianic cessation as something akin to the 
continually deferred realization that Merleau-Ponty saw in the situation of the right hand 
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touching the left hand.  The very fragmented being of the oppressed within history defies its 
closure and realization in an end of history.  Indeed, it is only in the realm of the ontological site 
of utopia – something akin to the messianic realm of “universal and integral actuality,” the only 
place where universal history exists129 – that such a realization can exist as completion.  But in 
the realm of profane existence, caught up in the fragmentation of being and time, the completion 
of historical being or knowledge remains an impossibility.  This problem is drawn out in the 
proclamation that the present fails to touch all moments of the past equally.130  In the flow of 
time, as the present becomes past it also becomes capable of being marred by catastrophe.  
Within the “displacement of vision” affected by the rising up of the negative, the positive comes 
into play as “something different from that previously signified.”131  But this is a process of 
persistent incorporation, for it occurs “ad infinitum, until the entire past is brought into the 
present in a historical apocatastasis.”132   
As Anson Rabinbach suggests of the messianic tradition from which Benjamin emerged, 
the concept of redemption is not “immanent” to history: it is not “an event produced by history” 
in a deterministic, evolutionary/reformist or progressive fashion.  Rather, it is a radical, 
apocalyptic break conceived of “as the end of history or as an event within history”133  Within 
Benjamin’s work, given that historical movement occurs within time and comes via the attempt 
to transcend the lack identified through the ontological site of utopia that can never be 
transcended/realized, this redemption/apocatastasis represents a continually deferred moment of 
realization, defying any conception of the end of history.  The concept of the end of history is 
intimately tied to the concept of homogenous, empty time, which is at odds with historical time.  
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Historical time is characterized by the persistence of the apocatastasis, a persistence still subject 
to the conditions of authentic experience, which is caught up in time, uniqueness, memory and 
actualization – all conceived of as active phenomenon.  Thus, rather than being merely an 
arrested moment,134 it is a moment that arrests the time of progress (devoid of change or 
meaning) opening up a qualitatively different kind of time,135 one attuned to the uniqueness and 
activity of intersubjective experience as a time of giving new meaning to the world – that is, a 
time of politics that is itself capable of regression back into empty, homogenous time.136  
Likewise, this is not merely the destruction of “tradition,” but the emergence and creation of a 
new tradition: the tradition of the oppressed as the creation of a time and place (the caesurae) of 
their intersubjective meeting/being.  Historical time cannot thus be conceived as a time of eternal 
sameness, but only as the continual affirmation of the genuine political experience that emerges 
via dialectical images and the political experience of history/alterity.  Thus, as Benjamin states, 
“The eternal lamp is an image of genuine historical existence.  It cites what has been – the flame 
that once was kindled – in perpetuum, giving it ever new sustenance.”137  In keeping the past 
alive, the present must maintain a continual dialogue with the emaciated spectres of the past, to 
avoid committing the crime of forgetting and trampling the past yet again.  In a sense, then, 
Benjamin separates the messianic/classless from historical time, for the former presupposes the 
end or annihilation of the latter.  Indeed, the concept of the end of history is intimately tied to the 
idea of the “revolutionary situation” and to the end of historical development.  In returning to 
classless society its “messianic face,” Benjamin is alluding to the messianic as that which can 
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come at any given moment, and that which maintains its existence as the ontological site of 
utopia.  In this vein, the messianic/classless is not something determined in advance but 
something that comes about through the process of its own coming into being through time.  In 
these respects, every day engages in the simultaneous assessment of the present and in the 
concept of the messianic/classless society.  This allows for the genuine engagement with the 
past, rather than the “information”-like accumulation of facts about it.  By furnishing this critical 
relation, Benjamin transforms the everyday and historical encounter into the Day of Judgement: 
“Every moment is a moment of judgement concerning certain moments that preceded it.”138  Or, 
put another way, we find that every moment seeks a higher face of actuality – a higher phase of 
the realization of the liberation that continually evades it.  This persistent judgement becomes 
necessary because of the very transiency of time itself, but it likewise locates liberation in the 
arrest of time and the coming into being in which all of the moments of historical experience can 
be grasped in their totality: “only a redeemed mankind is granted the fullness of its past – which 
is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments.”139 
*   *   * 
   
[XVIIa] …the historical materialist determines the presence of a messianic force in history.  Whoever 
wishes to know what the situation of a “redeemed humanity” might actually be, what conditions are 
required for the development of such a situation, and when this development can be expected to occur, 
poses questions to which there are no answers.140 
 -Walter Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’ 
 
Benjamin’s work illustrates and transcends two interconnected flaws in Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of the flesh (and its concomitant theory of intersubjectivity).  In the first place, the flesh 
and intersubjectivity cannot be treated as completely abstract: we must understand them in their 
concrete, historical incarnations.  In the process of treating them historically, we find that far 
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from pre-existing, intersubjectivity and human community are created through the innervation of 
ethical experiences which emerge in the face of (or against) their elision.  As Chapter 3 argued, 
in the context of capitalist modernity the anaesthetization of bodily experience short circuits the 
flow of the flesh, interiorizing and dulling sensuous capacities.  The innervation of 
intersubjective experience is consequently denied, and the alterity that is central to subjectivity-
as-intersubjectivity is ultimately cut off.  But, as I sought to show in Chapters 2 and 4, this 
experience of the elision of alterity likewise exists at the level of history, where it can also be 
broken.  By resurrecting and redeeming the past as “objects” and “subjects” that are repressed in 
the collective memory, Benjamin seeks to explode the continuum of history in opening us via the 
alterity of the past and present to an alterity of the future.141  But this is not a simple 
conservative/reactionary return.  Rather, it is a historical opening that seeks to redeem the past 
and present by transforming the very being/meaning of both.  Indeed, redemption is an 
intersubjective collision, much like the experience of storytelling, which transforms (in 
accordance with the non-identical depth of the world of things and being) those beings that come 
into contact with one another.  Moreover, redemption is a process of resurrecting the interstitial 
places and subjects that were annihilated by the victors of history, who sought to impose the 
identity of their own being upon the oppressed.  By excavating the past, Benjamin sees the 
means to drawing into action the image of the classless society and the transcendence of the 
present via a constellation of historical subjects. 
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The question of the character or nature of an emancipated humanity (as well as the 
specifics of emancipatory praxis) poses something of a gap or absence in Benjamin’s work.142  
This is not to say that Benjamin lacks a theory of praxis.  He is centrally concerned with the 
notion of historical rupture, and the break with the reigning unfreedom and unhappiness that are 
created via the oppressive structures of capitalist modernity.  Moreover, he is concerned to 
theorize forms of reason and language that can break with these very structures.  But, more often 
than not in his work, this sort of praxis exists only as an insurgent moment: as the impulse for 
emancipation, which can emerge in the moments of collective memory and their transformations 
into praxis.  Even his focus on the interstitial moments of utopian experience are limited to their 
momentary existence, or the flitting by of their image.  The regression into the assertion that a 
positive optic for critical theory is a taboo is politically insufficient, and Benjamin’s work hints 
at ways of transcending its silences.  The injection of messianism into historical materialism 
constituted a break with the concept of progress towards the revolutionary situation, positing 
every moment as the moment in which the messiah (or messianic) may come.  Moreover, in 
abiding by the Jewish prohibition on looking towards the future, Benjamin is not concerned with 
creating an abstract and identitarian utopian construct that would be imposed on the world.  
Rather, the concepts of remembrance and redemption instruct us to look to the past as a means to 
opening up a future.  For Benjamin, this entails understanding the character of the interstitial 
moments of emancipatory experience – be they in storytelling or the insurgence of the Paris 
Commune – neither as merely epistemological contours of historical understanding143 nor so we 
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can return to them144 but so that we can extend the types of intersubjective experience and action 
that they brought into being.  These moments of the caesura are ones in which emancipation 
came to the fore through new ways of being.   
While Benjamin is quick to mention the flitting up of the interstitial – or its image – his 
work fails to adequately theorize what it is that takes place in the vacuum of the arrest of time, in 
the moments of ethical and intersubjective experience and praxis as a new form of time (vis–à–
vis  the eternal recurrence of progress).  As Peter Osborne says of this contour of Benjamin’s 
thought: “Revolutionary political action is evoked, but it is never actually thought.”145  
Specifically, what needs to be thought are the roots of the utopian/revolutionary impulse, and the 
political nature of such a utopian/revolutionary construct beyond the merely emergent or 
insurgent break with historical progress.  But this should not be taken as a means to dismissing 
even the possibility of the existence of a positive political optic latent within his work.  In order 
to overcome these un-thought elements and to construct a politics out of the gaps in Benjamin’s 
work, the following two chapters move away from our being tied to his “authenticity” and read 
him in a constellative relationship that can bring to fruition a political concept that is attuned to 
his concerns – and one that can be transformed in accordance with Benjamin’s concerns.  With 
the critical acumen we have attained through the exploration of the historical character of the 
relations of intersubjectivity (and their elision) in Benjamin’s work, we can return to theorizing 
the moment of emancipation/politics through Merleau-Ponty’s work. 
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Chapter 5 
The Bio-Phenomenological Invariant of the Zoon Utopicus: 
Nature, Capacity/Potential, Ethics 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The content of the global movement which ever since the Seattle revolt has occupied (and redefined) the 
public sphere is nothing less than human nature.  The latter constitutes the arena of struggle and its 
stakes.”1 
 -Paolo Virno, ‘Natural-Historical Diagrams.’ 
 
“When I met him on the stairs, Salamano was busy swearing at his dog.  He was saying, ‘Filthy, lousy 
animal!’ and the dog was whimpering.  I said, ‘Good evening,’ but the old man went on swearing.  So I 
asked him what the dog had done.  He didn’t answer.  He just went on saying, ‘Filthy, lousy animal!’…I 
asked him again a bit louder.  Then, without turning round, he answered with a sort of suppressed fury, 
‘He’s always there.’”2 
 -Albert Camus, The Outsider 
 
In reading Benjamin through Merleau-Ponty, I placed the theory of intersubjectivity at 
the center of Benjamin’s interrogation of capitalist experience.  Thus, Benjamin offered a critical 
theory of society that illustrated the mortification of human experience, and consequently the 
exploitation and reification of intersubjective capacities – what I referred to as the elision of 
alterity.  This complicates the far too common tendency in Merleau-Ponty’s work to treat bodily 
experience in a positive fashion or intersubjectivity as a simple fact that emerges without conflict 
or complication in mundane activities and devoid of a specifically political import.  Yet, the 
problem posed by critical theory’s interrogation of society through the spectre of domination and 
the elision of subjectivity risks obfuscating the possibilities of emancipation as a political 
concept.3  Benjamin’s later work begins to go beyond this paradox, positing the utopian 
possibilities of an ethical inter/subjectivity at the level of history.  Yet, if his work fails to fully 
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theorize a positive political or ethical optic,4 then I want to return to Merleau-Ponty in order to 
begin developing this, while retaining Benjamin’s insights.  Benjamin imposes two necessary 
conditions or challenges: first, to incorporate the critical interrogation of capitalist experience, 
and its affects on the body; second, to begin thinking a utopian politics that might transcend or 
negate this dystopian universe.  In uniting these demands, we can say that the insights Benjamin 
injects call for a theorization of the body as containing a utopian, ethical capacity, but one that 
also acknowledges dystopian possibilities.   
To move in this direction, I want to draw on a provocative claim Paul Ricoeur makes 
regarding Merleau-Ponty’s work: “To understand the term ‘capacity’ correctly, we must return to 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘I can’ and extend it from the physical to the ethical level.”5  Merleau-Ponty 
utilizes the notion of the “I can” (or “I am able to”) to denote an “order of instructive 
spontaneity,”6 rooted in the corporeal capacities of the body.  However, I want to refute 
Ricoeur’s claim, showing that Merleau-Ponty’s bodily “I can” is indicative of an ethical 
capacity, and thus the ground for a theory of utopian intersubjectivity.  Ricoeur is correct to link 
the “I can” in Merleau-Ponty’s work to a physical level, for it is a function of the corporeal 
schema conceived as a psychophysical order.  Yet, it is at this level that Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that the corporeal schema exhibits “a natural rooting of the for-other.”7  The corporeal schema is 
exactly what Ricoeur claims it is not: an ethical “I can” constitutive of a utopian capacity – 
though one that can also be abridged because it is rooted in openness and desire.  The idea of the 
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body as a “capacity” or “potential” is key: the for-the-other is not something that is pre-existent, 
or pre-formed.  That is to say, though we are always-already “social” this sociality is not 
necessarily of the order of intersubjectivity or the ethical.  And, yet, intersubjectivity and the 
ethical retain the possibility of rupturing their elision via a resistant, utopian political capacity. 
While Chapter 1 outlined the contours of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh in terms 
of an ontology of the social, we now need to turn to the import of the flesh for a body-politics, 
particularly in the face of Benjamin’s contribution.  Centrally, this re-thinking calls for a re-
phenomenologizing of the flesh in developing a theory of the utopian body, but in a manner that 
acknowledges the body’s double belonging to the world of utopian and dystopian possibilities.  
In providing such a reading, I draw on the work of Paolo Virno and Miguel Abensour.  Working 
via a biopolitical approach, Virno explores the realm of political praxis as a function of the 
political struggle over the “bios.”  In these respects, he posits a potential transformation of 
human nature via a re-opening of the potential at the roots of the human animal.  In conjunction 
with this, I draw on Abensour’s description of utopia as rooted in an ethical site that emerges 
from the encounter with the other, which entails the transformation of the relations contained 
between people, inaugurating an intersubjective order that breaks with the autarchy of the self in 
re-opening alterity as a perennial/persistent project.  Reading Merleau-Ponty in the context of 
these insights brings a greater political nuance to latent elements in his work.  Conceptualizing 
what I refer to as the bio-phenomenological invariant, we must begin by recognizing the radical 
indeterminacy, openness and depth at the roots of his ontology.  Far from being a simple, 
positive ontology, “brute being” represents a constant, militant break with the given via the latent 
potential contained in human corporeity.  Moreover, through an esthesiological analysis of the 
body, we find the ontology of the flesh describing an originary openness to being and the other – 
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the assertion that, like Salamano’s dog, the other is always there.  While this manifests itself as 
an originary sociality (or capacity for solidarity), given the paradoxical nature of desire, it 
becomes embodied in particular forms of relations – including those which reify and elide the 
being/alterity of the other.  The utopian capacity found in this line of thought lies in theorizing 
the means through which we can contact and re-open the primordial capacities contained in 
human corporeity – our primordial capacity for sociality and solidarity.  The re-emergence of 
this radical indeterminacy is the opening of a political and ethical project. 
I. Points of Departure: Bios, Politics, Utopia 
One of the goals of biopolitics has been to return to the bios and body as political 
concepts.  In doing so, its innovation lies in seeing the bios (or human nature) as a site of 
political struggle8 – as increasingly subject to the intrusions of political mechanisms and control.  
As we saw with Benjamin, the body/bios has become a central site of capitalist exploitation: 
within the production process, “labour-power” is contained within the human bios, as the 
conglomeration of corporeal capacities, and utilized for the purposes of the production of 
surplus-value; and, in daily experience, our intersubjective capacity is likewise subjected to an 
anaesthetization process that saps it of the capacity for sensuous engagement and ethical 
experiences.  Yet, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest, resistance has perhaps been 
underexplored in biopolitical theory.  They trace this to an inconsistency or ambiguity in Michel 
Foucault’s own usage of biopower (“as the power over life”) and biopolitics (“the power of life 
to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity”).9  While this inconsistency or 
ambiguity remains latent in Foucault’s work, it has morphed into a lack of insight into the 
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processes of subjectification/resistance in latter day incarnations of biopolitics.  For Hardt and 
Negri, the emancipatory potentials of biopolitics must be understood through “the creation of 
new subjectivities that are presented at once as resistance and de-subjectification.”  This would 
recuperate the original Foucauldian intention which “aimed not merely at an empirical 
description of how power works for and through subjects but also at the potential for the 
production of alternative subjectivities, thus designating a distinction between qualitatively 
different forms of power.”10  This suggests that resistance denotes a complex interconnection 
between bios and history as an “event”: simultaneously, as a rupture with the existing order and 
as an innovative transformation of the nature of life.   
Such a re-conceptualization of biopolitics as political praxis emerges in Virno’s 
resuscitation of the concept of human nature as a site of struggle.  Rather than discussing the 
specific traits, drives or instincts of human nature, Virno is concerned with what he refers to as 
the “biological invariant.”  To explain this concept, he posits a question that attempts to theorize 
the revolutionary contours of biological transformation and the biological contours of 
revolutionary transformation: “can human beings experience human nature?”11  This effectively 
asks whether humans can experience the conditions (or innate characteristics) that make 
experience possible in the first place: “‘human nature’ effectively denotes the ensemble of innate 
dispositions that guarantee the very possibility of perceiving phenomena, to be emotionally 
involved, to act and discourse.”12  In providing an affirmative answer to the question, Virno 
explicitly rejects the treatment of the biological invariant as a non-accessible, transcendental 
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subjectivity.  Rather, he suggests that the invariant retains the determinate characteristic of 
indeterminacy or openness.  In theorizing our access to the invariant, Virno turns to the “natural-
historical,” which “consists in demonstrating that the conditions of possibility of human praxis 
possess a peculiar empirical counterpoint.  In other words, there are contingent phenomena 
which reproduce point-by-point the inner structure of the transcendental presupposition.  Besides 
being their foundation, the ‘eternal’ exposes itself, as such, in such and such a given socio-
political state of affairs.”13  Essentially, the invariant and its empirical counterpoints possess a 
relationship of non-identical reversibility in which, at various moments, each exposes the other.  
In utilizing the metaphor of a map, he suggests: “The map is the diagram of a territory, part of 
which is constituted by the diagram of that territory, part of which…to infinity.”14  The 
relationship posited here is not causal, but co-constitutive and reversible.  Human nature exposes 
and experiences itself when contingent historical events offer a map or diagram of those very 
invariant capacities – when events expose the conditions of possibility of the anthropogenetic 
process – and vice versa.   
The openness of human nature resists positing natural-historical diagrams as the 
emergence of an essentialist nature.  Indeed, the very core of human nature lies in potentiality as 
“a deficit of presence,”15 something that is constitutive of temporality itself.  As Virno point out, 
actuality has a dual meaning, denoting “what is in act” or in the process of being, as well as 
“what is present.”  The first represents a statement of realization or actualization, while the 
second denotes the temporality of the present.  The “inactual” carries with it a mirror duality, 
denoting a temporal statement (the “not-now” or “not present”) and a statement of the non-actual 
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or non-realized as “something potential.”16  Biological potentiality lies in the language faculty 
(the capacity for speech divorced from the specificities of given linguistic systems), “instinctual 
non-specialization” (the organism’s incomplete character), neoteny (the retention of earlier 
phases of phylogenetic development – their non-adaptation to socio-cultural control) and, by 
virtue of the first three, the lack of a circumscribed or univocal environment.  All of this 
represents the non-presence of the human organism as an orientation towards disorientation: the 
human being is always potential and incomplete.  The various manifestations of potential in acts 
are only their temporal coming into being, which do not represent the essence of potential itself: 
while complimentary, potential and act retain a heterogeneity that is tantamount to the 
relationship between the capacity for speech and particular incarnations of speech.17  Outside of 
all essentialisms, Virno thus conceives of the invariant as rooted in biological capacities, which 
are not predetermined but remain in potentia and in perpetuity.  These capacities are the raw 
material of human experience that come to the fore only via their historical opening and re-
opening as potential/capacity.  At the same time, the social and political creation of pseudo-
environments produces an order by the imposition of repetitive and predictable behaviours that 
act to stabilize this indeterminate being – they limit the possibilities that the openness of the 
biological invariant entails.  Yet, this is coupled with the lack of a univocal environment “in 
which to insert oneself with innate expertise once and for all” that characterizes the political 
counterpoint of the biological invariant.18  This makes human beings “dangerous” animals: they 
are subject to a state of insecurity and displacement.  
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The point of Virno’s natural history is to extract or collect “the social and political events 
in which the human animal is put into direct relation with metahistory, that is with the 
unmodifiable constitution of the species.”19  This occurs when the maps of human nature begin 
to portray or illustrate the non-identity of the empirical and its invariant counterpoints – when we 
“portray the absence of a univocal environment.”20  More particularly, we find this emerging 
when non-specialization emerges as the assertion of the growth of instinctual capacities rather 
than their contraction, reification or repression, and when neoteny re-asserts the incomplete 
transformation or utilization of capacities in the given social environment.  When this occurs the 
“always already” of the human organism (indeterminacy, openness, potential) returns “for a 
moment to the ‘primal scene’ of the anthropogenetic process.”21  Here, we experience the most 
vivid diagrams of human nature, but often times these diagrams are closed via the cultural re-
writing or re-imposition of a pseudo-environment that contains “the inarticulate and chaotic 
dynamis” (i.e. potential) at the roots of the human animal.  The fundamental political point lies in 
elaborating a theory of action predicated upon praxis as a contingent re-opening or re-
appropriation of the anthropogenetic process outside of all determinism and oppressive 
harnessing of this potential (e.g. the commodification of labour power or the reification of being 
generally).  The bio-potential of human nature becomes the arena of political struggle, though 
this exhibits the ambiguity or neutrality under which these potentials can be a source of further 
oppression or a form of emancipation.  Leaving this ambiguity aside, Virno describes the 
emergence of the invariant as “a full historical, phenomenological, empirical display of the 
ontological condition of the human animal…It is as if the root has risen to the surface, finally 
revealing itself to the naked eye.”  This would constitute “a fundamental biological configuration 
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which becomes a historically determined way of being, ontology revealing itself 
phenomenologically.”22   
In relating the biological to political action (or in turning the biological into a site of 
political action), Virno veers towards intersecting the biological invariant and utopia in 
describing this as a physiological distancing from the eternal present, in the service of opening a 
political alterity.  This is an opening of alterity that shows the inactual/potential that the present 
represses or exploits.23  The utopian contours of biopolitics also emerge in his suggestion of the 
need for natural history to intersect with a political ethics,24 in paving the way for entirely new 
forms of subjectivity that would include an exodus from state and capitalist power relations.  
Against the reifying effects of the capitalist exploitation of human capacities, this would require 
political action to institute an ethical way of life – an ethical transformation of human nature and 
human creation, in the production of being-together via a we-centric and intersubjective sphere.  
This dovetails with Hardt and Negri’s understanding of biopolitical subjectification as including 
“the invention of new forms of the relation to the self and others.”25  Here, the very openness of 
human nature is re-opened via forms of political action that seek to create new possibilities of 
human action, and consequently human interaction. 
Drawing on this, I want to begin thinking the possible connection between biopolitics and 
utopia, in conceptualizing Merleau-Ponty’s “I can” as a politico-ethical capacity.  To do this, 
Miguel Abensour’s analysis of utopia is key.  For Abensour, the fundamental core of utopian 
thought lies in “the orientation toward what is different, the wish for the advent of a radical 
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alterity here and now.”26  Persistent utopia emerges from the recognition of the need to preserve 
this alterity even in the process of striving for utopia, and in the face of utopia’s persistent 
reversion into dystopia/domination.  In light of Virno’s work, we might deem the preservation of 
persistent utopia as the need to preserve the very potential – including the temporality rooted in 
potential – at the root of the human animal.  Consequently, rather than being a permanent “one 
off” that would allegedly realize humanity for eternity, persistent utopia represents a permanent 
attempt to achieve the realization of the indeterminate (pure potential), and by virtue of this 
impossibility the permanent alternation between fulfillment and defeat, between the opening and 
re-opening of the utopian desire/capacity.  In this sense, the end of utopia is always also its 
beginning, “the ever-reborn movement toward something indeterminate.”27   
As we saw, Abensour suggests that this persistence emerges from an ontological and an 
ethical site.  Building on the insights from biopolitics, the bios becomes the meta-site in which 
the ontological and ethical sites of utopia are themselves located: by virtue of its potential being, 
which is never exhausted by particular incarnations, the human bios is always capable of “other” 
deployments and incarnations of its capacities, both utopian and dystopian.  The possibility of 
this alterity as a re-subjectification is central to Abensour’s conceptualization of utopia.  
Persistent utopia “designates a stubborn impulse toward freedom and justice – the end of 
domination, of relations of servitude, and of relations of exploitation.”28  In the face of dystopia, 
this would entail a transformation of the very conditions of possibility of human interactions, by 
way of intersubjective creation: a rupturing with the mass-monadic and anonymous being that 
permeates modernity via a collective action that retains the écart (the perennial gap that 
precludes totalization) that is the very essence of alterity.  Utopia, as an an-archic rupturing of 
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the reigning forms of interaction and power, would thus represent “a transformation of the power 
in potential to act in concert: it signifies the passage from power over human beings to power 
with and between human beings, the between being the place where the possibility of a common 
world is won.”29  In a sense, utopia denotes the attempt at instituting an intersubjective space 
against the autarchy of individual being.  As an-archic action, this would both rupture the 
reigning political order (with its forms of subjectivity and power) and represent a turning (away) 
towards an ethical form of subjectivity that retains the element of alterity, and thus refuses the 
movement towards a politics of closure/essentialism. 
II. The Bio-Phenomenological Invariant 
While Merleau-Ponty does not develop a specifically biopolitical theory of the body,30 
Roberto Esposito suggests the ability to take Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh beyond his 
own conceptualization.  Indeed, the central contribution of the flesh lies in turning the body 
outward, towards exteriority/externality, and thus situating the flesh “environmentally.”  By 
positing body and world as located in the hinge of one another, the flesh suggests the political 
character inscribed in the body’s being: it is partially constituted by the world which it is “in” 
and “of.”  Moreover, if the body-as-flesh is the seat of the bios’ fundamental capacities (for 
motility, sense, speech, etc), we should recall Virno’s assertion that capitalism – as the historical 
conjuncture that founds biopolitics – is a particular mode of the consumption/production of 
subjectivity as a modality of bodily potentiality.  That is to say, capitalism is a specific 
mobilization of the sensuous capacities and potentials attached to human existence.31  Esposito’s 
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account of Merleau-Ponty shows how he contributes to escaping the silence on the resistant 
elements of the bios.  This begins with the hyperdialectical rejection of the body’s self-sameness 
via the assertion of its internal and external fragmentation (including its intersubjective/outward 
orientation).  This directly confronts the unitary, totalitarian body’s attempts to close the body on 
itself against the alterity of the outside; against this, the flesh opens the possibility of breaking 
any attempt to contain the bios’ dynamic qualities.32   
While Esposito offers only a brief gesture in thinking Merleau-Ponty’s potential 
contribution to biopolitics, I want to take this further through a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s third 
lecture, entitled ‘Nature and Logos: The Human Body,’ from his course notes from the College 
de France on Nature and his ‘Working Notes’ for The Visible and the Invisible.  The courses on 
Nature seek to re-animate the biological or “natural” features that inform the corporeality of the 
body.  His ‘Working Notes’ indicate the centrality of such a project for his turn to ontology: 
“Necessity of a return to ontology -- the ontological question and its ramifications: the subject-
object question[;] the question of inter-subjectivity[;] the question of Nature[.]  Outline of 
ontology projected as an ontology of brute Being – and of logos…Plan for Part One: to see (by 
immanent analysis) what ‘Nature’ has become – and consequently life – and consequently man 
as psycho-physical subject.”33  In this brief description, Merleau-Ponty discloses that his 
ontology is caught up with concerns about nature, and that he is concerned to understand the 
“nature” of the human body and of human life.  The lectures – which begin to develop, in 
embryo, the flesh – enclose the body in a bio-natural world, but one removed from the dualistic 
binaries that clouded western thought.  This links up with the project of biopolitics in a manner 
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that can politicize Merleau-Ponty’s thought.  The lectures – in concert with the ‘Working Notes’ 
to The Visible and the Invisible – offer a means to applying the later, general ontology of the 
flesh to the body, in reconceptualising elements of human (inter)subjectivity in a biopolitical 
context and offer a means to situating the political import of brute or savage being in potentiality, 
particularly as a utopian potential that holds out the possibility of breaking with the power over 
life, via the power of life to re-create the conditions of its own possibility.  Read through Virno 
and Abensour, Merleau-Ponty offers a phenomenological and biological account of solidarity 
and ethical capacities rooted in the potentiality of the body’s phenomenal and esthesiological 
being.  This might be viewed as akin to Virno’s idea of political praxis as “ontology revealing 
itself phenomenologically”: the ontology of intersubjectivity is represented as merely a capacity 
that comes into being phenomenally, via particular incarnations of this potential/capacity.  
Hence, the body contains a primordial quality that resists closure, and can thus rupture 
established being via a neotynic return that re-opens the very capacity for the production of 
intersubjectivity.  But, to do this, we need to begin by showing the body-as-flesh as rooted 
simultaneously in indeterminacy and potentiality, as well as invariance and transformation. 
We can start charting this path by re-christening Virno’s biological invariant in Merleau-
Ponty's terms as the bio-phenomenological invariant.  By bio-phenomenological invariant, I 
mean to suggest that Merleau-Ponty turns to a biologically (or naturally) rooted phenomenology 
in his later ontology.  I refer to this as bio-phenomenological, rather than bio-ontological, 
because – as a whole – it as an ontology that shows itself phenomenally: it expresses itself in the 
lived experiences and practices of embodiment.  At the same time it is an ontology in which 
these phenomenal appearances do not exceed or exhaust being (which retains a surplus).  In this 
vein, the Phenomenology of Perception sought to establish the body and body-image as an 
 254 
 
invariant element of being via its present position, but also as something that is “an open system 
of an infinite number of equivalent positions directed to other ends.”34  The body represents our 
mode of being in the world, the invariant appearing of being in the world, but it also represents 
an open system of potential – the body can always be “otherwise.”  Of course, in developing his 
late ontology in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty aims to correct any residues of a 
philosophy of consciousness approach that may have remained within his phenomenology of 
bodily experience.  In this vein, he sought to undermine aspects of the intentionality of the 
subject that permeated earlier phenomenology: intentional consciousness constituted the object, 
but there was no exchange or interaction between the two.  His ontology of the flesh aims to 
understand how world and flesh are created from a similar realm of being, and thus intertwined 
with one another – that is, the flesh or subject was in and of the world and not wholly a subject 
but also not wholly an object acted upon.  This intertwining includes the intertwining of body 
(and psycho-physical being) and world in a manner congruent with biopolitics and an invariant 
capacity.  But we also need to establish that the body transcends its phenomenal appearance. 
With the concept of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty deploys what he describes as a savage 
ontology that contacts a primordial (“brute”/“wild”) realm of being.  This primordial being has 
overcome “serial time, that of ‘acts and decisions,’” and is “the mythical time reintroduced.”35  
What Merleau-Ponty has in mind here is an ontology that is the raw material or potential of the 
ontic, rather than a mere abstract encompassing of the totality of the ontic world.  Brute being is 
akin to the capacity for speech, which becomes embodied in (but is never exhausted by) the act 
of speech itself.  Thus, it is instructive when Merleau-Ponty refers to this ontology as descriptive 
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of “a time before time, Being before functioning.”36  This latent being represents potential in a 
manner that seeks to overcome the Sartrean division of the in-itself and the for-itself.  Sartre fails 
to transcend the Hegelian distinction in which one can become what one is (e.g. a waiter) by 
taking responsibility for what one is (e.g. by playing the part of a waiter) and thus by becoming 
what being already determines.  Merleau-Ponty replaces the “in-itself” (something specific) with 
an etwas (something) to indicate being as a hollow of possibilities.  Indeed, being is 
“inseparable” from this “hollow of emptiness” in a sense that describes something more than an 
opposition between being and nothingness (or in-itself and for-itself).  Rather, he suggests that 
being is always “inflated with non-being or with the possible, that it is not only what it is.”37  
This indicates the centrality of “openness” to being as a potentiality that always defies the limits 
of factual/empirical existence.  The etwas of being is something “always on the horizon, the 
positive determinations of which are the trace and the absence.”38  In the “something,” the trace 
denotes the existence of a fraction of being, which does not exhaust being as such and thus 
retains elements of absence via being’s excess.  We might read this as suggesting that all traces 
of being in the phenomenal are thus haunted by the absence constitutive of an originary 
potentiality that defies positive determination in the sense of the in-itself becoming the for-itself: 
the trace only ever partially embodies the primoridality of being, and is constantly afflicted with 
absence or lack by virtue of the excess of being. 
 Here, we begin to see Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to discover what he refers to as the 
urstiftung or primordial/originary institution.  This urstiftung is not merely a transcendental 
modality of being; rather than being the condition of possibility of human experience, it is 
tantamount to the condition of the condition of possibility of human experience.  Centrally, the 
                                                 
36
 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 213. 
37
 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Working Notes,’ Visible and the Invisible, 180-181. 
38
 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 228. 
 256 
 
primordial character of this ontology is indicative of its own indeterminacy and precariousness.  
As openness, it is subject to continual creation and recreation.  In explaining this, Merleau-Ponty 
invokes the history of geometry.  Subject to historicity and ideality, the “history” of geometry is 
never closed, but retains the openness we have been describing as an ontological potentiality.  As 
he explains: “there is an unfinished history of geometry which remains open, while at the same 
time there is a corpus of geometry which forms a system in which the early steps seem to have 
been cancelled insofar as they were partial or contingent developments…Both the early stages of 
geometry as well as all its later advances contain a certain surplus of sense over and beyond their 
manifest or literal sense such as it is lived each time by the geometer.”39  The urstiftung does not 
denote a metaphysics of the true in the vein of Plato’s theory of the forms; rather, it denotes the 
opening of a possibility of continual expression or recreation of the institution, and is thus 
anchored to a genesis divorced from essence and anchored instead to surplus and indeterminacy.  
Here, transcendence denotes a reconfiguration of the existing institution: “The movement, the 
Beweglichkeit, of geometry is unified with its ideal sense only because the ideal sense is the 
sense of a field, a sense of initiation or a sense of openness which involves continuous 
production and reproduction.”40 
In translating this into a more general ontology, the flesh describes “the Urstiftung of 
‘foundations’ which, as in mythical thinking, are always before the everyday and the 
empirical.”41  In this sense, Merleau-Ponty describes his own philosophy as a philosophy of 
structure, but we can see here a concern with the institution of structure itself, which finds time 
and space to be particular forms of institution outside of “objectivity” and thus subject to 
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sedimentation and reactivation.42  It is perhaps because of this, and because he aims to get at an 
understanding of the urstiftung as the institution of the institution (or the expression of 
expression) that Merleau-Ponty refers to his savage ontology as “vertical” or uses geological 
metaphors to describe it.  This represents a ground of being that requires constant excavation, not 
for the purposes of unearthing the identical and complete metaphysics that lies buried beneath 
ontic being, but because the being of this vertical ontology is – like the ontic – always 
incomplete.  This incompletion, far from being a fault, reflects the hyper-dialectic that must 
constantly interrogate itself, and is thus “a philosophical theme” rather than a symptom of an 
“unhappy consciousness”: “the incompleteness of the reduction (‘biological reduction,’ 
‘psychological reduction,’ ‘reduction to transcendental immanence,’ and finally ‘fundamental 
thought’) is not an obstacle to the reduction, it is the reduction itself, the rediscovery of vertical 
being.”43  In essence, the reflection on reflection that the phenomenological reduction aims at 
cannot be closed without falling back into the sort of transcendental position that Merleau-Ponty 
seeks to avoid.  As he describes the philosophical/ontological problem that he confronts in 
‘Nature and Logos: The Human Body’: "Brute or savage being against sedimented-ontic being.  
Ontology that defines being from within and not from without: at every level of Being is 
infrastructure, framework, hinges, and not offered in perspective and calling for the construction 
of what is behind these appearances…This means that ontologies concern the leaves of one sole 
Being in which we already are at the moment we speak, and which can be globally defined as 
what is not nothing. – Nature, life, man, and so Ineinander."44   
We need to grasp savage being against the sedimented and reified ontic being that often 
corrupts our understandings (or practices).  Merleau-Ponty does so via the idea of the “hinge” or 
                                                 
42
 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Working Notes,’ Visible and the Invisible, 258-259. 
43
 Ibid., 178. 
44
 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 220. 
 258 
 
interbeing.  This constitutes the phenomenological intention or rooting of his ontology – which is 
thus not a “pure” ontology as a “there is.”  As the phenomenon is enclosed in the field of 
phenomenality (i.e. even the phenomenological reduction cannot ignore that we are in the world, 
and it is thus not absolute), being is never pure.  Thus, we also find the localization (both 
temporal and spatial) of the phenomenon and its being.  In this sense, the phenomenal field is an 
inextricable realm that we are always already in, which, to quote Marc Richir, produces the 
paradox that “as soon as we begin to philosophize, we simultaneously outline this structure anew, 
we invent it at the same moment that we thought we were discovering it.”  Richir further notes 
that “from now on it will be impossible to philosophize otherwise than in the singular, for the 
singular is our only way of access to the universal.”45  This singularity emerges from the 
particularity of the ineinander (the in-between) that always permeates being’s appearing, and in 
this context Merleau-Ponty’s ontology must be read phenomenologically – as always caught up 
in the appearing of being, though this appearing is rooted in temporality and singularity and 
retains a utopian excess via potentiality and capacity.  
We must also understand nature and “life” as central to understanding elements of this 
ontology.  This constitutes the “bio” element of the bio-phenomenological invariant.  Thus, 
Merleau-Ponty is beginning to conceptualize the nature of the body as a lived, biological 
organism subject to no forms of determinism, but also not absent of a structural characteristic or 
limitation.  It is a living and perceiving body, as well as a lived and perceived body which allows 
it access to the very conditions of its own existence/experience.  This entails turning to the being 
of the body as the roots of life and experience.  The body appears as the invariant appearing of 
experience itself – and, consequently, as something that we can experience, both in the form of 
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our own body and the body of others.  And, yet, this very invariance is located in the 
indeterminate paths that the ontology of the flesh opens up: the body exists as always caught up 
in a process of becoming, subject to history and a subject within history.  But we must also be 
cognizant of the body’s embedding within nature.  Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to suggest that 
“Nature is the primordial – that is, the nonconstructed, the noninstituted; hence the idea of an 
eternity of nature (the eternal return), of a solidity.”46  Ultimately, nature is the urstiftung that his 
ontology of the flesh aims at.47  But we should be quick to qualify this: while nature may be non-
instituted, it would appear to be instituting and thus subject to indeterminacy on the back of its 
invariance.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty is quick to indicate that nature is not an “object” that is “in 
front of us,” but is “our soil…that which carries us.”48  In these respects, his deconstruction of 
the claim that “nature is at the first day” is instructive: it indicates the necessity of understanding 
the flesh in the present as containing “an ‘ever new’ and ‘always the same.’”  This is more 
accurately described as an “Existential eternity”49 that is subject to what Virno described as the 
“just now” and the “always already.”  Nature may be the urstiftung, but like any institution it is 
that which brings forth a realm of possibility that is subject to transformation or the “ever new,” 
despite being anchored by the “always the same.”  It is in this context that Merleau-Ponty retains 
his tendency to describe the flesh through notions of pregnancy, and suggests the need to “do a 
psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother.”50  Nature appears as something other than a 
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pure object, as that “from which we have arisen,” giving birth to the world of being itself.  This 
is a case of being borrowing from the primordial in presenting itself always anew.51   
III. The Corporeal Schema of the Zoon Utopicus 
In order to undertake a psychoanalysis of nature, Merleau-Ponty turns to the question of 
the human body (as flesh), which is the bio-phenomenological invariant.  The body is anchored 
in the general ontology that was just outlined, which attempts to break with the in-itself of 
“objective being.”  In opposition to this, Merleau-Ponty calls for a turn to the lebenswelt 
(lifeworld) as something that can affect the passage from “biology” to “the being of life.”  The 
lifeworld breaks with objective being in trying “to disclose the ‘organic history’ under the 
historicity.”  The attempt at such an urhistorie seeks to replace the notions “of transcendental 
subjectivity, those of subject, object, meaning – the definition of philosophy would involve an 
elucidation of philosophical expression itself…as the science of pre-science, as the expression of 
what is before expression and sustains it from behind.”52  In exploring the urhistorie of the body, 
Merleau-Ponty turns to psychophysical subjectivity via a hyperdialectical conception of nature 
and biology that attempts to find a pre-objective or prescientific realm that refuses the idea of an 
objective space, time or being in front of or before us.  He seeks to open “unto the Nature that 
‘we are,’ unto the Nature in us – and thereby to begin a revision of the ontology of the object, a 
fortiori, since the leaf of nature detaches from the object and rejoins our total being.”53  In the 
context of the reflection on philosophical reflection, nature can only be comprehended as 
perceived nature.  But this in turn opens up what is perhaps most important in understanding any 
conception of the “bios” for Merleau-Ponty: namely, that the human body – in its 
phenomenological and biological/natural significance – must be understood as a perceiving body 
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or “as that which perceives nature which it also inhabits.”54  The perceiving body reinserts the 
human into nature, rather than divorcing it from being via the “I think that” that would inform a 
disembodied subject that is exterior to being55 or nature.  In these respects, we return to the 
ineinander as the opening of a new dimension of being, namely the lebenswelt as field of 
experience and the perceiving and experiential body as an entity that blurs the lines between “the 
phenomenal body and the objective body.”56 
To understand the psychophysical nature of the human body, Merleau-Ponty attempts to 
excavate its primordial characteristics, capacities and relations.  Yet, in order to do this, he adds 
to the vertical element of his ontology a lateral one: in borrowing from philosophical 
anthropology, he refuses to separate humans from animals (or animality).  By describing this as a 
lateral move, Merleau-Ponty intends to suggest that the difference between humans and animals 
is not qualitative: despite differences, they retain a “kinship.”57  The general move towards 
understanding the human via what I have described as the bio-phenomenological invariant 
entails following Merleau-Ponty’s attempt “to take [the human] at [its] point of emergence in 
Nature.”  As he continues: “Just as there is an Ineinander of life and physicochemistry, i.e., the 
realization of life as a fold or a singularity of physicochemistry – or structure, so too is the 
human to be taken in the Ineinander with animality and Nature.”58  This establishes the necessity 
of starting from the body as an invariant element of experience (even if a modifiable one), rather 
than positing the human or subjectivity on the basis of an entirely abstract and unconstrained 
becoming, as is the tendency in variants of post-humanism.  Esposito suggests that, far from 
representing a break with humanism, this mode of thought reproduces the anthropodicy of 
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humanism, presenting humanity as a unique species because it is able to throw off the shackles 
of animality and entirely shape itself.  For this approach, “There is no ontological constraint, 
fixed character, or natural invariant that binds [man] to a specific natural modality.  He is not 
nothing, since he can become anything, create himself again and again according to his liking.  
Properly speaking, he is not even a being, but a becoming in perpetual change.”59  Moreover, 
starting from the body, Merleau-Ponty’s approach rejects even a modified version of these 
philosophies, which would see humanity as constituted by a union of animality and reason.  
Indeed, the primordial approach to the body aims to understand the being of the body before 
reason, and thus to understand humanity as a form of corporeity.   
Consequently, the flesh describes a general ontology that is directed towards experiential 
and existential concerns as rooted in the body as a bio-phenomenological invariant.  In particular, 
it describes the invariant element of being-in-the-world, which is centrally organized around the 
openness of the invariant.  In linking such being to our corporeal existence, the structure of the 
bio-phenomenological invariant – which is to say, simultaneously, the structure of experience – 
is portrayed or contained specifically in what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the corporeal schema.  
The corporeal schema represents the primordial, preflective and preobjective relation that our 
body has with/to/in the world (including others and things).  In being primordial and containing 
the qualities of both invariance and transformation, we need to think the schema as rooted in the 
potentialities of our corporeal being.  Thus, it cannot be read in a limited sense, as reduced to the 
universe of the objective or phenomenal body; rather, it exceeds the being of either of these, and 
the latter is merely a particular incarnation of potentiality or a particular embedding/appearing of 
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the schema.  If we begin with the bare fact of the body’s being as the root or urstiftung of 
experience and our connection with the world then we need to turn to understanding the basic 
contours of its contact with the world, others, things – its very perceptual, sensuous and 
connective capacities.  In these terms, the body is not a thing but “a relation to an Umwelt.”60  
While I will explore the meaning of umwelt in more depth below, we need now only note that 
Merleau-Ponty uses it to signify the world as a perceptual entity, something that the body is in 
and of – it is a world for-the-body, but only in a relation in which the body is also for- and of-
the-world.  The corporeal schema – as the ground of perceptual and sensuous being – structures 
the potentialities of the body as a relation.  Consequently, Merleau-Ponty turns to an 
esthesiological account of the body. 
 An esthesiological account of the body acknowledges being-in-the-world as being 
constituted by being open to the world – by the sensuous organs, which are (once again) in and 
of the world.  We might think of this in contrast to the Sartrean position.  For Sartre, the 
exemplary case of experience in the world is the situation in which one person looks through a 
keyhole in a door at an “other.”  This relationship is one in which the looker acts as a subject (via 
vision) and objectifies the other that they look upon.  But in this situation, the looker is outside of 
the world, hidden behind the door, though their eye may be exposed/visible.  The eye acts as the 
stand in for consciousness and its attempts to objectify the body of an other as an object.  The 
body of the seer is obscured by the door, and their eye becomes the true “actor.”  This bears the 
hallmarks of a high altitude thinking in so far as the body of the viewer is outside of the realm of 
the viewed.  An esthesiological approach takes the corporeity of the body – the body of the self 
and of the other – and its sensibility (as sensing and sensed) as the a priori condition for 
experience and contact with the world and others.  What Sartre illustrates is but a particular case 
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of the experience of others – and, more specifically, a one-sided case bearing the hallmarks of a 
reified existence.  Our corporeity is informed by the entirety of the sensorial human system, 
dependent on the surface of the body as the flesh (in the colloquial and the technical sense) that 
makes contact with the world, though this need not exclude vision as a particular modality of this 
sensibility/corporeity – it means acknowledging vision as a modality of the esthesiological 
capacities of corporeal being.  Ultimately, our corporeity is our means of contact with the world, 
and vice versa, a means of being intertwined, intersubjectively, with the world and others.61   
What needs to be further emphasized is the idea that the esthesiological, corporeal body 
is an “open totality”: it gets beyond the in-itself and for-itself, as well as all manner of 
essentialist determinations, by divorcing being from a particular object (either the self/body, the 
other/body or the external world) and representing the body as an entity whose being cannot be 
entirely closed or enclosed.  In displacing subjectivity from a vision embedded within subject-
object terms, this corporeity admits of the ambiguity and incompleteness of our interactions and 
intentions.  As Merleau-Ponty states: “Body-things, penetration, at a distance, of the sensible 
things by my body.  Things are what are missing from my body in order to close its circuit.”62  
The point here is that the dual character of the body allows for the intersubjective relation, which 
is ingrained in the very structure of its being: as an open, non-identical totality in circuit with the 
outside (a circuit that always short-circuits at the moment the body would transcend itself to 
become the other, thus retaining its immanence), the body and the outside allow for a mutual 
encroachment, a positive exchange.  To understand this, we need to first re-acknowledge the 
écart that separates the beings in relation: they never pass over into one another, but they do 
transform one another in their process of intersubjective engagement, in the intertwining of their 
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corporeal schema.  Likewise, in being sensoriality without a particular object it remains in 
potentia, always capable of re-opening its world in a new constellation or a new signification of a 
priorly given (or newly emergent) object.  For example, vision is a hollow that always awaits the 
entrance of visible things into its sphere.  Hence, there is a continual absence accorded to the 
object-less state of being that is the essence of an “open totality.”  The eye is “made for a future 
vision (the embryo)” and remains a hollow until there is the contingent emergence of a particular 
field of vision that disrupts the existent one.  But the eye/vision is attached to a corporeal body 
that likewise participates in this open schema as seeing and seen.63 
The central point of this esthesiological approach is that this primordial contact is part of 
the brute/savage being that is “preobjective”: that is, the body (before reason) is intertwined with 
the world and others, via relationships of “ejection”/projection and “introjection.”  In essence, 
the body as a double leaf participates in the world by extending itself into the world, and by 
having the world extend into it.64  Here, Merleau-Ponty challenges the traditional trope regarding 
subjectivity, in which the other represents “a freedom seen from without as destiny and fatality, a 
rival subject for a subject.”65  On the contrary, from the esthesiological perspective, 
intersubjectivity denotes an originary belonging formed by a common connection to being – a 
common contact and circuit with the world and others.  Perhaps more to the point, it is through 
the esthesiological character of the corporeal schema that the body becomes a being-for-the-other 
as an a priori (or pre-temporal) condition – that it contains “a natural rooting of the for-other.”66  
To begin with, this mode of organization – centered on perception and senses – is always-already 
oriented towards alterity, towards what is not itself and towards the outside.  This is contained in 
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the body’s two-fold character: “the body as touching-touched, seeing-seen, the place of a kind of 
reflection and, thereby, the capacity to relate itself to something other than its own mass, to close 
its circuit on the visible, on a sensible exterior.”67  Contained in this is the idea that the body’s 
corporeity is an originary investment and elevation towards the outside/alterity, primordially 
informed by a demand “for something other than body, but asking for it by its own bodily 
weight.”68  It is by virtue of the body’s corporeity that it can experience other corporeal bodies, 
and its own corporeity always-already contains a drive towards the outside.  Yet, because of the 
paradox of immanence and transcendence, there is always a simultaneous union and separation 
of myself and the outside, even if this relation is repressed through cognitive mechanisms that 
usurp the originary recognition that constitutes our primordial contact with the world.69  In the 
context of the primordial character of this originary contact with the world, and this original 
capacity, my body remains an esthesiological piece of flesh – with the capacity for both 
“projections and introjections” – and thus “the inner framework of intersubjectivity,” the root of 
a capacity or potential for the transitive experience to be formed by a genuine alterity that 
acknowledges the écart that separates the self from the other.70  The touching-touched and 
seeing-seen illustrate the body as a public organ, something with which to see and be seen in a 
lateral relation that is – before its socio-political incarnations – devoid of hierarchy.  This is 
constitutive of the very condition of possibility of intersubjectivity: the body’s openness to the 
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world represents not an autarchic imposition but the capacity to be affected by and to affect the 
outside, a mutual participation in the being of each other.71   
What much of this presupposes, and what has perhaps the strongest political and utopian 
import is esthesiology’s structuration by desire.  Desire is the moving and motive force of the 
flesh/body (which is the “I of desire”), a power that informs the very esthesiological and 
perceptual capacities that make the body not an insular being.  As Merleau-Ponty describes it: 
“the body as the power of Einfühlung [empathy] is already desire, libido, projection-introjection, 
identification.”72  In these respects, desire – as tied to the body73 – denotes “an elevation 
toward”: an elevation toward the outside, as an indeterminate “hollow” of future potentials.  
Central to unpacking this is the subsequent claim that the esthesiological character of the 
corporeal schema is “a libidinal structure” or “a relation of being and not of knowledge.”74  As 
Abensour has suggested via his reading of Emmanuel Levinas, relations of knowledge are of the 
order of the I-it, and inherently objectifying/reifying rather than “intersubjective”: they are 
colonial and colonizing, imposing the “I” upon the other, while abstracting from them via the 
third person perspective.  As a relation beyond the non-transcendence of knowledge or the 
insularity of being,75 desire (informed by empathy) pushes the body towards the other, and 
creates the possibility or capacity of taking on or being affected by the existence of the other, 
being affected by their sentiments/feelings in a manner that opens the possibility of a “we” or 
association.  This represents intersubjectivity as mirroring the paradox of immanence and 
transcendence that the body exhibits: intersubjectivity would thus constitute a case of 
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overlapping, whereby self and other open up a realm of overlap/sharing, that simultaneously 
includes the irreducible écart that maintains their separation as a folding or overlapping of flesh 
to flesh.  The place of overlap would represent a “we” (as multiplicity) that refuses to be reduced 
to a “One” on the order of colonization or subsumption within the self or a third term.  On the 
contrary, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the other alienates me from myself, and this is the 
condition of possibility of my transformation according to the intersubjective ejection that I take 
into my own being.  This introjection or incorporation occurs when “I see by the eyes of the 
other”76 or when I can take on their behaviour or approach to the world as part of the realm of 
possibility, though as something that still transcends my own being.   
Ultimately, desire – as the structure of esthesiological being – produces a carnal relation 
that transcends the body’s own narcissism, opening it to a generality, in which “I live the offered 
behaviours as my own, and I see them animated by a corporal schema.”  The esthesiological 
animation of corporeal being opens this as possibility: “it is because I perceive that the other is 
possible for me as an other perceiving the same sensibles that I perceive.”77  Hence, my 
perception of the other’s corporeal schema is the condition of possibility for me to experience 
my own corporeity.  These sorts of acts or associations precede the cognitive mechanisms that 
inform relations of knowledge, and the esthesiological focus establishes an originary sociality as 
the condition of possibility of experience (including the experience of the elision of alterity) via 
the encounter with the other: there is an originary engagement or investment with the world and 
others, rather than the insular detachment and objectification emblematic of relations of 
knowledge/cognition.  Desire as pleasure is structured by the affirmation of the other in the self, 
or by the co-feeling that ruptures the cognitive closure of the universe of being.  It is as a being-
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for-other that the body serves its function, and affirms an originary schema of empathy and 
affectivity.  Here, the weight of intentionality is thrown off, and the body becomes a truly 
intersubjective being opened to an originary passivity.  My body still contains the capacity for 
intentionality, or the approach to things and the capacity to “eject” my body into them.  
Simultaneously, my body (as the touching-touched) is also touched by them, and incorporates 
parts of their being into itself.  But this indivision of being is not the universal interchangeability 
of roles/speakers/hearers,78 nor does it reduce being to the One of identity as the discovery of “a 
rationally motivated agreement”79 that transcends the plurality of subjective positions.  Such a 
conception of intersubjectivity reduces the other to “what one knows of oneself.”80  For Merleau-
Ponty, the experience of the other (in its primitive or individuated forms) is a means of learning 
to transcend myself via what I learn from the other.  It is a leaving of one self, via the alterity of 
the other.   
IV. Desire and Umwelt: A Corporeal Socio-Historical Configuration 
The difficulty with desire is that it lacks an immediate object and is thus, in Merleau-
Ponty’s words, “something entirely other than an automatic operation.”81  This establishes two 
interrelated consequences.  First, desire – as constituted by the openness at the heart of being – is 
the root of subjectivity (which is always-already intersubjectivity), as the condition of possibility 
and motive force of the latter’s creation.  Second, because it is both non-automatic and structured 
by its own non-closure, desire is always the attempt to realize the unrealizable: the non-identity 
of the body as the seat of desire creates the perennial condition of the deferred realization or the 
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constitutive gap at the heart of being-as-flesh.82  Consequently, subjectivity – as the enactment of 
embodied desire – retains the contingency and agency at the root of its aleatoric condition.  The 
particulars of this can be appropriated from Merleau-Ponty's reading of love in Proust.  Desire, as 
with love, "entails a beyond oneself."  But this manifests in the duality or paradox that the other 
is always-already there, but the other is also always-already absent as the lack at the heart of 
openness and the non-automatic functioning of desire.  Merleau-Ponty describes love as a 
"hollow in us, not the presence of the other."83  In fact, the presence is a presaging of the absence 
(the grounds for it) and rooted in the absence that is desire's non-automatic functioning or object.  
Love and lost love (like desire and its failure, or its eclipse into something else) are unified as a 
singular reality.  In this, love – as seemingly transcending, or expressing a sublimated form of, 
desire – is the reality of the intersubjective relation insofar as "it allows us to see everything that 
someone is, how someone is the world itself, being itself, a world, a being from which we are 
excluded; in the experience undergone of this pain, one is beyond desire and domination."84  This 
love recognizes the very alterity of the other.  Yet, while the basic relation of love as affect and 
solidarity may appear at the very core of the body’s capacity, the non-mechanical functioning of 
desire opens the possibility of the failure to achieve the sociality that desire desires: the originary 
desire or orientation towards being-for-the-other can capsize and wind up in relations of 
domination that efface both the other and self and, hence, the preconditions of intersubjectivity.   
In his psychoanalytic analysis of Etienne de La Boétie’s Discourse on Voluntary 
Servitude, Fabio Ciaramelli draws out the modalities of this problem.  As he notes, sociality is 
predicated on desire as a transcendence of the self – as the striving for an affection and being-
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together that is “another’s good” or “toward the other.”  Yet, this requires the creation of 
relations that do not exist a priori: they must be achieved via the institution of the social and 
social space.  But the economy of desire is paradoxical, as La Boétie’s text shows with respects 
to tyranny/domination and friendship/solidarity: both emerge from the desire for fulfillment of 
the lack that constitutes individual existence.  As Ciaramelli puts it, “If it is true, therefore, that 
desire gives rise to friendship, it is no less true that friendship – incapable, as this relation is, of 
achieving a unity in fusion, since it is nourished by the unsurpassable duality of its terms – is 
lived as a failure to achieve that immediate fulfillment desire dreams of accomplishing.”85  
Ultimately, the striving towards alterity or sociality can result in a repressive desublimation of 
desire, because desire cannot be fulfilled absolutely.  Desire seeks a union founded on solidarity 
or affection, but because of the difficulty of fulfilling this immediately and totally, desire submits 
itself to “an allegedly originary unity,” found in the “charm of the One.”  Essentially, tyranny (or 
domination as effacement of the écart that informs alterity) fulfills the social drive in an 
“immediate” and reified way via the illusion of a natural or pre-given identity, in place of the 
difficulty of living under the indeterminate and unstable conditions that the mediation of desire 
via friendship would provide.  The end result is domination rather than friendship or solidarity.   
For Merleau-Ponty, our esthesiological being – with its rooting in desire – results in an 
“obsession” with others:86 by virtue of the body’s outward orientation, others are always-already 
there, as a primordial condition of our existence/experience that cannot be transcended.  But the 
particularity added by the experience of the elision of genuine alterity is that, as 
capacity/potential, desire and ethical capacities become enacted/embodied in various 
forms/practices including in the guise of reified relationships and modes of subjectification – 
                                                 
85
 Ciaramelli, ‘Friendship and Desire,’ 373. 
86
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Man and Adversity,’ Signs, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964), 231. 
 272 
 
including the capitalist homogeneity of the masses as commodities coming to represent a modern 
stand in for the tyranny of the One.  In this vein, the originary belonging that constitutes the 
precondition of experience cannot be seen as a political or social belonging: it is existential and 
ontological.  Consequently, we need to incorporate the ambiguity and ambivalence that 
characterizes the other in our primitive or pre-instituted relation to them.  Abensour’s persistent 
utopia grasps this ambiguity/ambivalence as caught up in the dialectic of emancipation, in which 
the desire for emancipation turns into its opposite, domination (and even the desire for 
domination).87  In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, as an underdetermined relationship without a 
particular object and hence aleatoric, our relation to others can manifest itself as “a mass of 
pleasures and of pains that are not closed in on themselves, but [are] used by us to please and to 
suffer from the world and from others (pleasure and reality).”88  As he further explains: “Freud: 
To sense is already to be human.  To be flesh is already to be human.  ‘Pleasure’ is haunted by 
‘reality’…Freudian Eros and Thanatos rejoin our problem of the flesh with its double sense of 
opening and narcissism, mediation and involution. – Freud truly saw with projection-introjection 
and sadomasochism the relation of the Ineinander of ego and world, of ego and nature, of ego 
and animality, of ego and socius.”89  Here, the duality of openness is manifested: pleasure and 
pain both remain in the hold of being, as the other can be our salvation or our torture (as master 
or as the slave that besmirches our insular and totalitarian being).  Hence, Sartre’s dualism is 
confirmed, but only as one side of the relationship of desire and alterity.  If desire is a latency 
that leads to varied relations with the outside and others – characterized by both pleasure and 
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pain, affirmation and failure,90 introjection and projection – then we need to note the political 
significance of the economy of desire: namely, that it is ambivalent, and this ambivalence is 
mirrored in the body.  As a corporeal schema, which is both open to, and of, the world, the body 
manifests itself in myriad forms.  In the case of the negation of the other via the repressive 
anonymization of all within an essentialist One that denies an outside, the other appears in the 
dystopic guise of a loss of the “otherwise” and thus constitutes our singularity and loneliness – a 
closure and failure of the originary sociality that desire desires.  But, even this false unity is 
always already broken by the écart that sunders the body from the outside, and which makes the 
body non-identical with itself: the originary sociality created by desire is structured by a non-
identity that is informed by the corporeal schema as an open totality, which cannot be closed or 
fixed.  In this context, desire and its primitive sociality represent a capacity prior to the 
constitution of subjects but still the raw material of the creation of an intersubjective space,91 or 
of the embodiment and objectification of intersubjective potential.  This, in turn, creates the 
condition of possibility of a socio-history of esthesiological and intersubjective being.  That the 
body is of the world, suggests that the body is written on by the world but that the body also 
retains its ability to express itself against its determinacy.  Indeed, the corporeal schema is itself 
an openness that includes not only its embeddedness in a socio-historical environment, but 
simultaneously the retention of the latent potentiality of the schema beneath this environment – a 
neotynic retention of the originary openness.  The socio-historical (as phenomenal) is an in-
between, the chiasm between body and world.   
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To understand this socio-historical character, we need to understand the concept of 
umwelt that Merleau-Ponty adopts from Jakob von Uexküll.  In Uexküll’s concept of umwelt, 
Merleau-Ponty finds a non-dualist understanding of subject and world.  As he states: “The 
Umwelt marks the difference between the world such as it exists in itself, and the world as the 
world of a living being.  It is an intermediary reality between the world such as it exists for an 
absolute observer and a purely subjective domain.  It is the aspect of the world in itself to which 
the animal addresses itself, which exists for the behaviour of an animal, but not necessarily for its 
consciousness; it is the environment of behaviour as ‘opposed to the geographical 
environment[.]’”92  In suggesting something prior to consciousness, we must think of the umwelt 
“at the level of the organ, at the level of the embryo.”93  This is centrally an esthesiological 
starting point, oriented towards the interconnection of sensuousness, behaviour and world.   
Umwelt denotes the world that our bodily-organism creates, and yet is determined by, in 
its being/functioning: stimuli “are given to neural elaboration and translated into a linguistic 
system of the nervous system.”94  This is structured, first, by the body’s very opening onto and in 
the world.  In avoiding a causal claim, Merleau-Ponty suggests somewhat evasively that the body 
is neither first nor second, denoting its complicity with the relationship to the outside world, but 
also, simultaneously, its determination.  In this sense, the umwelt has an esthesiological match in 
the organism, the gegenwelt: the esthesiological organs take on a particular functioning within 
the umwelt, but this is particular because objects and organs retain a surplus of meaning and 
potential.  What comes to structure (as part of the corporeal schema) the potentialities of the 
gegenwelt, is the merkwelt: the specific perceptual triggers or stimuli that come to enact sensory 
organs, which read the symbolic meaning of these triggers.  The merkwelt is “a ‘grill’ interposed 
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between the animal and the world.”  The gegenwelt is only a structured potential or limitation; 
the actual responses and actions of the organism are determined by the wirkwelt – that is, the 
manner in which the impulses “sing” in a particular environment.  The wirkwelt is tantamount to 
instinct, though structured by the symbolic matrixes that inform our relation to the world.  It 
offers up the specific responses that organisms exhibit to the merkwelt of a given umwelt, and 
often comes to displace the merkwelt – that is, by virtue of habituation, our sensory organs can 
fall into the backdrop via the force of habit of response to the environment.  In essence, the body 
and world define one another, with each precipitating responses from the other and with neither 
holding the power of causal determinacy.  As Merleau-Ponty summarizes: “The Umwelt is the 
world implied by the movement of the animal, and that regulates the animal’s movements by its 
own structure.”95 
In translating this to conceptualize the specificity of socio-historical regimes, we need to 
understand how the originary sociality of desire is “sung” by the human organism – or how it is 
structured and experienced/lived.  Under a capitalist umwelt, we can say that the affective 
agencies of the body are subjectified to register others as merely objects in a world of reified 
beings ruled by the dictates of capitalist competition – and acted out, not at the level of 
“consciousness,” but through embodied behaviour.  Here, the symbolic meaning of the other is 
no longer interpreted by the sensorial system as “human” or “other,” but simply as another 
exchange value or object there for instrumental purposes – i.e. they are reduced to the identity 
inherent to the colonizing logic of capitalism.  Likewise, in the example of Nazism that Virno 
draws from Primo Levi, we find that “the tears of this old Jewish man are not human”96 because 
a particular institution of the organization of esthesiological (as embodied neural) capacities 
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rejects the “other” as human or as part of the same human community as the one who negates 
their humanity.97  Through these mechanisms, the empathetic and ethical capacities of the body – 
its being as a site of a natural rooting of the for-the-other – capsizes in an economy of desire that 
usurps the écart of others via an allegedly originary One that is threatened by alterity.  This is the 
coming into being of the totalitarian body, in which the symbolic image of the One is a 
regression into an allegedly original indivision that refuses difference.  Under these 
circumstances, the subsequent individuation in which the self becomes a self and the other 
becomes an other is denied, as is the possibility of being-for-the-other as an act of genuine 
intersubjectivity.  This exhibits the ambiguity that characterizes the capacity and openness 
endemic to desire: both affirmation and negation are rooted in the lack and uncertainty contained 
in the deficit of presence that characterizes potential, and always allows for the possibility that 
things can be “other” than how they are.98  Our desire and orientation towards the outside is not 
fixed or fulfillable, but is a structural characteristic of the indeterminacy of the relation of being 
generally and, therefore, the very condition of possibility of experience and intersubjectivity.  
Thus, as Ciaramelli asserts, the lack at the heart of being is “the source of the possible,”99 though 
we need to add that the possible includes dystopic negation.   
 Consequently, Merleau-Ponty refers to the stabilization of esthesiological orders via the 
umwelt as an “institution of nature.”  As he explains it: “We must understand life as the opening 
of a field of action.  The animal is produced by the production of a milieu, that is, by the 
appearing in the physical world of a field radically different from the physical world with its 
                                                 
97
 It bears noting that I am interpreting this against Virno’s own claim that negation is a purely linguistic 
phenomenon.  For Merleau-Ponty, language and body hold an analogic relationship (via expression) and hence the 
“linguistic” negation is something that plays out at the level of bodily expression and hence behaviour and affect.  I 
turn to the problems of Virno's account in the next chapter. 
98
 Virno, Multitude, 20. 
99
 Ciaramelli, ‘Friendship and Desire,’ 370. 
 277 
 
specific temporality and spatiality.  Hence the analysis of the general life of the animal, of 
relations that it maintains with its body, of the relations of its body to its spatial milieu (its 
territory), of inter-animality either within the species or between two different species[.]”100  But 
the notion of institution is the key to understanding a non-transcendental human being or nature, 
for it opens up the possibility of experiencing the conditions of possibility of experience and 
consequently their modification.  “Nature” (and the bio-phenomenological invariant as 
urstiftung) is a launch pad which both structures and is the condition of possibility of action.  The 
esthesiological organs retain a certain orientation, an orientation towards the outside and towards 
sensory perception, but are “built from experiences and in this sense [are] at first blind.”101  Via 
the accumulation and repetition of experience, behaviour comes to take on “a structuration.”  The 
repetitive ordering, which is to say the institution that establishes the present incarnation of 
capacity, comes to take on a permanency when it is embedded as culture; likewise, the very 
capacity of sensibility as the latent potential for intersubjectivity via the body’s empathetic 
capacities morphs into a system, as particular forms of intersubjective action or esthesiological 
experience.  Merleau-Ponty cites Schilder to the effect that “the corporeal schema has a libidinal 
structure…and sociological [sic].”102  Thus, while desire structures the orientation of the body 
towards the outside, social conditions or biopowers likewise come to structure the nature of 
desire and its concrete embedding – even if desire can retain its originary function, as the desire 
for the outside and the body’s education via alterity.  Consequently, while Merleau-Ponty wants 
to assert the intersubjective fact of being (i.e. that the invariant and existence are always 
intersubjective), we also need to realize that this corporeal relation is embodied in historically 
specific situations and circumstances.  The contingency of capitalism thus represents a particular 
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form of subjectification structuring the corporeal schema, producing the reified and monadic 
relations that Benjamin describes, which possess a “match” in the esthesiological functioning of 
capitalist subjects.  In these instances, reification is not a closing off of the relation to the outside 
world nor even a negation of the outside world via a totalizing and irreversible inward turn.  
Rather, reification and the elision of alterity merely represent a particular embodiment of the 
mode of relation to the outside world.     
At the same time, this structuration is not “total” or “physiological.”  Rather, the 
esthesiological organs are present as the possibility of diverse organizations, and thus the 
corporeal schema is transformable or susceptible to different articulations: it is armed with 
“instruments of observation and action” but not pre-established responses, for body and world 
form a diacritical system and neither the scope/function of sensory organs nor sensorial triggers 
are pre-established.  They are structured through the mutual praxis of body and world, and 
ingrained through habituation to particular chiasmic experiences of the sensory organs and thus 
to particular meanings attached to sensory triggers.  Ultimately, the body as a “machine” is 
instituted and capable of being instituted otherwise, because the body retains a surplus potential, 
and the world as symbolic matrix retains a surplus of meaning.103  The potential for 
transformation is rooted in the very indeterminacy of the body itself, as well as in the symbolic 
surplus at the root of “ambiguous perception” – the idea that the esthesiological organism is 
rooted in symbolic matrixes that do not exhaust the meaning of experienced phenomena, nor 
have these symbolic matrixes integrated the totality of experiential content.  We return here to 
the notion of ontological depth, for the corporeal schema retains its originary indeterminacy.  In 
fact, the body of experience or the body-object is only the phenomenal appearance or trace of the 
corporeal schema: “present substitute of a past that no longer is – the trace for us is more than the 
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present effect of the past.  It is a survival of the past, an enjambment.”104  Indeed, the corporeal 
schema retains a primacy over and above the concrete incarnation in the umwelt, and acts as the 
condition of possibility of that umwelt.  As an orientation towards the outside and experience, the 
corporeal schema can only ever be the condition of possibility for the institution of time, space, 
and the conditions of possibility of experience, which do not exist a priori.  Consequently, this 
condition of possibility retains its indeterminacy – its lack of a univocal environment and its 
transformability – positing a permanent “enjambment,” which refuses the closure of the body’s 
being within the “objective” or the “actual.”  The body retains its archaeological structure or 
moorings, as the possibility of the re-opening of the corporeal potentials/capacities.  Thus, 
insofar as the umwelt is open and subject to transformation, it represents an organic non-
specialization and neotyny: the ability of organs to break with existing functions, and return to an 
earlier (unshaped) phase of development or symbolic meaning.  Essentially, the “being” of 
humans as organic bodies is established via their perceptual and sensory capacities in so far as 
they are the “pre-empirical architechtonic, the preobjective, the pivots, hinges, and structures of 
organisms and species”105 that take on a shape via their contact with the world, but that retain a 
primordial being that exceeds their phenomenal appearance.  This – the body as the hinge and 
being as an in-between – constitutes the reversibility of the body and world, self and others.  
V. Utopia and Natural-Historical Diagrams:  
The Encounter as Biopolitical Opening 
Benjamin’s account of capitalist experience encloses the bios within a political umwelt as 
the current embodiment of the bios in a particular set of historical circumstances.  Capitalism, as 
a mode of subjectification, produces particular modulations of the bio-phenomenological 
invariant.  Thus, in the experience of modernity, Benjamin suggested the collective solitude of 
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the crowd as a sort of being-alone-together.  In the context of desire, we must view this as a 
particular institution of the social, which denies both individuality (for it is a mass individuality 
as “repetition of the same”) and sociality (for the collective is a repressive and exploited “we,” 
utilized solely for the purposes of capital accumulation).106  In effect, we find here a dialectical 
negation of each concept through its other: individuality rooted in a homogeneity that denies the 
expression that would be individual; sociality/collectivity that denies the collective its own mode 
of action by suppressing each potential member within their own individuality.  The individual 
and the social deny themselves, and negate the creative or affirmative content that would seem to 
be the essence of each.  This speaks to the very poverty of modern life that creates the condition 
of possibility (or necessity) of utopian transformation.  In his classic text, Paths in Utopia, 
Martin Buber locates utopia’s specificity in the attempted renewal or (re)creation of “society” 
outside of (or against) its corrupted or poor incarnations.107  As Abensour summarizes the crux of 
this utopian position: “It reconstructs the social destroyed by capitalism and the state, 
multiplying small communities ‘behind the state’s back’ and against the state in order to remake 
the social fabric, to reconstitute it, to remake the social bond.”108  
  Merleau-Ponty adds to this an account of how the body’s primordiality can act as an 
agency of resistance which transforms the conditions of possibility of subjectivity and experience 
at the level of bio-phenomenological institution.  That is, the indeterminacy and primordial 
alterity endemic to the bio-phenomenological invariant can act to rupture its sedimented 
incarnations in re-opening the umwelt and the body’s sensuous capacities to new institutions.  In 
elaborating on this reading, we can borrow from Herbert Marcuse’s suggestion that revolutionary 
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transformation would have to develop on the basis of a biological foundation, with the moral or 
ethical elements contained in human nature being the condition of possibility for solidarity: 
“Political radicalism...implies moral radicalism: the emergence of a morality which might 
precondition man for freedom.  This radicalism activates the elementary, organic foundation of 
morality in the human being.”109  This locates solidarity in the instincts or desire (that is, 
“morality as a disposition of the organism”), as exhibited in the “erotic drive to counter 
aggressiveness, to create and preserve ‘ever greater unities’ of life.”110  The ever greater unities 
emerge in the project of the creation of solidaristic relations via the re-activation of an in-grained 
sociality in combating the surplus repression at the roots of capitalist society.   
For Merleau-Ponty, the body as the power of empathy denotes such a primordial capacity 
for solidaristic relations with the world and others – the expression of flesh through our 
engagement and intertwining with them.  As Jean-Philippe Deranty argues, this would constitute 
“an ethics of being in the world, where the ethical duty is to be a full participant recognizing the 
existence and right of all that participate in one’s own flesh.”111  In this context, the full 
“humanity” of the flesh can only be expressed through the exercise of our solidaristic capacity, in 
the service of negating the inhumanity that effaces and excludes the alterity of others.  From the 
perspective of a phenomenological account of desire, the originary capacity/desire for sociality 
as a transcendence of lack is pre-temporal, denoting the condition of possibility of sociality and 
individuality, both of which are instituted.112  The repressed represents not a “need” or “instinct” 
but a potential as neotynic re-opening of capacity.  Here, the very sociality of the body can never 
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be fixed, and consequently it retains a perennial resistance to its reification or sedimentation: 
always retaining its originary openness, it can never properly be closed (as the closure of the 
conditions of possibility) in a fixed schema.  Such closure is rooted in totalitarian thinking.  But, 
in order to fully think these motifs in Merleau-Ponty’s work in terms of political resistance, I 
want to return to the themes drawn from Virno and Abensour.   
While Merleau-Ponty suggests that the body is diacritical and that the umwelt (as the 
expression of this diacritical quality) “is open, transformable,”113 the praxis that would transform 
it is not something he explores or explains.  Virno’s understanding of the biological invariant can 
provide a means to theorizing transformability via a form of radical praxis.  The element of 
praxis contained in Virno’s biological invariant was rooted in its own indeterminacy.  In 
particular, the biological invariant (conceived as potential) portrayed itself in natural-historical 
diagrams in which the conditions of possibility of human experience (indeterminacy) found an 
empirical counterpart and re-opened the ontological potential at the phenomenal level: “ontology 
[reveals] itself phenomenologically”114 when the possibility of potentiality is re-opened – when 
neotyny returns human experience to the primordial beginning of the anthropogenic process, or 
to the conditions of possibility of experience itself.  This would appear to occur under a number 
of conditions: when cultural habituations break down through states of emergency; when new 
permeations of human capacities (the explosion of semantic excess/surplus) break cultural 
habituations and produce a state of insurgence; or, when the potentials of human capacities are 
themselves used as the raw material of cultural habituations – that is to say, when the creative 
capacities of human subjects are put to work by the social system itself.  At these points, there is 
a re-opening of the capacity to experience and create human nature anew and, consequently, a 
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transformation of the being of the human organism and its world (i.e. a breaking or re-opening of 
the umwelt and the body-as-flesh). 
For Merleau-Ponty, the conditions of possibility of experience lie in the body’s corporeal 
being, and in its esthesiological relationship to the world.  Our embodiment and capacities for 
sense, motility and becoming inform the very conditions of possibility of experience.  This was 
the fundamental insight that informed embodiment in Phenomenology of Perception.  With the 
The Visible and the Invisible, this element remains but it is deepened via the ontological assertion 
that the world and body are made of the same flesh.  This establishes experience as a situation of 
folds and overlapping within being.  The idea of the flesh as a fold of being entails that it is 
something that can experience the world as it experiences itself – that the very corporeity of the 
flesh creates the condition of possibility for an overlapping of flesh to flesh and visible to visible 
(or invisible).  What is central to understanding this corporeity as utopian at its core is that it 
seeks to establish the variability of the fold itself: that our capacity for a form of radical praxis 
lies in our expression of our corporeity, or our ability to create and re-create our relations to the 
world – to orient the folds of being otherwise.115  While this constitutes the invariance of being, 
something we cannot escape, the being of the flesh is also embodied in contingent and 
preliminary ways, subject to particular situations: while corporeity is the always-already of 
invariance, the particular modulations of it constitute the just-now of mutation or transience.  
But, within this, it is through our corporeity and associated capacities that we can experience the 
other (as another fold of being), and through the other that we truly experience the possibility of 
utopia.  A disembodied subject can only – solipsistically – experience the other, as an object of 
constitution or a subject that challenges the self’s own claim to subjectivity by 
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objectifying/constituting it.  Without the other, this disembodied subject would be possible.  But 
the other undermines constitution as a philosophical concept, and illustrates its contradictory 
character as well as the intersubjective force of the world.  For Merleau-Ponty, the world can 
only exist when considered from the perspective of a body open to other bodies, which 
undermines the objectivity that constitution asserts.  More particularly, the other creates a hinge 
between myself and the world, and opens up the non-identity of the world and the self.  This 
brings us to the centrality of the event (and advent) of the encounter to thinking utopia, and to 
thinking the biopolitics contained in utopia.   
As I suggested in the previous chapter, on Abensour’s reading Levinas posits the 
centrality of ethics and the encounter to utopia.  Yet, what is offered there is perhaps a bit too 
simple of a formulation, or one that fails to account for the specificity of the encounter in the 
context of the specific forms of subjectification and biopolitical exploitation of sensuous 
capacities.  We should note the centrality of the encounter to Benjamin’s work as well, but we 
find here the ambiguity/ambivalence of the phenomenon.116  On the one hand, the flâneur 
entered the modern crowd in an attempt to provoke an encounter, to confront the crowd by 
walking against the grain.  And, yet, this encounter showed the suppression or elision of alterity, 
and the power of the market: the crowd itself responded in a manner that failed to acknowledge 
the provocation of the flâneur, instead betraying the deferential bowing and continuing on 
symptomatic of the mechanistic nature of voluntary experience; and, in turn, the market turned 
the experience of the flâneur into a commodity value, subject to the power of instrumental 
rationality that it levelled upon all subjects with the consecration of its power.  Here, the 
embodied capacities give way to the bodily comportment endemic to capitalist experience – that 
of the factory worker, the member of the crowd, the gambler, etc, all acting without agency, joy 
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or memory.  At the same time, the encounter with the historical other – with the past as 
something that truly transcended the present, and with the oppressed as an historical subject that 
transcended the narrative on time and memory that creates an always the same – constituted an 
advent/event that retained a transformative and symbolic value, as the debt or obligation to the 
other contained in redemption.  In accepting the “claim” that the past places on the present, there 
is the opening up of the possibility of a collective innervation – the creation of a collective 
connection, via a corporeity rooted in the embodied ethical capacities.  
 Merleau-Ponty’s thought can provide a political reading of the character of this collective 
innervation.  He never transcends ontology to the extent that Levinas demands, but the concept 
of the encounter can bring some semblance of a utopian politics to the reading I have been 
offering: it is in the potentiality of the encounter, as the activation of the originary desire that 
animates the body’s corporeal schema, that the corporeal schema might be re-opened in breaking 
the esthesiological system’s negation of the other/alterity.  While Merleau-Ponty never accepts 
the absolute transcendence of the other (for he rejects the dualism of immanence and 
transcendence), the other still evades me as something that transcends my own inner 
being/frame, and which re-opens my own possibilities with a transcendent response or 
experience in, of and to the world.  Far from being simply an epistemological relation of the 
order of I-it, this constitutes the core of an ethical insight, for this difference creates the 
possibility of an ethical relation with utopian potentials.  The encounter is still informed by the 
écart that makes the other other than myself – that assures their transcendence of me – and that 
opens up something beyond myself.  If the relation with the other is truly an alterity, I can not 
experience them as merely the same or as part of the sedimented realm of meanings/being for 
myself: “if the other person is really another, at a certain stage I must be surprised, disoriented.  
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If we are to meet not just through what we have in common but in what is different between us – 
which presupposes a transformation of myself and of the other as well – then our differences can 
no longer be opaque qualities.  They must become meaning.  In the perception of the other, this 
happens when the other organism, instead of ‘behaving’ like me, engages with the things in my 
world in a style that is at first mysterious to me but which at least seems to me a coherent style 
because it responds to certain possibilities which fringed the things in my world.”117  This 
highlights the manner in which the other opens up a world beyond my own, beyond what I could 
see or experience.  Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s non-mechanistic account of desire refuses the 
presupposition of an ethical summoning, or at the very least opens up the possibility that this 
summons may capsize through the narcissicism of the self or through a repressive 
subjectification of ethical capacities.  In the cases Benjamin invokes, we see two separate 
regimes of ambiguous perception, in which the other is always there, but is corporeally 
responded to according to different symbolic matrixes.  In the case of the flâneur, the other is 
absorbed into the order of the Same; in the case of the historical oppressed, the other breaks with 
the self’s autarchy, freeing up the semantic excess that the Same represses or belies. 
The lack or denial in the elision of the other is exactly the source of the start of an 
politico-ethical project, which lies in the search for (or experience of) an ethical subject as a 
process of intersubjectification that surprises and disorients me, subjecting my own approach to 
the world to a transformation – to a utopia beyond the existent world, with its reifying tendencies 
that close off any “otherwise."  Indeed, the exclusion of the other entails a closing off of the self 
within a self-same universe (the One of identity or the same), laden without change and subject 
to the sort of collective loneliness and eternal return Benjamin describes.  Thus, solipsism 
becomes a practical and ethical problem, rather than a merely epistemological one: the insularity 
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of being has the consequence of denying ethical capacities/necessities, in closing the self off 
from others or in turning them into little more than objects.  Consequently, the ethical 
summoning that characterizes the encounter is no longer a merely phenomenological description, 
but something to be created or produced,118 which would thus be an acknowledgement of alterity 
by the transformation of subjectivity as an opening by means of dispossession of the self.  In 
these respects, an ethical intersubjectification requires that we see beyond the other as a mere 
corporeal appearance, and see the other as a subject who re-opens the world that I took to be 
objective in a manner that demands an action that opens this world to a multiplicity of egos: “the 
perception of the other founds morality by realizing the paradox of an alter ego, of a common 
situation, by placing my perspective and my incommunicable solitude in the visual field of 
another and of all the others.”119  The ethical relation is something to be created via the 
contingent use and re-activation of our perceptual capacities according to the originary corporeal 
schema that becomes embodied in a particular umwelt – a particular umwelt that creates the 
condition of possibility of not recognizing the other as other.  If the body is a relation to an 
umwelt, the idea that the other must “become meaning” implies a transformation of this very 
relation – of the nexus of self-other-world as ingrained in the corporeal being of the body.   
The potential praxis of the human body is located “as a spontaneity which teaches me 
what I could not know in any other way except through it.”120  While my corporeity retains an 
invariance, the very essence of that invariance as indeterminacy is the condition of possibility of 
a praxis that transforms my being, and which I can only know through the process of that 
transformation.  The body retains a spontaneous capacity for action/expression that defies the 
                                                 
118
 Michael Yeo, ‘Perceiving/Reading the Other: Ethical Dimensions.’ Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics, and 
Postmodernism, ed. Thomas W. Busch and Shaun Gallagher, (Albany: SUNY Press 1992), 40-42. 
119
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception,’ The Primacy of Perception, 28. 
120
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘On the Phenomenology of Language,’ Signs, 93. 
 288 
 
historical writing that would structure and limit it.  Indeed, the determinate gap which resists the 
closure of being (or the body’s corporeal schema) emerges in those situations in which the body 
“sings” its corporeal schema anew, as a re-activation of invariance as indeterminacy/openness.  It 
is through the duality of the encounter that this spontaneity emerges: through the expression of 
my body in such a way that it brings us back to the lifeworld, and breaks with reified being in 
opening up the body’s potentialities, which exist as cause and result of the encounter with the 
other who represents the transcendence of the insular being of the constituting consciousness.  
This can occur in the first place because “the body proper is a premonition of the other person, 
the Einfühlung an echo of my incarnation, and that a flash of meaning makes them substitutable 
in the absolute presence of origins.”121  Again, this substitutability is not an identical 
interchangeability; it is of the order of belonging to the same world and corporeity as the power 
of expression.122  And, yet, this belonging still requires the individuation that would produce 
both self and others capable of a relationship that could constitute intersubjectivity, rather than 
an autarchic subjectivity or intrasubjectivity.  The premonition of the other that is my body (and 
likewise hers) already presupposes the being of another prior to the “ego” itself – or at least their 
possibility.  Indeed, the indivision of being presupposes an other as part of “the haze of an 
anonymous life” mired in the sort of transitivism that structures the confusion of self and others, 
a level at which “there is neither individuation nor numerical distinction.”  But it is out of this 
generality – as a utopian exit from anonymity and solipsist experience – that “others and my 
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body are born together from the originary ecstasy,”123 or an originating ecstasy that gives birth to 
the possibility of intersubjectivity.  It is only by disaggregating ourselves from anonymity and 
sedimentation that intersubjectivity is possible as an expression of our corporeal capacities.  In 
this context, it is the moment in which I truly experience another – when they surprise and 
disorient me – that their approach to the world attaches itself to the self, in summoning a 
different response to the world that unseats autarchic insularity.  This is the sort of “queer 
experience” that inaugurates a new expression of meaning, in which the “intentional 
transgression” of Husserl’s philosophical project becomes a political transgression or ethical 
summoning.124  Consequently, transitivity would take on a mature character as the possibility of 
an ethics based on an individuation as intertwining that retains the écart of difference.  
 Building on this line of thinking, we must assert the corporeal character of 
intersubjectification, as a process that transforms the ethical and esthesiological capacities.  If 
utopia is of the order of the ethical or the encounter, as an experience that “introduces” us to the 
other, then the encounter is the moment (or advent) of the potential for biological transformation, 
as the natural-historical diagram that re-opens our openness to the world via the experience of 
another openness.  Thus, the umwelt and the functioning of the corporeal schema can be 
transformed via the encounter as the condition of possibility of experience, and of the creation of 
the umwelt as an intersubjective symbolic institution.  Mauro Carbone describes this experience 
of the sensible as an “event-advent,” signifying the opening of a succession of actions and 
therefore possibilities: “the ‘event-advent’ of appearing functions as an aesthetic shock, which 
ignites the astonishment in our encounter with the sensible, suspends our habits and dispossesses 
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us of the ability to distinguish reciprocally between the active and the passive.”125  We need to 
connect this sentiment to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the surprise and disorientation affected by 
the advent of the encounter as originary experience (the encounter as an advent that breaks the 
mechanistic experience of the other in the crowd) and the ethical project that it produces.  While 
the experience of the encounter “threatens to fall into non-sense,” it likewise has the potential to 
“open us to another meaning.”126  It is in the latter respects, as an aesthetic shock, that we 
experience the condition of possibility of experience, its natural-historical diagram: namely, the 
ontological condition of the flesh as a deferred realization (or open totality) haunted by 
indeterminacy and the premonition of the other.  Ultimately, the habitual behaviour produced by 
the umwelt is broken by the spontaneous experience of the sensible, and the other’s summoning 
of me as an aesthetic shock (as a rupturing/caesura of the esthesiological experience habituated 
through the umwelt) requires a re-opening of the sensorial response to their very alterity.  This 
aesthetic shock is precisely what shatters the reified capacity in re-opening the affective and 
solidaristic agencies of the body via a dispossession of the self that releases or breaks the 
semantic meanings imprisoned in the esthesiological organisms’ “linguistic” interpretation of the 
world.  We thus experience a neotynic return through which our contact with others returns us to 
the conditions of possibility of experience – which includes communication, empathy and being-
for-the-other – and re-opens the human corporeal schema to new instantiations.   
Ultimately, the other opens and mirrors the determinate gap or slippage that is 
constitutive of the very indeterminacy and becoming of the body.  It is this very experience that 
opens the experience of the chiasm, a term that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Valery.  In 
Valery’s words: “Thereby a sort of simultaneous reciprocal limitation occurs.  You capture my 
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image, my appearance; I capture yours.  You are not me, since you see me and I do not see 
myself.  What I lack is this me that you see.  And what you lack is the you I see.  And no matter 
how far we advance in our mutual understanding, as much as we reflect, so much will we be 
different.”127  In this situation the chiasm operates as a collective innervation, connected to the 
very possibility of the corporeal schema as an experience of the inversion of my own corporeal 
schema in the other.  But we need to see this not as, in and of itself, the realization of a true 
essence informing the ontological condition.  Rather, it is the re-emergence of potential as the 
hollow of subjectivity.  It is in the experience of reversibility that “there is a passage from the 
‘For Itself’ to the For the Other – In reality there is neither me nor the other as positive, positive 
subjectivities.  There are two caverns, two opennesses, two stages where something will take 
place – and which both belong to the same world, to the stage of being.”128  This cavern or 
hollow (the something/etwas) merely breaks with reified being in opening up the potential for a 
positive affirmation: it is the moment in which the pairing of self and other is opened as a 
possibility – as the plurality of an association without fusion (because it is informed by the écart 
that makes the other always transcend me), and which relies on our mutual transcendence of the 
relationship of activity and passivity, which becomes the intertwining of answering the inverted 
ethical obligation that the corporeal being of each imposes on the other.  All of this lays the 
groundwork for a corporeal expression of a new ethical relation, which is founded in the 
originary capacity and shatters the reified life of the body in creating the alterity that the 
encounter with the other demands – in creating an alterity that was held captive in being’s 
sedimentation and denial of alterity.  In this sense, expression – the expression of the body’s own 
indeterminacy and capacity – is a rupture with “being” as previously constituted, and henceforth 
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the acknowledgement of “a unity exposed to contingency and tirelessly recreating itself.”129  In 
producing a new umwelt, with concomitant changes to the sensorial system and its linguistic 
translation of phenomena, this is not just another experience, but the production of a new set of 
conditions of possibility of experience: the construction of a possible bodily comportment that 
truly becomes a being-for-the-other, as the construction of connective and affective tissue for the 
possibility of collective action.  It is the creation of a capacity for a qualitatively richer 
experience of the intertwining/chiasm. 
*   *   * 
 
One of Abensour’s fundamental contributions to thinking utopia lies in his idea that the 
utopian text aims at the education of desire.  As he states, “the point is not for utopia (unlike the 
tradition that calls for the ‘moral education of humanity’) to assign ‘true’ or ‘just’ goals to desire 
but rather to educate desire, to stimulate it, to awaken it – not to assign it a goal but to open a 
path for it.”130  Thus, the utopian text aims to open up a realm of alterity – to allow people to 
imagine an “other” mode of potential being, particularly as the non-repressive we-being of an 
intersubjective space that respects, simultaneously, the alterity of the other as well as the 
temporality within which this is disclosed and, therefore, the very aleatoric nature of any we-
being.  In essence, “desire must be taught to desire, to desire better, to desire more, and above all 
to desire otherwise; it must learn to shatter the dead weight, to alleviate the weakness of 
appetence, to liberate the firebirds of desire, to give free rein to the impulse of adventure.”131  
The attempt to avoid the imposition of identity-thinking inspired doctrinal forms is why 
ambiguity retains such a central role in utopian writing: it is an ambiguity or openness that is 
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intended to carry on.132  The dialogical form thus opens a conversation about truth and freedom, 
for this form is part and parcel of the attempt to fashion a political community, and this element 
of the literary analysis is itself political: the function of the utopian text takes pride of place over 
the form or content.   
In the context of my reading of Merleau-Ponty, the idea that utopia entails the education 
of desire takes on a new meaning for it is through the other that desire is educated – educated to 
break the autarchy of the self, to feel and empathize with the oppression of the other as a debt of 
responsibility, and therefore to desire otherwise than the insularity of singular being and to 
transform the existing social space.  But this is not simply the release of the primordial 
capacities, as a pre-determined order.  It is a re-institution of them, for primoridality itself retains 
the quality of potential.  The very non-identity of the flesh – the in-between of act and potential, 
visible and invisible – represents a refusal of closure.  If utopia is about a dialectic between the 
desire for another world, and the education of that desire as an opening, then it is tied to both the 
ontological (the potentiality of the body) and ethical (as enactment, via intersubjectification, of 
that potential) place that Abensour speaks of.  Desiring otherwise is rooted in the very 
ontological movement beyond the given (the adventure of a new way of life), and it is 
simultaneously educated by the alterity of the other – educated as a for-the-other.  While this 
puts forth the biopolitical demand of understanding intersubjectivity as a political project 
attached to trasformations in the corporeal schema, we now need to move more directly into the 
question and problem of the forms of subjectification implied in this utopian political insight, as 
well as the potential models for understanding this political project/process. 
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Chapter 6 
Towards a Political Theory of Intersubjectivity:  
Anonymity, Individuation and Social Institution 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“In Merleau-Ponty being-inside the concrete reality of bodies implies an even more fundamental relation to 
alterity, being among others, in the perceptive modalities and the linguistic forms of being.  And the 
experience of alterity is always traversed by a project to construct the common.”1 
 -Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth 
 
“The political problem would be rather that of conceiving the institutions where this dynamic would find a 
place.  What institutions would permit the repetitive dynamic between the preindividual and the 
individuated?”2 
 -Paolo Virno, Interview 
 
 Intersubjectivity is often understood in the context of the philosophical problem of "other 
minds."3  In these respects, the study of intersubjectivity aims to verify or confirm the being of 
others: given that I only have first-person access to my own experiences, how can I know that the 
other is also a subject?  Merleau-Ponty often addresses intersubjectivity in these terms, using it to 
describe an epistemological dilemma and an ontological condition.  To borrow his malapropism 
of Husserl: "Transcendental subjectivity...is intersubjectivity."4  This suggests that the character 
or structure of human existence denies the autarchy of the self, for we are always-already caught 
up in concrete situations that intertwine us with others.  In Chapter 1, intersubjectivity was 
largely considered in this context, through the specific attempt to understand an ontology of the 
social.  Yet, at the same time that he refers to intersubjectivity in ontological (or 
phenomenological) terms, Merleau-Ponty also uses it in political terms.5  While this was alluded 
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to, Chapter 1 largely attempted to understand Merleau-Ponty's ontology in the context of his 
political engagements, rather than understanding intersubjectivity as a specific political theory.  
It is to this issue that I want to turn in this final chapter, building on Chapter 5's 
conceptualization of a dystopian/utopian subjectivity rooted in the intersubjective and ethical 
capacities of the body.     
 In terms of the political theory of intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty suggests that humans 
are caught up in "a natural and historical situation" from which they are, simultaneously, 
incapable of abstracting themselves from and to which they are incapable of being reduced.  
Here, the existential conditions of contingency, decision and division include the ability to act 
and transform one's situation, though only through immanent engagement with it.  Under such 
conditions, the individual is neither an isolated consciousness nor an absolute legislator; rather, 
as a "social being," the individual is a producer-product (or generic subject).  Merleau-Ponty 
interprets this common situation through Marx's proposition that the character of intersubjective 
relations are determined by "a certain way of appropriating nature in which the mode of [one's 
relationships] with others takes shape."6  This shows a concern for not merely the 
epistemological dilemma, but with the political nature of the existential bonds that unite us: 
human beings are relational, and embedded in the externalizing/externalized characteristics of 
the body as a corporeal being that is capable of sensing and suffering.  If this is all enclosed 
within a "generic" being that is the endowment of history as intersubjective process or unfolding, 
then our embedding within this generic being includes the possibility "of rupturing the given 
structures of society, and of acceding through praxis to 'the reign of liberty[.]'"7   
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 In pulling on the political threads of Merleau-Ponty's mobilization of intersubjectivity, 
this chapter aims to draw together the various insights thus far developed in order to put forth a 
political theory of intersubjectivity.  Far from merely positing that being is always-already social, 
a political theory of intersubjectivity views intersubjectivity as a particular form of political 
action – or, as the movement towards a particular mode of being-together across and through the 
alterity that is characteristic of being as such.  Thus, such a political theory draws its sustenance 
from a particular understanding of the body and its capacities/potentials – an argument that was 
developed in the previous chapter.  To further develop this account, we must think through the 
parameters of processes of subjectification as intersubjectification, as well as the phenomenal 
forms of such processes.  To do so, the chapter begins by drawing on the work of a number of 
scholars who have sought to recuperate the critical import of anonymity in Merleau-Ponty's 
work, seeing anonymity not as an abstract or neutral account of the body, but as fundamentally 
tied to indeterminacy and temporality.  Building on this, it turns to the process of individuation 
as a mode of the production of subjectivity out of this anonymous being.  Individuation not only 
lays the ground work for understanding the instituted nature of society and the individual, but 
calls for intersubjectivity as an expression of the multiplicity of being.  Next, the chapter turns to 
the problem of social institution, particularly Merleau-Ponty's account of proletarian being as a 
form of such social institution.  While his account of proletarian being ultimately describes a 
failed intersubjective project, this failure still expresses the political project that the politics of 
the flesh demands – namely the institution of a mode of subjectivity rooted in being-together in a 
manner that allows for the further expression of difference. 
I. Re-Interpreting Anonymous Being 
 Throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes reference to the 
anonymity of being (or to the "prepersonal" or "original past").  This suggests something beyond 
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or before first-person experience.  In this vein, he seemingly presents perception as an 
anonymous faculty that is not under the purview of an "I" but is a function of the anonymous 
"one" that denotes the generic character of all perceiving subjects, or that all perceiving subjects 
are anonymous in their relation to the world.  As he summarizes this position: "if I wanted to 
render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I 
perceive."8  Here, both the I and the other "are brought together in the one single world in which 
we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception."9  These sentiments have lead critics to 
suggest that, in such a conception of anonymity, Merleau-Ponty neglects the particularities of 
difference (in particular sexual and gendered differences) in his theory of embodiment, and thus 
falls back on a de facto norm rooted in a universalist (or masculine) understanding of the 
contours of the body/perception.10  Here, it is claimed that anonymity denotes "the impersonal or 
a shared generality of human existence,"11 and that Merleau-Ponty's work contains a version of 
what Dan Zahavi has referred to as the radical anonymity thesis, in which "the anonymous life is 
apparently a life with neither individuation nor numerical distinction."12  Consequently, Merleau-
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Ponty is accused of falling into solipsistic and potentially patriarchal conceptions of the body, 
thus introducing a philosophical model of domination.13   
 While sensitive to the particular concerns regarding gender and difference that animate 
this criticism, a number of scholars have defended Merleau-Ponty's work, seeing anonymity as 
rooted in indeterminacy or temporality, both of which include the openness to socio-historical 
forms that come to structure and shape the being of the body in ways that do not exhaust the 
potential for further (or resistant) forms of subjectivity.  Sylvia Stoller deconstructs a 
fundamental equivocation in criticisms of Merleau-Ponty, differentiating anonymity from 
neutrality in a way that draws to the fore the phenomenological intentions of his account of 
difference.  As she states: "anonymous does not mean that subjects face each other 'neutrally,' 
nor does it mean that their bodily identity is completely 'unknown' or even one of 'anyone and 
everyone.'"14  While anonymity may denote an originary commonality in which self and other 
are, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "two sides of one and the same phenomenon," this still allows for 
the difference which separates us and makes our experiences not susceptible to being 
"superimposed on each other."15  Ultimately, commonality does not preclude difference or 
differentiation, and existence includes the being of a plurality of persons.  Moreover, Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology is fundamentally concerned to understand the phenomenon of 
difference, its coming into being as the emergence of differentiation.  Indeed, far from starting 
from difference, Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the conditions of possibility of difference, and 
the disclosure of differentiation as a process.  Fundamentally, "anonymity" is rooted in both a 
surplus that makes possible different deployments or comportments of embodied experience 
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(including gendered ones) and in the dual non-identity of being, which Stoller calls the "double 
difference" of the relation to the other and the relation to oneself.  
 Alia Al-Saji emphasizes the indeterminacy and temporality at the roots of anonymous 
being in focusing on the notion of "a past that has never been present."  Centrally, she 
understands sensibility as characterized by an indistinct temporality, which becomes actualized 
in forms of perception as particular rhythmic attunements to the world: sensibility is the ground 
out of which perception emerges.  Thus, the body plays out the role of an individuating function 
that breaks with anonymous being, conceptualized as a form of prereflective experience.  Yet, 
the body as a function of the originary past retains its openness, even if it is already habituated 
into a particular style or rhythm of being.  As she states: "For Merleau-Ponty, bodies are 
individuated by their style or rhythm.  It is in this sense that lived bodies can be compared to 
works of art, for both are 'individuals' in Merleau-Ponty's sense."16  Essentially, the body's 
intertwining with the world includes the malleability of the very bodily rhythms that are lived.  
Through engagement with the world, and repetitions of new rhythms, the corporeal style can be 
"improvised upon" so that it recasts the "I can."  In this sense, sensory life is a virtuality that is 
not preconstituted.  Instead, it is always permeated with a surplus (as the unconscious): "The 
communion and polysemy of sensory life hence leave traces in perception, even while its 
rhythms overflow perceptual representation.  Thus, although sensory life can be described in 
terms of negativity or lack, it is clearly a lack that is felt and that makes a difference in the 
perceptual outcome...This unconsciousness points to the peculiar 'spontaneity' that belongs to 
sensory life as 'original past[.]'"17  Surplus assures the possibility of transforming the 
actualization of particular "styles" of the perceptual capacities contained in the corporeal schema, 
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"but not without breaking with historically sedimented forms."18  Thus, Al-Saji asserts that 
"perception is hence a culturally and historically specific process."19   
 Drawing on Stoller and Al-Saji, Megan M. Burke explores the idea of "anonymous 
temporality" as a surplus containing political potentials.  As she states: "For Merleau-Ponty, 
anonymity is a structure of temporality that is prior to the cogito; it is a time that actualizes the 
reflective self."20  To understand this, Burke draws on the notion of the phantom limb, explaining 
that the feeling of the lost limb is structured by the habituated experience that cannot simply be 
passed over or moved beyond because of the loss of the limb.  Essentially, the acculturation of 
experience structures the lived body of the "I" in a matter that precedes the knowing self-
presence that would presumably emerge after amputation.  Thus, the previous experience 
constitutes a different time of being that undergirds and structures (or "haunts") my present 
being.  As Burke explains: "anonymous time is the generative past of my present.  It is only a 
level beneath me in so far as they are before the cogito.  In other words, my 'I,' my present 
happens at a time after sensing, but is nevertheless continuously informed by my sensing.  It is 
not 'I' who perceives, since 'I' am a time beyond sensing, but rather 'one perceives in me.'"21  
Building on this insight, she suggests that gendered norms are "internalized and sedimented" as 
part of one's bodily norms, but at a level prior to the cogito and in a manner that makes these 
ways of being appear natural to the self-conscious "I."  Thus, this anonymous past "generates 
particular gendered cogitos....anonymity illuminates how it is that gender becomes habit; existing 
prior to reflective experience means gender is deeply embedded or sedimented into one's 'I.'"22  
Yet, such constructions retain an excess or surplus that is rooted in indeterminacy.  The very 
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shifting of gender norms – their rooting in the historical – suggests the malleability of such 
anonymous experience, and thus the conditions of possibility of its transformation.  Hence, 
"insofar as anonymous time enfolds the emergence of my 'I,' my self is at once more than just the 
'I.'"23  Consequently, gender retains a two-fold character, denoting at the same time, a 
sedimentation that leads to unreflective relations and actions, and a surplus when it breaks with 
that sedimented realm of existence via lived experiences.   
 Stoller, Al-Saji and Burke all make important contributions to the debate regarding 
Merleau-Ponty's use of anonymity.  But they draw primarily on Phenomenology of Perception, 
which has been the particular target of critics.  I want to turn to Merleau-Ponty's specific 
deployment of anonymity in the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible, which 
substantiate and add new contours to understanding anonymity, centrally the relationship 
between corporeal potentiality and acts of expression.  To begin with, Merleau-Ponty makes a 
statement that seems to confirm the radical anonymity thesis: "The I, really, is nobody, is the 
anonymous; it must be so, prior to all objectifications, denomination, in order to be the Operator, 
or the one to whom all this occurs."24  Yet, he immediately qualifies this by describing the 
anonymous as a non-identical, non-achievable or non-realizable negativity.  The anonymous or 
primary "I", which is really a "one" (un), "is the unknown to whom all is given to see or to think, 
to whom everything appeals, before whom...there is something."25  In essence, this is the abstract 
subject who stands before the world of experiential content.  But this "I" is a negativity that is 
"ungraspable" and is therefore not the thinking, speaking, experiential "I"/subject.  It is the 
subject "prior to all objectifications."  The concrete I ("the named I, the I named") is the 
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objectification or signification of this primary and primordial I.  The act of speaking, listening, 
seeing, etc, is the negation of the primary "I" that preceded objectification; and objectification 
thus becomes a leistung (performance, achievement, power), which is achieved through the 
bodily relation to the world, whose originary quality lies in its anonymous openness.   
 The openness of anonymity (its originary indeterminacy or surplus) represents the 
corporeal potential located in the body.  The objectified I, which is the subject, is the translation 
of a hollow of subjectivity: the performative translation of an originary negativity as openness, 
which becomes the particularity of the amorphous openness that is an originary potentiality.  We 
might read this through Paolo Virno's understanding of potential as faculty/capacity, which was 
alluded to in the previous chapter.  Virno argues that we cannot think potential in terms of a 
potential act, but only as a capacity/faculty.  Speech is the prime example.  The capacity for 
speech must be conceived as a different order than the potential act of speech; that is, we cannot 
think the "potential" for speech as capable of being realized in acts (nor as an ideal model).  The 
potential lies separate from the incarnations/acts, which would in fact represent the negation of 
the potential.  Potential as capacity/faculty is opposed to such a philosophy of presence in so far 
as the speech faculty – which is different than acts of speech – cannot be "present."  Likewise, 
potential as a generic faculty cannot be conceptualized in the act, with the latter denoting a 
"partial" fulfillment of the former.  Rather, there is a heterogeneity between them.26  Indeed, the 
generic qualities of capacities present a negative relationship between potential (not-now) and act 
(the now), and refusal to equate them entails the refusal to limit the possible occurrences to a 
predetermined essence.  Hence, potential "is a perpetual not-now, a lasting non-actuality."27  For 
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Virno, this is symptomatic of the radical virtuosity –  in the sense of virtuoso – that characterizes 
human praxis.   
 While we cannot include "the body" as a potential in and of itself, the body's movements 
and perceptions are forms of acts rooted (but separated from) the body's capacity as motility, 
tactility, perception and comportment.  Indeed, no singular movement can encapsulate fully the 
potential acts that the body is capable of and, for Merleau-Ponty, the body speaks a language that 
mirrors speech.  In this sense, the body becomes a performative enactment or expression of 
capacities.  As Merleau-Ponty states: "the self of perception as 'nobody,' in the sense of Ulysses, 
as the anonymous one buried in the world, and that has not yet traced its path."28  The latter 
claim suggests the performance that escapes or exits the anonymous (as un/pre-conscious or 
un/pre-reflected) and produces the subject out of "'a lake of non-being,' a certain nothingness 
sunken into a local and temporal openness."29  Tracing a path signifies a type of action, 
embodied in speech, perception and motility, which makes the acting subject "the subject of a 
praxis."  But prior to this praxis, the power to perform such acts is constituted by the 
lack/surplus/non-presence that is contained in its being as the possessor of such powers of 
performance – that is, the flesh as a potential mass for performative/expressive enactment.   
 All of this is congruent with the accounts rendered by Stoller, Al-Saji and Burke.  
Anonymity must be understood in its two-fold significance: first, as the preconscious, 
prepersonal, prereflective world of habituated being; second, and simultaneously, as a lack and 
surplus that is at the heart of being, and which represents something that is defied by anonymity 
– anonymity negating itself by its own weight.  By connecting this more particularly to a 
conception of potentiality, we can see the full complexity contained in the various meanings of 
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leistung: "power" as the potential of being contained in the hollow/negativity of the originary 
anonymity; "achievement" as the translation of this hollow into a particular form of being; 
"performance" as the praxical action which also signifies the non-coincidence or non-identity 
between that which is translated into being and the originary hollow/potential.  In this vein, 
Merleau-Ponty draws a connection between painting and being.  He suggests that the 
"'amorphous' perceptual world" is, in and of itself, devoid of a mode of expression, but that it 
calls such modes of expression forth from the painter in an effort to express the perceptual world.  
Ultimately, "this perceptual world...is more than all painting, than all speech, than every 
'attitude,' and which, apprehended by philosophy in its universality, appears as containing 
everything that will ever be said, and yet leaving us to create it."30  Ultimately, the act of creation 
comes on the back of the potentiality contained in the perceptual world.  While this world 
precedes and activates such capacities, what will be created from it is contained in leistung as a 
form of action, as a relation to the world rooted in anonymity as an overcoming or 
transformation of it. 
II. From Anonymity to Individuation 
  Re-reading Merleau-Ponty's deployment of anonymity is important to recuperating the 
political implications of his work; more particularly, understanding anonymity as rooted in 
indeterminacy, temporality and potential allows us to understand it in the context of processes of 
subjectification.  Indeed, the anonymous represents a pre-reflective mode of being, which can be 
rooted in past instances of subjectification.  Consequently, the differences contained in gender 
are not ones that Merleau-Ponty seeks to naturalize or ignore, but ones whose emergence he 
seeks to understand.  At the same time, anonymity also denotes a surplus that can 
rupture/transform habituated and sedimented modes of being, something rooted in the very non-
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identity of the self with itself and the outside.  In these respects, Stoller, Al-Saji and Burke make 
seminal contributions to extracting the political import of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and 
to extracting a critical attention to difference in his work.  Yet, they also neglect to transition this 
into a larger proposition about the political significance of intersubjectivity, and in fact neglect 
the intersubjective elements of Merleau-Ponty's thought.  Indeed, much of their discussion 
focuses on the question of identity politics and Merleau-Ponty's potential contribution to 
understanding subjectivity at the individual level.  Connecting intersubjectivity to anonymity 
would imply thinking difference from the perspective (or in the context) of a political 
subjectivity.  Moreover, it would involve a movement to new forms of subjectivity.   
 To begin thinking along these lines, we might draw a political parallel between the 
accounts of gender as habituated practices that produce anonymous experience and Benjamin's 
account of voluntary memory and isolated experience in his excavation of everyday experience 
under capitalism.  For Benjamin, the factory worker, member of the crowd and gambler all act in 
accordance with anonymous being as a prereflective (and therefore reflex-like) relation to the 
world, which defies their essential agency through processes of acculturation.  This is 
particularly pertinent to the crowd, whose anonymous indifferentiation (including its amorphous 
organization) was easily harnessed for the purpose of usurping the individual in the midst of the 
crowd's mechanical being and its corollary herd instincts.  Here, the "one" of anonymous being is 
no longer a philosophical prepersonal that is faceless or nameless, but a political anonymity that 
effaces the subjective capacities contained in embodied being.  This draws out the two-fold 
character of intersubjectivity, which is not merely a mode of collective being but the being of a 
social individual, whose collective belonging must likewise resist the effacement of individual 
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being as well.31  In thinking a political theory of intersubjectivity, we must therefore think 
intersubjectivity as a process of subjectification against the mass being that permeates certain 
forms of political being – be they fascist (the one of race), capitalist (the one of the 
market/commodification) or patriarchal (the one of the masculine universal).  Moreover, 
Benjamin theorizes the ability to break these forms of subjectivity/experience through the depth 
of the historical past in a manner congruent with Al-Saji's understanding of a past that has never 
been present – as something containing an historical excess or surplus capable of rupturing 
habituated being and its self-same, ideological self-assuredness.  In returning to Merleau-Ponty, 
we must begin thinking intersubjectivity according to or in the context of its ontological 
potentials as "flesh" in which we are made of the same stuff as "others" but that others 
ultimately/always transcend us.  The question we are left with is how to go about conceptualizing 
a political intersubjectivity that has fully imbibed the contours of the flesh – the peculiar mixture 
of unity and difference, immanence and transcendence.   
 To connect anonymity to an intersubjective political project (or process), I want to turn to 
a bridging concept.  As I suggested in Chapter 1, the social retains an indeterminacy.  Here, we 
need to take this further by acknowledging that society itself is instituted out of – or on the 
foundation of – the corporeal capacities or the characteristics of the flesh of the social.  In this 
context, Virno's account of individuation is instructive, and pertinent to thinking through 
Merleau-Ponty's work.  This account draws on the work of Gilbert Simondon, who was a student 
of Merleau-Ponty.  Individuation refers to the production of subjects as a process, which rejects 
the pre-constitution of either the individual or society.  Both “individual” and “society” are 
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products of a process of individuation and, consequently, capable of being ruptured in the service 
of opening the possibility of something new.  The fundamental problem with presupposed or 
static approaches to individuals or individuation is, in Donald Landes' words, that they see 
"becoming as an inessential aspect of ontological explanation, a mere ontic unfolding of the 
deeper truth of the preexisting principle of individuation."32  Drawing on Simondon, Virno turns 
to what "precedes" individuation, namely the pre-personal or pre-individual realm, "something 
common, universal and undifferentiated."33  This pre-personal realm is the raw material of 
subjectification/individuation or its potential: that is, the latter emerges out of particular 
deployments or comportments of the former.  Thus subjects emerge as a process of individuation 
from the one of the pre-individual/personal or the "common."  Fundamentally, the 
individual/subject lies in the hinge or intertwining of the pre-individual and the individuated, for 
the individuated is never the full enactment or “translation” of the pre-individual.  The 
individuated is a particular singularity that never exhausts the common that is represented by the 
pre-individual, and the subject "should be understood as a permanent mixture of the Common 
and the Singular."34  Thus, the subject as an individuated “I” remains a precarious being, with 
subjectification being always “reversible” and never complete.35   
But, individuation should not be understood to reduce singularity to the individual or 
individuality – nor, perhaps more nefariously, does the collective reduce individuation.  Rather, 
Virno suggests: "By participating in a collective, the subject, far from surrendering the most 
unique individual traits, has the opportunity to individuate, at least in part, the share of the pre-
individual reality which all individuals carry within themselves.  According to Simondon, within 
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the collective we endeavour to refine our singularity, to bring it to its climax."36  The ultimate 
result is the “social individual.”  This would be something tantamount to a subject that shares in 
the potential of the common, but who differentiates themselves within and via this commonality: 
“‘Social’ should be translated as pre-individual, and ‘individual’ should be seen as the ultimate 
result of the process of individuation.  Since the term ‘pre-individual’ must include sensory 
perception, language, and productive forces, we could also say that the ‘social individual’ is the 
individual who openly exhibits a unique ontogenesis, a unique development (with its own 
different layers or constituent elements).”37  In this sense, Virno advocates a particular form of 
subjectivity (the multitude) as a being-with, in which the "with" implies and demands the 
defence/maintenance of an alterity that refuses to reduce any "collective" to a singular will that 
usurps singularity.  Indeed, the "many" remain a many because they are produced out of an 
individuation that leaves behind (or exits) the universality of the pre-individual and, 
simultaneously, through their being-with further individuates their collective being from such a 
unity.  Moreover, the process of individuation is permanent and precarious.  By this, Virno 
means that we are constantly reproducing or returning to individuation in the production of new 
subjectivities.  Given the restlessness and openness of human nature, this process can never be 
complete: the nature of potentiality is something that continually haunts all forms of 
individuation, because individuation fails to exhaust the potential contained in the pre-
individual,38 and therefore returns via a neotynic regression to the origins of the process of 
individuation.  This calls for forms of politics that would not reduce this indeterminacy. 
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While Virno’s work provides a number of insightful means for reading Merleau-Ponty 
politically, before turning to this we need to note a particular shortcoming – in the context of a 
biopolitical reading of Merleau-Ponty – of Virno’s work, namely the idea that language (or, more 
particularly, speech) is the medium of the common/pre-individual that facilitates individuation.  
Virno draws a direct connection to Merleau-Ponty in elaborating his appropriation of Simondon's 
conception of individuation, isolating three particular elements of the realm of the pre-individual: 
first, the “biological basis of the species, that is the sensory organs, motor skills apparatus, 
perception abilities”; second, language or the language faculty; third, “the prevailing relations of 
production,” which are historically constituted but precede the particular individuation which 
makes use of them.  In explaining the first of these three elements, Virno states: "In this regard, 
Merleau-Ponty maintains something very interesting: ‘I am no more aware of being the true 
subject of my sensation than of my birth or my death.’  And later in his study he writes: ‘sight, 
hearing and touch, with their fields, […] are anterior, and remain alien, to my personal life.’  
Perception cannot be encapsulated by the first person singular pronoun.  It is never an individual 
'I' who hears, sees, touches; it is the whole species as such...The pre-individual nature inscribed 
in the senses is a generic biological endowment, which is not susceptible to individuation."39  By 
contrast, Virno argues that the common possession of the language faculty facilitates 
differentiation and individuation, via the singularizing use of speech: "while language belongs to 
everybody and to nobody, the passage from the pure and simple ability to say something to a 
particular and contingent utterance determines the space of an individual's notion of 'my own."40   
 It bears mentioning that Virno’s use of the prepersonal and preindividual coalesces in 
some respects with the work of Stoller, Al-Saji and Burke.  Indeed, that Simondon refers to this 
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realm as the metastable, which seeks to pinpoint what precedes individuation,41 is in line with the 
elements of indeterminacy and temporality that are central to recuperating the political efficacy 
of anonymity.  Moreover, Virno's focus on the specificity of particular relations of production as 
the markers of a prepersonal, historical realm that we are always-already subject to, operates in a 
similar vein to the understanding of gender as anonymous or preconscious in the sense that it is 
something one "does" prior to reflection as an historical endowment.  Yet, ultimately, Virno's 
account utilizes and attests to Merleau-Ponty's work a variant of the radical anonymity thesis.  
This has a number of problems.  In the first place, Virno appears to suggest that anonymity 
precedes or precludes individuation in so far as our perception or intentionality is 
undifferentiated – that it is the same for all subjects.  This moves towards the very high-altitude 
thinking (and universal exchangeability of perspectives) that Merleau-Ponty seeks to refute 
throughout his work, and ignores that, as experiential beings utilizing experiential capacities, we 
can only ever know these faculties in the context of our first-person experiences.  Even if they 
are "generic" faculties (and this seems very much debateable), we would have to recognize an 
originary differentiation between self and others.  Moreover, Virno’s disembodied turn to 
language as the sole means of individuation represents a significant and problematic (because 
dualistic) departure from the embodied approach of Merleau-Ponty – as Al-Saji's work in 
particular suggests via the notion of bodily rhythm.  Hence, we need to account for differences in 
bodily motility and spatiality in the context of the anonymity of priorly articulated subject-
positions via individuation and thus further subject to resistant forms of subjectivization. 
While Virno’s understanding of potential as faculty/capacity is useful, we need to 
significantly expand its scope, including understanding it in the context of the specific 
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“language” the body speaks via its comportment.  In this vein, Iris Marion Young’s seminal 
essay ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ suggests that the body as a mode of experience connected to 
perceptive capacities is subject to individuation as a distinction between subject positions, and 
therefore refuses the radical anonymity thesis and refuses a fundamental essence to the "I can."  
Young draws on both Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir in asserting that “every human 
existence is defined by its situation; the particular existence of the female person is no less 
defined by the historical, cultural, social, and economic limits of her situation.”42  Consequently, 
the body is inscribed within a particular regime which structures the more general contours of 
embodied experience.  Young explores the body’s “structures and conditions” within a specific 
life space, noting the differences between female and male bodily comportment.  While not 
ignoring physiological differences, she suggests that the particularity of comportment comes 
from “the way each sex uses the body in approaching tasks.”43  Indeed, Young suggests that at 
the level of lived experience the female body is used in ways that suppress its latent capacity: it 
largely retains an immanence that abridges its transcendent qualities; its intentionality is 
inhibited, which hems in its motility/“I can” and “severs the connection between aim and 
enactment”44; and it exhibits a “discontinuous unity” which severs the body from itself and its 
relation to the world.  Consequently, the female body is often reduced to the order of an object at 
the level of lived experience.  Far from being anatomical and rooted in a feminine essence or the 
result of linguistic individuation, these inhibited bodily capacities are rooted in perceptual 
modalities of women’s lived experience within a particular historical (and patriarchal) 
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situation.45  Thus particular power relations attach themselves to the body as a human sensorium 
that is neither objective nor anonymous (in the sense of non-difference).46   
To put this into the language of biopolitics, the human body as bios is constructed in a 
political way, which differentiates not only the meaning of the body, but its lived and 
experienced capacities.  Hence, we need to recognize, again, that the body as a mode of being in 
the world is subject to processes of individuation on the two-fold level outlined above: as 
inherited or prepersonal/habituated positions that come to shape how differentiated subjects act 
and experience the world (such as gendered or classed ones); and, as the capacity to individuate 
or comport the body otherwise than this anonymous/prepersonal form.  Virno’s understanding of 
potential adds to Young’s account of bodily motility the idea that the body can always be 
comported otherwise – that the historical and contingent inscription of power relations are 
particular and subject to resistance by virtue of the body’s originary indeterminacy and ethical 
capacity, both constitutive of the potential contained in the body’s “I can.”  Moreover, this 
"otherwise" is an indeterminate other, not rooted merely in the dysfunction of an objective 
capacity, but in the production of particular modes of subjectivity divorced from such 
essentialisms.47  Thus, the relation between the bio-phenomenological invariant and history 
becomes key to the comportment and expression of bodily capacities at the micropolitical level.  
In these respects, Maurizio Lazzarato provides a poignant way of thinking about subjectification, 
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suggesting that revolutionary transformation is not just a political project, but also an issue of 
forms of life/being at the level of “individual conducts.”48   
 Here, we return to the themes enunciated in the previous chapter – namely, the 
ambivalent character of desire and its connections to, simultaneously, utopia and dystopia as 
functions of the human corporeal sensorium.  As my reading of Merleau-Ponty suggested, desire 
is a bodily capacity, not something linguistically structured.  It is rooted in relations of 
affect/empathy that can be enacted in innumerable and indeterminate ways.  This roots a radical 
politics in the re-articulation of desire as an originary capacity for solidaristic being that ruptures 
and transforms modes of bodily conduct.  Extended to bodily motility as a function of desire and 
to desire as a function of bodily motility, potential as capacity/faculty opens the body up to being 
understood as the root of processes of subjectification, both as the result of biopower 
(subjectivity imposed from without, or a preconscious and sedimented subjectivity) and 
biopolitics (resistance to biopower through the bios’/body’s own being and the formation of new 
modes of subjectivity).  Here, we can maintain individuation and processes of subject formation 
as internal to the biopolitical perspective rather than seeking a transcendent leap to language that 
obfuscates bodily agency.  We might recall Uexküll's suggestion that the body-umwelt relation 
includes a symbolic translation of worldly phenomenon at a micropolitical level via the body’s 
organs as perceptive elements of our being-in-the-world – as the root of our experiential and 
lived relation to the world.  Thus, relations and values emerge – or are rooted – in the body as a 
mode of affective relation to the world, but one that retains a "linguistic" character.  But it is 
through the very "linguistic" character of the body that expression begins: the body is the root of, 
to quote Lazzarato, "gestures, bodily attitudes, movements, facial expressions, etc" all of which 
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represent particular modulations of ethical and political being.49  By inscribing this in the 
particular context of power relations, Young expands this intuition beyond a merely 
philosophical/biological assertion.  But in thinking beyond the inscription of power relations on 
the body, we need to think bodily comportment – in so far as it includes the capacity to be 
oriented otherwise – as containing the ethical and political possibility of being produced via 
intersubjectification.  This includes not merely the element of my own being or comportment of 
my body, but the manner in which this comportment is open or closed to the being of others.  
Indeed, returning to the question of a political theory of intersubjectivity, we need to consider 
intersubjectivity as a particular mode of bodily comportment – which is to say a particular 
relation to the other that is contained in our bodily relation to them. 
III. Individuation as Intersubjectification 
 The avenues opened up thus far can allow us to provide a reading of Merleau-Ponty 
through Simondon.  Simondon's influence on Merleau-Ponty (or vice versa) is not obvious: there 
are no references to Simondon in his major works, and some have suggested a certain opposition 
or antipathy between their particular philosophical approaches.  Yet, the concept of individuation 
and its pre-individual antecedent or incipit can be utilized for a politically efficacious reading of 
Merleau-Ponty, and one that is not entirely imposed from the outside.  Indeed, one scholar has 
suggested that Simondon's work involves a memorialization (as a taking up) of Merleau-Ponty's 
work.50  Establishing this connection might further politicize the idea that nature (including our 
embodiment) represents the primordiality of being, which is never exhausted in the phenomenal 
appearing of the body as the product/producer of particular institutions of the socio-historical.51  
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To further think through this, we can turn to two working notes from Merleau-Ponty's lectures on 
Nature that address Simondon's doctoral dissertation – a rare instance of Merleau-Ponty citing 
such a work, and his only references to Simondon's work specifically.  
 In the second note, Merleau-Ponty discusses Simondon's accounts of collective/organic 
regulation and individuation, while equating aspects of this to his own philosophical lexicon.  At 
the outset, Merleau-Ponty suggests the need to broaden the embryological approach of science in 
understanding regulation to include "the regulation of an organ and the regulation of an 
individual."52  This regulation implies the functional structuration of the social/collective, which 
"presupposes" individuation as a transformation of nature and history.  Nature and history are, 
thus, not self-same but subject to qualitative transformations.  Moreover, Merleau-Ponty asserts 
that what "is in common between history and nature is that they are individuations – but they are 
irreducible precisely for that reason – Historical individuation is irreducible."53  As 
individuations, history and nature are forms of institution created through processes of 
subjectification/creation, rather than being objects of scientific study – and they are lived, rather 
than observed.  Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty describes Simondon's position as "trans-
perceptive": "perception is for him on the order of the inter-individual, unable to account for the 
true collective."54  Simondon challenges the authenticity of individuality and the collective, 
instead seeing these as products of the process of individuation.  But, we need to note 
simultaneously that the history of these entities entails transindividuality as a historical culture55 
which is formed from the different articulations of the preindividual via individuation – and, 
thus, part of anonymous being.  For Merleau-Ponty, perception is a particular form or part of the 
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phenomenon of human existence.  In this context, we should think perception as a realm 
symptomatic of the common ground of humanity, constituted by humans as sensuous beings.  
Perception possesses a meta-perceptual antecedent/incipit, which is prior to the being of a subject 
as an individuated form of sensuous/perceptual capacities.  As Merleau-Ponty states, "We do not 
constantly perceive, perception is not coextensive with our lives."56  This is partially emblematic 
of the anonymity that permeates being, but it is also emblematic of institutions that stand behind 
the realm of first-person experience: anonymity includes priorly articulated subject positions that 
are habituated prior to conscious action or appropriation.  But these are themselves facilitated by 
the body's embedding within the world, which is primordial or pre-instituted, as the institution of 
institutions.  As Merleau-Ponty states: "the philosophy of brute (or perceptive) being...reveals to 
us institutions beneath the flux of Erlebnisse [experiences] and the fulgurations of the decision – 
but for it, the nexus remains the perceptive field, insofar as it contains everything: nature and 
history."57  In this context, Merleau-Ponty draws an equivalence between his understanding of 
institution and Simondon's preindividual, with the concept of individuation representing the 
translation of this metastable ground into the being of experience (or that which has become) and 
the subject which experiences it.  The complex relation Simondon attests to the interplay 
between this ground/foundation and the lived world retains the indeterminacy and potential that 
is necessary to account for the openness of new individuations, which would confirm the 
metastable character of the ground out of which these new individuations emerge.   
 The focus on foundation, and the transformative capacities that characterize the 
metastable/indeterminacy, raises the issue of the nature of historical individuation more directly.  
While Merleau-Ponty clearly acknowledges that history is the product of individuations, we must 
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turn to the meaning of historical individuation, which is the topic of the first working note.  
Merleau-Ponty notes that modern biology is infused by "the idea (Simondon p. 231) of heredity 
as prolongation of ontogenesis, of individuation, themselves understood as vital processes and 
not as phenotypal adventures – The constitution of a tradition, of a memory, of a past, of a 
history, of an order of 'choice' do not therefore indicate a creation ex nihilo."58  Far from the 
absolute freedom of the cogito, creation is constructed out of an ontogenetic process which is its 
ground.  To put this in political terms, human nature and biological being are subject to particular 
institutions, which represent the ground of biopolitical action, and this tradition or institution can 
be re-opened when the ontogenetic process returns to its origins via a neotynic return to an 
originary openness (or a re-opening of the institution or the pre-individual potential).  Of course, 
Merleau-Ponty embeds this being within a particular field that – like anonymity – is inherited 
from a historical culture.  In this context, he reframes, in the same vein as ambiguous perception, 
the very notion of the unconscious.  The unconscious is equated with ambivalence, and not with 
a truth whose appearance is simply masked by a reality that cannot be known: "by principle 
perception is imperception,"59 and this partiality/ambivalence of perception constitutes the very 
ground or field of freedom – or the surplus that is the condition of possibility of the 
transformation of the existent institution.  Consequently, Merleau-Ponty notes that the "relations 
between an individual and its unconscious are relations with the 'indestructible,' i.e., not an 
enemy of freedom, but the field of freedom."60  He describes "freedom" in opposition to abstract 
creation or negation, and instead conceives of it on the order of "modulation" and a form of 
gestation/care-taking or "inheritance."  This again points towards corporeity and its subjectified 
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comportment as a preconscious/anonymous realm that, far from negating agency or action, is the 
condition of its possibility and its ground. 
 If this offers a connection to Simondon's work, albeit in an abbreviated and cryptic form, 
the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible, and Merleau-Ponty's synopsis of his own 
work, draw out the potential connection between anonymity and individuation, and highlight the 
latter as a process of intersubjectification.  In the working notes, Merleau-Ponty links anonymity 
specifically to a potentiality for creation/expression that defies a closed identity/essence or the 
predetermination of an ideal type/norm – which, in the context of anonymity's Janus-faced 
quality, represents its surplus form.  Moreover, he distinguishes his notion of being from the 
"represented" in denying the potential of an identity or mirroring: vertical being denotes 
something that "none of the 'representations' exhaust and which all 'reach,' the wild Being."61  
Wild being (as the non-identical that undergirds all signification) is thus distinguished from "the 
In Itself"  and tied to particular "cuttings" of the folds of being.  In gesturing to the political 
implications I have been suggesting, Merleau-Ponty states: "the (predicative-cultural) truth as 
this Individual (prior to the singular and the plural) upon which the acts of significations cross 
and of which they are cuttings."62  We should first note the "anonymity" that is overcome by the 
particular significations that produce the individual as a form of singularity or plurality – which 
is to say that the anonymous denotes the "I" prior to such significations.  But Merleau-Ponty 
further suggests the being of subjects as always-already embedded within a social structure, "as 
structurations of Being (a way of thinking oneself within a society is implied in its social 
structure) and where the structurations of Beings are modes of consciousness."63  Hence, the 
social and the individual are particular institutions or articulations of social/political space, ones 
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which we are born into/inherit from a past.  Yet, this past is a "past which has never been 
present" in the two fold sense of anonymity as simultaneously unreflected life (the prior 
articulation of subjectivities) and as the past potentiality that has not yet been exhausted, for it 
retains a permanent surplus.  Hence, Merleau-Ponty states: "The meaning of being to be 
disclosed: it is a question of showing that the ontic, the 'Erlebnisse,' 'sensations,' 'judgements'...is 
in reality abstractly carved out from the ontological tissue, from the 'body of mind.'"64   
 Fundamentally, this posits a process of individuation/intersubjectification as an exit out 
of "anonymity" (here conceived as a "non-difference") that facilitates an individuated expression 
that is explicitly posited against the Sartrean irreconcilability of consciousnesses.  In approaching 
this from the perspective of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty argues that existence is permeated by a 
sameness or generality that defies both "ideality" and "real identity."  As he states: "The same in 
the structural sense: same inner framework, same Gestalthafte, the same in the sense of openness 
of another dimension of the 'same' being...there is first their underlying bond by non-
difference."65  This is what facilitates the possibility of a solidaristic being-with that is the 
essence of intersubjectivity, one which includes a mutual encroachment and "multiple chiasms" 
but does not obscure or colonize the very alterity of the other.  Indeed, modeled on the body as 
perceptive/sensuous being, such an intersubjectivity implies that "there is no coinciding of the 
seer with the visible.  But each borrows from the other, takes from or encroaches upon the other, 
intersects with the other, is in chiasm with the other."66  Encroachment denotes not the 
imposition of identity, but a mutual process of dis-identification – or the realization of the non-
identity of the body-as-flesh.  Hence, as a process, individuation implies that "the chiasm binds 
as obverse and reverse ensembles unified in advance in process of differentiation – when in sum 
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a world that is neither one nor two in the objective sense – which is pre-individual, generality."67  
This rather cryptic note draws together a number of ideas.  The reference to the pre-individual 
and generality denotes the primordial realm of the flesh as part of the common, or that which is 
shared as the innate potential or capacity of embodied beings.  It is the realm of non-difference 
that is common by virtue of its generality and its pre-individual character: our embodiment, 
including the particular capacities for perception/sensuous experience, motility and relations of 
affect rooted in desire.  And, while this denotes anonymity as the foundation of particular 
comportments of being, we must also include within this prior individuations or objectifications 
of those capacities.  The element of individuation lies in freeing or re-opening the capacity for 
non-domination located in the common and its potentialities, as an overlapping of beings in the 
process of differentiation that coincides with a mutual encroachment.  Merleau-Ponty's attempt 
to transform the "problem of the other" is in fact an attempt to open the possibility of this sort of 
relation, through recourse to a philosophy of sensuous and experiential being, a move through 
which "one acquires a wholly new idea of the 'subjectivity'[sic]."68  Thus, rather than 
understanding "freedom" as something constituted out of a conflict between rival subjects who 
gain or lose their freedom through rationalist imposition, freedom emerges as an affective quality 
within the context of a "transitivism by way of generality," which no longer opposes passivity 
and activity, but seeks to express an intersubjective space that transcends binaries and facilitates 
the capacity for further individuation.  As a foundation/institution that facilitates the 
particularities of speech, language illustrates the individuating elements of expression: it allows 
for an inauguration of meaning that is not predetermined, and it likewise allows for a multiplicity 
of expressions rooted in the same linguistic system (as generic or common).   
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 Merleau-Ponty draws out this implicit political project more explicitly in his overview of 
his intellectual itinerary, submitted as part of his candidacy to the Collège de France.  He 
concludes this work by pinpointing a shift in his own work from perception to expression: "The 
study of perception could only teach us a 'bad ambiguity,' a mixture of finitude and universality, 
of interiority and exteriority.  But there is a 'good ambiguity' in the phenomenon of expression, a 
spontaneity which accomplishes what appeared to be impossible when we observed only the 
separate elements, a spontaneity which gathers together the plurality of monads, the past and the 
present, nature and culture into a single whole.  To establish this wonder would be metaphysics 
itself and would at the same time give us the principle of an ethics."69  This passage is suggestive 
of the politics/ethics of the flesh.  If the flesh is characterized by the paradoxical character of an 
originary belonging that includes the irreducible and transcendent alterity of the other (and the 
self), then a politics or political subjectivity of the flesh necessitates a principle of the being-
multiple (as being-together), or what Merleau-Ponty refers to here as "a spontaneity which 
gathers together the plurality of monads."  Of course, the reference to monads should be read in 
the context of the utopian ethical relation (or the constellative intersubjectivity) that Benjamin's 
concept of history seeks to express.  Such a subjectivity includes the very embodied/carnal 
relation of affective solidarity as something that refuses to efface the alterity of the other, while 
signifying a return to the site of a lost potential contained in the surplus of the past that has never 
been present.  Merleau-Ponty describes such an action as part of the phenomenon of expression.  
In his lexicon, expression denotes a particular coming into being (or creative enactment) of a 
potentiality contained in an institution, but one which is not itself already expressed – and could 
not have been expressed previously.  In effect, this would be an expression (as act) based on the 
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institution (as potential or facilitator of the act), but one whose potential only emerged and 
became possible at the moment of the expression itself.  This is represented by the difference 
between language as a system of words, and language as a spoken medium that brings into being 
(or expresses) a new meaning that was not, and could not be, known before the act itself.  The 
new expression borrows from the existent linguistic system, but it is not the system for it 
transcends it as a unique singularity, as the coming into being of a new potential.  The expression 
of this monadic constellation – the bringing into being of the being-multiple as an expression of 
intersubjectivity – would be tantamount to a collective innervation rooted in the ethics of the 
flesh.  Indeed, that this appeared "impossible" prior to its spontaneous coming into being 
illustrates that this intersubjective innervation is the expression of a possibility of ethical 
relations that, while rooted in the "I can" of the body, had yet to be expressed – with its 
expression representing a transformation of human meaning and possibility.  Yet, despite being 
the establishment of "metaphysics itself," we cannot think this as the realization of an essence, 
but only as the activation of a potential that does not exhaust potential.   
 It is in this sense that we must begin thinking intersubjectivity on the order of 
intersubjectification, or intersubjectivity as a type of relation or political action to be established 
vis–à–vis  its elision: it is an outcome, not something pre-existing, even if its conditions of 
possibility lie in primordial capacities – but primordial capacities that are ambivalent.  The 
project represents something tantamount to Hardt and Negri's claim that Merleau-Ponty's thought 
was always striving towards "the common."  From a Merleau-Pontyian perspective, the common 
would be the political translation of the hinge of being that his ontology of the flesh constantly 
refers to: a source of the unity and multiplicity that a "plurality of monads" would require if they 
were not to remain at the level of a Hegelian struggle of consciousnesses, in which each "seeks 
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the death of the other."70  While such a death struggle is emblematic of a type of 
"intersubjectivity," in which I and the other seek to impose our own rationalism on each other, 
the primordial experience of childhood – devoid of the consciousness of the irreconcilability of 
perspectives on the world, or the knowledge of the private character of consciousness – teaches 
the sort of political intersubjectivity that the "common" can be rooted in.  Yet, this must be seen 
as a project/outcome that ruptures the impoverished intersubjectivity rooted in philosophies of 
consciousness.  In turning to an intersubjectivity of the body/sensible, "it is necessary to 
rediscover as the reality of the inter-human world and of history a surface of separation between 
me and the other which is also the place of our union, the unique Erfüllung of his life and my 
life."71  The flesh as a reciprocal site of introjection and projection (mutual encroachment) 
suggests the ability to overlap one another in ways that do not usurp the being of others (a la 
totalitarianism) nor reject the other as an externality or isolated monad (a la liberalism).  Rather, 
the flesh is the emblem and potential of the possibility of a realm of the common that overlaps 
and facilitates the empathetic concern for the other, which manifests in a transformation of the 
self and other – which would be the essence of intersubjectification.72  Thus, intersubjectification 
as a process or outcome (as an Erfüllung) would be rooted in the potentialities or capacities of 
the flesh.  This involves the full expression of the empathetic capacities contained in the body as 
desire, which would facilitate the production of an intersubjective space that mirrors the unity 
and difference emblematic of the flesh itself.  Moreover, this would entail the paradoxical 
production of the "social individual," which draws together the three composite parts of 
intersubjectivity as a process: the individual/separation, the social/unity, and the concrete 
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situation or institution through which these poles can be mediated without appearing as 
oppositions, and without "terminating" in that institution. 
IV. Institution-Advent-Expression 
 To adequately think through a political theory of intersubjectivity requires thinking 
through a number of political problems.  The first relates to the dynamic between the 
preindividual and the individuated, which Virno summarizes: "What institutions would permit 
the repetitive dynamic between the preindividual and the individuated?”73  Indeed, if we are to 
avoid falling into essentialist thinking, and are to affirm a creative dynamic in political 
subjectification, we cannot simply assert individuation as a political goal that realizes an inherent 
essence.  The preindividual (and its political articulations in "institution/s") must be constructed 
on the model of a common that facilitates and acknowledges the primordiality of indeterminacy 
in the creation of an alterity that allows for solidaristic relations, and allows for the continual 
exchange that maintains the alterity (and being-together) that is necessary for solidarity to be 
more than identity.  In this vein, we must also think the specificity of the event (particularly as an 
encounter in which the possibilities of human experience and their transformation re-emerge) in 
its relation to the preindividual as institution.  But the event immediately raises a dilemma that 
has marred radical democratic thought: the reduction of politics to a merely ruptural moment, 
and the consequent inattention to the relationship between spontaneity or insurgency (as an 
individuation emblematic of multiplicity) and institution (as a stable infrastructure for the 
continual existence of multiplicity).74  While spontaneity is a key function of political 
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praxis/expression, such spontaneity does not emerge out of nothing, or out of the pure will75: 
rather it emerges out of an institution or a foundation, even if this implies a break with 
sedimented being in some form.  In the context of a utopian/ethical demand, this takes on a 
political primacy, and we need to think institutions beyond the fixed and inflexible character that 
would limit future forms of subjectification and transformation.    
 Merleau-Ponty’s lecture notes from his courses Institution and Passivity provide a means 
to thinking through these problems, by re-conceptualizing the subject and its relationship to 
praxis in a way that is perhaps central to unravelling a political theory of intersubjectivity.  As 
with the flesh, Merleau-Ponty turns to the concept of institution in order to think praxis and 
subjectivity beyond the confines of the constituting consciousness so central to the 
phenomenological tradition and the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity.  To begin with, 
constitution implies an absolute presence in every instant, which in turn transforms the subject's 
own past into a "spectacular" relation, as just another object of knowledge that is self-same and 
transparent to the subject itself.  Moreover, because the act of constitution depends on the 
constituting power of consciousness, there is no reciprocal interaction (no intersubjectivity) 
between consciousness and its object: consciousness as subject is constituting and the 
object/world is constituted.  This presents two particular problems.  First, the objects do not 
overlap with the being of consciousness, throwing consciousness onto itself through their very 
interaction and producing the possibility of event or history; rather, consciousness is always pure 
presence to itself, without history or movement.  Second, there is no room for other 
consciousnesses – that is, the closed character of the world passes over to the closure of the 
world to others outside of my own constituting capacity.  As Merleau-Ponty states, "when 
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consciousness considers others, their own existence is for consciousness only its pure negation; it 
does not know that they see it, it knows merely that it is seen.  Diverse times and diverse 
temporalities are incompossible and form only a system of reciprocal exclusions."76  Indeed, the 
solipsism inherent to constituting consciousness lies in the very act of constituting, which is 
entirely dependent on the subject that constitutes, for "the constituted makes sense only for me 
and for the 'me' of this instant."77  The re-worked understanding of anonymity draws into 
question simultaneously the idea of an absolute presence of the subject to itself (by asserting a 
surplus/excess that denies presence), as well as the reduction of temporalities and time to a single 
nodal structure (anonymity is preconscious, and surplus is historical).  Moreover, the very idea of 
a political theory of intersubjectivity is intended to simultaneously assert the intersubjective 
character of power relations (as in gender and capitalist relations) as well as to assert the political 
project of a world open to diverse temporalities and new modes of subjectivity that challenge 
reified and solipsistic forms.   
 The turn to "institution" aims to break with these problems in inaugurating a new 
understanding of both the intersubjective character of our existential situation and the forms of 
political subjectivity contained in it.  The result is a unique definition of institution as a 
mediating and mediated concept that overcomes the duality of subject/object and 
passivity/activity.  As with the flesh, this is dependent upon understanding that the subject is in 
and of the world.  Indeed, the subject as instituting is enclosed within the temporal flow that 
makes up its history, rather than in the instant.  Ultimately, institution represents the fundamental 
historicity/temporality and creativity/openness of human praxis, and its intersubjective field of 
meaning/being.  As Merleau-Ponty defines it: "by institution, we were intending here those 
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events in an experience which endow the experience with durable dimensions, in relation to 
which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, will form a thinkable sequel or a 
history – or again the events which deposit a sense in me, not just as something surviving or as a 
residue, but as the call to follow, the demand of a future."78  Hence, institution refers to the 
sedimentation of experience into a coherent field of meaning that embodies the conditions of 
possibility for praxis.  As we saw in the previous chapter, this includes the "natural" or 
biopolitical institution by which the body "linguistically"/symbolically interprets – via corporeal 
organs and capacities – the umwelt.  Yet, here, Merleau-Ponty refers to a more general notion of 
institution that retains the same hallmarks: the world sediments into a system of experiential and 
symbolic meanings as a form of anonymous being.  But “institution” is not merely 
sedimentation.  Rather, this sedimentation is exactly what brings into being the means of 
transforming and giving new expression to the experiences that institution draws together: as the 
instituting-instituted, it is an opening that creates the conditions of possibility for its own 
transformation.  In this vein, Miguel Abensour describes Merleau-Ponty's understanding of 
institution as an experiential and practical matrix, possessed by an “imaginative dimension, one 
of anticipation, which in itself has the potential to engender customs, or rather attitudes and 
behaviours, consistent with the emancipation it announces.”79  
 Merleau-Ponty argues that this understanding of institution fundamentally changes the 
relation of the subject with the world, others, "doing" and time.  The subject, as in and of the 
world, is born into a relation – simply by virtue of "living" – that defies its own intentional 
designs/acts on the world; the world is there, and while the subject is not determined and retains 
freedom, this freedom is confronted by obstacles and a particular situation.  Hence, the subject is 
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instituting and instituted, with these binaries being inseparable.  The instituting-instituted 
facilitates the very possibility of event and advent, which are the particular "genius" and "genus" 
of our being in the world as a creative process irreducible to the given, but not abstractly 
conceived.  As Merleau-Ponty states, "The subject [is] that to which such orders of events can 
advent, fields of fields."80  Effectively, the instituting agency (which confronts the subject's 
already instituted being) is a field of praxis in which the field is transformed via the advent that 
carries the institution in new ways that are accessible because of the very field that the institution 
is.  It is this very instituting-instituted that moves away from "radical solitude" in positing a new 
relation to the other: the institution (as instituting-instituted) is common for both of us, and the 
very means of our communication and intersubjective relation (as our hinge).  We co-exist 
because we engage with the same world, are product-producers of it, and the product (as 
instituted) is accessible to both as part of a world that is the field of our action and experience; 
even the other's actions are accessible to me in this way because it is the same world/field that 
makes such actions intelligible.  Rooted in the "between" as a field that is not merely external to 
the subject or constituted by it, coexistence is no longer a problem "because the instituted is not 
the immediate reflection of the activity of [the subject] and can be taken up by himself or by 
others without a total re-creation being at issue.  Thus, the instituted exists between others and 
myself, between me and myself, like a hinge, the consequence and the guarantee of our 
belonging to one selfsame world."81  This rolls into the elements of "doing" or praxis as a 
"symbolic activity" constituted by the non-dualistic relationship between "doing" and "seeing" – 
between passivity and activity.  The passive is active, in the sense that the intersubjective field 
confronts me even as a "seer" and forms or informs my capacity for action.  Likewise, acting 
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takes on a passive character when it is known that my actions are also seen and therefore capable 
of being taken up, as a style of being, by others.  In these terms, action is not teleological or 
closed – it is an opening, susceptible to adaptation and innovation.  But this in turn is rooted in 
the very temporal transformation that is enacted by institution.   
 Returning to the notion of event/advent, Merleau-Ponty contends that "institution [is] 
what makes possible [a] series of events, [a] historicity: in principle event-ness."82  In the first 
place, this is because institution rejects the notion of creation ex nihilo – that is, abstract creation 
as abstract negation.  Institution denotes a determinate form of creation which emerges out of, 
and because of, the institution itself.  Merleau-Ponty likens institution to "birth" in the sense of 
an act that is the "institution of a future" and the "openness of a future."  This denotes a non-
determinate future, a future which will change the instituted, "but this very change is called for 
by its Stiftung" – that is a change inaugurated or made possible by the institution itself.83  The 
very language of stiftung is derived from Husserl, who used it "to designate first of all the 
unlimited fecundity of each present which, precisely because it is singular and passes, can never 
stop having been and thus being universally; but above all to designate that fecundity of the 
products of a culture which continue to have value after their appearance and which open a field 
of investigations in which they perpetually come to life again."84  Hence, action is caught up in 
the temporal flow of the institution itself even where it ruptures or re-makes it; in fact, it is the 
tradition opened by the institution that establishes this possibility of re-making, that makes 
possible what can be made as a re-making.  Drawing on the Husserlian inspiration that resembles 
the epicycloidic history in Benjamin's work, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the true form of 
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memorialization lies not in preserving, but in giving a new life to the past.  By virtue of this, 
there is with institution a "trans-temporality" divorced from essence and from "decline," 
"realization" or telos.  Trans-temporality is the containment within time, and the consequent 
"lateral" relationship between "nows" in which institutions of the past are taken up and given 
new forms which mutate their past forms in ways irreducible to a telos contained in the origin.  
This is the relation announced by the language of "advent" which, as opposed to an event that 
contains a singularity, announces a succession as "a beginning and a continuation which, insofar 
as it is not walled up in its singularity and finished once and for all like an event, points to a 
continuation or recommencements."85  In these respects, Merleau-Ponty argues that institution 
draws on the past as a "symbolic matrix" susceptible to new inflections or significations, which 
in turn transform the potential contained in the institution itself.  In being indefinitely open, 
institutions are subject to regression, progression and stagnation.  The past – or institutions of/in 
the past – is thus returned to as a new means of transforming the now, or re-instituting the now 
via reintegration or transformation of the past institution that was left behind.  Similar to 
Benjamin's images, Merleau-Ponty's notion of the past as symbolic matrix opens up the non-
identity of the "object" itself, as well as its action as a subject that provokes the now.  Hence, we 
cannot think of institution on the order of entelechy, for there is no particular potential to be 
realized; there is only the inauguration of a future that is not pre-determined, but which contains 
a field that limits and facilitates action.  Again, this is subject to "pre-maturation" and 
"regression," always returning to the origins ever anew because they open not an end point but a 
beginning as an openness to creation and action within a temporal flow.86 
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 While this represents a fairly general explanation of institution, Merleau-Ponty turns to a 
more directly political problem – the idea of social institution.  This raises the issues of the 
ontology of the social discussed in Chapter 1, but now as a form of institution – as a creation (a 
created-creating/instituted-instituting).  To begin with, social institution must be understood on 
the order of the symbolic and non-essentialist principles that institution implies with advent and 
expression.  Institution, as the matrix/field that forms the social, is "the symbolic apparatus of 
this intersubjectivity."87  The institution of the social creates a "pattern" and matrix of social 
being, or a structure of social interaction/exchange.  Merleau-Ponty likens this to perception, 
insofar as perception is also informed by a "sens" (both sense and direction): we have a particular 
picture of the world and its operations, which is informed by our relation – via institutions – to 
history and others that has lead to the present.  And, yet, this structure or matrix often informs 
our actions without our knowing it, as with anonymous being.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it: "The 
subjects living in a society do not necessarily know about the principle of exchange which 
governs them, any more than the speaking subject needs to go through a linguistic analysis of his 
language in order to speak...Rather than their having got it, it has, if we may put it in this way, 
'got them.'"88  While this sentiment draws from structuralist anthropology, Merleau-Ponty makes 
clear that this structure is not impermeable; rather, it is part of a system of structures ("a structure 
of structures") which is transformable and subject to individual or collective innovation.  This is 
precisely the sentiment that institution and individuation were intended to express, and the core 
of the Janus-faced quality of anonymity.  Indeed, the social is not an object outside of us, but 
something within which we live and experience as the field of our existential modalities – 
something we live in by virtue of existing, but which does not restrict us absolutely.   
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 In the latter respects, while the particular form of society might be idealized/ontologized 
in a rigidified or ideological sense, there is, for Merleau-Ponty, no "ideal" society, nor any 
entelechy or telos – no "true" society.  But there are societies that are "false" (or more false): 
"they follow the letter of institution but not its spirit, which consists of not being limited, 
prohibited, enclosed on an island of customs.  The spirit of institution consists in setting an 
unlimited historical labour underway."89  In these societies, custom takes on a de facto fixture, 
divorced from both conscious action and from the critical interrogation of the roots of society 
itself.  Hence, these societies deny the very act of institution, or ignore and deracinate its 
possibilities – both as origin-institution and as future-institution.  Consequently, they revert to a 
rationalist imposition that denies the existential condition of being.  In positing institution as 
universal, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that it is an "existential" universal caught up in the 
hyperdialectics and critical interrogation that questions or aims to answer the foundation of the 
problem of human co-existence.  These sorts of "open societies" – though not being "true" – at 
least allow themselves to be subject to history, including recuperating and taking up the 
historical origins (perhaps even the originary openness) that instituted "society" in the first 
place.90  But, perhaps more to the point, this openness to transformation is intended to be fed by 
a social motor – the drive towards the recognition of the singularity and alterity/difference of the 
beings that constitute the social itself.  According to Merleau-Ponty, "The truth [of societies] is 
not in the individuals, it is not in the sum of individuals – it is in the field of social gravitation.  
This field is capable of posing and resolving 'problems.'  It is the real seat of the dialectic."91  
This dialectic aims at the realization of an intersubjectivity, in which the social fabric allows 
subjects to confront a common situation that allows for mutual recognition and mutual 
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coexistence, in a manner that opens itself to challenges to this order itself.  This implies the 
recognition of the very historicality of the social and its institution92 – their embedding within a 
temporal flow that can only end with either the death of the other (which would end the 
existential condition of the human) or with the death of the human as human (their 
transformation into the static being of the pebble). 
V. Luxemburg and the Biopolitics of the Mass Strike 
 The notion of social institution becomes particularly (and politically) compelling when 
we acknowledge that perhaps the first instances of Merleau-Ponty's use of the concept relate to 
his writings on the proletariat.  In this context, I want to re-read Merleau-Ponty's account of 
proletarian being through the lenses of his later writings, with their greater emphasis on alterity 
and in the context of his critique of Lukács – which includes his unwillingness to accept an 
identical subject-object of history, in relativizing social institution and refusing its closure.  In 
this vein, I want to take a minor detour to help draw out the political import and lineage of this 
concept of institution, by suggesting that we should read Merleau-Ponty's understanding of 
proletarian institution in the light of Rosa Luxemburg's work on spontaneity.  Although 
Luxemburg's work has rarely, if ever,  been discussed in connection with Merleau-Ponty's, this is 
far from an idiosyncratic move.  In his eulogy for Merleau-Ponty, Sartre states: "Through friends 
and through the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, he had been converted to the idea of the 
'spontaneity of the masses,' which was close to the general movement of his particular 
movement.  When he saw 'reasons of state' smouldering behind the masses, he turned away."93  
While Sartre makes the fundamental connection between Merleau-Ponty and Luxemburg, I also 
want to challenge the idea that Merleau-Ponty "turned away" from the spontaneity of the masses.  
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This seems to repeat Sartre's own, overly simplistic, narrative – much regurgitated by 
commentators – that Merleau-Ponty turned away from politics generally, or that his increasingly 
critical engagement with Marxism is ipso facto a retreat into a moderate liberalism.  It is because 
of the suppression of spontaneity by the state/party, and therefore the reification of proletarian 
institution, that Merleau-Ponty began calling for a non-communist left in face of the historical 
trajectory of the Soviet regime.  The maintenance of the conditions of possibility of spontaneity 
(as a mode of expression of the masses) is central to retaining the non-identity of the social. 
 Luxemburg's understanding of spontaneity is directed specifically against the abstract 
version posited by what she deems the "anarchist" mentality that permeates both anarchist and 
vanguardist understandings of the mass (or general) strike.  From different perspectives, both of 
these schools posit the mass strike as a matter of the pure will – whether this will is to be 
exercised at any moment or repressed until the moment is "right."  For Luxemburg, spontaneity 
involves a "spontaneous" element, but one that is educated and transformed through its own 
emergence, and which is therefore not rooted in the "immediacy" of the act, but mediated and 
shaped by experience itself.  Thus, in analyzing the Russian Revolution of 1905, she provides 
what we might call a phenomenology of working class resistance, via the mass strike as the 
mode of becoming of the working class as revolutionary subject.  In this context, she makes two 
remarks particularly relevant to thinking through the political implications of Merleau-Ponty's 
account of institution.  First, "the mass strike, as shown to us in the Russian revolution, is not a 
crafty method discovered by subtle reasoning for the purpose of making the proletarian struggle 
more effective, but the method of motion of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the 
proletarian struggle in the revolution."  Second, "The mass strike has now become the center of 
the lively interest of the German and the international working class because it is a new form of 
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struggle, and as such is the sure symptom of a thoroughgoing internal revolution in the relations 
of the classes and in the conditions of the class struggle."94  Here, we see that the mass strike 
represented the institution of proletarian being in a two-fold sense: on the one hand, as a mode of 
the proletariat's institution of itself as subject; on the other, as the production of a new mode of 
being/acting in concert vis–à–vis  the order of capitalist exploitation.  In both senses, it 
represents an immanent transformation of social relations – an internal attempt at a 
transformation of their being and significance.  But, in this context, the mass strike should also 
be seen – at least in the context of Merleau-Ponty's thought – as an intersubjective experience, 
constituted by the dialectic of spontaneity and organization, and driven by an impulse/desire for 
solidarity.   
 For Luxemburg, the 1905 Russian mass strike illustrated the dialectical interconnection 
between spontaneity, organization and event, as the core of historical transformation.  In these 
respects, the Russian experience shattered the theorizations from German which saw the mass 
strike as occurring both from above via party/union organization, and emerging all at once as a 
singular movement.  Instead, Luxemburg saw a series of seemingly disparate phenomenon that 
came together into a mass strike through the dialectic of spontaneity and organization, with each 
spontaneous outburst or uprising in turn spurring an organizational movement that in turn further 
spurred more mass spontaneous uprisings outside the organizational movement/moment.  This 
implies the opening of the mass strike as a particular form of action, as well as its transformation 
in the process of its utilization.  As she describes this, in the context of the increasing intensity of 
its utilization in Russia: "On closer inspection, however, it can be seen that the mass strike was 
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appearing in other forms than those of the previous period."95  As the parties/unions aimed to 
grasp and direct the spontaneous emergence of mass movements, these movements further 
expanded their own force beyond the organizational efforts.  Hence, a la Merleau-Ponty's 
institution, the matrix introduced by the institution is also the means to transforming it, or taking 
it in new directions – the opening of a particular mode of being includes innovation, for it opens 
a path rather than providing an ending.  This dynamic includes the mutual conditioning of 
individual and mass strikes, with mass strikes taking up the momentum built by local ones, and 
with each expressing the strike in new forms.  Here, the dialectic is represented as a mutual 
conditioning or "reciprocal action," in which cause and effect constantly change places.  
Luxemburg saw an open, revolutionary insurrection as the logical and inevitable outcome of 
such events, but this traversed a series of "defeats" which made such actions look "premature," 
but were actually the condition of possibility of a larger transformation.96 
 The further element we need to note in the progression of the mass strike is the centrality 
of solidarity to the spontaneity of the masses.  Indeed, the mass strike is rooted in its gradual 
progression from a local phenomenon to a mass phenomenon that draws on the solidarity that the 
more minor actions inspire in the populace.  Hence, Luxemburg sees the centrality of events in 
St. Petersburg during a bloody suppression as the rallying cry of a larger phenomenon, whereby 
solidarity strikes broke out elsewhere that escaped the organizational capture of social 
democratic parties, further expressing the spontaneity of the masses.  As she states, "But this first 
general direct action reacted inwardly all the more powerfully as it for the first time awoke class 
feeling and class consciousness in millions upon millions as if by an electric shock.  And this 
awakening of class feeling expressed itself forthwith in the circumstances that the proletarian 
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mass...quite suddenly and sharply came to realize how intolerable was that social and economic 
existence which they had patiently endured for decades in the chains of capitalism.  Thereupon 
there began a spontaneous general shaking of and tugging at these chains."97  Luxemburg 
expresses a particularly anti-orthodox understanding of class consciousness here, seeing it as 
something that simultaneously emerges in the process of action and in the context of a particular 
situation, rather than merely arising from consciousness of one's position in the relations of 
production.  Moreover, this is a coming together or coming into being of the proletariat, founded 
on a form of intersubjectivity in which a response to a set of circumstances/events leads to co-
feeling and mutual action via the mass strike as a vehicle for that expression – with the "electric 
shock" grasping the masses as something tantamount to Benjamin's collective innervation.  The 
mass strike aims at a transformation of the existent institution of the social, and a reversal of the 
exploited conditions that the proletariat finds itself in.  This is far from assured, and is predicated 
upon confronting a particular economic, political and, dare I say, existential condition/situation. 
 Luxemburg's account of the mass strike as a political sublation of the binaries of 
spontaneity/organization – as well as moment/totality, institution/rupture and activity/passivity – 
mirrors Merleau-Ponty's own philosophical attempts in the concept of institution.  Here, action is 
not ex nihilo creation, but involves the immanent attempt at transforming the historical form of a 
given social institution and its attendant social relations.  Likewise, spontaneity constantly 
pushes the boundaries of the possible, in a way that defies determination and an abstract plan.  
But, perhaps more pertinently, the notion of the spontaneity of the masses as rooted in solidarity 
as an affective capacity (and not merely a matter of consciousness) can be a further way of 
thinking through Merleau-Ponty's work (bio)politically.  In this context, we need to keep in mind 
the symbolic function of the "proletariat" as a form of social institution, though this also takes us 
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beyond Luxemburg (and Lukács) in refusing the proletarian revolution as the end of institution.  
While orthodox Marxism provided an objectivist account that rooted this identity in the 
particular organization of the relations of production, even this represents a symbolic deployment 
of a mode of social institution that draws together what is already in process of being formed.  
Indeed, it was not the theory that brought into being the movement, but the theory that responded 
to the phenomenal emergence of experiences of working class resistance.  This interaction is 
representative of the very dialectic of spontaneity and organization that Luxemburg describes.  
Borrowing Merleau-Ponty's language in labelling this "symbolic" does not negate the reality of 
relations of class oppression, but it does denote the subjectivity of the "proletariat" or "working 
class" as a social institution that draws together seemingly disparate struggles that require 
something like the mass strike to draw them into a ruptural logic that is more than a series of 
disconnected local struggles.  Indeed, the intersubjectivity enacted via the mass strike is founded 
on the solidaristic claim that the multitude of groups that make up the working class are for-the-
other via their engagement with the attempt to tear down the oppressive fabric of capitalism.   
 Yet, in Luxemburg's work – as in Lukács'98 – class largely winds up being subsumed 
under a notion of consciousness or knowledge, and she certainly does not go as far as to describe 
this as a bodily act.  In the context of biopolitics, we need to think this through the contours of 
desire and solidarity as embodied modes of praxis.  In drawing on Virno’s account of natural-
historical diagrams in the previous chapter, I suggested that the encounter with the other 
constituted the event as possible transformation of the human corporeal/sensorial system – that 
is, the encounter with the other represents the potential transformation of modes of subjectivity 
and their attendant forms of perception and, we might add in the context of individuation, bodily 
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comportment.  Of course, the process of intersubjectification does not emerge from nothing.  
Rather, it emerges in the concrete context of the event (or, in Merleau-Ponty's language, advent) 
of institution.  Hence, in the context of persistent utopia in relation to the encounter as return to 
the possibility of institution, the matrix or field of intersubjectivity opens via the ethical relation 
to the other – this is the moment of alterity in which the face to face relation breaks with the 
autarchy of the self and opens the possibility of a new social institution.  The event is akin to the 
existential concept of the situation, denoting our inherence in a particular historical world but 
also representing our ability to transcend it through the contingency and decisions that 
characterize human existence.  In essence, the event/advent denotes the moment at which that 
decision or act emerges as the possible rupture with the previously constituted modes of being 
and offers an exit from the anonymity of priorly established subject positions via the introduction 
of new subjectivities that could not be known beforehand.   
 Lazzarato provides an insightful suggestion that can help us to think through Merleau-
Ponty's account of class subjectivity.  In the context of exploring the event of biopolitical action, 
Lazzarato states: “The crossing of this threshold was instantaneous and collective and produced a 
rupture, a discontinuity in ‘history’ and subjectivity.  The event does not affect the state of things 
it emerges from without first affecting the subjectivities that partake and position themselves in 
it, saying ‘no’…This instantaneous subjective change is an act of both resistance and creation, 
resistance to power and creation of possibilities whose limits are not clearly established.”99  In 
the mass strike, this emerges when workers see and feel themselves as caught up in a common 
situation with others, and therefore are willing to act in concert, in a subjectivity that no longer 
accepts the situation within which they are born and invites the action of a multitude of subjects 
that confront this common situation.  This transformation re-shapes the situation, opening 
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undetermined avenues and possibilities – new modes of subjectivity and the possibility of 
intersubjectivity as a being-together.  More to the point, Lazzarato describes the event and its 
possibilities as non-discursive: it is felt in the process of its transformation, and felt as the 
possibility of this transformation.  As undetermined, this entails the re-articulation and re-
opening of desire as an ambivalent order and as the root of subjectivity.  Lazzarato affirms the 
indeterminacy of collective and individual identities, emblematic of intersubjectification as 
individuation, though with a particularly existential inflection: “individual and collective 
subjectivities are not given; they are in the process of making and open to be made.  The event 
returns the world to us as a ‘matter of choice,’ and subjectivity as a ‘crossroad of praxis.’”100  In 
the context of the biopolitical reading of Merleau-Ponty, we can give a new tint to spontaneity, 
as denoting the peculiar mixture of a number of features.  In the first place, spontaneity is 
predicated on the creativity and openness inherent in the human-corporeal, existential condition.  
Yet, this is still built on the back of (or within) an existing framework – namely capitalism as a 
particular form of social institution, that retains moments that may allow for the rupturing and 
transformation of it.  In these respects, spontaneity denotes not an abstract expression but an 
openness/creativity within an institution that is the limitation and facilitation of 
openness/creativity.  Moreover, this spontaneity is predicated on the originary character of desire 
and its ethical potentials as the very root of solidarity as an affective capacity.  Rooting 
spontaneity in desire as a corporeal capacity signifies its embodied character – its attachment to 
the body's "I can" as an "order of instructive spontaneity.”101 
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VI. From Proletarian Intersubjectivity to Proletarian Identity 
 To the extent that Merleau-Ponty's work has been considered in the light of proletarian 
subjectivity, it has largely been in the context of Lukács' work and influence.102  Yet, we get a 
different image of proletarian subjectivity if we read Merleau-Ponty through Luxemburg's work 
on spontaneity and the mass strike, and root these in the biopolitics of the "I can."  To begin 
with, in Humanism and Terror – where he is allegedly at his most Lukácsian – Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that what is central to a humanist politics is, as he re-asserted later in his writings on 
institution, the form of social gravitation that is created.  The alleged uniqueness of proletarian 
institution – the reason why it represents "the sole authentic intersubjectivity" – lies in the fact 
that, by virtue of its situation, "it alone lives simultaneously the separation and union of 
individuals."103  We return here to the idea of the social individual contained in individuation: a 
unity within difference and difference within unity, which acknowledges the moment of 
separation and being-together – a moment of separation that is the condition of possibility of 
being-together as a non-repressive social bond that binds without permanently binding, and 
allows for further individuation.  This expresses the very essence of intersubjectivity: it is not 
simply the assertion of a plurality of subjects, but the institution of an intersubjective condition 
as something that unifies via a common situation (and the attempt to transcend that situation), 
and creates a field/institution that all can relate to and through without being reduced to it.   
 In this vein, Phenomenology of Perception offers an un-orthodox reading of working 
class (or proletarian) becoming in the 1917 Russian Revolution.  Merleau-Ponty rejects both 
idealist and objectivist conceptions of class and class consciousness, with the latter reducing 
working class identity to the fact of the relations of production (or the fact of being working 
                                                 
102
 For examples of this, see both James Miller, History and Human Existence: From Marx to Merleau-Ponty, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1979) and Smyth, Merleau-Ponty's Existential Phenomenology and the 
Realization of Philosophy. 
103
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, (Boston: Beacon Press 1969), 116-117. 
 342 
 
class), and the former reducing it to consciousness of the relations of production (or the 
consciousness of these relations).  In presenting an early notion of institution, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that class consciousness emerges from the existential modalities of a particular situation 
that transcend these deterministic elements: being "working class" entails a way of being-in-the-
world, and responding to the particular situation and conditions that confront subjects.  As he 
states: "What makes me a proletarian is not the economic system or society considered as 
systems of impersonal forces, but these institutions as I carry them within me and experience 
them; nor is it an intellectual operation devoid of motive, but my way of being in the world 
within this institutional framework."104  This acknowledges that capital/ism represents a 
particular form of the institution of the social, a particular force of social gravitation, that 
structures our actions and perceptions, even if in a particularly reified way.  But by virtue of the 
concept of institution, this is not the "end" of the social or institution.  Rather, proletarian 
institution implies carrying capitalist social institutions in a particular way, which also 
acknowledges proletarian institution as an act of transcendent expression that is not the end of 
history but immanent to the very process of social institution.105  This retains the Janus-faced 
quality of anonymity: our being in the world is structured by the prior subjectivities into which 
we are born and habituated; yet, this retains a surplus that allows us to carry these in new ways, 
and through new modes of subjectification.  The specific manner in which the working class 
"carries" these institutions implies the gamut of conditions of oppression, including the 
experiences of the indignities of wage-labour, the anonymity of market forces, and the general 
features of estrangement from the social world via individualizing and isolating processes.  
Through this, "I have acquired the habit of reckoning with a fatum, or appointed order, which I 
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do not respect, but which I have to humour."106  Yet, carrying/living in these institutions implies 
no necessary class or revolutionary consciousness, but an experiential commonality contained in 
bodily comportment ("tasks and gestures") as a response to the world and our situation.  This is 
precisely the non-deterministic element of class subjectivity contained in Merleau-Ponty's work.  
Revolution is not predetermined, even if it is possible; moreover, it is an act of expression that is 
not ordered by a telos or representation of revolution. 
 Ultimately, it is not the development of the relations of production or the event of 
capitalist crisis that bring about a new social transformation, but the change (or attempted 
change) in the conditions of life of the working class in their comportment and modes of being-
in-the-world.  This implies the individuation of new subjectivities via the surplus contained in 
the historicality of anonymity and, in this particular case, implies individuation as a form of 
intersubjectification – as a mode of re-making our relations to ourselves and others.  According 
to Merleau-Ponty, this is the result of an "existential project which merges into our way of 
patterning the world and co-existing with other people."107  This, then, presumes a new 
orientation of desire towards others in reconstituting the social institution and the relations 
contained in it.  In this vein, Merleau-Ponty describes the general strike in terms remarkably 
close to those expressed by Luxemburg, though with a greater emphasis on the intersubjective 
character of this mode of co-existence and co-feeling.  In describing the phenomenology of the 
working class – its coming into being – Merleau-Ponty focuses on three fundamentally dissimilar 
class figures: the factory worker, the peasant day-labourer and the tenant farmer.  This divorces 
proletarian being from the particularities of relations of production and identity, instead tying it 
to the common situation of capitalism and potential modes of being-together.  Proletarian or 
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working class subjectivity emerges through the intersubjective process of these subjects being 
caught up with one another in carrying social institutions anew, the condition of possibility of 
which lies in their interaction via the general strike as an ethical encounter and meeting place of 
intersubjective transformation.  This opens the possibility of a transcendence of the singular 
position of each class figure in feeling themselves as caught up in a common situation and 
subject to connected conditions that repress or defy the existence of each.  Transcendence 
emerges through the spontaneity and freedom immanent to social institution, and spontaneity and 
freedom in turn emerge in the concrete context of their expression and experience, as a form of 
giving meaning to the world.  Moreover, spontaneity emerges at a "molecular" level that 
precedes the "consciousness" or revolutionary will that is seen as necessary by what Luxemburg 
decried as the anarchist tendency.  In thinking through Lazzarato's framework, we might equate 
this molecular level with desire, as a mode of feeling.  In this context, we find a redeployment or 
re-enactment of desire in the service of re-constituting our relations to the outside/other in the 
context of the event.  This would represent a re-making of the umwelt/institution that governs 
social space and our bodily relationship to it.  In this vein, the working class emerges through 
preconscious experiences of co-existence, which can provide the basis for intersubjectivity.  Co-
existence emerges through a transcendence of an original difference – "cultural, moral, 
occupational and ideological differences"108 – in a manner that allows for a form of unity via 
solidarity and being-together.  In coming together, there is a synchronization of positions, which 
does not annul their alterity or singularity.  Synchronization as solidarity emerges when, as 
Eleanor Godway explains, "the members of each group feel the others' oppression as their 
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own."109  Merleau-Ponty saw this specifically when the Russian peasants joined the cause of the 
workers of Moscow and Petrograd.  In such situations, "class is coming into being,"110 with the 
full becoming implying a transformation of the perceptual and affective capacities of the 
working classes and their relations to one another.  As Merleau-Ponty states: "Social space 
begins to acquire a magnetic field, and a region of the exploited is seen to appear.  At every 
pressure felt from any quarter of the social horizon, the process of regrouping becomes clearly 
discernible beyond ideologies and various occupations."111  It is this felt oppression and ethical 
co-feeling that affects the need for a new mode of relation or force of social gravitation, which 
then emerges as a social project.  This would constitute the realization of a new field of force and 
thus a new perceptive and affective relation to others – a new force of social gravitation.   
 In thinking through the essence of intersubjectivity, Merleau-Ponty finds in this process a 
hyperdialectical relation between the binaries of individual and social, particular and general, 
institution and passivity.  Indeed, the very core of intersubjectivity as a political theory lies not in 
the assertion of a singular mode of subjectivity, nor in the pure plurality of a multitude of 
subjects.  Rather, as a project of co-existence and pairing, it lies in a shared generality that opens 
onto (or from) the particularity of individual manifestations of that generality.  There is an 
overlap or hinge between self and other that blurs the distinction between the for-oneself and for-
another, though without annulling the relationship between ipseity and alterity.  The generality 
that is necessary or informs the particularity of the for-oneself – the self's own constitution as 
subject – must be accessible to the other, in a manner that defies their merely being an object.  
Hence, the recognition that my individuality/particularity is accessible – as "a kind of halo of 
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generality or a kind of atmosphere of 'sociality'" – is precisely the means of my access to the 
being of the other, as well as theirs to mine.  But the reversibility of this condition/situation is the 
means through which I can become for-another.  As Merleau-Ponty states, "My life must have a 
significance which I do not constitute; there must strictly speaking be an intersubjectivity; each 
one of us must be both anonymous in the sense of absolutely individual, and anonymous in the 
sense of absolutely general.  Our being in the world, is the concrete bearer of this double 
anonymity."112  Essentially, the "I" is centered outside itself; as the flesh suggested, this is rooted 
in the very openness of the perceiving subject to the world.  But part of this lies in the fact that I 
am always-already constituted by the outside (or instituted in it).  Intersubjectivity implies a 
relationship to the outside that is prior to my being, which deprives the self of an absolute 
ipseity.  Yet, this very sociality is derived from the outward-oriented nature of the body, and 
rooted in its limited ipseity.  Anonymity denotes this double belonging: to the world that is 
priorly constituted and that I find myself already subject to/instituted in; and to the individual 
anonymity that lies in the way I carry these institutions, in the deployment of my individual 
subjectivity within this world.  Moreover, the double of this double anonymity lies in the non-
possessivity of approaches and engagements to the world, with the individual response of 
subjects (the wage-labourer, peasant or tenant farmer) being accessible to the others, as well as 
the general movement of proletarian institution being subject to individuation and innovation by 
each of these subjects.  This is not the universal interchangability of perspectives, particularly as 
contained in a third person perspective structured by the objective rules of language.  Rather, it is 
an overlapping between individuated beings, with the realm of overlapping (the "proletariat" as 
mode of institution) facilitating the further individuation and expression of their very alterity out 
of this realm of common being.  It is in the context of intersubjectivity as the advent of the 
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dialectic between individual (or individuated) and mass action, between individuality and 
generality, that historical subjectivity can emerge.  And this is the substance of proletarian being: 
it emerges not through the being of a Cartesian subject, self assured and always present to itself, 
but through the convergence and overlap of the being of a set of subjects who institute their 
plight as connected, and who re-make their means of being and co-existence in a manner that 
refuses to annul their singularity, but that allows for a generality/universality that unites them.   
 Yet, we need to remain cognizant that Merleau-Ponty described societies (or institutions 
of the social) that were closed/false, ones that could not allow for further expression or which 
could not solve the problem of co-existence as an intersubjective project.  It is through this 
contention that we should read Merleau-Ponty's account of proletarian being in the Soviet 
experience after 1917.  In a properly phenomenological approach, we cannot regress into 
abstractions, but must consider the emergence and becoming of a given phenomenon.  What 
Merleau-Ponty's changing account of the potentials of proletarian intersubjectivity suggests is the 
changing historical trajectory of it as a form of social institution.  While Humanism and Terror 
maintained a "wait-and-see" attitude, by the time of Adventures of the Dialectic – under the 
emerging truths of labour camps and the maintenance and strengthening of a repressive 
state/party apparatus that he had already discerned in the earlier work – Merleau-Ponty could no 
longer see a potential in the Soviet Union and called for the emergence of a non-communist Left 
that was anti-capitalist but not pro-Soviet.113  Much of this is a seemingly commonplace reading 
of Merleau-Ponty's work.  But reading his work through Luxemburg can help us to further 
establish the contours of intersubjectivity as a mode of institution. 
 Humanism and Terror repeats a number of features surrounding proletarian being and 
intersubjectivity that were suggested in Phenomenology of Perception.  But, I want to focus on 
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the elements of spontaneity deployed there to show how these coalesce with Adventures of the 
Dialectic in advocating intersubjectivity as a political project (modeled on, but not fully 
constituted by, proletarian being).  In Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty asserts the 
spontaneity of the masses, specifically suggesting that this spontaneity is predicated upon an 
"instinct" that defies the dictatorial power of a Hegelian bureaucratic vanguard – and presumably 
a Bolshevik variant.  On this front, he cites Lenin to the effect that the move beyond 
"syndicalist" action and towards political praxis requires organization, but does not negate the 
revolutionary role of the spontaneity/instinct of the masses in the process.114  The very reticence 
that frames the wait-and-see attitude of Humanism and Terror emerges precisely from the 
overriding subsumption of the masses' spontaneity and class instinct by the organizational role of 
the Communist Party.  Read through Luxemburg's insights, the dialectic becomes undialectical 
when spontaneity is repressed or negated in favour of the organizational pole/side.  Under these 
conditions, "communist behaviour" becomes "underwritten less and less by class spirit and 
revolutionary brotherhood, relying less and less upon the spontaneous convergence of proletarian 
movements and the truth of its own historical perspective."115  The dialectic becomes an identity 
imposed from outside with the expressed intent of occluding spontaneity and praxis from below, 
along with their non-teleological, experiential and experimental basis.  As in Sartre's account, the 
party becomes the Cartesian subject, with its needs to quell dissent and the possibility of 
difference/conflict as agonistic contention; the "other" (as well as alterity as another permeation 
of institution) becomes antithetical to the very being of the party as subject.  But this is (or, in 
Phenomenology, was) not the essence of the proletarian being for Merleau-Ponty – as institution 
or a mode of intersubjectivity.  Institutions that are not "false" (but not true) acknowledge the 
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moment and conditions of possibility of their own becoming via institution, and proletarian being 
represented this in its very intersubjectivity.   
 While Lenin and Sartre assert the necessary organizational role of the party, this misses 
that the party is not the proletariat and that the former is merely a reflection or response to the 
emerging forms of the latter.  According to Merleau-Ponty, party action (or the party's 
intervention in historical subjectivity) "would lose its meaning if it were not exercised according 
to the pattern outlined by history itself, unless the Party's activity were not the prolongation and 
fulfillment of the spontaneous existence of the proletariat."116  Here, he is not dismissing the role 
of the party or organization, but asserting the dialectical connection between mass and party, and 
the need to retain both the element of organization and spontaneity, lest the intersubjective and 
creative/open element of proletarian being/institution be reduced to an identity.  By containing 
spontaneity, the party imposes a false anonymity/subjectivity on the masses that represses the 
very surplus of being that is intended to enable the further expression, individuation and 
innovation that springs from social institution.  Moreover, it regresses into the desire for an 
allegedly originary unity that suppresses the alterity/écart that makes the social not identical with 
itself, and which is the condition of possibility of solidarity and being-together (rather than 
identity).  This is tantamount to de-historicizing the institution of proletarian being, and therefore 
de-racinating institution itself.  Spontaneity is representative of the constitutive gap (between my 
left hand touching my right hand): spontaneity and mass action represent the indeterminacy of a 
social that "represents" itself in modes of organization.  As a mode of being-in-the-world, 
proletarian being represents an institution in its two fold capacity as, (1) a being of the social that 
is non-identical with itself, and (2) a force of social gravitation, a hinge or a common in which a 
multiplicity of subjects find a common fold for modes of being-together while not eliminating 
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their singularity or their own capacity for expressing this situation in different and agonistic 
(though not incompossible) ways.  Yet, in the Soviet experience, we find a regression of 
proletarian being/institution into a proletarian identity, imposed from without and repressing the 
constitutive gap that separates the social from itself.  As a constitutive and constituting identity, 
the proletariat is no longer an intersubjective form of social institution but a positive identical 
subject-object of history – which is to say a constituting subject which colonizes all that stands in 
its way.  As Merleau-Ponty suggests in Adventures, this constitutes a regression into a Cartesian 
subjectivity and its corollary intuitive philosophy that defies time, and does so through the 
elision or erasure of the other (as an interference with the self).  This is rooted in the assertion of 
a "true, homogenous" society that is no longer intersubjective but autarchic. 
 The transition from a proletarian mode of being-in-the-world to a proletarian identity 
would seem to be the implicit, motive force of the 'Epilogue' to Adventures of the Dialectic, and 
Merleau-Ponty's account of the dialectic generally.  Indeed, the 'Epilogue' posits – in embryo – 
the hyperdialectical contention that the dialectic cannot be terminated, but must be ruthlessly 
applied to itself: it is not an abstract or a priori logic, but something that emerges within the 
specificity and particularity of experiences.  Hence, the properties or consequences of the 
dialectic "enlighten us only when one grasps them in our experience, at the junction of a subject, 
of being, and of other subjects: between those opposites, in that reciprocal action, in that 
relationship between an inside and an outside, between the elements of that constellation, in that 
becoming, which not only becomes but becomes for itself, there is room, without contradiction 
and without magic, for relationships with double meanings, for reversals, for opposite and 
inseparable truths, for sublations, for a perpetual genesis, for a plurality of levels or orders."117  
Hence, the dialectic cannot be sundered from its concrete manifestations and engagements – 
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something that Merleau-Ponty's turn to a philosophy of institution aimed to convey.  Far from 
being the result of a subject that is entirely present to itself, and existing outside of time, the 
dialectic is embedded within temporality and the existential condition of intersubjectivity – the 
world has already been instituted, but this is the condition of possibility of praxis and a future as 
the continuation of temporality and praxis.  He posits this in contradistinction to the "Kantian 
conception of an ideality of the world which is the same in everyone."118  Such an idealization 
ignores the very meetings and exchanges between subjects, the very differences that emerge and 
open onto the world.  It is this multiplicity that defies the centered presence of a subject to itself; 
the subject is always de-centered by the openness of the body to the world, and the existence of 
other bodies in the world.  This dual openness is the condition of possibility of these subjects' 
"common residence, the place of their exchange and of their reciprocal interpretation," 
something facilitated because "we are imitable and participatable through each other in this 
relationship with [the world]."119  This is the very principle of the interaction and overlap of the 
factory worker, peasant labourer and tenant farmer in the events leading up to the 1917 
revolution: their intersubjective exchange created a common mode of being, but only through 
forms of participation and imitation that neither excluded the others, nor imposed itself upon 
them.  In this context, proletarian being symbolized a being-together as being-with, and being 
caught up in a common struggle, that did not reduce or eliminate the singularity of each being. 
 In turning to Merleau-Ponty's account of the "adventures" of the dialectic in the work of 
Lukács and Sartre, we return to a number of ideas elaborated in Chapter 1.  Lukács' account of 
the proletariat ends dialectical development through the identity established in revolutionary 
society.  This stunts the process of institution through the closure (or disclosure and discovery) of 
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absolute meaning – a problematic resuscitation of universal history.  Sartre's account posits the 
more nefarious attributes of proletarian identity, positing the party as Cartesian subject in a 
manner that annihilates time, alterity and institution.  The problem here lies not in the dialectical 
experience of the proletariat (particularly prior to 1917), but with the attempt to turn the 
proletariat into the dialectic.  This is the illusion of identity, in its two fold significance as the "I" 
of a particular being, and as the I=I of that being.  When this "I" finds its historical vehicle in the 
being of the party – or when the party asserts its monopoly of the definition of this "I" that is 
proletarian identity – there is a regression into the Hegelian bureaucratic state apparatus120 of 
which spontaneity was supposed to be the dialectical opposite.  Consequently, the plurality of 
subjects – the various monads – that found a uniting force via the situation and institution of a 
particular mode of being-together is repressed by the overarching identity that is imposed from 
the outside.  As Merleau-Ponty states of Sartre's work: "there is a plurality of subjects but no 
intersubjectivity," for these subjects "are not joined in action, in the relative and the probable, but 
only in principles and on condition that the other stick rigorously to them, that he does credit to 
his name and to the absolute negation that it promises.  The world and history are no longer a 
system with several points of entry but a sheaf of irreconcilable perspectives which never coexist 
and which are held together only by the hopeless heroism of the I"121   
 Essentially, this model turns the proletariat into the dialectic, rather than seeing 
dialectical movements – with their attendant tensions and reversals – in its becoming, and seeing 
this becoming as another form of social institution.  As the dialectic, as an identity, and 
consequently as the absolute subject that realizes history by realizing itself, the proletariat 
becomes the representative of a "true, homogenous society" that is prepared not by its own 
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movement, but the philosophical consciousness that represents it via the party and its 
organizational movement.  By virtue of the necessity of realizing itself through the heroism of 
this I, the institution of proletarian being – both as social institution and the institutions of its 
social being – erases the tensions that dialectical development was supposed to entail, denying 
dispute and disagreement, because the totality of historical meaning is imputed to be contained in 
its emergence and becoming via party organization.  Far from being the suppression of class 
power – by virtue of its realization being its own negation – the concept of proletarian identity, 
as carrier of "true democracy," "is a dream of an 'end of politics' out of which one wants to make 
a politics."122  In asserting the necessity of class politics from the perspective of a non-
communist left, Merleau-Ponty refuses the game that presumes one mode of class power can 
erase class power tout court; the moment a class takes possession of the political artifice, it 
negates its own revolutionary intention, either immediately or by indefinitely delaying its 
dissolution of state power.  This is why Merleau-Ponty asserts the centrality of the moment 
between the transfer of power from one class to another: "The essence of revolution is to be 
found in that instant in which the fallen class no longer rules and the rising class does not yet 
rule."123  This moment is not necessarily the dissolution of class as a category, so much as the 
dissolution of class power.  Indeed, whether Merleau-Ponty goes this far or not, it is in the 
moment that precedes the transfer of power that the true intersubjectivity of the proletarian mode 
of being – the moments exemplified by the general strike as an institution of class being-together 
– emerges in its purest form.  This is precisely the moment at which the constitutive gap takes on 
a pre-eminent form, and Merleau-Ponty appears to be suggesting that this constitutes the genuine 
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moment of a politics of intersubjectivity – the moment the flesh realizes its essence as 
indeterminacy. 
 In light of this indeterminacy, institution takes on a paradoxical character as the fixed-
not-fixed or a pairing that is never a binding.  Indeed, "institution" for Merleau-Ponty denotes 
something other than its traditional deployments: it is a social matrix, a field of action/force 
rather than being an actual body as in the case of the party.  What holds us together is not an 
external force, but simultaneously a mode of co-feeling and a sensuous/perceptual outlook on the 
world.  Moreover, even thinking it through the traditional spirit if not the word, institution is – as 
Abensour so adeptly grasps – not so much a mode of stasis as the conditions of possibility of 
action and innovation.124  Within institution, the dialectic between spontaneity and organization 
places a primacy on spontaneity as the creator or root of the very institutional infrastructure, with 
the condition that the latter can transform into a blockage of the former when it becomes 
externalized or ontologizes a particular moment of the spontaneity of the masses.  The moment 
of spontaneity conditions and is conditioned by the "institution," but retains a primacy that 
includes the ability to subvert or transform any stasis, or any transubstantiation of institution 
(verb/action) into an "institution" (noun/body).  But if the question becomes – pace Sartre – 
whether something like the party is necessary for the creation of the identity/unity that institution 
denotes, whether the fused group requires the party to hold it together, then, returning to the 
themes elaborated at the beginning of the chapter, it must be noted that we cannot assume the 
fact of the individual as the originary moment of subjectivity.  Anonymity and individuation (in 
connection with institution) deny this individualism as the ontological starting point.  As a social 
product, the individual cannot be presupposed as the basic unit (nor can society/the social).  
Rather, subjectivities are the outcome of individuation/subjectification.  But, perhaps more to the 
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point, the necessity of the external unifying body is defied by the rejection of imposing an 
identity that would obfuscate the very intersubjectivity that institution is supposed to constitute – 
an overlap in which ipseity and alterity are not opposed, but become the condition of possibility 
of a being-together as multiplicity that should not be fused into an indissolvable unity.  
*   *   * 
 
 While anonymity has been a favoured target of critics, recent scholars have sought to 
recuperate its analytical and political import.  Their insights dovetail with the themes around the 
ambivalence of the body explored in the previous chapter, and see in anonymity a way of 
theorizing subjectivity, both as an inherited mode of embodied being and as always containing a 
surplus that can rupture its sedimented forms in producing new ways of being and being-
together.  What I have sought to draw out of this, or where I have sought to redirect this 
sentiment, is towards the process of intersubjectification.  While intersubjectivity is often posited 
as an epistemological problem, Merleau-Ponty also conceives of it as a political problem and 
project.  Intersubjectivity as a political project then comes to express the very politics latent in 
his ontology of the flesh – though, through the path we have taken with Benjamin, one that 
complicates and heightens the political import of the flesh.  Indeed, the types of experiences 
Benjamin describes require a form of intersubjectification to shed the dead weight of anonymity-
as-subjectivity via the surplus that historical being contains.  In this context, the expression of 
intersubjectivity is characterized by: 1) the preliminary character of any institution of the social, 
which retains the non-identity emblematic of the constitutive gap that separates the self from 
itself and others; 2) the mutual intertwining which allows for the projection/introjection 
relationship to take place, without reducing the other to the self or imposing the latter on the 
former; 3) the common hinge that facilitates this intertwining and that is the principle of a 
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common or unity, but one that facilitates individuation as a recurrent form of action/creation; 4) 
the reconstitution of desire on the level of a for-the-other rooted in the for-the-self, as well as in 
the abstract generality that modes of action create.  While proletarian being began by expressing 
this form of intersubjectivity in its formative period, under the weight of the political tendencies 
in the Soviet experience, this regressed into a closed social institution (an identity) that was no 
longer intersubjective.  Hence, Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity appears to end in a 
lament or despair for the tragedy of its failure. 
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Conclusion 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 We have come full circle with respects to intersubjectivity.  At the beginning of this 
dissertation, I considered it from the perspective of the intersubjective flesh of the social, from an 
ontological foundation.  Yet, with Benjamin's interventions, we see it as needing to be inflected 
historically, and not merely as a historical being, but in the particularlity of this historical being: 
as a lived reality.  This involved the conceptualization of the historical as a monad, under which 
the present needs to be understood in its specificity, divorced from progress and linearity.  The 
lived reality of the present moment is the reality of capitalist experience.  Here, Benjamin found 
the deadening of sensuous and perceptual capacities, which led to the elision of intersubjectivity 
and our experience of the other under the stultifying weight of reification.  At the same time, the 
depth of history – its ontological and ethical surplus – constituted a means of transcending this: 
the experience of history was structured by a utopian relationship, which held out the possibility 
of shattering this mode of being.  These insights from Benjamin allow us to apply new contours 
to the flesh, and to complicate the ontological account of it.  Indeed, experience and 
intersubjectivity as embodied in the body constitute a complex dialectic that needs to be 
considered in its concrete becoming, as well as in the context of the general lifeworld of the body 
and its structure or corporeal schema.  Here, the body becomes a historical being, but one whose 
very openness to the world and history includes the ambiguity of a primordial sociality that can 
become enacted in the form of domination or solidarity.  With this complication added, 
intersubjectivity takes on the shape of a political project that must be enacted against its elision.  
In considering it in these terms, the ontological contours find a further expression, as we saw 
with the concept of anonymity, which posits the two-fold character of the body as subject: its 
containment within a habituated field of already instituted subject positions, and the surplus 
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(historical and temporal) that facilitates the possibility of shattering these positions in opening 
new modes of subjectivity, as individuations.  In a sense, this leaves us to consider the 
phenomenology of intersubjectivity – its coming into being, particularly through the emergence 
of the proletariat as a mode of social institution. 
 In the end, Merleau-Ponty's and Benjamin's accounts of intersubjectivity and experience, 
politics and utopia, end in disappointment: Benjamin's, with the Nazi-Soviet pact and the 
regression of the left into a reformist politics founded in an ideology of progress; Merleau-
Ponty's, with the failures of the Soviet Union and the regression of proletarian politics into the 
very rationalism it was supposed to oppose.  Yet, disappointment is not the final word.  Merleau-
Ponty's disappointment produces a dual lament: a lament for the failures of the proletariat to 
enact a genuine intersubjectivity, amidst its regression into a problematic identitarian politics; 
and a lament at the failure to think politics beyond the simplistic binaries of liberal-capitalism 
and Soviet-communism.  This encourages us not to reject intersubjectivity, but to re-think it; and 
not to regress into binary thinking (particulary the binary thinking of a bygone era), but to try and 
think through these binaries in finding a different form of politics.  Benjamin's work ends with a 
warning and a plea: a warning against modernity's continual crises and occlusions, and against 
the violence of historical amnesia and experiential anaesthetics; and a plea to recuperate (or 
return to the origins of) the lost energies of the oppressed, lest our forgetting of them contribute 
to our oppression and our stranding in a world that fundamentally denies or elides the other in its 
two-fold significance, as the ethical other and the possibility of something other than the given.   
 While all of this retains a pessimistic tone, this pessimism – and failure, more generally – 
is part of the economy of the utopian.  Utopia's persistence denies finality, and its failure merely  
signifies its always present striving for something that can never fully be achieved.  As Abensour 
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states: "Despite all its failures, disavowals, and defeats, this impulse is reborn in history, 
reappears, makes itself felt in the blackest catastrophe, resists as if catastrophe itself called forth 
new summations."1  We thus need to embrace failure as the condition of possibility of utopia.  
This entails accepting that the failure of utopia is also the very condition of possibilty of its 
continual re-emergence – the failure denoting the necessity of utopia in challenging the reigning 
order, but also signifying that utopia can only be thought through the dual dialectic of 
emancipation and domination, of fullfillment and defeat.  Both require that we retain the 
ambiguity at the center of desire, its potential political fullfillment as domination or freedom – or 
as domination and freedom.  Indeed, the lack of an "object" makes desire (as the root of 
subjectivity) the very source of the experience and experiment of re-shaping the social order.  
And the education of desire implies not merely inspiring it towards this transformation, but 
educating it in the process of defeat, and educating it by keeping the lessons of these failures 
alive.  Benjamin's invocation of redemption and rememberance points to this: “The eternal lamp 
is an image of genuine historical existence.  It cites what has been – the flame that once was 
kindled – in perpetuum, giving it ever new sustenance.”2  This represents the attempt not to 
return to the past, but to retain and redeem the past by remembering the lessons of failure. 
 So, what lessons can be learned from the failures that animate the work of Merleau-Ponty 
and Benjamin, from the adventures of intersubjectivity and experience, politics and utopia?  Or 
what new avenues for politics can they inspire?  In the first place, intersubjectivity denotes a 
particular mode of being-together, a mode of being in the world.  While a particular movement 
and subjectification may take this as the result of its action or coming into being, we cannot 
replace this being-together with the identity of a given subject.  This is the regression into an 
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autarchic identity thinking that is the antithesis of intersubjectivity.  Intersubjectivity 
acknowledges the écart that separates the self from others, and which is the condition of 
possiblity of being-together, as opposed to the identity that merely implies a subsumption of the 
other to the order of the same.  Here, the political theory of intersubjectivity demands a mode of 
being-together – through social institution – that can act as a hinge, or in-between, whereby we 
participate in the very being of others, while not occluding their difference; moreover, this hinge 
must supply a means to further institution or further expression of the singularity of subjects, as 
well as new forms of their being-together.  The fundamental dilemma that attaches itself to such 
a project lies in the inability to predict the "future" forms this it might take.   
 While I have not labelled it as such in the course of development, we might view the 
perspective of this dissertation as a phenomenology of subjectivity, or a political 
phenomenology.  This differs from a historiographical or sociological approach: rather than 
providing a chronological, causal or scientific analysis of phenomena, a political phenomenology 
draws together the appearance of a number of seemingly disparate phenomena in order to 
provide a political reading of these events.3  A political phenomenology relates these events 
through the sort of montage and constellative approach – with its anti-linear understanding of 
origin – deployed by Benjamin, seeing in these phenomena not a development, but the continual 
and discontinuous emergence of new institutions and modes of appearance of subjectivity.  We 
find here an expansive and heterodox use of "the political" that challenges the reigning common 
sense understandings in accordance with the very challenges presented by the subject matter 
itself, including how emergent modes of subjectivity re-make and create institutions, in 
challenging old forms.  What Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin offered is largely an account of 
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embodiment and intersubjectivity in the particular context of an older vision of Marxism, that 
they largely aimed to challenge.  In providing their own political phenomenology, they offered a 
means to think through, simultaneously, the manner in which the subjectivity of the oppressed 
classes sought to rupture reigning orthodoxies, and how these subjectivities could transform their 
official embodiments in the doxa of classical Marxisms.  But a political phenomenology must be 
tied to Merleau-Ponty's hyperdialectical phenomenology, which acknowledges its own partiality 
and temporality and thus must accede to new forms of analysis, in applying its methods to itself.  
This is the quintessence of persistent utopia's self-critical stance, implying that each utopian 
failure is the condition of possibility of another utopia's development.  What we are left to 
ponder is how new instantiations of the chiasm between embodiment and intersubjectivity, 
experience and utopia, can open up new political avenues and new political possibilities. 
 362 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abensour, Miguel.  ‘An-archy Between Metapolitics and Politics.’  Parallax.  Vol. 8.  No. 3.  
December 2010. 
 
---------  De la compacité. Architecture et régimes totalitaires.  Paris: Sens & Tonka, 1997.   
 
---------  Democracy Against the State: Marx and the Machiavellian Moment.  Trans. Max 
Blechman and Martin Breaugh.  Cambridge: Polity Press 2011.   
 
---------  ‘Persistent Utopia.’  Constellations.  Vol. 15.  No. 3.  2008.  
 
---------  ‘Philosophie politique critique et émancipation.’  Politique et Sociétés.  Vol. 22.  No. 3.  
2003. 
 
---------  ‘To Think Utopia Otherwise.’  Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal.  Vol. 20/21.  No. 
2/1.  1998. 
 
---------  L'Utopie de Thomas More à Walter Benjamin.  Paris: Sens & Tonka 2000. 
 
Adorno, Theodor.  Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.  New York: Columbia 
University Press 1998. 
 
---------  History and Freedom.  Malden: Polity Press 2009. 
 
---------  ‘The Idea of Natural History.’  Things Beyond Resemblance: on Theodor W. Adorno.  
New York: Columbia University Press 2006. 
 
---------  The Jargon of Authenticity.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973. 
 
---------  Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life.  New York: Verso 2005. 
 
---------  Negative Dialectics.  New York: Continuum 2000.   
 
---------  Prisms.  Cambridge: MIT Press 1982. 
 
Aesthetics and Politics.  New York: Verso Books 2002. 
 
Al-Saji, Alia.  '"A Past which has Never Been Present,'": Bergsonian Dimensions in Merleau-
Ponty's Theory of the Prepersonal.'  Research in Phenomenology.  Vol. 38.  No. 1.  2008. 
 
Althusser, Louis.  The Future Lasts Forever.  New York: The New Press 1998. 
 
Arato, Andrew and Eike Gebhardt (editors).  The Essential Frankfurt School.  New York: 
Continuum 2002. 
 
 363 
 
Arnason, Johann P.  ‘Merleau-Ponty and Max Weber: An Unfinished Dialogue.’  Thesis Eleven.  
No. 36.  1993. 
 
Aron, Raymond.  Marxism and the Existentialists.  New York: Harper & Row Publishers 1969. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail.  The Dialogic Imagination.  Austin: University of Texas Press 1981. 
 
Barbaras, Renaud.  The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology.  Trans. Ted 
Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004. 
 
---------  Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception.  Redwood City: 
Stanford University Press 2005. 
 
Baudelaire, Charles.  The Flowers of Evil.  Trans. James McGowan.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2008. 
 
---------  Paris Spleen.  London: Oneworld Classics 2010. 
 
Beiner, Ronald.  ‘Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy of History.’  Political Theory.  Vol. 12.  No. 3.  
August 1984. 
 
Benjamin, Walter.  The Arcades Project.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 1999. 
 
---------  The Origin of German Tragic Drama.  London: Verso 1999. 
 
---------  Selected Writings.  Volume 1.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 1996. 
 
---------  Selected Writings.  Volume 2, Part 1.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2005. 
 
---------  Selected Writings.  Volume 2, Part 2.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2005. 
 
---------  Selected Writings.  Voume 3.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2002. 
 
---------  Selected Writings.  Volume 4.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2003. 
 
Berardi, Franco.  The Soul at Work: from Alienation to Autonomy.  Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 
2009. 
 
Bernasconi, Robert.  'One-Way Traffic: The Ontology of Decolonization and its Ethics.'  
Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.) Galen A. Johnson and Michael B.  Smith.  
Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1990. 
 
Bernstein, J.M.  Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2001. 
 
 364 
 
Bigwood, Carol.  ‘Renaturalizing the Body (with the Help of Merleau-Ponty).’  Hypatia.  No. 6.  
No. 3.  Fall 1991. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt.  Brecht on Art and Politics.  Ed. Tom Kuhn and Steve Giles.  London: Eyre 
Metheun Limited 2003. 
 
---------  Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic.  Ed. John Willet.  London: Eyre 
Metheun Limited 1977. 
 
---------  The Messingkauf Dialogues.  London: Eyre Metheun Limited 1978.  
 
Buber, Martin.  Paths in Utopia.  Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1996. 
 
Buck-Morss, Susan.  ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered.’  October.  Vol. 62.  Autumn 1992. 
 
---------  The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project.  Cambridge: MIT 
Press 1991. 
 
---------  The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
Institute.  New York: Macmillan Free Press 1977. 
 
Burke, Megan M.  'Anonymous Temporality and Gender: Rereading Merleau-Ponty.'  
philoSOPHIA.  Vol. 3.  No. 2. Summer 2013. 
 
Butler, Judith.  'Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.'  The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern 
French Philosophy.  Ed. Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young.  Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press 1981. 
 
Carbone, Mauro.  The Thinking of the Sensible: Merleau-Ponty’s A-Philosophy.  Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press 2004. 
 
Carman, Taylor.  Merleau-Ponty.  New York: Routledge 2008. 
 
Carman, Taylor and Hansen, Mark B. N. (ed.).  The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005). 
 
Camus, Albert.  The Outsider.  Trans. Joseph Laredo.  London: Penguin Books 2000. 
 
Chodorow, Nancy.  Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory.  New Haven: Yale University Press 
1991. 
 
Ciaramelli, Fabio.  ‘Friendship and Desire.’  Free Association.  8.  2001. 
 
 365 
 
Cohen, Margaret.  Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist 
Revolution.  Berkeley: University of California Press 1993. 
 
Connolly, William.  ‘A critique of pure politics.’  Philosophy and Social Criticism.  Vol. 23.  No. 
5.  1997. 
 
Coole, Diana.  Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics After Anti-Humanism.  Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers 2007. 
 
---------  Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and Dialectics from Kant to Poststructuralism.  
London: Routledge 2000. 
 
---------  ‘Philosophy as Political Engagement: Revisiting Merleau-Ponty and Reopening the 
Communist Question.’  Contemporary Political Theory.  2.  2003. 
 
---------  ‘Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment and Agentic 
Capacities.’  Political Studies.  Vol. 53.  2005. 
 
Cooper, Barry.  Merleau-Ponty and Marxism: From Terror to Reform.  Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 1979.  
 
Critchley, Simon.  Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary 
French Thought.  London: Verso 1999. 
 
---------  ‘Five Problems in Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them.’  
Radicalizing Levinas.  ed. Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco.  Albany: SUNY Press 2010. 
 
---------  Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance.  New York: Verso 
2007. 
 
Crossley, Nick.  ‘Body-Subject/Body-Power: Agency, Inscription and Control in Foucault and 
Merleau-Ponty.’  Body & Society.  Vol. 2.  No. 2.  1996. 
 
Dallmayr, Fred.  ‘Phenomenology and Critical Theory: Adorno.’  Cultural Hermeneutics. No. 3.  
1976.  
 
Deranty, Jean-Philippe. ‘Witnessing the Inhuman: Agamben or Merleau-Ponty.’  South Atlantic 
Quarterly.  Vol. 107.  No. 1.  Winter 2008. 
 
Dillon, M.C.  'Écart: Reply to Lefort's "Flesh and Otherness."'  Ontology and Alterity in 
Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.) Galen A. Johnson and Michael B.  Smith.  Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press 1990. 
 
---------  Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (2nd Edition).  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
1997. 
 
 366 
 
---------  The Ontology of Becoming and the Ethics of Particularlity.  Athens: Ohio University 
Press 2012. 
 
---------  ‘Preface: Merleau-Ponty and Postmodernity.’  Merleau-Ponty Vivant.  Ed. M.C. Dillon.  
Albany: State University of New York 1991. 
 
Eagleton, Terry.  Walter Benjamin: or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism.  London: Verso 2009. 
 
Eddon, Raluca.  ‘Arendt, Scholem, Benjamin: Between Revolution and Messianism.’  European 
Journal of Political Theory.  Vol. 5.  No. 3.  2006. 
 
Epstein, Barbara.  Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 
1970s and 1980s.  Berkeley: University of California Press 1991. 
 
Esposito, Roberto.  Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy.  Trans. Timothy Campbell.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press 2008. 
 
---------  ‘Interview [with Timothy Campbell].’  Diacritics.  Vol. 36.  No. 2.  Summer 2006. 
 
---------  ‘Politics and Human Nature.’  Angelaki.  Vol. 16.  No. 3.  2011. 
 
Farr, Arnold L.  Critical Theory and Democratic Vision: Herbert Marcuse and Recent 
Liberation Philosophies.  Lanham: Lexington Books 2009. 
 
Ferris, David S. (Ed.).  The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2004. 
 
Flynn, Bernard.  The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political.  Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press 2005. 
 
Fracchia, Joseph.  ‘The Capitalist Labour-Process and the Body in Pain: The Corporeal Depths 
of Marx’s Concept of Immiseration.’ Historical Materialism.  No. 16.  2008. 
 
Freud, Sigmund.  Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  London: W.W. Norton 1961. 
 
---------  Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis.  London: W.W. Norton 1909. 
 
Fritsch, Matthias.  The Promise of Memory: History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin and 
Derrida.  Albany: SUNY Press 2005. 
 
Gardiner, Michael E.  Weak Messianism: Essays in Everyday Utopianism.  Oxford: Peter Lang 
Publishers 2013. 
 
Ginzberg, Carlo.  The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller.  
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1980.   
 
 367 
 
Godway, Eleanor.  'Toward a Phenomenology of Politics: Expression and Praxis.'  Merleau-
Ponty, Hermeneutics and Postmodernism.  (ed.) Thomas W. Bosch and Shaun Gallagher.  
Albany: SUNY Press 1992. 
 
Gould, Stephen Jay.  The Structure of Evolutionary Theory.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2002. 
 
Grosz, Elizabeth.  Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1994. 
 
Gunster, Shane.  Capitalizing on Culture: Critical Theory for Cultural Studies.  Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 2004. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen.  ‘Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism – The Contemporaneity of 
Walter Benjamin.’  New German Critique.  No. 17.  Spring 1979. 
 
---------  The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.  Trans. Frederick Lawrence.  Cambridge: 
Polity Press 1987. 
 
---------  ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism.’  Journal of Philosophy.  Vol. XCII.  No. 3. March 1995. 
 
---------  The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society.  
Trans. Thomas McCarthy.  Boston: Beacon Press 1984. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio.  Commonwealth.  Cambridge: Belknap Press 2009. 
 
Hass, Lawrence.  Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2008.   
 
Hobsbawn, Eric.  Uncommon Men.  New York: The New Press 1998. 
 
Honneth, Axel.  Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea.  Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. 
 
---------  The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts.  Cambridge: 
MIT Press 1995. 
 
Horowitz, Asher.  Ethics at a Standstill: History and Subjectivity in Levinas and the Frankfurt 
School.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 2008.  
 
---------  ‘How Can Anyone be Called Guilty?  Speech, Responsibility and the Social Relation in 
Habermas and Levinas.’  Philosophy Today.  Vol. 44.  No. 3.  Fall 2000. 
 
Howard, Dick.  The Marxian Legacy.  London: The Macmillan Press 1977. 
 
Ingram, James D.  ‘The Politics of Claude Lefort’s Political: Between Liberalism and Radical 
Democracy.’  Thesis Eleven.  No. 87.  November 2006. 
 
 368 
 
Irigaray, Luce.  Two Be Two.  Trans. Monique Rhodes and Marco F. Cocito-Monoc.  New York 
Routledge 2001. 
 
Ives, Peter.  Gramsci’s Politics of Language: Engaging the Bakhtin Circle and the Frankfurt 
School.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004. 
 
Jacoby, Russell.  Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age.  New York: 
Columbia University Press 2005. 
 
Jameson, Fredric.  Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic.  London: Verso 
2000. 
 
Jay, Martin.  The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of 
Social Research, 1923-1956.  Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1973. 
 
---------  Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept From Lukacs to Habermas.  
Berkeley: University of California Press 1984. 
 
---------  Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought.  
Berkeley: University of California Press 1993. 
 
Johnson, Greg.  ‘Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology as Non-Conventionally Utopian.’  Human 
Studies.  Vol. 26.  No. 3.  2003. 
 
Kojeve, Alexandre.  Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1980. 
 
Korsch, Karl.  Karl Marx.  New York: Russell and Russell 1963. 
 
---------  Marxism and Philosophy.  London: New Left Books 1970. 
 
---------  Revolutionary Theory.  Austin: University of Texas Press 1977. 
 
Kruks, Sonia.  The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.  New Jersey: Humanities Press 1981. 
 
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal.  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Demoratic Politics.  London: Verso 1985. 
 
Landes, Donald.  Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression.  New York: Bloomsbury 
2013. 
 
Lazzarato, Maurizio.  ‘The dynamics of the political event: Process of subjectivation and 
micropolitics,’ http://eipcp.net/transversal/0811/lazzarato/en/print.   
 
---------  ‘From Biopower to Biopolitics.’  Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosopy.  No. 13.  2002.  
 
 369 
 
---------  Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity, trans. Joshua David 
Jordan, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2014). 
 
Lee, Lisa Yun.  Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of T.W. Adorno.  New 
York: Routledge 2005. 
 
Lefort, Claude.  Democracy and Political Theory.  Cambridge: Polity Press 1985.  
 
---------  'Flesh and Othereness.'  Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.) Galen A. 
Johnson and Michael B.  Smith.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1990. 
 
--------- Machiavelli in the Making.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2012. 
 
--------- ‘Thinking Politics.’ Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty.  Ed. Taylor Carman and 
Mark B.N. Hansen.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. 
 
---------  Writing: The Political Test.  Durham: Duke University Press 2000.  
 
Leibniz, G.W.  Philosophical Essays.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1989. 
 
Lenhardt, Christian.  ‘Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes.’  Telos.  No. 25.  
Fall 1975. 
 
Leslie, Esther.  Walter Benjamin.  London: Reaktion Books 2007. 
 
---------  Walter Benjamin: Overpowering Conformism.  London: Pluto Press 2000. 
 
Levin, Michael David.  ‘The Body Politic: The Embodiment of Praxis in Foucault and 
Habermas.’  Praxis International.  Vol. 9.  No. 1/2.  1989. 
 
---------  ‘The Embodiment of the Categorical Imperative: Kafka, Foucault, Benjamin, Adorno 
and Levinas,’ Philosophy and Social Criticism.  Vol. 27.  No. 4.  2001. 
 
---------  'Justice in the Flesh.'  Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.) Galen A. Johnson 
and Michael B.  Smith.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1990. 
 
Levitas, Ruth.  The Concept of Utopia.  London: Phillip Allan 1990. 
 
Lowy, Michael.  ‘“Against the Grain”: The Dialectical Conception of Culture in Walter 
Benjamin’s Theses of 1940.’  Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History.  (Ed.) Michael P. 
Steinberg.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996. 
  
---------  Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’.  New York: Verso 
Books 2005. 
 
 370 
 
---------  ‘Jewish Messianism and Libertarian Utopia in Central Europe (1900-1933).’  New 
German Critique.  No. 2.  Issue 2.  Spring-Summer 1980.  
 
 
Lukacs, Geog.  A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and Dialectic.  London: 
Verso Books 2000. 
 
---------  History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics.  Cambridge: MIT Press 
2002. 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa.  'The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions.'  The Rosa 
Luxemburg Reader.  Ed. Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson.  New York: Monthly Review 
Press 2004. 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolo.  The Discourses.  London: Penguin Classics 1983. 
 
Mallin, Samuel B.  Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy.  New Haven: Yale University Press 1979. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert.  Counter-Revolution and Revolt.  Boston: Beacon Press 1972. 
 
---------  Eros and Civilization.  Boston: Beacon Press 1974. 
 
---------  An Essay on Liberation.  Boston: Beacon Press 1969. 
 
---------  The Essential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert 
Marcuse.  Boston: Beacon Press 2007. 
 
Martel, James.  ‘Taking Benjamin Seriously as a Political Thinker.’  Philosophy and Rhetoric.  
Vol. 44.  No. 4.  2011. 
 
Marx, Karl.  Capital (Volume 1).  New York: Penguin Books 1990. 
 
---------  The Communist Manifesto.  London: Penguin Books 1967. 
 
---------  The Poverty of Philosophy.  Amherst: Prometheus Books 1995. 
 
---------  Karl Marx: Early Writings.  New York: Penguin Books 1992. 
 
May, Todd.  'Living the Biopolitical: Body and Resistance in Foucaul and Merleau-Ponty.'  
Graduate Faculty Philosohy Journal.  Vol. 36.  Issue 1.  2015. 
 
---------  ‘To change the world, to celebrate life: Merleau-Ponty and Foucault on the body.’  
Philosophy and Social Criticism.  Vol. 31.  No. 5-6.  2005. 
 
McNally, David.  Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labour and Liberation.  Albany: 
SUNY Press 2001. 
 371 
 
 
McRobbie, Angela.  ‘The Passagenwerk and the Place of Walter Benjamin in Cultural Studies: 
Benjamin, Cultural Studies, Marxist Theories of Art.’  Cultural Studies.  Vol. 6.  Issue 2. 1990. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  Adventures of the Dialectic.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
1973. 
 
---------  Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language.  Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press 1973. 
 
---------  Humanism and Terror.  Boston: Beacon Press 1947. 
 
---------  Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 
2002. 
 
---------  Institution and Passivity: Course Lectures from the Collège de France (1954-1955).  
Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2010. 
 
---------  Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France.  Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press 2003. 
 
---------  Phenomenology of Perception.  London: Routledge 2005. 
 
---------  ‘Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Hegel.’  Telos.  No. 29.  September 1976. 
 
---------  In Praise of Philosophy.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1963. 
 
---------  ‘Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard’s L’Oeuvre de Freud.’  
Merleau-Ponty and Psychology.  Ed. Keith Hoeller.  New Jersey: Humanities Press 1993. 
 
---------  ‘Philosophy and Political Engagement: Letters from the Quarrel Between Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty.'  The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.)  Jon Stewart.  Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press 1998.   
 
---------  The Primacy of Perception, And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the 
Philosophy of Art, History and Politics.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964. 
 
---------  The Prose of the World.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973.  
 
---------  Sense and Nonsense.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964. 
 
---------  Signs.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964.  
 
---------  'Unpublished Working Notes.'  Chiasmi International.  Issue 7.  2005. 
 
---------  The Visible and the Invisible.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1968. 
 372 
 
 
---------  The World of Perception.  London: Routledge 2004. 
 
Miller, James.  History and Human Existence: From Marx to Merleau-Ponty.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1979. 
 
Moran, Dermot.  Introduction to Phenomenology.  New York: Routledge 2000. 
 
Mouffe, Chantal.  ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism.’  Social Research.  Vol. 66.  
No. 3.  Fall 1999. 
 
---------  On the Political.  London: Routledge 2005. 
 
Nadir, Christine.  ‘Utopian Studies, Environment Literature, and the Legacy of an Idea: 
Educating Desire in Miguel Abensour and Ursula K. LeGuin.’  Utopian Studies.  Vol. 21.  No. 1.  
2010. 
 
Neilson, Brett.  ‘Potenza Nuda?  Sovereignty, Biopolitics, Capitalism.’  Contretemps.  No. 5.  
2004. 
 
Neve, Mario.  '"Milieu," Luogo e Spazio.  L'Eredita Geoestetica Di Simondon e Merleau-Ponty.'  
Chiasmi International.  Issue 7.  2005.  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life.  Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing 1980. 
 
Oliver, Kelly.  ‘Stopping the Anthropological Machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty.’  PhaenEx.  Vol. 2.  No. 2.  Fall/Winter 2007. 
 
---------  ‘Witnessing Subjectivity.’  Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to 
Alterity.  Ed. Shaun Gallagher, Stephen Watson, Philippe Brun and Philippe Romanksi.  Rouen: 
Publications de l’Universite de Rouen 2004. 
 
O’Neil, John.  Perception, Expression and History: The Social Phenomenology of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970. 
 
Osborne, Peter.  ‘Small-scale Victories, Large-scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin’s Politics of 
Time.’  Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience.  Ed. Andrew Benjamin and 
Peter Osborne.  Manchester: Clinamen Press 2000. 
 
Plot, Martin.  ‘Our element: Flesh and democracy in Merleau-Ponty.’  Continental Philosophy 
Review.  Vol. 45.  No. 2.  2012. 
 
Poltier, Hugues.  Passion du politique: La pensee de Claude Lefort.  Paris: Labor et Fides 1998. 
 
 373 
 
Poster, Mark.  Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1975. 
 
Rabinbach, Anson.  ‘Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Blosch and Modern 
Jewish Messianism.’  New German Critique.  No. 34.  Winter 1985. 
 
Radnoti, Sandor.  ‘Benjamin’s Politics.’  Telos. 37.  Fall 1978. 
 
Rancière, Jacques.  ‘The Archaeomodern Turn.’  Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History.  
(Ed.) Michael P. Steinberg.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996. 
 
---------  ‘The Myth of the Artisan: Critical Reflections on a Category of Social History.’  Work 
in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Practice.  Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press 1986. 
 
---------  Proletarian Nights: The Workers’  Dream in Nineteenth-Century France.  New York: 
Verso 2012. 
 
Read, Jason.  ‘The Production of Subjectivity: From Transindividuality to the Commons.’  New 
Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics.  No. 70.  2011. 
 
Reynolds, Jack.  Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity.  Athens: 
Ohio University Press 2004. 
 
Richir, Marc.  ‘The Meaning of the Phenomenology in The Visible and the Invisible.’  Thesis 
Eleven.  No. 36.  1993. 
 
Ricoeur, Paul.  Memory, History, Forgetting.  Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2004. 
 
---------  Oneself as Another.  Trans. Kathleen Blamey.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1992.  
 
Rovatti, Pier Aldo.  ‘Critical Theory and Phenomenology.’  Telos.  No. 15.  1973. 
 
Russon, John.  ‘The Bodily Unconscious in Freud’s “Three Essays.”’  Rereading Freud: 
Psychoanalysis Through Philosophy. Ed. John Mills.  Albany: SUNY Press 2004.  
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul.  Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology.  New York: 
Washington Square Press 1966. 
 
---------  'Merleau-Ponty Vivant.'  The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.) Jon 
Stewart.    Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1998. 
 
---------  No Exit and Other Plays.  New York: Vintage International 1989. 
 
 374 
 
---------  ‘Philosophy and Political Engagement: Letters from the Quarrel Between Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty.'  The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  (Ed.)  Jon Stewart.  Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press 1998.   
 
Schmidt, James.  ‘Lordship and Bondage in Merleau-Ponty and Sartre.’  Political Theory.  Vol. 
7.  No. 2.  1979. 
 
---------  Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism.  New York: St. 
Martin’s Press 1985. 
 
Scholem, Gershom.  Kababalah.  Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House 1974. 
 
---------  Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship.  New York: New York Review of Books 
2001. 
 
Schwartz, Vanessa R.  ‘Benjamin for Historians.’  American Historical Association.  Vol. 106.  
No. 5.  December 2001. 
 
Schweppenhäuser, Gerhard.  Theodor W. Adorno: An Introduction.  Durham: Duke University 
Press 2009. 
 
Smith, Gary.  ‘Thinking Through Benjamin: An Introductory Essay,’ Benjamin: Philosophy, 
History, Aesthetics.  (Ed.) Gary Smith.  Chicago: University of Chicago 1989. 
 
Stavro, Elaine.  'Merleau-Ponty and Revolutionary Agency.'  Theory & Event.  Vol. 17.  Issue 1.  
2014. 
 
Stoller, Sylvia.  'Reflections on Feminist Merleau-Ponty Skepticism.'  Hypatia.  Vol. 15.  No. 1.  
Winter 2000. 
 
Sullivan, Shannon.  Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism and 
Feminism.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2001. 
 
Suvin, Darko.  ‘The Arrested Moment in Benjamin’s “Theses”: Epistemology vs. Politics, Image 
vs. Story.’  Neohelicon. Vol. 28.  No. 1.  2001. 
 
Thompson, E.P.  The Making of the English Working Class.  New York: Penguin Books 1980. 
 
Tiedmann, Rolf.  ‘Historical materialism or Political Messianism?  An Interpretation of the 
Theses ‘On the Concept of History.’”  Benjamin: Philsophy, History, Aesthetics.  (Ed.) Gary 
Smith.  Chicago: University of Chicago 1989. 
 
Tronti, Mario.  'Workers and Capital.'  Telos.  No. 14.  1972. 
 
Valentine, Jeremy.  ‘The Political.’  Theory, Culture and Society.  Vol. 23.  No. 2-3.  May 2006. 
 
 375 
 
Von Uexküll, Jakob.  A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with A Theory of 
Meaning.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2010. 
 
Virno, Paolo.  Deja Vu and the End of History.  London: Verso 2015. 
 
---------  A Grammar of the Multitude.  Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2004. 
 
---------  'Interview: Reading Gilbert Simondon: Transindividuality, technical activity and 
reification.'  Radical Philosophy.  Issue 136.  March/April 2006. 
 
---------  ‘L'azione innovative: L'animale umano e la logica del cambiamento.’  Lecture at the 
Fondazione Collegio San Carlo di Modena.  October 7, 2011.  Translated by Arianna Bove, 
available at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_virno14.htm  
 
---------  Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation.  Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2008. 
 
---------  ‘The Multitude and the Principle of Individuation.’  Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal.  Vol. 24.  No. 3.  2003.   
 
---------  ‘Natural-Historical Diagrams: The “New Global” Movement and the Biological 
Invariant.’  Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy.  Vol. 5.  No. 1.  
2009. 
 
---------  ‘On Multitude and Beyond: An Interview with Paolo Virno.’  Cultural Politics.  Vol. 
10.  No. 2.  2014. 
 
Weber, Samuel.  ‘Genealogy of Modernity: History, Myth and Allegory in Benjamin’s Origin of 
the German Mourning Play.’  MLN.  106.  1991. 
 
Weigel, Sigrid.  Body- and Image-Space: Re-Reading Benjamin.  London: Routledge 1996. 
 
White, Hayden.  Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1978. 
 
Whiteside, Kerry.  Merleau-Ponty and the Foundations of an Existential Politics.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1988. 
 
Wohlfarth, Irving.  ‘Smashing the Kaleidoscope: Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Cultural 
History.'  Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History.  (Ed.) Michael P. Steinberg.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 1996. 
 
Wolin, Richard.  The Frankfurt School Revisited, and Other Essays on Politics and Society.  
New York: Routledge 2006. 
 
---------  Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption.  Berkeley: University of California Press 
1994. 
 376 
 
 
Yeo, Michael.  ‘Perceiving/Reading the Other: Ethical Dimensions.’ Merleau-Ponty, 
Hermeneutics, and Postmodernism.  (ed.) Thomas W. Busch and Shaun Gallagher.  Albany: 
SUNY Press 1992. 
 
Young, Iris Marion.  ‘Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment 
Motility and Spatiality.’  Human Studies.  Vol. 3.  No. 2.  April 1980. 
 
Zahavi, Dan.  'Anonymity and first-personal givenness: An attempt at reconciliation.'  
Subjektivitat - Verantwortung - Wahrheit.  Ed. David Carr and Chr. Lotz.  Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang 2002. 
 
---------  'Intersubjectivity.'  Routledge Companion to Phenomenology.  New York: Routledge 
2012. 
